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BUSINESS ETHICS: THE PROCESS OF MAKING A 
MORAL DECISION IN THE WORKPLACE 
This research investigates the process of making a moral decision in the 
workplace, the influences upon it and the nature of its structure. Existing 
literature is reviewed relating to the nature of a decision, theories of moral 
philosophy and the psychology of individual moral development and the 
influence of membership of groups and organisations. Supported by a social 
constructionist methodology, sixteen informants are inter-viewed and involved 
in producing a cognitive map of a particular decision which they have made 
within their employment situation. Their narratives and their maps are then 
analysed. Four themes emerge relating to gender, emotions, virtues and 
membership of communities. On gender, general support is indicated of 
Gilligan's theory relating to ethics of justice (predominantly male) and of 
care (predominantly female). The process of cognitive mapping highlights 
the way in which informants tend to include their emotions around their 
decision as an acceptable influence within the context of the overall situation. 
At the same time, informants refer frequently to the need to be virtuous in 
some respect, confirming the key principles of virtue theory. Finally, the 
decisions shared with the researcher demonstrate that the difficulties of the 
decisions relate to the influence of being members of different communities 
and serve to emphasise the tension that often exists between an individual 
with her personal values and her employing organisation which requires her 
to conform to behaviour which is underpinned by conflicting values. This 
research seeks to illuminate the subject in a holistic way, using a qualitative 
approach and aiming to avoid the compartmentalisation of elements of 
influences within the whole process of making a moral decision in the 
workplace, an inevitable result of using the more dominant quantitative 
methods within current business ethics research. In doing so, it demonstrates 
that there is no one specific identifiable process and that there are many 
different ways of making such a decision. 
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The fact that this was people's livelihoods, everything that they knew 
to be secure in their work terms was all being thrown out of the 
window it appeared on the whim of three or four people in the board 
room, you know, and I found that very difficult. It was hard to do my 
job because it was hard not to tell them what was happening because I 
felt quite strongly that they had a right to know and that it was, to 
some degree, it was more than my job was ... (Joanne) 
Joanne was working as a human resources (HR) officer. She was employed 
by a public body which was transferring some of its business, together with 
related personnel, to another organisation. She was concerned about the 
terms of that transfer and that the employees affected by it should be kept 
informed of its impact on such issues as terms and conditions of employment 
and pensions. She found herself in the situation of knowing more than she 
could pass on, having to keep "confidential" information from those 
adversely affected by decisions being made by the board of the organisation. 
Her degree of discomfort is evident in the above quotation. Such situations 
as encountered by Joanne are not unusual and employees throughout the 
world have to cope with such problems and the conflicts that they create in 
terms of finding the "right" thing to do. Yet, how does she resolve this 
decision? What are the processes and skills that she uses to make a decision 
in such circumstances? When there is a conflict between her own feelings 
about what ought to happen in the situation and how her employers are 
instructing her to behave, which has the greater influence? 
It is these types of situation which I have sought to explore in greater depth. 
As a manager in the voluntary sector, I had been used to working with 
colleagues in a relationship where they were either paid to work in the same 
organisation or were giving their skills and experience as volunteers. All 
were responsible to me and we were all responsible for providing an excellent 
quality service to the local community which we served. Thus, in most cases, 
being in the voluntary sector gave the organisation a higher profile in terms 
of principles and values. We knew the "rules of the game" in working with 
members of the public, why we were doing what we were doing and the way 
that we should behave within that context to our clients and to our colleagues. 
However, the problems which I found myself deliberating on the most 
related, firstly, to people and their welfare and, secondly, contained some 
element of conflict of guiding principles. For example, I had to decide what 
to do about a long-serving volunteer whose quality of work was no longer of 
an acceptable standard. Two principles were in conflict - "our clients 
deserve a certain minimum standard of service" and "the organisation offers 
support and opportunity for personal development to its staff both paid and 
voluntary". The thought processes in deciding how to approach this problem 
were ad hoc, at times emotive and, it appeared, non-logical. There was no 
objective formula to be applied in that situation. The factors that were 
involved appeared to come from a range of influences. No one specific 
ethical theory seemed to be suited and applicable. Academic literature 
around the subject focussed on parts of the process but not the whole and, 
where it attempted to consider the total it seemed to be one step away from 
what might actually happen in practice. The theoretical use of questionnaires 
or hypothetical situations did not seem to me to be reaching the reality of 
making a moral decision in the workplace. 
The aim and objectives of this research project have been devised in the light 
of the above experience. The overall aim is to explore the process of making 
moral decisions in the workplace with a view to enlightening others using a 
method which enables the project to take a holistic approach, rooting the 
research in the totality of an individual's experience set in its social and 
historical context. The subsidiary objectives are to identify the nature of the 
decision-making process, the way individuals come to assess the moral 
content and work with it and, finally, the various influences upon people in 
such situations. At the same time, the question is asked "how do the moral 
strategies used by people in the twentieth and twenty-first centuries compare 
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with philosophical theory as it has developed around moral and ethical 
issues? ".
It is important to "fit" this work into a perspective which embraces existing 
research and, in order to do this, I highlight here four recent articles which are 
pertinent, firstly because they touch on part of the aim of this project and, 
secondly, because they demonstrate current approaches to the research 
questions. Douglas et al (2001) investigated the nature of the relationship 
between organisational culture, ethical orientation, individual values and 
professional codes on moral judgements in the workplace. They used 
vignettes and questionnaires to work with accountants and used quantitative 
research methods to establish that judgements are affected by personal 
values, ethics instruction and professional codes of conduct as well as by the 
nature of the corporate ethical culture. Using a method involving theoretical 
scenarios and questionnaires, Kujala (2001) sought to relate type of ethical 
theory approach to the ethicality of the scenarios and found a wide range of 
ethical theory being used in practice. Lovell (2002) examined actual moral 
situations at work, investigating a sample of HR managers and accountants 
within organisations about particular incidents with which they had been 
involved. He recognised the gap between moral intention and action and 
sought to overcome it. His research team hypothesized about the nature of 
the process of a moral decision involving three key variables (personal 
autonomy, intensity of issue and support of others). They saw these variables 
as being informed by society norms, organisational influence and individual 
values. They sought to categorize the nature of the situation into eight 
different types ranging from neutrality to cynicism, including puzzles and 
dilemmas and they recognised that, as situations progress, their category 
could change depending on events. 
They drew a distinction between individual moral agency and "pragmatic 
responses to ethics at work" (Lovell, 2002, pl. 50) and in many of the cases 
there was an underpinning acquiescence to the behaviour of senior 
management. One element which emerged was the influence arising from 
professional codes which urged professionals to challenge colleagues in the 
3 
interests, for example, of patient welfare. They were particularly concerned 
with the coping strategies of their informants. In ten of the fifteen cases 
which they examined, informants had resolved their personal conflict through 
taking a stance of ethical cynicism involving convincing themselves that 
resolution of the problem was not their responsibility but that of others. What 
appears to have surprised Lovell's team was the extent of this type of amoral 
behaviour within organisations which they had believed to be at the forefront 
of quality and principled actions. They included two hospital trusts and a 
leading international "caring" charity. 
Finally, the fourth relevant recent work to mention is that of Paolillo and 
Vitell (2002). Using two scenarios and a questionnaire sent to a sample of 
business managers, they sought to establish the significance of the influence 
of individual and organisational factors as well as the degree of moral 
intensity within a given situation. They found no influence of personal or 
organisational factors on an individual's ethical intentions but found a 
significant influence within the nature of the moral question itself. They 
themselves were very surprised at this result and suggested that the scenarios 
used were very issue-related and therefore influenced their respondents to a 
greater extent. Again, the investigation involved quantitative methods. 
These four articles exemplify current research around the process of a moral 
decision in the workplace. My approach is distinct from these in taking an 
essentially qualitative perspective and seeking to maintain a picture of the 
"whole" while examining its detail. They serve at this point to highlight the 
nature of current literature against which this piece of work needs to be seen. 
However, before commencing this process, there are some commonly used 
terms which need clarification and definition. 
The words "moral" and "ethical" are used sometimes interchangeably within 
different contexts. I intend to be specific and consistent in my usage. Peter 
Singer (1994) raises the question of definitions in considering the linguistic 
derivations of the words "ethics" and "morality". He makes the point that 
they both come from a word meaning "customs" - in Greek, the term from 
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which we get "ethos" and in Latin, for morality, "mores". He differentiates 
between "ethics" as being the study of the philosophy of right and wrong and 
"morality" being any society's view of what is right and wrong. However, 
when the adjectives are applied, rather than the noun, then "ethical" becomes 
society's view of what is right and "moral" describes the notion of "rightness 
and wrongness". To give an example, we might say "it is not ethical to 
falsely claim one's expenses at work" but the question of whether or not to 
cheat one's expenses is a moral question. The study of why it is or is not 
right to steal from an employer is the study of ethics. It would be society's 
common view of morality that it is considered to be wrong to steal from one's 
employer. The distinction is therefore made between the evaluative 
judgement of whether something is right or wrong and the concept of right 
and wrong as the description of a theoretical construct. The nouns 
"morality" and "ethics" apply to these respectively while they are reversed 
when the adjectives are applied. It follows that I am researching moral 
decisions in the workplace. These are decisions which have a moral element 
within them in terms of involving judgements about what it is right to do and 
what is wrong. 
I maintain that this project falls within the academic field of business ethics. 
However, I take a broad view of what is meant by "business". While one's 
construct of business might only relate to organisations whose aim is to make 
a financial profit, I also intend to include those not-for profit organisations 
which employ personnel such as government departments, local authorities, 
educational establishments and some parts of the independent/voluntary 
sector. The common factor is that individuals are employed in paid work. 
The purpose of the thesis is descriptive. It seeks to capture a shared reality 
with informants of what has happened when they have made a moral decision 
in the workplace, the nature of that process and the influences that came to 
bear on it. CL Stevenson (1963) differentiates between descriptive, 
normative and analytical ethics. Descriptive ethics describes what people 
have considered to be good or bad. Normative ethics involves making 
judgements about the justice of a particular law or the value of a type of 
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conduct. It refers to overriding principles such as Bentham's greatest 
happiness principle or the categorical imperative of Kant. Analytical ethics, 
according to Stevenson, seeks to consider the nature of normative ethics in 
order to identify the arguments and principles with which its conclusions 
might be supported. In taking a descriptive approach, the purpose of this 
project is not to make judgements about the rightness or wrongness of 
particular individuals' decisions. Rather, it is to paint a picture of how 
employees embrace and deal with problems at work that contain a moral 
element within them. 
The aim of the thesis is to take a historical descriptive perspective on the 
psychological processes of making a moral decision in the workplace which 
involves examining actual decisions made by individuals in their recent past. 
At the same time, it takes account of philosophical theory in comparing how 
informants saw their own line of reasoning within their decision. If ethics is 
about ensuring that a specific process of thinking takes an individual to an 
ethically acceptable resolution, then that theory is compared with the methods 
used by employees in seeking the "right" thing to do. If it is about 
prescribing, then this thesis sets out to be non-judgemental and relativistic in 
its approach. This descriptive analysis is criticised by Hugh Wilmott. 
The coherence of descriptive ethics is challenged on the grounds that 
it relies upon the assumption that accounts of the world can exist in a 
relation of externality to what these accounts claim to describe. 
(Wilmott, 1998, p79) 
Wilmott maintains that descriptive ethics dissolves into normative ethics 
because it is impossible to separate truth from values. However, if one 
suspends value judgements then all moral conclusions become a form of 
truth. An example of when this situation occurs is in relation to Bob who is 
regularly cheating his employers. It is a form of truth that he is doing this 
and can be described as such while omitting any evaluative judgement on the 
ethicality of his actions. This is what this thesis aims to do. It aims to 
explore the values used by individuals at work when faced with a moral 
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decision without imposing judgements upon their ethicality. In the same 
publication, Martin Parker is more supportive of the descriptive approach. 
If we accept this social construction of the ethical, rather than insist 
on some form of trans-historical foundation, then this effectively 
presses upon us a suspension of our judgement, an attempt to go 
beyond any metaphysics of good and evil and gesture at relativism in 
the interests of a thicker description. Rather than entering into the 
hurly-burly of prescriptive argument we might attempt to see how 
others reach their conclusions about good and bad. Not of course that 
we can ever do this in some final sense, but rather that this is what we 
would like to think of ourselves doing in order that we could ' do 
justice' to those 'others'. (Parker, 1998a, p285). 
The area of research of this project falls under the general heading of 
"business ethics". By that is meant conduct relating to right and wrong 
within a business setting. Here, I take the widest definition of "business" in 
terms of its relation, firstly, to the management of money (whether for profit 
or working within a defined budget of expenditure) and, secondly, to embrace 
the relationship between employer and employee. Chryssides and Kaler 
(1993) offer a detailed history of the discipline of business ethics and what it 
means in practice. I shall explore the nature of the relationship between 
ethics and business in greater detail in Chapter Nine. 
At this point, I wish to draw attention to the current characteristics of 
descriptive research within business ethics, much of which can be found 
published within issues of the Journal of Business Ethics. Articles from that 
publication tend, in the main, to draw on research conducted with methods 
which derive from a scientific/psychological tradition of investigation. Most 
are deductive, taking hypotheses and testing them empirically, and the 
hypotheses usually refer to one particular factor within the moral decision in 
the workplace. This type of work is demonstrated by the work of Roozen et 
al (2001) which epitomises the modernistic quantitative approach to 
descriptive ethics which appears to pervade in the paradigm of business 
ethics. They seek to research the relationships between the various influences 
which they identify relating to organisational commitment, individual values, 
the relative ethicality of an employee and such socio-demographical factors 
as age, gender and income. Questionnaires were sent out to university 
alumni. In particular, what they refer to as "ethicality" was tested through 
giving respondents nine profiles relating to the type of ethical profile of a 
decision process of an employee. They conclude that the most ethical 
employees are young, with a relatively low income, limited work experience 
and with a low level of responsibility in the company. Employees working 
within public and educational fields appear to be more ethical then those 
working in the 'private' sector. As far as age is concerned, they conclude 
specifically that the older an employee, the less likely they are to be 
"ethically concerned" (Roozen et al, 2001, p96). I will argue that such 
research methods as demonstrated tend to "sterilise" the question to such an 
extent that it is distorted away from any shared reality. It fails to 
acknowledge the intricate complexity of such decisions and the relative 
influences. Further, in assessing "ethicality", it requires research informants 
to indicate their judgements on a theoretical basis. I will explore theory 
around the divergence between what might be decided in theory and carried 
out in action. My own purpose is to examine moral decision-making in a 
holistic way, maintaining the historical and social perspectives as an intrinsic 
framework for the decision itself. 
Some research within business ethics has also attempted to relate 
"mainstream" philosophical theory to practice within a business setting. 
Sligo and Stirton (1998), for example, conclude that there was little relation 
between decisions taken in the workplace and theories relating to rights, 
justice and utilitarianism. On the other hand, Butterfield et al (2000) found 
that managers tended to argue along deontological and virtue theory lines 
rather than consequential ist. Whether this is the case or not will be tested by I 
this empirical research. 
I seek to investigate the nature of a process, the process of making a moral 
decision. The word "process" implies that there is continuity from a start, 
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through a middle part, to an ending and that these are discrete and 
identifiable. I also wish to find out the nature of the influences on that 
process. Various attempts have been made to draw up a model of the 
decision-making process when faced with a moral question in the workplace. 
Writers have built on and modified the models of others, adding different 
factors and attempting to test the validity of the models. Such examples can 
be found within Ferrell and Gresham (1985), Hunt and Vitell (1986), Trevino 
(1986), Trevino and Youngblood (1990), Jones (1991), Herndon (1996), 
Street et al (1997) Malhotra and Miller (1998), Cole et al (2000). Parts of the 
process within the various models include individual and organisational 
factors, opportunity, "significant others" (Ferrell and Gresham, 1985), and 
industry and cultural norms (Hunt and Vitell, 1986). Thomas Jones (1991) 
identifies four elements within a process as being (1) recognising a moral 
issue, (2) making a moral judgement, (3) establishing a moral intent and (4) 
engaging in moral behaviour. He theorised that organisational factors would 
influence the last two elements. Street et al (1997) added the concept of 
escalating factors to Jones' model while Cole et al (2000) tested the Hunt and 
Vitell model. Malhotra and Miller (1998) refer to five stages within a process 
relating to awareness, perception of dilemma, ethical judgement, 
determination and actions. Thus, within this study, questions will arise in 
relation to the nature of the process of making a moral decision in the 
workplace. Does it have a beginning, middle and end as implied by the 
above writers? Are the factors identified above significant influences within 
the decision? 
The general weakness of the approach of these writers relates to the use of 
quantitative methods without apparent regard to a qualitative perspective and 
it will be argued in this thesis that the investigation of such human processes 
is better met through other means more suited to the questions in hand. This 
project's aim will be to capture the experience of making moral decisions and 
to learn from it in such a way that the "whole" is maintained without 
unnecessary dissection or distortion. A social constructionist framework is 
adopted while rejecting the approach of grounded theory. However, it 
retains an element of induction in that work with informants was carried out 
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with as few preconceptions as might be possible and with a view to "opening 
up" the decisions to expose the detail of their fabric. The problems 
associated with detailed textual analysis are outlined in terms of the resulting 
tendency to lose the historical and social perspectives of the informants' 
stories. Having established the methodology, the research methods are 
described in terms of the principles of cognitive mapping and narrative 
analysis (Chapter Three). Chapter Four details the methods of working with 
the project's informants. 
In considering the first objective of the project, the nature of a decision is 
explored within the context of the existing literature and evidence which 
emerged from the experience of working with individuals and the story which 
they brought to me (Chapter Five). In line with the second research 
objective, I then focus on the individual and, in Chapter Six, I examine the 
literature on bow she gains the ability to identify and work through a situation 
with a moral dimension. Theories of cognitive moral development are 
described and criticised in the light of the project's experience in working 
with informants. Issues relating to gender differences are considered in 
Chapter Seven. Do men and women differ in the way they approach moral 
judgements? If so, what difference does their gender make? Comparisons 
are made based on the evidence gathered from informants with existing 
theory on the subject. This takes me to consider the third objective of this 
project which relates to identifying influences on an individual when they are 
in the process of making a moral decision in the workplace. Three themes 
emerge and the first influence identified relates to the nature of emotions. The 
informants express a range of emotions in relation to the decisions which they 
bring to the project and how they affect and influence the decisions is 
explored. This raises the question of whether moral judgements are "rational" 
and philosophical theory around the role of emotions and reason within a 
moral decision is outlined. 
The second influence to emerge is that of the concept of virtues. The way 
that informants themselves refer to particular ways of behaving (for example, 
being loyal or being fair) as being something to aspire to is described before 
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outlining the theory of virtue ethics. Comparison between the practice and 
the theory raises questions relating to the teleological/deontological nature of 
virtue ethics theory (Chapter Eight). 
Finally, an individual's membership of communities is recognised as an 
influence on moral decision-making in the workplace in terms of her 
relationship with an employing organisation and with groups. Membership 
of different communities becomes significant not only when we ask ourselves 
"Where do we get our moral values from? " but also when it comes to a 
particular decision to be made and we have various communities of which we 
are members telling us to do different things. Here I use the word 
"community" to mean any loosely-structured, connected or affiliated group of 
people associated with an individual. This would therefore include one's 
own family, membership of political or religious groupings, people working 
in the same office, and, indeed, one's employing organisation. The nature of 
the concept of community can vary considerably depending on the context in 
which it applies and can imply a degree of complexity. I intend to use the 
word in its widest sense to embrace groups of people united in a particular 
interest or involvement with an individual specific to them and which provide 
a social framework for a person's moral outlook. Poole (1991) expresses the 
situation succinctly. 
Morality requires a social identity: only then will the moral subject 
have reason to do what is morally required ... We will make sense of 
what we are doing, even of our own existence, because of its place in 
a larger community. (Poole, 1991, p5l) 
Each separate community seeks to influence the behaviour of its members 
and it is apparent that this is very often a point of tension. Chapter Nine 
considers the nature of the relationship between employer and employee and 
the influences identified by informants as their employing organisation and 
society, together with the role of emotions in the aforementioned relationship. 
The influences of peer groups of fellow employees and of people in similar 
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posts within a particular sector of business, together with membership of 
professional bodies and unions are discussed in Chapter Ten. 
In Chapter Eleven I summarise the points which have emerged throughout 
the thesis, drawing from the informants' experiences in the light of the 
literature review before pulling together the various conclusions of the project 
against its aims and objectives. Appendix A provides a summary of each of 
the project's informants' situations, together with their cognitive map of the 





In any investigation relating to essentially human processes, a number of 
choices are available around method and the justification for any particular 
method. This project seeks to enlighten others about the processes and 
influences involved in making a moral decision in the workplace. The 
challenge has been to identify a methodology which would approach the 
subject area in a holistic way, allow analysis without disturbing the concept 
of the 'whole' and which would provide detailed data while preserving it 
within its social and historical context. 
This chapter aims to present an argument that supports the social 
constructionist approach which has been taken in this research project. In 
doing so, it considers quantitative and qualitative methods, grounded theory 
and alternative interpretive methodologies before rejecting them in favour of 
an ontology and epistemology which unite within the social and historical 
contexts of that being researched. The implications of a relativistic perception 
of reality are explored. Finally, some testing questions are proposed which 
would seek to assess the effectiveness of the work in relation to its social 
constructionist framework. 
I define the term "methodology" as being the theoretical justification for the 
ontology and epistemology of the project's methods and not the methods 
themselves (Kaplan, 1964). This distinction is made throughout this thesis. 
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2. The scientift approach and its continuing influence 
I intend referring to the scientific/quantitative approach as the belief that 
empirical reality can be described through scientific formulae capable of 
objective confirmation or denial and derived either from a form of logical 
argument or from observation within a context where all possible external 
influences on results have either been withdrawn or nullified in order to 
recreate an "experiment" within "clinically clean" conditions. It denies the 
acceptability of any influence on the work by humans. By that, it implies the 
emotional, feeling, spiritual, thinking aspect of human beings, aspects of 
humanity which it considers to be non-logical, subjective and therefore 
detrimental to any scientific, logical investigation. It attempts to describe 
truth as observed within conditions as close to test tube conditions in a 
laboratory as possible. Thus, reality is external and objective and knowledge 
of it is only significant if it is based on observations of the external reality. 
Further, the observations must be capable of replication in other situations 
that would test the theory and be capable of generalisation across other 
identical conditions. 
This approach is referred to by writers using a variety of terms - scientific, 
objective, quantitative, empiricist or positivist - the latter usually in the 
context of the philosophy of methodology or epistemology within social 
sciences. Thomas Lindlof writing on qualitative communication studies 
describes what he calls the "objectivist science" approach as follows. 
Objectivist science depends on literal meanings of events and 
processes that can be mathernaticized in nonlinguistic propositions 
about which there can be universal agreement. Such propositions are 
themselves dependent on "meaning realism", or the notion that 
meanings always have fixed phenomenal referents. In other words, 
only those events that all inquirers can examine with respect to given 
meanings, and are therefore publicly available as "facts", merit 
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scientific standing - which is why introspection and intuition are not 
generally valued as scientific tools. (Lindlof, 1995, p23) 
Thus, science supports the belief in a "knowable" world, that there is some 
objective world "out there" which is comprehensible if we could only get to 
know more about it. It also maintains that research is progressive, that 
research can build upon itself in reaching for knowledge of the universe and 
that if we could only progress fast enough and in sufficient different 
directions, we could finally acquire the optimum knowledge of "life". At the 
same time, the scientific realist would claim that, in order to understand 
processes, they need to be broken down into their constituent parts and 
analysed within the sterile atmosphere of the laboratory. White describes the 
scientist's beliefs about the way human beings relate to the world: "The 
individual subject is conceived of as an isolated mind and will; and his 
vocation is to get clear about the world, to bring it under the control of reason 
and thus make it available for human projects" (White, 1991, pp2-3). 
It is this approach which is taken in many current investigations around 
businessethics. Examples of this can be seen in an article in the Journal of 
Business Ethics by Scott Vitell and Foo Nin Ho (1997) which sets out to 
scope the "state of play" of work within the field of business ethics relating to 
scales measuring the various components of decision making in ethical 
situations. It tables an analysis of the contents of articles contained in six 
different journals, listing the varieties of variables measured within the 
research being reported. These variables include personal characteristics, the 
organisational environment, ethical climate, deontological norm (set of 
values), marketing-related norms, desirability of consequences and ethical 
judgement. Other work in the field has considered the influence of factors 
such as age (Wimalasari et al, 1996), gender (Smith and Oakley, 1997), and 
individual personal morality (Logsdon et al, 1994). A range of different 
sources of samples has been used: business students, managers at different 
levels of responsibility and working in different fields - computers, 
marketing, for example. Results have been collated from questionnaires 
according to established statistical criteria, testing hypotheses and theories. 
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In the light of this, some models of the decision making process have been 
offered (Herndon, 1996) as were described within the introduction to this 
thesis. The object has been to gain new knowledge of the factors that 
influence moral decision-making in the work environment. The methods 
being used are well accepted within the field of psychology from which 
business has, in this instance, borrowed. Single identifiable factors are 
extracted from within the whole social and historical context in order to 
analyse their impact in a scientific, "objective" framework. 
Robert Chia (1994) describes this research style as relying on a 'strong' 
ontology of being which privileges thinking in terms of discrete phenomenal 
estates', static 'attributes' and sequential 'events'. He recognises that it has 
concentrated on the "ideally isolated system" (Chia, 1994, p5) with the 
implication that "things", "events" or social "entities" can be isolated before 
being put under the microscope. He describes scientists as talking of 
processes within ideally isolatable events as being a series of actions within 
the event under study. "It does not refer to the precarious and tentative 
'assemblages' of patternings or local orchestration Of relationships which 
generate consequent effects that appear to be observable as discrete and 
isolatable stages/states" (Chia, 1994, p7). According to Chia, in a 
quantitative framework, the investigation of process renders it static and 
abstracted from its context. Given that the aim of my research project is to 
investigate one particular process, it is difficult to ignore this poi nt. It means 
that the process must be considered in and as a whole and not broken down to 
such an extent that it no longer reflects the totality. 
The first step is therefore to be clear about the nature of the piece of research 
and its objectives before deciding on the most appropriate method. Martin 
Bulmer (1984) argues that the nature of the problem should set the 
parameters for the conscious choice of method and that very often that choice 
has not been made but that the option has been for the empirical survey 
method as described above. Similarly, Alfred Schutz (Wagner, 1970) argues 
that the nature of the problem dictates the methodological approach. It is 
therefore important to have made an informed choice relating to the 
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methodology in order to ensure that it best fits the problem, rather than 
following the mainstream of thought currently prevalent within the field 
without question. 
3. The development of qualitative research 
Given that this project is an investigation of the complex processes which 
relate to humans, then what are the alternatives? We need an approach which 
enables us to take a holistic perspective to the problem. 
The nineteenth century philosopher, Wilhelm Dilthey, argued that the 
empirical/objectivist approach could not be imposed on studies relating to 
humans because human beings are different from the physical world, being 
able to reflect, make decisions, have a conscious, mental state, for example. 
He grouped human studies around psychology, sociology, history and literary 
review. 
The human studies differ from the sciences because the latter deal 
with facts which present themselves to consciousness as external and 
separate phenomena, while the former deal with the living 
connections of reality experienced in the mind. It follows that the 
sciences arrive at connections within nature through inferences by 
means of a combination of hypotheses while the human sciences are 
based on directly given mental connections. We explain nature but 
we understand mental life. Inner experience grasps the processes by 
which we accomplish something as well as the combination of 
individual functions of mental life into a whole. The experience of 
the whole context comes first; only later do we distinguish its 
individual parts. This means that the methods of studying mental life, 
history and society differ greatly from those used to acquire 
knowledge of nature. (Rickman, 1976, p89). 
Dilthey concluded that we therefore need to take a holistic approach in any 
investigation of human phenomena using an interdisciplinary approach, 
including historical and literary analysis. 
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Psychology depends on the different approaches compensating for 
each other's defects. It combines awareness and observation of 
ourselves, understanding of other people, comparative procedure, 
experiment and the study of anomalous phenomena. It seeks entry 
into mental life through many gates (Rickman, 1976, p93). 
This strand of philosophy has influenced writers such as Max Weber, 
Edmund Husserl and Alfred Schutz as they have developed philosophies and 
methodologies in the light of theory expounded by Dilthey. Detailed 
description of this work is available elsewhere (Lindlof, 1995; Wagner, 
1970). 
A summary follows of various methodologies which have developed out of 
the above theory and which might be appropriate to this project. Different 
terminologies are used by writers working within particular paradigms and 
from those implied theoretical perspectives. The term "paradigm" is used 
here in a Kuhnian sense, that is, to refer to a tradition of a particular 
discipline which embraces its history, the development of its theory and its 
research methods (Kuhn, 1970). For the sake of clarity, I intend to take 
Thomas Lindlof's analysis as a means of proceeding. 
He identifies three strands of qualitative "interpretive" methodology - 
naturalistic inquiry, ethnography and qualitative research. The natural. ist 
aims to study his or her research subjects as a naturalist/bird-watcher would 
observe wildlife in a wood. He or she would recognise that the subject needs 
to be observed in its "natural" surroundings in order to explain certain 
phenomena. A number of different methods are used to discover a single 
objective reality. Lindlof identifies a potential problem with this approach as 
being that of ignoring the impact of the researcher on the researched and the 
resultant effect (Lindlof, 1995). 
Norman Denzin defines naturalistic behaviourism as "the studied 
commitment to actively enter the worlds of native people and to render those 
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worlds understandable from the standpoint of a theory that is grounded in the 
behaviours, languages, definitions, attitudes atuffeelings of those studied" 
(Denzin, 1979, p38). It attempts a bringing together of the covert, private 
features of the social act with its public behaviourally observable 
counterparts. He describes the naturalist as collecting "behaviour 
specimens". 
In seeking to investigate a process relating to how humans reason and 
subsequently behave, the naturalistic approach might appear, at first glance, 
to have some attraction. However, it fails to ignore the impact of the 
researcher on the researched and the process of communication and 
influencing that occurs as the researcher gains information and knowledge 
from the informant. 
Ethnography has developed from the field of anthropology and implies a full 
involvement by the researcher in the context of the researched. Thus, the 
researcher participates in the chosen environment in order to gain a more in- 
depth understanding of the subject of the study and to describe the subject of 
the study. According to Lindlof, ethnographers; need to contract with the 
researched the activities to be studied and areas to be covered (Lindlof, 1995, 
p20). Thus, the research is subject to negotiation with the researched. This 
approach has been subjected to criticism on the grounds that there may not be 
particularly clear criteria as a result as to how the phenomenon being studied 
is described. Howell describes a number of different ethnographic studies of 
morality in a wide variety of communities (Howell, 1997). He concludes that 
there was no converging overview of the nature of morality. At the same 
time, he recognised that a number of differing moral discourses may be found 
in any one society which emerge depending on the context. 
How might insights gained through an ethnographical approach benefit this 
project? It might be a potential way of moving forward but the problems of 
describing moral behaviour become particularly challenging when the aim of 
the project is to consider the underpinning reasoning or thought processes or 
19 
influences which might be involved in making a moral decision in the 
workplace. 
Lastly, Lindlof describes qualitative researchers as "seeking to preserve the 
form and content of human behavior and to analyze its qualities, rather than 
subject it to mathematical or other formal transformations" (Lindlof, 1995, 
p2l). He lists a number of different methods which might come under the 
heading of qualitative research but maintains that they would all have the 
same characteristics; a theoretical interest in human processes and with the 
study of social human action. They all use human investigators as the 
primary research instruments and all rely primarily on narrative/textual forms 
for coding data and writing texts relating to the research work. Thus, the 
justification for taking a qualitative approach to the methodology of this 
project stems from the nature of the research question when it relates to 
humans, their thought processes and perspectives. In considering the nature 
of the process of making a moral decision in the workplace, I seek to argue 
that the current Work of quantitative researchers within the general paradigm 
of business ethics has failed to reach any form of universal "causal" 
explanation of the process. A naturalist approach to the problem would not 
provide any other enlightenment than to describe what is seen. An 
ethnographic perspective on the process would, again, provide a description 
of the multitudinous influences which might enhance understanding without 
the means of exploring them in greater depth. In conclusion, therefore, a 
form of qualitative approach to the problem of what happens when someone 
is faced with a moral dilemma at work would seek to recognise that this is a 
research question relating to human processes, involving interaction with 
others within a social context which the researcher influences by his or her 
very questioning but which provides a method of enlightening others and 
discovering new perspectives on the subject. However, being a form of 
antithesis to the modernist approach, the method would seek to maintain the 
arena of inquiry within its social and historical context and to examine it 
within that framework. 
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The qualitative research paradigm is a stable for many different 
methodologies, all of which might have an element within them which could 
be deemed to provide an appropriate approach to this inquiry. The one most 
obviously appealing alternative methodology relates to the means of research 
provided by grounded theory. This is outlined and rejected before moving on 
to a presentation of the argument for adopting a social constructionist 
perspective. 
4. Deduction, induction and grounded theory 
It is one of the characteristics of the scientific approach to research methods 
that the aim is to test hypotheses either to prove them or disprove them. In 
other words, a theory of possible explanation of a phenomenon is 
conceptualised before the start of a particular project with the aim of either 
proving it or disproving it. This would follow the logical process of 
deduction, moving from a general position to a particular theory as a result of 
discovered "facts". 
Glaser and Strauss in their work The Discovery of Grounded Theory: 
strategiesfor qualitative research proposed using an inductive approach - 
starting with a group of particular facts and extrapolating a general theory 
from those facts (Glaser and Strauss, 1967). They described theory as by 
necessity "fitting" the situation being researched and "working" when put 
into use. They define "fit" as being that "the categories must be readily (not 
forcibly) applicable to and indicated by the data under study" and define 
"work" as "they must be meaningfully relevant to and be able to explain the 
behaviour under study". They therefore suggest that theory should be 
generated from an examination of the data. They argue that grounding theory 
in the data means that the researcher can be more faithful to the data than by 
trying to fit the data to either prove or disprove a preconceived theory. They 
consider the dichotomy between quantitative and qualitative research 
methods and acknowledge the strengths of each. "We believe that each form 
of data is useful for both verification and generation of theory, whatever the 
primacy of emphasis. .. In many instances, both forms of data are necessary 
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- not quantitative used to test qualitative, but both used as supplements, as 
mutual verification and, most important for us, as different forms of data on 
the same subject, which, when compared, will each generate theory" (Glaser 
and Strauss, 1967, p18). 
One of their justifications for the grounded theory/inductive approach to the 
generation of theory is that the deductive method tends to limit the researcher 
to the testing of the proposed hypothesis. It thereby restricts and constrains 
the researcher and limits the possibilities of discovery such as that of a 
different theory that would fit the situation better. On the other hand, the 
inductive approach of grounding theory in the data means that the researcher 
can take a "clean", almost naYve view of the data available and induce theory 
that fits the data and works in resulting testing of the theory. 
The "purist" form of grounded theory would therefore insist that the 
researcher start with a tabula rasa, in other words, an attitude that presumes 
nothing and that attempts to forget, or, at least, puts aside any prior relevant 
knowledge. This approach instantly raises the question of whether this is in 
fact possible or practicable. Glaser and Strauss appear to be advocating the 
suspension of prior knowledge by the researcher when working on base data. 
"An effective strategy is, at first, literally to ignore the literature of theory and 
fact on the area under study, in order to assure that the emergence of 
categories will not be contaminated by concepts more suited to different 
areas. Similarities and convergences with the literature can be established 
after the analytic core of categories has emerged. " (Glaser and Strauss, 1967, 
p37). Thus, as patterns emerge within the initial stages of data analysis, there 
would appear to be little problem within grounded theory with beginning to 
compare what is emerging with previously researched hypotheses which have 
perhaps touched on some element of the subject under study. It is a constant 
"flip-flop" between data and conceptualisation (Henwood and Pidgeon, 
1993). 
The history of the dispute between Glaser and Strauss which later developed 
over grounded theory is not relevant for this thesis except to state in the 
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broadest terms that it relates to the nature of the process in analysing data and 
that which is achieved by it. Strauss would argue that theory is generated 
through a rigorous analytical process of data while Glaser holds that such 
disciplined processesforce theory and that these therefore distort the data; 
grounded theory should be aiming to develop hypotheses for testing by other 
methods. In reading the two approaches (Strauss and Corbin, 1994, and 
Glaser, 1992), the argument appears to reflect two different points on a scale 
between quantitative and qualitative methods, Glaser taking a less structured 
approach than Strauss. 
The purpose for including grounded theory within this writing is because I 
originally hoped to adopt its approach. The reasons for this were that it 
appeared to suit my project in terms of being able to take a more "holistic" 
approach to the subject, that I wanted to get away from testing hypotheses 
(the mainstream of business ethics research) and felt that an inductive 
approach was appropriate. A number of factors have come together to 
change my direction. Firstly, I started the project with a literature review 
and, although every attempt was made to "suspend" knowledge of possible 
influences on the moral decision-making process, nevertheless the knowledge 
derived from existing writing was present. Secondly, grounded theory 
involves the decontextualising of text and coding of data to the extent that I 
would have difficulty in relating the detail to the whole process, apart from 
my rejection of detailed textual analysis. Thirdly, the influence of social 
constructionism has alerted me to my own influences on the research process 
and that these need to be accounted for. 
However, the notion of induction, of starting with as much of a labula rasa as 
possible in the circumstances and opening the process under study up to see 
what emerges remained with me and it was my intention that the research 
methods used should reflect this. In seeking for "new" knowledge the 




Social constructionism appears to offer a form of resolution to questions 
relating to an approach which enables the process of making a moral decision 
to be examined in a holistic way, embedding it within its social environment, 
recognising the nature of the interaction between researcher and researched 
and providing an ontology and epistemology which unite within a shared 
historical context. 
(a) The roots of social constructionism 
The roots of social constructionism are identified as being within the work of 
George Kelly in The Psychology of Personal Constnicts published in 1955 
(Sarbin and Kitsuse, 1994; Rychlak, 1992). In summary, Kelly sees humans 
as perceiving the world through a series of what he calls "transparent patterns 
or templets" (Kelly, 1955, p7). He refers to these patterns as constnicts 
because they are a way of construing the world. In general, an individual will 
continually modify these constructs in the light of experience. 
Kelly maintains that an individual develops discrete constructs in order to 
pre dict and, therefore, control future events. Thus, a construct is tested 
against its ability to predict events. Each construct consists of a concept, 
together with its opposite. Thus, black and white are one construct. The 
minimum context for a construct is three objects, the third being a duplicate 
of or likeness of the first (i. e. black). Similarly, there has to be a minimum of 
two relationships involved, that of likeness and that of difference. The 
emphasis in Kelly's writing is that constructs are continually modified as a 
result of experience and are a means of "making sense" of an individual's 
"world". 
In 1966, Berger and Luckmann published The Social Consti-tiction of Reality. 
They identified the key terms in their treatise as being "reality" and 
"knowledge". They defined "reality" as being a "quality appertaining to 
phenomena that we recognize as having a being independent of our own 
volition" and "knowledge" as "the certainty that phenomena are real and that 
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they possess specific characteristics" (Berger and Luckmann, 1966, p13) 
maintaining that "the sociology of knowledge is concerned with the analysis 
of the social construction of reality" (p15). 
Berger and Luckmann considered the social interaction between two people 
and the nature of that shared reality. They recognized what they call the 
"typifications" that people make when talking to another. By this, they refer 
to the types of "labels" that we place on others as we get to know them and 
the process of testing out and adjustment of the labelling process as the 
interaction progresses (cf Kelly). Following on from this, they point to the 
"objectifying" process which happens in the reality of everyday life in that 
we acknowledge an objectivity of certain aspects of reality in relation to the 
existence of objects. 
They recognized that humanity is an inherently social being, influenced from 
an early stage of development as individuals by a social environment which 
provides a stability and direction. Where does this come from? Their answer 
is that "social order is a human product, or, more precisely, an ongoing 
human production" (p69). In considering the nature of organisations, 
institutions are depicted as achieving an objectivity which is created by 
humans and which is a socially constructed reality. The influence of Berger 
and Luckmann's work spread wider than the sociological paradigm within 
which it was written and, as with Kelly's work, it is acknowledged as seminal 
to the development of social constructionism, (Sarbin and Kitsuse, 1994). 
At this point it is useful to consider the terminology around social 
constructionism. The literature is divided between constructionism (for 
example McNamee and Gergen, 1992) and "constructivism" (Denzin and 
Lincoln, 1994; Schwandt, 1994). Hoffman sees a clear distinction which she 
presents as follows: 
According to this (constructivist) view, percepts and constructs take 
shape as the organism bumps against its environment. By contrast, 
the social construction theorists see ideas, concepts and memories 
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arising from social interchange and mediated through language. 
(Hoffman, 1992, p8) 
She identifies a common theme in that both challenge the modernist view that 
the world and its reality can be known with objective certainty. This 
definition appears to rely on the question of how active a role an individual 
takes in interacting with his or her environment in the ways that personal 
constructs are modified by such tensions. The constructivist would appear to 
take a more passive view of the individual than that of the social 
constructionist, although not in all literature (for example, Schwandt) and one 
therefore has to come down on the side of Sarbin and Kitsuse in 
acknowledging that in many cases the distinction is unclear and inconsistent. 
I therefore propose to use the phrase "social constructionism" throughout. 
(b) Social constructionism -a paradigm of beliefs 
Following on from Kelly and Berger and Luckmann, a collection of research 
work and writing has developed around the term "social constructionism". I 
seek here to summarise its perspective. Denzin and Lincoln refer to the 
individual's perceptions of the world in terms of constructions which are 
subjective and gained through experiences. 
Realities are apprehendable in the form of multiple, intangible mental 
constructions, socially and experientially based, local and specific in 
nature (although elements are often shared among many individuals 
and even across cultures), and dependent for their form and content on 
the individual persons or groups holding the constructions. (Denzin 
and Lincoln, 1994, pp 110-111) 
Similarly, Schwandt on constructivism: 
Constructivism means that human beings do not find or discover 
knowledge so much as construct or make it. We invent concepts, 
models, and schemes to make sense of experience and, further, we 
continually test and modify these constructions in the light of new 
experience. (Schwandt, 1994, pp125-126) 
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McNamee and Gergen define what is meant by social constructionism in 
terms of the grounding of our experiences within a social and historical 
context. Coming from a psychological tradition, they see constructionism as 
challenging the subject/object relationship along with the traditional view of 
the therapist/scientist (McNamee and Gergen, 1992). 
Thus, social constructionism challenges the scientific, positivist view of 
objective reality. In doing so, it is seen as placing itself alongside the 
thinking of Foucault and Derrida (Hoffman, 1992). Hoffman seeks to expand 
this by identifying five different ways in which social constructionism looks 
to challenge quantitative psychology. The first is that it is possible to carry 
out objective social research. The second area relates to the nature of the 
"self" with tile placing of the concept of the self within a social setting, 
relating to the concepts of others and the history of experiences that one 
individual accrues. Thirdly, social constructionism, according to Hoffman, 
rejects developmental psychological theories, arguing that development 
cannot happen through scheduled progress but is haphazard and 
unsystematic. Fourthly, emotions as a separate state within people are 
rejected by social constructionists who see them as a part of a wider 
communications process. The last area to be rejected is the concept of 
different 'levels' within any one particular theory and she gives several 
examples of different layers of concepts within, for example, communication 
theory. Social constructionists would deny such orderliness. 
The following offers a useful summary of the social constructionist position: 
Social constructionism, rather than assuming that reality has an as yet 
undiscovered order, recognizes that, as a matter of present, contingent 
fact, none of the social or mental forms of which we currently speak 
has an objective nature. In reality, they are all partial, provisional, 
and intersubjective (Shotter, 1992, p202). 
27 
It is apparent that, in the scale of things, social constructionism might be seen 
as overlapping with the deconstructionism of discursive constructions by 
writers such as Derrida and Saussure. Hearn offers a useful distinction: 
Whereas social constructionism takes a phenomenon ... and seeks to 
explore the social forces that construct or account for that 
phenomenon and the forms it takes, deconstructionism attends to the 
social, and particularly discursive, elements that account for that 
phenomenon in the first place. (Hearn, 1993, p142) 
Thus social constructionism places itself against objectivist approaches and 
theories and sits very closely next to deconstructionist theories. 
6. Criticisms of social constructionism 
While it might appear, at first sight, that social constructionism "fits" this 
project, it is necessary to face the criticisms that have been made of it before 
adopting it finally. 
Four criticisms of the "constructivist" approach come from Schwandt. 
The problem of criteria for judging research work. By its very 
nature, constructionists are unwilling to acknowledge that 
there is some independent base foundation against which 
results might be judged. Several attempts are made to 
overcome this - an appeal to the quality of the method through 
procedural criteria is one. Another possible solution relates to 
what Schwandt calls a "subtle realism" (Schwandt, 1994, 
p130) which appeals to some type of intuition beyond the 
conclusions (or constructions) of the research. The last 
suggestion is to forego concerns about the differentiation 
between mind and world and focus on "intentional, 
meaningful behaviour that is by definition historically, socially 
and culturally relative" (pDO). This leads to judgement on 
constructive accounts which are attempting to make clear that 
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which was previously unclear and which is based on whether 
they are "useful, fitting, generative of further inquiry, and so 
forth" (p130). 
2. The lack of a base from which to criticise the interpretation or 
construction (the "critical purchase" according to Schwandt). 
He traces this back to the view of the inquirer as objective and 
disinterested. Thus critics argue that it is not possible for 
inquirers to become totally cognisant of any situation while 
they remain apart from it. 
3. One set of criticisms derives from postmodern ethnography 
and sees the inquirer in the constructionist framework as 
having unjustifiable authority over the informant. 
4. Another criticism relates to the nature of the epistemology. If 
one asserts that knowledge is individual to the knower and that 
it is impossible to draw a distinction between the knower and 
the known, this is a psychological theory. However, if one 
also claims to be saying on an epistemological front that there 
is no independent foundation of knowledge, then how does 
one explain the transmission of so-called knowledge? 
Schwandt has no resolution to this tension. However, this can 
be explained by examining the concept of shared constructs 
between knower and learner, between informant and 
researcher. Each comes to an encounter with a particular set 
of constructs which are modified as a result of the experience 
of the encounter through a sense-making process and 
acknowledgement of each other's realities. 
Parrott identifies what he calls the central fallacy of constructionism which is 
that even though it maintains that there is no absolute knowledge or certainty, 
it argues this with great spirit. "If social constructionism is correct about the 
uncertainty of the world, to be consistent it would have to be uncertain about 
its own validity" (Parrott, 1992, p217). However, Parrott fails to make the 
distinction between social constructionism arguing its own case and applied 
constructionism where we have seen from the practical projects above, very 
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little is concluded in any definite form but much is illuminated. Validity 
becomes subsumed within a relativistic epistemology where the knower and 
the learner's perspectives are different but shared and thereby enlightened. 
A final criticism of the constructionist approach can be summed up in the 
question "How do you get anything new in terms of ideas or theory if all 
knowledge is dependent on social interaction? " My response to that is that 
by sharing perspectives between knower and learner a new perspective is 
created which is the shared perspective. Consider a young child whose 
experience of her surroundings is that the world in which she lives in is, 
essentially, flat. It may only be when she comes to see a sphere of the global 
world and photographs of earth from space that she learns that the world is 
round. She learns a new construct about her surroundings, or modifies an 
existing one. It might be possible that the child next door to her has always 
conceptualised the world as round and never seen it as potentially flat. That 
child, too, learns a new construct in the concept of the flat earth. The 
different perspectives introduce new experiences and new learning for those 
involved. A second defence to this challenge in asking the question "How do 
you get anything new? " would be to question the assumption is that there is 
something "new" to get. In terms of social sciences, is that an appropriate 
assumption? 
The social constructionist alleges that reality is rooted within its social and 
historical context and that there is no absolute reality. He or she denies that 
any enlightenment gained from research can be generalised into a "universal 
truth". As with many other paradigms, there is a broad width of beliefs and 
theories which all fall within the label "social constructionist". Thus, 
Liebrucks is able to assert that social constructionists do not subscribe to a 
relativist epistemology and refers to a "moderate" cultural relativism 
(Liebrucks, 2001, p387) which is dependent on a high degree of abstraction 
from more specific accounts at a more local level. 
This point of view would appear to lead to problems in terms of defining the 
scale of any particular project. What would constitute a "very high level of 
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abstraction? " It is doubtful that this project would qualify against that test 
which leaves it with a relativist epistemology and ontology. 
Since it is also maintained that there is no "universal truth", the social 
constructionist position remains tenable because it is not possible to be other 
than relativist in perspective. Scheurich (1997) describes the argument in 
relation to relativism as "binary" and maintains that, if one side of the debate 
is removed (in this case, the belief in the possibility of universally held 
principles or truths), the other side of the debate stands on its own and 
defends itself. 
7. The project ontology and epistemology 
Denzin and Lincoln describe the qualitative researcher as being a philosopher 
who is guided by principles (Denzin and Lincoln, 1994). They refer to this 
network of beliefs around the researcher as an interpretive framework which 
can be defined by the responses of the inquirer to three questions. These 
questions are in a particular order that determines their consequent responses. 
They relate to (a) the ontological question of the nature of reality (What is the 
nature of reality? ) (b) the epistemological question of the relationship of the 
inquirer to such reality (How do we know that reality? ) and (c) the 
methodological question of how such sought knowledge can be gained 
(Given the nature of the research question, bow can we achieve knowledge of 
that reality? ) 
As indicated above, within the social constructionist framework that I intend 
to adopt, the ontology and the epistemology merge into one. (Scheurich 
(1997) in fact argues that the epistemology precedes the ontology). They are 
relativist in nature; reality and knowledge merge into their particular social, 
cultural and historical context (Denzin and Lincoln, 1994). There is no 
independent universal reality, only the reality that we perceive as individuals 
living as members of a variety of communities. This reality can be shared 
with others but it is not a condition of being a reality that it be so shared. 
However, once shared and understood, it gains an additional strength of its 
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own. That understanding comes from the sense-making of others, sharing 
common concepts or constructs. An example of this might be someone 
suffering from depression who will often say "only people who have been 
there themselves know what I am going through and what it is like". 
Someone who has never been so ill cannot therefore share that reality but, 
through the experience of talking to a number of depressives, might come to 
acknowledge that it exists. However, two people with experience of 
depression can share their various experiences and find common elements 
within, thus giving the nature of their experienced reality an additional 
strength through its commonalty. Indeed, much personal support for 
sufferers is gained through such a process deriving strength from the sharing 
of individually perceived realities. 
The epistemology of a constructionist is dependent on the nature of the 
transaction between researcher and informant. "The investigator and the 
object of investigation are assumed to be interactively linked so that the 
"findings" are literally created as the investigation proceeds" (Denzin and 
Lincoln, 1994, p111). The concepts of ontology and epistemology merge 
within one investigative process. The reality found within a particular social 
and historical context is also communicated within that context between 
informer and informed. 
Thus constructionist methodology, according to Denzin and Lincoln, is 
"hermeneutical and dialectical" (p111). The nature of social construction 
dictates that through the interaction between informer and informed shared 
constructs are used in order to build up a mutual construction which 
contributes to an additional awareness of the problem which did not exist 
before that encounter within the informed. Similarly, the task of the 
researcher is to learn from informants with a view to modifying her own 
construction of the research problem to such an extent that readers coming 
new to the project would, in turn, learn from it and refresh their own 
understanding as a result. 
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Conclusion 
In this chapter I have outlined the nature of the dominating modernistic 
approach to research within the field of business ethics and discussed the 
relative strengths of an alternative paradigm to be found within the "stable" 
of interpretive methodology. Having examined grounded theory as a 
potential alternative qualitative methodology which might have suited the 
nature of the research question, I have argued that the social constructionist 
paradigm fits the research question, grounding it within its societal and 
historical context. 
In conclusion, the methodology for this project sets the parameters by which 
it can be tested. Its social constructionist approach lays down certain 
principles which inherently question not the validity of the research but, 
rather, its honesty in relation to the reality of the informants and its 
consequent ability to "make sense" to the reader and to inform the reader. In 
examining the constructionist perspective on judging the quality of a piece of 
research, Denzin and Lincoln refer to the "authenticity criteria of fairness, 
ontological authenticity (enlarges personal construction), educative 
authenticity (leads to improved understanding of constructions of others) 
catalytic authenticity (stimulates to action), and tactical authenticity 
(empowers action)" (Denzin and Lincoln, 1994, p114). The following are the 
questions which need to be used to test this piece of research as a result of 
adopting a social constructionist philosophy: 
Does it "make sense" to the reader in that the results correspond to 
expectations deriving from current personal constructs around the subject? 
Does it inform the reader, improving his or her understanding of the 
constructions of others? 
Will it "make a difference"? For example, might it stimulate or empower 
action for change as a result? 
Certainly, in terms of providing some form of new information in addition to 
existing constructs, it is suggested that working with research informants in 
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this way has highlighted elements of making a moral decision in the 
workplace that we might have expected to see. Examples of this would be 
the exposure of the nature of the balance between individual and 
organisational values, the acceptance of emotions within a particular context 
and the difference between genders in the approach to moral problems. 
At the same time, it informs the reader in terms of the comparison between 
practice and philosophical theory and, by illuminating the thought processes 
of others through the use of cognitive maps, one gains a deeper insight into 
the types of factors in play in such situations. Lastly, a strong message comes 
from this work in terms of the nature of the tensions which can exist between 
organisation and individual which can be to the detriment of either if both are 
not in harmony. 
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Chapter Three: 
Mapping the moral decision: a social constructionist research 
project 
1. The nature of a social constructionist research project 
This chapter aims to demonstrate how the social constructionist approach has 
influenced the choice of research method in working with informants and 
sharing information about their experiences through the collection of their 
individual narratives and the use of cognitive maps. It outlines potential 
issues in gathering information and presents an argument for the rejection of 
detailed textual analysis of data. The supporting theory for working with 
narratives and cognitive maps is detailed before the chapter concludes with a 
proposed set of criteria by which to judge this project. 
Having identified the central themes within social constructionism, one is 
faced with the question of how this works in practice in terms of empirical 
research. How does the social constructionist approach a research question? 
How is the work carried out in practice? 
Sarbin and Kitsuse (1994) identify a common theme running through 
constructionist work in the use of the narrative. Much of the work involves a 
story relating to the subject under study. They describe the use of narrative 
as having the objective to tell a story about a phenomenon within its natural 
context. 
Narratives are, of course, shaped by and reflect the perspectives of the 
narrators who produce them, and constructionism explicitly 
acknowledges and sanctions the differential perspectives in the 
observation and interpretation of social phenomena. The logic of 
constructionism fosters the introduction of multiple perspectives to 
counter the positivist presupposition of a uniform and objective social 
reality. (Sarbin and Kitsuse, 1994, p8) 
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Sarbin and Kitsuse recognise that, in drawing upon narratives, such analysts 
may go beyond a "dispassionate academic discourse" (Sarbin and Kitsuse, 
1994, p9) in using a rhetoric which reflects a moral imperative concerning the 
content of their study. Their own moral values are reflected in the 
judgements they make around the contexts explored. Thus, the contributions 
in their book reflect concerns around institutional and social inequities. 
In considering some practical applications of social constructionism, I 
describe two different projects, both contained within Sarbin and Kitsuse's 
Constructing the Social. The first relates to RS Hallam's project on 
"Anxiety". He denies that the purpose of his study is to produce a "new" 
theory of anxiety and recognises that he is therefore at great variance to the 
aims of scientific psychology. He chooses to take theoretical statements 
relating to anxiety as cultural texts in the first instance and only on a 
secondary basis of relating to "processes and entities whose validity 
transcends a correspondence with lay discourse and everyday reality" 
(Hallam, 1994, p141). His purposes in writing on anxiety are twofold - 
firstly, to enable new empirical questions to be raised through conceptual 
analysis and, secondly, to influence lay discourse around the concept of 
anxiety. 
He summarises the literature relating to anxiety and addresses contemporary 
models of anxiety inferring the lay person's concept of anxiety from an 
intuitive perspective. He moves on to challenge the externalisation of 
causality of anxiety as perceived from a positivist psychological approach 
and concludes that the very existence of the scientific concept needs to be 
challenged in order that people might be enabled to question the nature of the 
concept as an involuntary natural emotion. Here, then, Hallam relies on the 
work of others for his evidence of the nature of the construct of "anxiety" 
within the field of psychology and his own experience of the "lay person's" 
construction and uses his own values in seeking to judge the academic 
perspectives before using them to challehge the essence of the lay 
perspective. Applying Denzin and Lincoln's test of social constructionist 
36 
projects, it is clear that Hallam, firstly, proposes a model construct of anxiety 
which makes sense to the reader and which successfully modifies one's 
existing concept of what anxiety is. In seeking to challenge the lay 
perception of anxiety, he seeks to "make a difference". 
The second empirical project I wish to consider is that offered by CL Bodily 
on "Ageism and the Deployments of 'Age"'. He takes the written comments 
from a questionnaire relating to returning to nursing as a career and analyses 
them in terms of their reference to the concept of "age" within that context. 
Along with other social constructionists , it is the process of analysis which is 
the enlightenment rather than any specific conclusions. Following the 
common theme of narratives within constructionist projects, Bodily describes 
their use as follows: 
At the very least, a constructionist view prepares us to construct, 
listen to, and value very different kinds of stories about ourselves and 
our world - stories perhaps less conclusive, more playful, and 
imaginative than is customary, but nonetheless potentially 
illuminating and important. (Bodily, 1994, p175) 
The common element amongst all contributors to this volume is that they all 
attempt to analyse a social concept within its own societal and historical 
context and seek to shed additional light on the concept through such 
analysis. The data used can include textual history, interviews and case 
studies. 
2. The project's research method 
In seeking to design a social constructionist piece of work which complied 
with the methods demonstrated by writers such as Hallam and Bodily, a 
number of practical decisions needed to be made around working with 
informants in order to elicit the best results from the researcher's contacts 
with informants. In doing this, I was mindful, too, of the nature of the data 
which would emerge and the processes which would be employed for its 
37 
analysis. Thus, the question of whether to work with informants as 
individuals or in focus groups, the sampling strategy, the use of "dilemmas" 
and the nature of any resulting textual analysis needed to be addressed. 
(a) Research informants as individuals or in groups? 
The first question to consider was whether to access research informants as 
individuals on a one-to-one basis or whether to work in groups. My study of 
theories relating to group processes (see Chapter Ten) very strongly indicates 
the different forces within groups and the likelihood that the overall end 
outcome might relate to a "group" output rather than the sum of the 
individual members' output. This would be unhelpful to the study of 
individual moral thought processes. The conclusion was that the researcher 
needed to work with individuals. 
(b) The nature of the sample 
The most interesting moral decisions in the workplace tend to be taken by 
managers because it is their responsibility for managing other people which 
leads to moral decisions which can be particularly challenging or difficult. It 
therefore seemed to be sensible to be looking for a sample of managers, 
preferably from a cross-section of type of organisation or industry. 
(C) The size of the sample 
The seminal writing on the qualitative researcher's approach to sampling 
(Kuzel 1992, Miles and Huberman 1994) is to be found within Michael 
Patton's book Qualitative Evaluation and Research Methods (1990). Inithe 
makes the distinction between probability sampling and purposeful sampling. 
The logic and power of probability sampling depends on selecting a 
truly random and statistically representative sample that will permit 
confident generalization from the sample to a larger population. The 
purpose is generalization. 
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The logic and power of purposeful sampling lies in selecting 
information-rich cases for study in depth. (Patton, 1990, p169). 
Patton defines "information-rich cases" as being those from which it is 
possible to gain much knowledge about issues which are central to the whole 
pinpose of the research. Amongst the purposeful sampling strategies that he 
identifies are typical case sampling, theory based sampling and a search for 
what he refers to as "negative" cases which would tend to disprove emerging 
theory and he recognises that a mix of strategies are required. 
The notion of saturation or redundancy, linked to a qualitative approach to 
research is often associated with the question of sampling strategy, most 
frequently within the context of grounded theory. Glaser and Strauss (1967) 
describe it as being a type of inductive process of gathering data to the point 
where no new information is available and existing information has been 
confirmed to a greater extent. Patton expresses reservations about the use of 
saturation in research projects (Patton, 2000a and 2000b) in terms of 
difficulties of deciding when it has been reached, planning for it and 
convincing others that a position of "saturation" has been attained. 
Kuzel and Miles and Huberman both reproduce Patton's typology of 
sampling strategy in qualitative research and both identify common features 
which include the smallness of thesize of the sample. This raises the 
question "if the sample is small, what implications does this have for 
gencralisability? " Patton and Kuzel are both clear that any potential theory 
that emerges from the sample relates only to that sample and cannot be 
generalised within a wider context. Miles and Huberman express it thus: 
We are generalizing from one case to the next on the basis of a match 
to the underlying theory, not to a larger universe. The choice of cases 
usually is made on conceptual grounds, not on representative grounds. 
(Miles and Huberman, 1994, p29) 
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This leaves the difficult question of how big the sample should be in practice. 
Patton maintains that the quality in terms of availability of information within 
the work with a small number of informants, together with the ability of the 
researcher to observe and analyse the information, is more important than the 
size of the sample. 
Kuzel suggests that "6-8 data sources are often sufficient for a homogenous 
sample while 12-20 commonly are needed when looking for disconfirming 
evidence or trying to achieve maximum variation" (p4l). Miles and 
Huberman, too, confirm that the question of size is not answerable on 
statistical grounds and ask the following question: "How many cases, in 
what kind of sampling frame, would give us confidence in our analytic 
generalizations? " (p30). Here, following Patton, they refer to the degree of 
richness of data in determining the size of sample and indicate that more than 
15 complex situations becomes unwieldy. "There are too many data to scan 
visually and too many permutations to account for" (p30). 
In summary, it is possible to extract a checklist against which to judge a piece 
of qualitative research in relation to the size of the sample of informants 
involved in the project whilst recognising that there is no "ideal". 
1. The need to be able to relate sampling to a particular strategy 
and justify it. 
2. The requirement that the work with informants provides 
"information-rich" data. 
3. The researcher's ability to observe and analyse information 
given by informants in all its depth. 
The recognition of the need to be extremely careful in relation 
to generalising shared concepts from a small number of 
informants. The shared behaviour or constructs relate to that 
group of people and cannot be claimed to be generalisable in 
any statistical sense into wider universalisable theory. 
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Finally, a piece of research by Swan and Newell (1998) involving cognitive 
mapping worked with 16 informants, of which data from eight were used. 
They justify the size of the sample by describing it as a "small sample but not 
unusual for this kind of cognitive mapping research which focuses on 
individuals or on small groups" (Swan and Newell, 1998, p118). 
(d) Hypothetical v historical dilemmas 
Much work has been done in the past relating to individual analysis of 
hypothetical moral dilemmas (Kohlberg, 1976,1981,1984,1987,1994). The 
main criticism of such dilemmas is that individuals tend not to identify with 
them personally but take an objective and impersonal view of them. This 
means that the decision that they come to might not relate to how they would 
actually behave in reality. Chapter Six of this thesis outlines the criticism of 
Kohlberg's use of the Heinz dilemma which was that, for most of his research 
informants, the fact that it was set in Europe meant that it was far removed 
from where they lived - United States, Mexico, Israel. Much more 
challenging is for individuals to have to talk about a decision which they have 
ah-eady made and for them to think about the influences on the decision and 
their reasons for taking it. This also avoids any problems of difference 
between moral intention and moral action because, historically, the intention 
has become the action. 
The problem then arises that one would be comparing data of totally different 
contexts. The challenge would be to spot the patterns within the raw data, to 
begin to analyse through a coding process the common elements. 
(C) A rejection of detailed textual analysis 
In surveying pieces of research which have used qualitative methods rather 
than quantitative, it becomes apparent that the analysis of "text", whether it 
be written or transcription of interviews often forms the basis for the 
emergence of "patterns" or codes which lead on to theory. Indeed, there are a 
number of software packages available, for example, NUD*ST, which offer a 
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tool to enable such analysis to be carried out more efficiently. The use of 
narratives and cognitive maps inevitably generates forms of text which might 
lend themselves to a form of analysis which takes patterns of words and 
phrases identified by the researcher and feeds them into a process which 
strips them of their context, leading the project into potentially new paths of 
discovery. However, I wish to challenge the validity of that process and 
reject its use for researching moral decisions in the workplace. In doing this, 
it is recognised that the interpretation of the word "text" has been widened in 
recent years to describe all life's experiences as "text". However, in this 
thesis, I intend to restrict my meaning to words which are spoken or written. 
I seek to reject textual analysis by an appeal to areas of theory around non- 
verbal communications and the way we communicate through language. 
While we seek to communicate through language, there are many forms of 
communication which do not depend on language. These include signs, 
signals, symbols, dance, music, the non-verbal expression of emotions and 
facial expressions. Much work has been done within the academic sphere on 
the nature of nonverbal communication and its implied recognition as a 
phenomenon which is of value to investigate (Key, 1980; Heslin and 
Patterson, 1982; Weitz, 1974; Knapp, 1978). As a result, it is proposed that 
nonverbal communication conveys as much, if not more, of the "message" 
between informant and informed with a resultant distortion of the project if 
too much emphasis is placed on the meaning of verbal communications. 
In communication theory can be found research on the relationship between 
words and their meaning and how this meaning is conveyed or communicated 
(Griffin, 1994). Communication is defined as being "the management of 
messages for the purpose of creating meaning" (Griffin, 1994, p19). The 
fact that words have multiple meanings within different contexts means that 
there is always a possibility for misinterpretation. Language becomes a 
reflection of part of an individual's reality. The nature of the reflected reality 
will change depending on the context in which it is being spoken or written or 
heard or read. 
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These two strands of theory both point to language, whether written or 
spoken, being one part of the total message which is communication. To take 
an example, I might be quoted as saying "I am having a day off work today". 
How I say this, the intonations in my voice and the expressions on my face 
will inform the listener about my feelings about this statement. I might be 
pleased because I have got some special plans for the day or I might be 
looking sad because I will be attending the funeral of a close relative. The 
words are only a part of what I am expressing. Every informant with whom I 
have worked has told their story and explored their cognitive map using 
words, body language and facial expressions to convey how they felt about 
the situation they were describing. An overemphasis on the words would 
bring the project into danger of distorting the informants' messages and, 
consequently, the conclusions which we might draw from them. In carrying 
out a conceptual analysis, I have tried to recall the totality of the informants' 
communication processes without the benefit of video but with the use of 
tape recording. The study of non-verbal communication and work around 
communication theory and "the meaning of meaning" provide the 
justification for my reluctance to carry out detailed textual analysis. 
Communication lies in a "sharing" of information leading to a common 
understanding between researcher and informant. 
In summary, in seeking to work with informants to enlighten others, I 
concluded that informants would contribute most working on an individual 
basis talking about actual historical situations in which they had found 
themselves making difficult moral choices. I also needed a research method 
which would not lead on to a detailed textual analysis of the resultant data but 
which would, rather, allow patterns to emerge from the data which would 
inform the reader. Such patterns would relate to a commonality of thought 
process or behaviour or nature of influence. This would lead to a conceptual 
analysis of the content of the data around the constructs of the informants. 
The procedure of collecting cognitive maps of informants around a given 
moment in time became immediately attractive, together with the collection 
of narratives which added detail to the maps. 
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3. Research Method: Narrative Theory 
In seeking a method of working with individual informants, I was certain that 
individuals would have put together a type of story in their own minds as a 
result of responding to my request for them to talk about a historical decision 
which they had made. I knew instinctively that they would have spent some 
time collating the various elements around the situation that we were to 
explore together and that they would be wanting to "tell their story" before 
we could look at mapping the content of the decision. I therefore structured 
the interview to begin with their account of the situation which they were 
offering to discuss. This was taped and, in most cases, the flow of the story 
was uninterrupted by me. The result was the collection of 16 narratives 
which were of potential value as a source of information around the process 
in themselves. The question of how to draw out common elements therefore 
arose and, for a solution, I turned to the theory of narratives and their 
analysis. I have already identified that the use of narratives is a common 
element amongst social constructionist research projects. 
Narratives have previously been used in researching individual moral 
development. Kohlberg used the "dilemmas" while Gilligan focussed on 
women's feelings around pregnancy and abortion (Attanucci, 1991). 
Similarly, MacIntyre (1985) related moral philosophy to its social and 
historical context by referring to the narratives which both exist as fictions 
promoting values and to individual life narratives which also embrace virtues. 
In the former, he refers to the virtues expressed in the Iliad and within Jane 
Austen's writing while also recognising the need for individuals to relate to a 
life narrative of their own which makes sense and which includes virtues 
which enable that individual to evaluate their own life (cf Fisher, 1984). This 
was therefore not a new approach in considering the nature of moral decision- 
making. 
Gergen and Gergen draw attention to the dominance of narratives within 
Western culture as a means of explaining our experiences, our lives and our 
own perspectives about self, making the point that they do not relate to the 
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individual outside of his or her social context but, rather, are "products of 
social interchange" (Gergen and Gergen, 1988, p18). They identify three 
forms of narrative - the stability narrative, the progressive and the regressive 
narrative. The stability narrative reflects a position of no change in relation 
to the individual's situation at the end of the story. The progressive and the 
regressive narratives reflect either positive or negative perceived benefits for 
the individual as a result. 
In using narrative to make sense of social interactions, they maintain that the 
narrative reflects one perspective on a series of events. However, individuals 
have the ability to choose the perspective which they place on the narrative. 
As well, there is a large temporal range for the context of the narrative 
ranging from a universal setting to what happened within the last hour. They 
conclude that an individual within today's society would be looking for a 
stable narrative but with an ability to change in a positive way. 
The type of reality that narratives portray is interpretive through being an 
indication of the informant's interpretation of events from their own 
individual perspective. An informant will often not respond directly to a 
closed question but, instead, tell a story that is intended to convey a chosen 
reply. Frequently, too, an individual uses the telling of a story to "make 
sense" of a series of events with particular emphasis on the self's role within 
it, in order to portray the individual's role in a positive light (Riessman, 1995; 
Shankar and Goulding, 2000). 
A narrative, in summary, can be defined as a discrete story with a beginning, 
a middle and an end. Various writers have sought to develop an identifiable 
common structure within narratives (Gergen and Gergen, 1988; Czarniawska, 
1998; Labov, 1972). The narrowest view of such frameworks is found in 
Czarniawska who defines narratives as having at least three elements "an 
original state of affairs, an action or an event, and the consequent state of 
affairs" (Czarniawska, 1998, p2). They also need what she calls a "plot", 
something which brings the events together, links them through, for example, 
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a temporal or causal relationship. Gergen and Gergen identify five factors 
within the structure of a narrative. 
1. The establishment of a valued "end point". There has to be 
some "point" to the story, some purpose for telling it which is 
acceptable to the teller and the listener. 
2. Selection of events relevant to the above end point (goal state). 
The establishment of the point of the story then governs the 
choice of events which are included within the narrative. 
3. The order of events. Such events are then placed within an 
order, usually temporal, in which they are recounted. 
4. Establishing causal linkages. In many narratives, the events 
are linked also by some causal link. However, the construct of 
this link may be particularly wide. 
5. Demarcation signs. These are signs which normally mark the 
beginning and end of the story and would include phrases such 
as "once upon a time" and appropriate endings such as "now 
you know". 
Labov summarises the process of a narrative as follows: 
A complete narrative begins with an orientation, proceeds to the 
complicating action, is suspended at the focus of evaluation before the 
resolution, concludes with the resolution, and returns the listener to 
the present time with the coda. (Labov, 1972, p369) 
Having said this, Labov acknowledges that the structure of the evaluation 
section spills over into the rest of the narrative and can be found elsewhere in 
various forms. It is Labov's identification of the evaluation element which is 
of particular interest to this project because it is within that context that value 
statements are made indicating, for example, virtues supported or moral 
principles being upheld. Thus, the purpose of the evaluation is to explain 
why the story is being told and the point of the story. 
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Labov's work does not reflect upon the significance of evaluation within a 
narrative which relates to a moral decision. However, it is clear that, in 
telling the story around such a decision, the narrator's evaluation of that 
process is going to be crucial to our understanding of it. Again, because of 
the very context of the story, it is likely that it will reflect upon the wrongs 
and rights of the situation and express principles which are being applied by 
the narrator in that setting. 
Telling a story can often involve a mixture of emotions and there is often 
much social pressure to ensure that a positive "spin" is placed on the 
evaluative outcome of the narrative. It is not necessarily socially acceptable 
to reflect negative emotions within such a context (Gergen and Gergen, 
1988). However, such negative emotions expressed within a narrative can 
help to illuminate a social construct such as loneliness according to Wood. 
An advantage of the narrative approach for viewing emotion, and 
particularly loneliness, is that it can incorporate and integrate all of 
the elements that may be involved, including any physiological 
aspects, whether these are viewed metaphorically or not. The 
complexity of the social construction of loneliness can be captured 
within the narrative not only because the story can incorporate a label 
for the emotion, but also because it has content. (Wood, 1986, p202) 
CK Riessman (1993) offers a useful framework for working with narratives 
in terms of a process of the five stages of attending, telling, transcribing, 
analysing and reading. 
Attending is the process of being part of a series of actions and imposing 
personal significance upon the events, depending on the perspective. 
Telling depends on language which inevitably brings about a gap between the 
experience and the communication of it to others. Riessman here sees the 
telling as a joint process between teller and listener. 
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Transcribing recognises that transcribing is part of an interpretive process in 
itself, for example, decisions of how much to impose "sense", grammatical 
correctness, insertion of "ers" and "ums" and silences 
Analyzing "The stop-and-start style of oral stories of personal experience 
gets pasted together into something different" (Riessman, 1993, p14). 
Reading rccognises the potential variety of readers' interpretation of the 
resultant text. 
In conclusion, Bush et al recognise the limitations of Previous work such as 
Ferrell and Gresham and Reidenbach and Robin who attempted to map out 
the process of making a moral decision and to evaluate the quality of that 
decision (Bush et al, 1997; Ferrell and Gresham, 1985; Reidenbach and 
Robin, 1991). They all failed in this through the inability of any system to 
embrace the individual nature of the historical and societal context of any 
"ethical situation". They identify the narrative paradigm as a way of 
overcoming this through the comparison, for example in the service industry 
of the narrative of the service provider and that of the customer. If the 
customer is saying that it is wrong to give a "live" concert with dubbed 
voices then the narrative of the corresponding service provider which puts on 
such concerts needs to be compatible. 
However, with a word of caution, K Grayson challenges narrative theory 
under what she calls "construct definition". She refers to the problem that 
everyone has a different concept of what is meant by a narrative. Secondly, 
she raises the question of the place of "silence". This highlights the issue of 
what is not said or who does not speak or what point is not made. Lastly, she 
refers to what is meant by narrative "truth". Narratives are assumed to be 
stories relating to actual events, even if they make some sort of sense of them 
as well as relating to fiction within other contexts. "Thus, the construct of 
narrative is problematized by multidimensionality, patterns of exclusion, and 
permeable borders between stories that are true fictions and/or fictionalised 
truths. " (Grayson, 1997, p68). 
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A social constructionist would resolve Grayson's "problem" by accepting the 
relativity of the reality being conveyed but also acknowledging that it is 
shared with others and that it is therefore not exclusive. It is multifaceted in 
that others might add additional elements whilst jointly owning common 
factors around a construct. A narrative is judged, not by its historical 
accuracy in all detail, but by its propensity for "fit" in another's social 
construction of reality, recognising that an individual changes the nature of 
the reality under discussion each time it is narrated as part of an ongoing 
sense-making process. 
4. Research Method: Cognitive Mapping 
I now seek to set out the argument for using cognitive mapping as a means of 
identifying the elements of the process which occurs when people make a 
moral decision in the workplace. It will consider the psychological theory 
behind the development of cognitive maps and the reasons for and against 
using the technique in empirical research. 
The research questions which are being asked in this study are 
1. What is the process, if any, that someone goes through when they 
make a moral decision in the workplace? 
2. What are the sources of the predominant influences in any one 
situation? 
The word "process" implies that there is a start, a middle and an end to it and, 
indeed, writers in the past have attempted to model this process showing it 
graphically as a linear process (Jones, 1991, Malhotra and Miller, 1998). 
Any research method needs to allow for the possibility that there may not be 
such a logical progression - that people may have a number of ideas or 
concepts in mind when they come to a decision which has a moral element to 
it. Any method also needs to bear in mind the various strengths of the 
different influences on the eventual outcome. It also needs to take into 
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account the potential problem of the dichotomy between moral decisions and 
moral action referred to in a previous chapter. 
Axelrod defines a cognitive map as being "designed to capture the structure 
of the causal assertions of a person with respect to a particular policy domain, 
and generate the consequences that follow from this structure" (Axelrod, 
1976, p58). Cognitive maps therefore consist of two elements - concepts and 
causal beliefs which relate to the relationships between the concepts. He 
maintains that such maps can provide an accurate picture of a person's belief 
system in any one particular situation. This can then be used either to show 
how a person should behave or as an explanation of why they performed in 
the way they did. This is the distinction between Axelrod's normative and 
empirical models. 
He identifies cognitive maps as being a means of helping us understand 
someone's decision-making processes. He identifies the real strength of 
cognitive maps as being that they are "able to employ the concepts of the 
decision maker who is being predicted, rather than the concepts of the person 
who is doing the predicting" (Axelrod, 1976, p223). 
A number of different theoretical bases have been used as the foundation for 
cognitive mapping. Eden and his colleagues have always referred back to 
Kelly's theory of personal constructs (Jenkins, 1998). Other writers (Axelrod 
and his colleagues) refer to a number of sources for their theoretical basis. 
Both Kelly's theories and the writing around schema theory appear to me to 
be expressing what we might intuit about the processes we use to think 
through situations and arrive at decisions. I therefore outline both, perceiving 
them as complementary to each other. 
(a) Kelly's theory of personal constructs 
Kelly's Theoq of Pei-sonal Constructs, previously referred to as being a base 
source for the theory behind social constructionism, is also identified as being 
50 
the underpinning psychological theory of cognitive maps (Eden, 1988; Huff, 
1990). 
Colin Eden has been responsible for much of the academic development of 
the use of cognitive mapping within management research in the UK. He 
refers to his admiration for Kelly because, not only did he devise an original 
theory but he also devised a means of putting it into practice (Eden, 1988). 
The repertory grid technique designed by Kelly to establish individual 
cognitive mapping processes is still recognised as a useful tool (Fransella and 
Bannister, 1977; Easterby-Smith, 1980) but is not appropriate to this 
particular study because of its emphasis on the mathematics involved within 
the created grid which tend to deflect from its main purpose which is to create 
a person's system of constructs. It also becomes unwieldy if the grid is larger 
than 12 x 12 (Eden, 1988) and is generally harder for any research subject to 
relate to in terms of verifiability. Eden holds the grid to be "constraining in 
the degree of richness that can be captured" (p3). This is confirmed by 
Sylvia Brown in her study which seeks to compare the use of repertory grid 
technique and cognitive maps (Brown, 1992). 
Eden outlines his own personal history of thinking around cognitive maps, 
moving on from Kelly's theory of personal constructs but alleging that the 
theoretical assertions behind cognitive maps are derived from Kelly's 
thinking. These are that 
1. We make sense of the world through drawing contrasts and 
similarities. 
2. We try to explain what is happening in our world. 
3. We try to understand things in terms of structuring our concepts in 
some form of hierarchy. 
Eden acknowledges that this last assertion stretches Kelly's theory and goes 




Schema theory offers a parallel explanation to that of Kelly's personal 
constructs theory for the graphic representation within cognitive maps. 
Marshall (1995) traces the origins of schemata back to Plato and Aristotle, 
through Kant, Bartlett and Piaget. She concludes with a definition of a 
schema as being "a mental structure centred on an event, situation, 
experience, or object" (p16). This may or may not include action, a factor 
promoted by Piaget but not by philosophers. While her interest lies in how 
students solve mathematical problems, she demonstrates that it is important 
for someone to access the correct schema in order to solve the problem. 
She outlines the eleven characteristics of schemas, classified into three areas 
of psychological investigation: 
"(a) schema formation: 
"A schema is constructed by the individual 
" Schema formation involves attention and selective processing 
"A schema results from a repetition of similar experiences 
" No two individuals will have precisely identical schemas 
(b) schema contents 
"A schema contains abstractions of commonalities in experiences 
" Schemas may have as foci either abstract notions or concrete 
situations 
0A schema is neither a concept nor a rule 
(c) schema usage 
" Schema instantiation may be purposeful or spontaneous 
"A schema is a problem-solving agent 
" Schema invocation involves analogical reasoning 
"A schema may involve both simultaneous and sequential processing. " 
(Marshall, 1995, p57) 
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She concludes as follows: 
Schemas develop after many similar and repeated experiences, each 
of which constitutes a problem for the individual. Schemas are used 
to interpret the problem and to apply to it as much as possible any 
relevant prior knowledge, using both parallel and sequential cognitive 
processing (Marshall, 1995, p58). 
The work of Harris will be referred to in greater depth in relation to his 
thinking in relation to schemas and individuals within organisational culture. 
However, it is useful to consider part of his contribution at this stage. 
Schemas refer to the dynamic, cognitive knowledge structures 
regarding specific concepts, entities, and events used by individuals to 
encode and represent incoming information efficiently. Schemas are 
typically conceptualised as subjective theories derived from one's 
experiences about how the world operates that guide perception, 
memory, and inference (Harris, 1994, p310). 
He defines schemas as "mental maps which enable individuals to traverse and 
orient themselves within their experiential terrain" (p310). He provides an 
explanation of how people come to share schemas which he claims come 
about through common experiences. 
Schemas can be both representation and process. "Each schema roughly 
corresponds to a domain of interaction, which may be an object in the usual 
sense, an attention-riveting detail of an object, or some domain of social 
interaction" (Arbib et al, 1987, p7) 
Fauconnier sees mental space mappings as being central to the linking of 
mental spaces outlined in discourse. He gives as examples such concepts as 
metaphors and analogy which refer to different domains but provide a linkage 
between tile two. For example, computer viruses use the domain of the 
medical paradigm to refer to technological problems in computers. In doing 
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so, the language imposes certain properties of the medical context on the 
computer problem. 
A language expression E does not have a meaning in itself; rather, it 
has a meaning potential, and it is only within a complete discourse 
and in context that meaning will actually be produced. (Fauconnier, 
1997, p37). 
In summary, Fauconnier analyses language use in terms of its relation to 
mental spaces and the relationship between them, whether metaphorical or 
analogical. This, too, confirms previously stated arguments against detailed 
textual analysis within this project. 
Finally, the mapping of schemas or constructs fits well within the social 
constructionist framework as described earlier. It reflects the aim of the 
project in terms of gathering mental constructions which are "socially and 
experientially based, local and specific in nature (although elements are often 
shared among many individuals and even across cultures), and dependent for 
their form and content on the individual persons or groups holding the 
constructions" (Denzin and Lincoln, 1994, pp 110-111). 
Stubbart and Ramaprasad summarise the literature relating to representational 
systems in cognitive science (Stubbart and Ramaprasad, 1990). They 
criticise cognitive maps for being over-representational in that they lose too 
much detail. In response, Huff argues that, at the very least, they are a useful 
tool for summarising and communicating information. Mental maps can hold 
something which has the same essential characteristics as thought itself. "In 
this view, the mental map is the knowledge that informants use themselves. 
Even if current maps fall short of this ideal, we are closer with cognitive 
mapping to understanding intentional choice than we have been before" 
(Huff, 1990, p14). 
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(c) Different types of cognitive maps 
In her introductory chapter to Alapping Strategic Thought, Huff (1990) 
describes different types of cognitive maps depending on their purpose and 
the means with which they are acquired. They range from those which assess 
attention, association and importance of concepts (using textual analysis) to 
those which show the structure of argument and conclusion. Since 1990, 
cognitive maps have become even more diverse and been used across a much 
wider range of contexts. Of particular pertinence to this study is her 
reference to maps that show dimensions of categories and hierarchies among 
concepts. She identifies these maps as having been used to explore the range 
and nature of choices perceived by decision makers in a given setting. "Since 
this kind of map usually requires direct inquiry, it offers a means for 
informants themselves to collaborate in defining the topics of study" (Huff, 
1990, p16). She makes the point that mapmakers looking for specific links 
between concepts make the following assumptions: 
1. Thinking involves searching and retrieval from organised memory. 
2. Learning involves categorisation - either the learning of new 
categories or the modification of old. 
3. The meaning of any particular concept derives primarily from its 
contrast or difference from other concepts (cf Kelly). 
Huff also refers to what she calls "causal" maps which are based on the idea 
that causal associations are the major way in which understanding about the 
world is organised, that causality is the primary form of post hoc explanation 
of events and that choice among alternative actions involves causal 
evaluation. Their weakness is that they tend to oversimplify to the extent that 
there are few contradictory forces in them. Huff groups with this category, 
systems and influences maps, recognising that influence maps can indicate 
the strength of influence on an individual's choice. Causal maps might be 
deemed to reduce that level of choice. As a result, I would prefer to refer to 
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"influence" maps in order to preserve an implied acknowledgement of an 
individual's ability to choose in relation to any particular action. 
If cognitive mapping is to be used as a method for eliciting the thought 
processes around moral decision making, it would appear that a technique 
combining parts of all of the above maps would need to be used. 
(d) Methods for acquiring cognitive maps 
Axelrod (1976) lays down four guidelines for acquiring cognitive maps: 
(a) the method used to gain cognitive maps (CMs) should be unobtrusive. 
(b) "the derivation should not require advance specification of the 
concepts a particular decision maker may use in his cognitive map. Ideally, 
these concepts, as well as the causal links between them, would come from 
the data and not from any a priori assumptions of the researchers" (p6). 
(c) the cognitive map should be tied in to an evaluation theory of decision 
making. He explains this as meaning that a map should include options, 
goals, the ultimate utility and the relevant intervening concepts. 
(d) the map should be verifiable, valid and reflect accurately the 
assertions made (and the relationships between them ) of the decision maker. 
Axelrod maintains that the analysis of textual evidence meets the above 
criteria according to recognised coding rules, together with the use of 
questionnaires and, as a third alternative, the open-ended probing interview. 
Textual analysis will be rejected as being judged inappropriate for this 
project. Questionnaires are very useful for extrapolating and collating solid 
facts in isolation but lack a richness of data which is needed to explore the 
process of decision making. Finally, there is the open-ended probing 
interview, as mentioned by Axelrod. This can help the research subject 
explore his or her thought processes and work towards putting them into 
some sort of order without "disfiguring" them any more than necessary. 
Where this process can be supported is by the use of graphic imagery in the 
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shape of a map growing as the interview proceeds, either on paper or on the 
computer screen. 
It is possible to deduce cognitive maps from an interview text and also from 
documentation. However, this is not generally recommended (Eden and 
Ackermann, 1998). Eden et al (1992) give some useful tips relating to the 
elaboration of CMs, in this particular instance, causal maps. They relate the 
number of constructs obtained to the length of the interview and the skills of 
the interviewer. They suggest that any coding and analysis of the map is 
carried out after the interview. However, it is necessary to be constantly 
aware of the potential problems around generating data which is gathered in 
an interactive way between researcher and informant (Bood, 1998; Eden and 
Ackermann, 1998). Bood concludes that rationalisations (or sense-making) 
are an inherent part of that process. "What one thinks often only becomes 
clear when thoughts are spoken aloud" (Bood, 1998, p226). 
(e) Quantifying maps - is it only a qualitative process? 
A number of writers have attempted to quantify the relationships between 
concepts in maps, resulting in some extremely complicated mathematics 
(Langfield-Smith and Wirth, 1992; Markham and Mintzes, 1994). It is very 
tempting to attempt to impose some form of mathematical logic, be it "fuzzy" 
or more conventional statistical calculations. While having severe 
reservations about using potentially quantitative methods within a qualitative 
study, it has already been shown that social constructionist research projects 
often include a mixture of both methods. The challenge is to use mathematics 
in a constructive way that does not distort the informant's "message". 
(f) Comparing cognitive maps 
Langfield-Smith and Wirth (1992) aim to develop a method of comparing 
causal cognitive maps both over time and between individuals. They start 
with a causal map using strengths of influence: -3 to -1 for negative 
influences and +1 to +3 for positive influences. They refer to analysing 
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cognitive maps in two different ways: the content and the structure of each 
map. Their research concentrates on the former - the content. 
Content difference is associated with differences in the events that 
individuals perceive as relevant to a domain (equivalent to differences 
in elements contained within two or more cognitive maps), and 
differences in the way that they relate those events (corresponding to 
differences in the various causal beliefs within one or more cognitive 
maps) (Langfield-Smith and Wirth, 1992, p1137). 
They recognise that cognitive maps do not easily lend themselves to 
comparison because of the wide variety of elements and causal linkages. 
They propose a method of comparison which assumes that the context of the 
map is the same for each map being analysed. Thus, they use the example of 
three managers launching a new alcoholic product and their varying maps. 
The mathematics then becomes very complicated. 
Wang (1996) draws attention to the fact that CMs can be either quantitative 
or qualitative or even both and cites Eden's maps as being essentially 
qualitative. However, he decides to take the quantitative route by developing 
a "neural network model" with which to compare maps. He cites Eden et al 
(1992) who state that there should be no general approach to the analysis of 
CMs and that any analysis should have a "particular meaning for an 
understanding and evaluation of cognitive complexity" (Wang, 1996, p539). 
In all three of the above studies, the common ground was that the maps being 
compared were all of individuals working within the same context. The maps 
reflected the individuals' perspectives of the same situation. This, at least, 
presented some common factors to compare within separate maps and, in 
some instances, some of the concepts were intentionally included in all maps. 
This, therefore, presents a potential problem for the use of cognitive mapping 
in drawing out comparisons from data received in different individual 
contexts. 
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(g) Potential issues with using cognitive mapping 
Jenkins outlines a number of issues apart from the problems of comparison 
which can occur around the use of cognitive mapping (Jenkins, 1998). He 
considers the range of different studies for which cognitive mapping has been 
used and the methods which have been developed as a result. He identifies 
issues around comparative causal mapping. The first is that of validity which 
he translates into the question "Have we allowed the respondent to respond in 
a way which is salient and meaningful to. him or her? " (Jenkins, 1998, p240). 
He, too, refers to the problems of comparing maps. The third issue identified 
is that relating to reliability and, while he recognises that this might not be 
appropriate to a qualitative methodology, he equates it with replicability 
which almost asks the same question of that asked in checking validity. 
Lastly, the issue of practicability has meant that where large maps have been 
worked on, concerns relating to availability of subjects over lengthy periods 
of time have had to be balanced with the need to involve informants in the 
research at first hand rather than working on secondary documents. 
In response to Jenkins' points, it is maintained that a project based on social 
constructionism for its ontology and epistemology would be seeking to 
recognise the interaction between researcher and informant within the 
particular social and historical context of the day on which the interview took 
place and to be aware that, in a sense, nothing can be replicated. The 
question of validity needs to be addressed in the actual working method with 
informants to ensure that they are content to "own" the map which is created. 
Another particular issue is that of presentation of data analysis (Laukkannen, 
1998). A series of maps can be difficult to access by a reader who is not 
aware of the particular context to which they refer. Laukkannen recommends 
keeping it "simple and to the point" (p188). 
In conclusion, despite the issues, cognitive mapping as a method of collecting 
data has the potential to reflect to a greater degree of accuracy the thought 
processes of the informant. 
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Cognitive maps provide a holistic picture of an individual's overall 
perspective, without any loss of detail, enabling the researcher to 
move beyond the assumption of internal consistency to the detailed 
assessment of specific concepts within the map (Clarke and 
Mackaness, 2001, p153). 
However, any such claim to accuracy could only be checked by reference 
back to the informant involved in order to establish the degree of shared 
reality and ownership. Whether the informant recognises the resulting map 
as a reflection of what they were saying about the situation described would 
provide the test of whether their reality had effectively been shared. 
5. Current qualitative research in business ethics 
Lastly, it is necessary to consider the range of qualitative-based work which 
has already been carried out within the field of business ethics. As previously 
stated, the dominant paradigm within business ethics is the modernist 
quantitative approach using conventional statistical methods to analyse 
questionnaires. However, a number of projects have moved away from this. 
For example, Vyakarnam et al used focus groups to analyse the way in which 
small business owners work through ethical dilemmas. The results produced 
little that was generalisable within the group (Vyakarnam et al, 1997). 
Of more direct relevance, the work of Derry takes Kohlberg's and Gilligan's 
respective theories of moral reasoning of justice and of care and interviews 
20 men and 20 women in a particular organisation, asking them to talk about 
a particular moral conflict. "The interviews were open-ended semi-clinical 
interviews in which an individual presented an actual moral conflict he/she 
faced at work and described the situation, the conflict, how he/she evaluated 
what should be done, and how it was resolved" (Derry, 1987, p32). He then 
analysed the data in terms of content analysis looking for elements of care or 
justice. 
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Apart from being of interest in relation to the results around the debate about 
gender and moral reasoning, this study appears at first hand to be working 
very similarly to my project. However, Derry started with the influence of 
care and justice reasoning and was almost testing hypotheses from existing 
theory rather than taking the holistic approach to the problem which I have 
striven to pursue. 
More recently, Crane argues that the predominant positivist approach to 
researching business ethics has constrained the development of theory within 
this field (Crane, 1999). He supports the case for a more holistic approach to 
the investigation of issues within business ethics and he identifies a number 
of issues which have arisen out of existing business ethics research. It has 
tended to lean towards normative prescriptions without developing a theory 
base within the field itself, thus hypothesis driven research may not be 
appropriate and case study work may be a better way of considering research 
questions within their context. Sampling is an issue in that, because of the 
breadth of inquiry, no particular sampling strategy will currently lead towards 
the delivery of general theory. In addition, Crane queries the value of 
quantification of factors of influence, raises the possibility that quantitative 
methods impose researcher values, together with a bias derived from social 
acceptability around the issues involved. Thus, it is unlikely that an 
executive would deny the fact that their company is "ethical". Finally, Crane 
denies the possibility of existing research being able to take a holistic 
approach within the context of the problem. He concludes: 
In essence, then, there is a significant and urgent need for practising 
business ethics researchers to scale the barricades of positivism's 
epistemological roadblock and thereby develop a more pluralistic 
approach, and hence a better informed understanding, of this 
fascinating and complex subject. (Crane, 1999, p246) 
As another example of the qualitative approach within business ethics, Takala 
and Urpilainen have taken what they term an "interpretive" approach to 
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researching managerial attitudes to lying at work (Takala and Urpilainen, 
1999). They interviewed two managers twice about their attitudes to telling 
the truth. They concluded that both managers identified honesty, justice and 
quality as being basic principles in managing. However, they recognised 
that sometimes honesty is not practicable in terms of telling the truth to 
everyone. There was a variation in how the concept of "truth" was defined 
between the two informants. This study also demonstrates how such a 
project can only inform on the level of what two individual managers thought 
and believed. 
Having discussed methodology and proposed method, the next chapter 
considers my work with research informants and concludes with a critique of 
how the chosen methodology and method were tested in practice. 
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Chapter Four: 
Working with Research Informants 
1. Introduction 
The purpose of this chapter is to record my method of working with research 
informants to gather data for the project. It includes the search for informants 
willing to take part and a description of the semi-structured interview with 
each individual, together with issues relating to the "contract" formed. 
The software used in the interviewing process was Decision Explorer, 
published by Banxia Software under the "umbrella" of the University of 
Strathclyde and developed by Professor Colin Eden. 
A secondary aim of this thesis is to "test" philosophical ethical theory to 
discover how individuals argue within a "real" situation and whether those 
arguments are mirrored by theory. In doing this, a supplementary question 
was asked of each informant relating to the alternatives of the teleological or 
deontological approach. 
2. The search for informants 
In order for people to be able to help this project, there were a number of 
criteria that they needed to meet within their life situations: 
1. They needed to be in employment (or have recent experience 
of employment) 
They needed to come from a diverse range of employers 
3. They needed to have a moral dilemma which they were 
prepared to discuss with me 
4. They needed to have the time (1 to 1.5 hours) to spend with 
me. 
63 
(a) Recruiting the pilot informants 
I attended two separate sessions of the MBA part-time module on Business 
Ethics for ten minutes each at the beginning of each session and presented on 
my project and search for informants. This resulted in an initial seven offers 
of involvement although one individual withdrew when the matter to be 
discussed became the potential informant of legal proceedings. 
Arrangements were made to meet the resulting six people either at their 
home, their place of work or on university premises and it was always made 
clear that the meeting should take place wherever they felt most comfortable 
and at their convenience. 
(b) Recruiting further informants 
Encouraged by this initial response, number of different attempts were made 
to recruit further informants through letters to local Rotary, Round Table and 
Lions Clubs, and articles in the newsletters of a local business club and the 
local Chamber of Commerce. These produced no response. 
The conclusion was therefore reached that recruitment was most successful 
where potential volunteers could be met face to face. More opportunities 
were made available fresh groups of university students; a group of part-time 
students studying for qualifications under the Institute of Personnel 
Development and, secondly, another group of part-time MBA students. 
Three volunteers were gained from the first group and three from the second. 
In the meantime, a work situation arose in which an informant offered one 
particular experience for discussion. 
An initial data analysis was carried out which tended to indicate that, in terms 
of influences on moral decisions in the workplace, most had been identified 
by the first 12 informants. The interviewing process itself was beginning to 
generate a feeling of "deja vu" within the researcher and an ensuing 
awareness of the meaning of "saturation" of data in the grounded theory 
sense. In addition, it was apparent that the amount of information generated 
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by these 12 interviews was "rich" in terms of Patton's definition of rich data. 
It was also clear from that initial analysis that the individual's relationship to 
the employing organisation was crucial in influencing the framework of 
moral decisions. I 
A third phase was therefore devised in which it was planned to interview a 
group of informants who were working within the same organisational and 
historical context. The staff in a particular department of a higher education 
institute were emailed and their involvement sought. The department had 
recently undergone a process of restructuring. Four members of staff 
responded, three of which brought decisions relating to the restructuring. 
3. The contract with informants 
Potential informants were asked to be Prepared to help in the following ways: 
1. to be prepared to talk about a recent decision which they had 
made that had a moral element within it and agree to the 
interview being taped 
2. to spend 1-1.5 hours in interview with the researcher 
3. to complete a short questionnaire giving relevant background 
4. to be prepared to verify the coding as being true to the event 
5. to notify the researcher of any change of address/contact 
details within a six month period after the interview. 
In return, they were promised the following: 
1. total anonymity 
2. the non-judgmental attitude of the interviewer 
3. that they would have the opportunity to learn from and about 
the process of cognitive mapping 
4. that they would have the satisfaction of knowing that they had 
contributed to the global increase in knowledge! 
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It is recognised that the first two points have, in themselves, a moral element 
within them which reflects the nature of this project. They had been carefully 
considered before being offered. The need to "care for" the informants in 
helping them express sometimes quite strong feelings was also taken into 
account. 
(a) Anonymity of informants 
An awareness of the profound practical problems of implementing a policy of 
total confidentiality had given me an additional sensitivity to this issue in that 
it was clear that it would not be possible to offer confidentiality of any nature 
in relation to the content of the discussion with informants because I would 
need to publish the resulting maps in order to present the data. However, it 
was possible to offer anonymity and, in some cases, names have been 
concealed within transcripts in order to enable this promise to be kept without 
exception. 
(b) Non-judgemental attitude of interviewer 
Again, the researcher's own employment experience had taught the 
importance of being non-judgemental in any "listening" situation. In 
addition, had this not been the case, my values would have interfered between 
the informant's meaning within the situation and the reader's interpretation. 
In listening to the tapes of interview, I might be criticised for colluding, if 
anything, with the speaker through my use of encouraging "ums". 
(c) "Caring" for the informants 
It became apparent very early on in my work with research informants that 
individuals were prepared to expose their feelings and emotions around quite 
difficult areas. It therefore became essential that this was recognised, that I 
ensured that they were as emotionally "comfortable" as possible and that I 
did not challenge or question those feelings or emotions in any way. In work 
with one individual, concern was expressed at the potential effect of her 
talking about her chosen situation on herself because it became apparent that 
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it would not be easy for her. She reassured me that it was what she wanted to 
do. It would not be right to attempt to measure the outcomes of these 
interviews in terms of any "healing" process around underlying feelings but it 
is clear that, to a very limited extent, there was evidence that the process of 
mapping a difficult situation enabled individuals to see it more clearly and, in 
some cases, to understand it better for themselves. 
4. Background information 
In the pilot study, in arranging the interviews, a questionnaire for informants 
to complete giving details of background information was posted out. This 
related to the following factors: 
1. Gender 
2. Age 
3. Ethnic origin 
4. Job title 
5. Type of employer 
6. Length of time with current employer 
7. Length of time in current post. 
Following the pilot study, when it became clear that the data became less 
detailed the longer the length of time between the event discussed and the 
interview, an extra question was inserted relating to that period of time and 
the questionnaire, so amended, was used with all informants. 
5. The interview process 
It was recognised that informants would have spent some time prior to our 
meeting putting the "story" together in their minds in preparation. They 
would have felt the necessity to construct something which "made sense" and 
which could be narrated and scrutinised. It was therefore important to start 
with the opportunity for them to "tell the story" in their own words. This part 
67 
of the interview was taped and transcribed as an "explanation" of the 
subsequent cognitive map. A probing question technique was used 
sometimes when it was not clear about the situation being described but 
otherwise I intervened or commented very little. 
Decision Explorer software installed on a laptop computer was then opened 
with a pre-prepared file relating to the particular informant, based on a base 
map which had five different styles of concepts and three different styles of 
links between concepts. The informant was asked, first, to identify the 
decision moment and to give it a label. In some cases it became quite 
difficult to identify a particular point in time to analyse when a situation 
causing a dilemma was ongoing or spread over a period of time. This point is 
taken up later in the thesis. 
Having identified the decision point, each informant was asked to identify the 
"thoughts" in their head at that particular time. These were dropped onto the 
map in random order and random placing. When the informant felt that all 
concepts had been identified, we moved on to consider the relative strength 
of influence of each of the concepts. Taking concepts in turn, the informant 
chose one of three different levels of strengths indicated graphically through 
three different styles of link (width of line and arrow) between concepts and 
the decision, either towards it (in support of it) or away from it (working 
against the decision). Lastly, for mapping processes, we talked together 
about the nature of the influences. I asked the question "if you could picture 
someone sitting on your shoulder putting a concept in your head, who would 
it be for each one? " We then took each concept in turn, starting with the 
most obvious and moving on to the more difficult, and the informant 
identified the source of the influence as she or he felt it. Each different 
source was allocated a different style of concept and labelled by the research 
informant. Thus, for example, Style 1 became "peer influence" if that was 
how the informant identified it, Style 2 "individual values", continuing until 
all concepts had been treated in this way. The concept styles had been 
previously set up in the base map to have different colour texts. 
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As a last element in the mapping process, the informant was asked the 
following questions: 
1. Are there any other concepts that you've thought of now that we've 
omitted? 
2. Do you recognise this map as being a correct "picture" of your 
situation? 
3. Would you like a hard copy printed off and sent to you? 
In every instance informants agreed that it accurately reflected their situation 
and requested a copy of the map to be sent to them with the exception of two 
informants who did not require copies. 
A final question was asked: 
"In making your decision, did you consider more what to do that was 
right in itself or were you more concerned with the nature of the end 
results, the consequences? " 
As example of the interview process, a transcript of the whole interview with 
Angela is included at Appendix B. 
The resulting information shared with the researcher will be analysed in the 
following chapters. However, issues relating to the nature of the strategy 
around the nature of the sample can-be appropriately raised at this point. It 
was the aim in reaching informants who were prepared to talk about 
particularly difficult situations to attempt to get as wide a range of people in 
work as possible. Thus, the aim was to look at a wide age range of 
individuals from as broad an employment background as possible. It could 
be argued that this was not achieved completely because of there being a 
common background of an involvement with higher education. However, in 
terms of their work roles, certainly the first 12 informants came from a range 
of employment backgrounds. The strategy of seeking a wide range was, in 
Patton's terms, a purposeful sampling strategy which related to typical case 
scenarios in the first 12 informants. The last four informants were sought as 
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part of a theory-driven sampling strategy in that issues had emerged from the 
initial analysis which needed to be explored further within the next four 
informants. As it happened, the fourth informant's decision explored did not 
relate to the common context but still was able to contribute to the total of the 
project's informants. This gave the project 16 narratives and cognitive maps 
to work with. 
Method of analysis: the cognitive maps 
The strengths of the sources identified by informants eitherfol- the decision (a 
positive figure) or against the decision (a negative figure) were listed against 
the informants' initial coding of the nature of the influence. I totalled these 
and re-coded the nature of the influence to provide some uniformity for 
comparison between maps. Table 1 overleaf shows this process for Angela's 
inap. 
The following sources of influence were identified as a result of this process 
over 16 informants. 
0 Individual 
Organisational (i. e. employer) 
Peer/group (internal to organisation) 
Peer/group (external to organisation) 
Professional 
Society 
Other (one occurrence only). 
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Angela 
Concept Code CK code K=5 
Peer/group 
Organisational Peer/group Individual external Professional Societal Other 






powerful influence -1 
3 Employee 
being scape- 




not to send 
memos Personal value 2 
5 manager Organisational 
high profile influence -2 
6 people at 
risk by 
withholding Professional 






team Peer influence -1 
8 manager 
involved 
cart) ing out Organisational 
interview influence -2 
9 worried 
about career Organisational 














job future Personal value -2 
13 not given I t 
important ! po Professional 
oi n as t inf value 0 
F 
141  Don't like 
em 1. lo ee Personal value -1 
15 ! a, She w s 
, na t p rtially to 
blame Personal %alue -2 
16 frustrated Personal value 
I 




A further analysis was carried out which looked at the balance between 
influences external to the organisation (individual, group/peer, professional 
(except in one case), society) and those internal to it (organisational, 
group/peer). In addition, I analysed the apparent reasoning system used by 
each informant to allocate a definition of the stage of moral development at 
which they were arguing according to Lawrence Kohlberg's theories. The 
literature around this subject has been explored elsewhere but a summary of 
the six stages is to be found at Appendix F to the thesis. I have fallen into the 
practice of referring to them as K-stages and an individual informant is 
"labelled" only for the sake of convenience as a K3 for example. It was 
reasonably clear how to classify each informant's argument but I am aware 
that it was done, in a sense, intuitively. While Kohlberg's researchers were 
trained to work with individuals, it is not clear that their final analysis of K- 
stages was any less intuitive than mine. It does provide a useful comparison 
between informants and the fact that it appeared such a clear process of 
classification served to support Kohlberg's theory of different types of 
argument. 
The combination of the maps, the information shown by the above initial 
analysis, and the background information provided by informants was then 
analysed according to classes identified by Schatzman and Strauss (1973). 
They outline a process of discovering classes and their linkages by defining 
three different types of classes: 
1. Common classes, for example, names, gender, age. These are 
normal groupings which are usually used within society 
Special classes which relate to particular groupings within the 
su ect under study (they give the example of types of 
leadership, structure, etc, depending on the context) 
3. Theoretical classes which are discovered and manipulated 
through the process of analysis by the researcher. They 
belong to the researcher and they change and develop during 
the process of analysis. 
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Thus my analysis started with the common classes of age, gender and type of 
employer. I then identified five special classes (length of time with 
employer, length of time in post, nature of employment, K-stages and the 
time between the interview and the decision). Theoretical classes related to 
the distinction between a decision and a dilemma, the various sources of 
influence, and the comparison with philosophical theory. I used the Decision 
Explorer software produced by Banxia as a means of sorting and controlling 
this process of analysis, generating a cognitive map of my emerging ideas 
around the analysis of each class. 
The relationships between the different classes were examined thoroughly 
and therefore cross-relate to each other. For this reason, one particular 
theoretical class which emerged early needs to be outlined at this point. It 
became apparent that, where an individual's total "score" of strength of 
influences was very low or in the negative, this was an indication that the 
decision had been a particularly difficult one. The positive scores for the 
decision were balancing or almost balancing the negative scores of influences 
against the decision. It appeared that the mathematics of the influences was 
serving to highlight the relative difficulty of the decision and that those 
decisions which were balanced or nearly balanced were worthy of separate 
investigation because of their very nature. I decided to take scores of 
between +6 and -6 (total range +43 to -6) as reflecting this close balance 
within the decision and to define them, for the purposes of analysis, as 
"dilemmas" as well as decisions. Six such dilemmas were identified within 
the total 16 decisions and they are examined as a separate class as well as 
within the total. 
In quoting the concepts raised by the informants within their cognitive maps, 
I have used the symbol ** in order to differentiate from quotations taken 
direct from their accompanying narrative. 
7. Method of analysis: the narratives 
Alongside and, also, temporally preceding the maps, were the narratives as 
told by each informant (with one exception due to taping failure (Frederick)). 
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These were the stories, relatively uninfluenced by the researcher, as prepared 
and ready to present by the informants. They had previously been invited to 
talk to me about a particular decision and arrangements had been made to 
meet as a result of them offering such a narrative. The narratives therefore 
represent a prime source of information in relation to the situation described. 
A strength and a weakness of cognitive mapping one particular decision was 
that it tended to focus on one moment in time. This meant that it enabled us 
to consider that moment in great detail but it also excluded all that had 
happened around that moment. The narrative provides the background and a 
series of events as well as a "fresh" evaluation of the situation. 
Labov (1972) identifies four different types of evaluation within narratives. 
The first relates to external evaluation by which he means that the narrator 
steps back from the narration and tells the listener what the point is. The 
second is evaluation which is embedded within the narrative so that the 
narrator might describe her evaluative thoughts at that time or describe 
something that was said at that point in the story. A third form of evaluation 
is to tell the listener what people did in terms of their evaluation of events. 
Lastly, Labov recognises that the first two types of evaluation tend to suspend 
the narrative and intervene in its flow. That very suspension can be used as 
an evaluative input in itself so the fourth type that Labov identifies is the 
suspension of action within the na. rrative when the sequence of events is 
"paused" for some particular evaluative comment. 
Labov's work does not reflect upon the significance of evaluation within a 
narrative which relates to a moral decision. However, it is clear that, in 
telling the story around such a decision, the narrator's evaluation of that 
process is going to be crucial to our understanding of it. Again, because of 
the very context of the story, it is likely that it will reflect upon the wrongs 
and rights of the situation and express principles which are being applied by 
the narrator in that setting. An analysis has therefore been carried out of the 
16 narratives of the research informants which identifies that evaluative 
process and which is then coded by the researcher in terms of the 
underpinning values which appear to be being implied by the informant. 
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Labov has imposed a fairly rigid structure on narratives which does not allow 
for the flexibility of body language and tone. I therefore included events 
which appear to be factual within the context of the text but which were said 
in interview in such a way that they implied a moral dimension to them. An 
example of this might be found in Edith where she says "So I went in at the 
weekend because I knew the codes to everywhere and I went in at the 
weekend". Because I interviewed her and observed her body language as she 
said this, I saw her distress at that point and can therefore confidently infer 
the following underpinning principle "It is wrong to enter work premises with 
the intention of doing something improper. " A hint that she was feeling 
slightly stressed at this point, in telling somebody else that she had done 
something she felt to be wrong, can be found in the fact that she repeated the 
words "I went in at the weekend". In doing this, I also felt that it would be 
helpful to make the distinction between principles that related to the actions 
of others and those relating to self. I was looking for a potential discrepancy 
between the two but found none. 
The narratives were analysed by identifying the informants' evaluative 
comments and sections within them. An example of how this analysis was 
carried out is given for Angela at Appendix E. It serves to identify the 
underpinning principles within the evaluation of the narrative. Very often the 
principles are repeated and expressed in a different way as a means of 
stressing the importance of them. In most cases, the whole point of the 
problem was stated in an evaluative way and this is summarised as follows in 
Table 2. 
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Informant Summary of Problem 
Angela: Do I tell the whole truth ... It is right to tell the truth but in doing 
or do I blame the manager? so, it's wrong that someone should 
suffer as a result when another 
individual was responsible as well. 
Bob: No summary 
Colin: My dilemma was simple really It is right to do one's best for an 
- the company's interests on the one employer as an employee but it is 
side were obviously important to me . wrong to be negotiating illegal 
.. On the other side, these payments payments. 
were illegal. 
Don: No summary 
Edith: No summary 
Frederick: No transcript 
Gaynor: My dilemma was "what do I It is right to take out a grievance 
do about this? Do I take out a against bullying line managers but it is 
grievance procedure against her or do also right to ignore what was 
I just ignore it and bide my time and happening on a day-to-day basis but 
go? " try to change jobs. 
Helen: It was really a dilemma how It is right to feel aggrieved at an 
much effort I put into it and my individual's bad treatment of one and 
reaction to her and the feeling of doing it is right to want to reflect this in 
the collection ... the first two I got a one's behaviour in some way but it is 
lot more money and I got less for her wrong to try less hard in collecting for 
but it was also the dilemma - the a leaving present than for others 
problem was it was the end of the previously. 
month and people were short of 
money and I wasn't very encouraging 
and enthused to ask people to give 
money. 
Isabel: No summary 
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Joanne: And there were a lot of things People have a right to know relevant 
going on which as part of my job I information in relation to their future 
knew about but wasn't actually able to career and livelihood but it is also 
tell these people and it affected their right to maintain the confidentiality of 
lives, their livelihood, where they sensitive information if required to do 
worked, how they worked, who they so by an employing organisation. 
worked for. 
Ken: We knew, suspected that some It is right to be honest about the 
of it was, well may have been suspect accuracy of data to funders but it is 
in some way or another so the difficult to confess that the accuracy 
dilemma was as to whether we should might not be of the required standard. 
actually go back and revisit the whole 
lot or whether we should actually 
ignore it and submit the data. 
Leo: What he was going to do was to It is good to support a friend but it is 
try to rally round and rebel against it wrong to support a colleague who is 
and basically go on strike .. he's the working on a personal crusade and 
sort of chap that thinks things out but I and inciting staff to strike. 
think under that sort of animosity, 
under that sort of pressure, he may 
make the wrong decision. 
Mark: Then it was going to create a It is right to follow a policy negotiated 
mess somewhere along the lines so I on a national basis but it is right to 
had to take a quick decision that s/he treat all employees equally and 
should be allowed to apply even equitably. 
though it went against several 
principles I had little choice but to do 
that I felt ... that was the dilemma. 
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Neil: And one or two members of 
staff have been particularly persistent 
in their opposition to that claiming 
things like "this is unfair" I can't do 
this" "I should not be expected to do 
this". Now when they say things like 
"this is unfair" that raises a moral 
issue so far as I am concerned and that 
places me I would say in a dilemma 
because I think there is a moral issue 
but I think the moral issue is whether 
to say "OK" and keep everything 
sweet and I understand what they're 
saying and I'll give in to them which 
in terms of popularity would be easy 
but what I tried to do and it has 
happened with a very close friend who 
hardly speaks to me now. 
Owen: I thought "well, you know, it 
was in the interests of any of our 
members to be able to go for that 
position and we were keeping the 
(department) leadership to what they 
had said they would do" and the 
normal equal opportunities issues in 
advertising nationally were being set 
aside because of the redundancy 
issues. So the fact that I personally 
stood to gain from it was no reason for 
me in my union hat to not pursue that. 
I would have done so even if I hadn't 
been personally interested. 
It is right that all members of staff 
should be expected to carry out the 
same amount of work but it is right 
that staff should like and respect their 
manager and that the manager should 
be popular. It is right that friends 
should support each other. 
It is right for a union representative to 
act in the best interest of his or her 
members and it is not right for that 
individual to gain personal advantage 
through his or her union position 
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Penny: So in the back of one's mind I It is right to be open and honest with 
is always that question "am I being too colleagues and it is right to respect 
led by what his perception is and not 
ý 
their decision but it is wrong to take 
sufficiently led by her decision which 
was her decision to resign? Am I 
doing it for that particular reason or is 
it because she was a very good 
member of staff and if there was any 
chance of her coming back it would be 
very nice if she could? " 
into account a self-interest in 
persuading her to go against her 
decision. 
Table 2. 
Further analysis of the narratives would have led the project into more 
detailed textual analysis than I could justify, having presented the argument 
against it in the previous chapter. Analysis of the coding of the concepts of 
the cognitive maps was acceptable because the informants were involved in 
the initial coding and had provided the concepts. The potential for distorting 
the overall meaning of the maps was therefore less while the informants 
shared the process of interpretation and took on "ownership" of the maps and 
their content in accepting that they reflected the situation that they had 
described fairly accurately. 
8. Comparing maps and narratives 
It is very clear that the maps and narratives complement each other in many 
ways. In most cases, the availability of both the map and the narrative 
enhances an understanding of the decision or dilemma by the reader. Very 
often, part of the process which benefited the informant the most was the 
"telling of the story" and, in some cases, they appear to have related less well 
to the map. Others felt able to develop (explore) the story through the map 
which provides extra underpinning detail to the original story, particularly in 
that the maps allowed emotions to be revealed and accounted for. 
One way in which the narrative helped me was that, originally, I made the 
assessment of the K-stage using the map and, in one particular case, was 
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unclear as to whether the individual involved was arguing at a level of K4 or 
K5. Analysis of the narrative confirmed the assessment at K4. 
The narratives thus provide a richness which complements the tendency to 
dryness of the maps enabling the reader to gain a greater understanding 
through the use of both. 
9. Critique of Project Methodology and Method 
In the process of analysing the information obtained from the project's 
informants it became clear that the method of gaining such information 
steered and influenced resulting findings. It is therefore appropriate to review 
the usefulness or otherwise of the methods and underpinning methodology 
for achieving any answers to the research question. The original purpose has 
been to investigate the nature of the process of making a moral decision in the 
workplace. The social constructionist perspective has involved an awareness 
of the relationship between the researcher and the informants and the 
resulting social interaction which inevitably influenced the quality of the 
information obtained. It has also provided an emphasis on the social nature 
of individuals making moral decisions at work in terms of their relationships 
with others in their working environment and the influences upon them 
deriving from a variety of social groupings. However, it has also meant that, 
from a group of 16 informants, it is'not possible to make any universalisable 
generalisations. Rather, it has sought to enlighten the reader in describing 
what is involved in the reality of the informants in facing problems at work 
which have a moral dimension. 
One of the tests of whether the project has succeeded is whether another 
person reading the cognitive maps and the points which have been pulled out 
of them can "make sense" of it all in that it also relates to their reality and 
also adds to their knowledge. This is something only the reader can decide 
for himself or herself. The aim has been not to distort the maps and 
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narratives to such an extent that the conclusions cannot be traced back into 
the words and concepts of the informants themselves. 
A number of constraints can be identified which are caused by the methods 
used. The cognitive maps may be deemed to simplify issues to such an 
extent as to distort the original picture away from its contextual reality. 
However, in my defence, all informants with one exception, when offered the 
opportunity to receive a copy of their "map" wished to do so. All 
acknowledged that the map reflected how they saw their particular situation 
and all were involved throughout the process of collecting information in 
influencing it to maintain its relationship to their reality. 
The cognitive maps sought a moment in time which was the "decision". In 
practice, this was sometimes not quite so easy to identify and the fluidity of 
the nature of the decision-making was sometimes pushed into a false time 
framework through seeking to take a "snapshot" of the decision itself. 
My reluctance to undertake detailed textual analysis has meant that I have 
had to look at a wide range of information which, although it was coded to a 
certain extent, retained a relationship to its social and historical context 
within the narratives and maps. While not being able to generalise outside 
the 16 informants' experiences, this has meant that I have not been able to 
analyse the data to the extent of sufficient detail that others might have 
wished. However, where general trends do appear, they are all the more 
strong and influential for being that much more obvious. An example would 
be the fact that, with little variation, all informants identified independently 
and without influence from the researcher, similar sources of influence on 
their thought processes across a spectrum of different situations. 
The range of backgrounds of informants was from that of executive to 
manager at director level. This is a well-researched group well able to 
express their thought processes and it would have been good to have been 
able to attract a wider sample of informants. Similarly, it was disappointing 
not to be able to include volunteers from diverse cultures as this would have 
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added a welcome and interesting dimension to the project. However, the 
nature of the subject for discussion is a sensitive one and I am grateful to all 
who offered their experience and their time. 
On the positive side, the cognitive maps and the narratives provide 
information which is rich according to Patton's definition (Patton, 1990). 
Together, they enlighten the reader around the nature of the experiences of 
the informants in facing a problem at work with a moral dimension. The 
method of talking to individuals about historical events has ensured that the 
"gap" between intention and action is overcome. We have information 
relating to actual situations in the workplace rather than the theoretical 
intentions of research informants considering hypothetical case studies. 
In conclusion, research methods have been chosen which meet the criteria of 
a social constructionist methodology. They seek to keep the informants' 
situations rooted within their historical and social context. Having identified 
the aims and objectives of the research project, defined the methodology and 
decided on appropriate methods of collecting and collating data, it is now 
possible to move on to consider how the work with informants has enhanced 
our knowledge about what happens when someone makes a moral decision in 
the workplace, considering existing theory and comparing it with the way in 
which informants described their experiences. 
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Chapter Five: 
The nature of a decision 
1. Introduction 
In investigating an individual's moral decision made in the workplace, the 
first element of the research question to examine is the nature of the concept 
of decision. The purpose of this chapter is to consider issues around the 
construct of decision as perceived through a multidisciplinary perspective, 
embracing contributions from philosophy, psychology and organisational 
theory, each of which has provided a different element to a holistic approach 
to the concept and then to compare it with the approach to decision-making 
demonstrated by the project's informants. 
The aim of my research is to investigate how the individual makes a moral 
decision within the contextual framework of being a member of an 
organisation. There is a separate but large collection of research relating to 
organisational decision-making and, while it is helpful to look to it for 
possible definitions of decisions, I have deemed it not relevant to my main 
purpose. Sometimes it has been important to recall that distinction when the 
literature appears unclear as to whether it is referring to an individual making 
a decision within an organisation or an organisation making a decision for 
itself. The nature of a collective decision is inevitably different from that of 
an individual. 
I begin with asking the question, "What is a decision? " and then consider 
what is involved in the making of any decision, the identifiable elements 
within a decision and the degree of process, using Gaynor's and Ken's 
cognitive maps to illustrate the diversity of the nature of a decision. I then 
consider the separate definition of a dilemma while comparing theory with 
evidence of the approach of the project's informants. Chapter Eight will 
consider in greater detail the element of a decision which makes it "moral" 
(that is, having an element within it which means that the resultant action 
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might impinge on the welfare of others) or "ethical" (that is, the "right" thing 
to do). 
What is a decision? 
A decision is an act of resolving deliberation by a marking of 
intention to act (Magill, 1997, p87, original emphasis). 
Magill offers the above definition of "decision" and asserts that decisions 
thus resolve uncertainty about what to do, concluding a period of 
deliberation. However, he raises two problems in relation to this definition. 
The first relates to the distinction between the intention to act and the action 
itself. This is significant when it comes to struggling with moral issues and 
doing right or wrong. Elsewhere I shall criticise Kohlberg, for example, for 
judging stages of moral development on theoretical arguments, arguing that 
there is a recognised "gap" between what one might think is right to do in 
theory and what one does in practice. Which end of this process, if it can be 
called such, is the decision? Should the definition of a decision embrace both 
intention and action? This leads to an issue also identified by Magill. 
Sometimes it is not possible to identify the moment of deciding to act and, 
indeed, it is recognised in law that it is possible to act without first having the 
intention to act (Mintzberg and Waters, 1990). The difference between 
murder, which involves a deliberate intention to kill someone, and 
manslaughter which recognises that there was no prior plan to kill someone 
(for example, killing someone through dangerous driving is usually an 
accidental act without previous intention) are an illustration of the distinction 
between intention and action. Thus we might have either an intention to act 
on its own with no action ("the road to hell is paved with good intentions"! ), 
an action which has not been considered beforehand, or an intention to act 
followed by an action. 
It is clear that decision-making involves some form of relationship to action 
whether it results from it or not, either directly or indirectly. Are there other 
elements which we can identify which relate to the nature of a decision and 
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help to define it? Four other factors are involved - that of information, of 
choice, of debate and of awareness. 
We depend on information with which to make our decision. We may 
consciously make a decision about which information to include within the 
decision but whatever information we gather, either consciously or not, we 
take into account in our decision. Very often, we are judged on whether we 
took into account all relevant knowledge available to us in making a decision 
(for example, a judicial decision). Often, too, we choose to ignore certain 
facts if other factors are stronger influences. For example, if I smoked, I 
might choose to ignore all the research relating to potential damage to my 
health. 
The second element within the construct of a decision is that of choice. We 
know when we have a number of practical and possible options open to us 
and that these are often mutually exclusive. I am aware of the ongoing 
debate around free will and determinism (for example, Magill, 1997) and the 
effect of this debate on the nature of decisions. For the purpose of this thesis, 
whether libertarians or determinists are right, I have assumed that, because 
we intuitively feel that we have a choice within certain situations, that that 
choice is i-eal to us, and that we can then state from a social constructionist 
point of view that that freedom exists for us. 
The third element within a decision relates to the nature of the debate. With 
whom do we discuss the options? Mostly - ourselves (Billig, 1987). The 
nature of the conscious rhetoric involved when faced with a particularly 
difficult situation to resolve ranges through all the information available to us 
as we attempt to make sense of the situation and to resolve potential 
problems. Handling all the available information can be a challenge in itself 
and in Judgment and Choice (1987) Hogarth shows that an inability to 
process information leads people to adopt mental "strategies" that simplify a 
judgement but which, in doing so, tends to lead toward the introduction of 
systematic biases. 
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Goldstein and Weber (1997) promote the theory that thought processes used 
within decision making are directed by the content of the decision and its 
context, using the term "domain specificity". They describe four different 
broad categories of decision making. 
1. Nondeliberative decision making. This includes the routine action 
which is hardly considered but can also embrace choosing at random or 
whim. 
2. Associative deliberation. 
In associative deliberation, the decision maker is not actively guiding 
the process of deliberation by following a well-defined procedure so 
much as she is being buffeted by the stream of considerations that 
come to mind. Each successive consideration inclines the decision 
maker toward a particular course of action, either augmenting or 
counteracting the effects of previous considerations. The decision is 
resolved when the cumulative effects of the considerations 
sufficiently incline the decision maker toward a course of action 
(Goldstein and Weber, 1997, p595). 
3. Ride-based deliberation, comparing the choices available against 
particular rules which apply in the situation. 
4. Scheina-based deliberation. Here Goldstein and Weber give as an 
example the process of a jury making sense of given evidence, creating 
choices and then matching a causal model from the "narrative" produced to 
an available choice alternative. 
Which strategy is adopted will depend on a number of factors and these 
include the amount of knowledge held by the decision maker around the 
subject and the semantic content pet, se in that a particular cultural usage 
might direct into a particular decision making strategy. 
86 
Thus, the process of sense-making and of internal debate is complex and is 
described by Chia as a means of rationalising our reality. "It acts to reduce 
equivocality and to punctuate our field of experience thereby helping to 
configure a version of reality" (Chia, 1994, p803). However, the nature of 
the debate involved is one element within the complex construct which is the 
decision. 
The fourth and last element of the decision construct is that which relates to 
whether a decision is taken on a habitual basis and with a certain awareness 
or not. The concept of decision tends to imply decisions which we make 
consciously and which are not habitual. I am not always aware of deciding to 
change gear when driving around a bend in the road which I travel every day. 
On an unknown road, I would consciously be deciding the best gear to be in 
as I approach the bend. However, when do we know that we are consciously 
making a decision? Is the decision only at that point of consciousness? If we 
were not conscious of the decision, was it our decision, even though an action 
has followed? 
While recalling the previous caveat in relation to the danger of confusing 
organisational theory with theory relating to individuals in organisations, I 
wish to refer to Mintzberg and Waters' work on studying deciding in 
organisations which illuminates the lack of structure around decision making 
within organisations and, I argue, also for individuals (Mintzberg and Waters, 
1990). They refer to the commonly held belief that organisations take 
decisions. In their work in researching organisations, they found that what 
they in fact were investigating were the resulting actions of the organisation, 
for example, new shops being opened, new staff being taken on. They found 
it difficult correspondingly to identify the actual decision. 
If a decision is really a commitment to action, then the trace it leaves 
behind in an organisation can range from a clear statement of intent - 
as in the recorded minute of a meeting - to nothing. (Mintzberg and 
Waters, 1990, p2, original emphasis). 
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In pursuance of this argument, Robert Chia maintains that recent thinking 
around decision-making in organisations has turned it into an explanatory 
principle rather than an explanation in itself. He refers to it as a "conceptual 
invention" (Chia, 1994, p794) and argues that this explains the problems of 
tracing the real "point" at which it occurs. 
Deconstructing the concept of 'decision' is a 'ground-clearing' 
exercise intended to pave the way for a more symmetrically naive 
approach to understanding the day-to-dayness of human activities as 
ongoing collective accomplishments rather than as a consequence of 
individual intentional choices (Chia, 1994, p804). 
We thus arrive at a particularly fluid concept of decision-making which 
relates in some form to an action or intention to act. However, it is apparent 
that very often we make a decision not to act and that therefore this type of 
"negative" decision is equally valid but even more difficult to identify 
because its result is that nothing happens or changes. Any knowledge of that 
decision by a wider audience would depend on the individual stating that she 
had made that decision. It is also possible for a series of events to be 
interpreted historically as a decision that led to action where, possibly, no 
actual decision could be identified. Mintzberg and Waters' work on 
attempting to track decisions and resultant actions within organisations 
confirms that (Mintzberg and Waters, 1990). 
3. Gaynor's decision 
Gaynor was a social services manager facing behaviour from her line 
manager which she found particularly difficult. Her story tells of a number of 
incidents which brought the problems to a head and she had identified moral 
factors within her situation which caused her to volunteer spontaneously to 
me to tell me her story. The story itself spanned a number of years and 
involved a number of choices within it at various times. Having heard the 
story, we had to identify one decisive moment in time to analyse through the 
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cognitive mapping process. She decided to focus on a negative decision 
which was not to take out a grievance procedure against her manager. The 
effect of this decision was that she took no action. An additional factor 
relating to it was that it was repeated as a decision on an almost daily basis as 
she sought to make sense of her situation and work her way through it. 
I have identified theory relating to the type of decision (Goldstein and Weber, 
1997) and the separate elements of a decision which need to be present in 
order for it to meet our construct of what a decision is. Applying Goldstein 
and Weber's types (non-deliberative decision-making, associative 
deliberation, rule-based deliberation and schema-based deliberation) to 
Gaynor's description of her situation, it would appear to fit best their 
definition of associative deliberation in that it did involve the "buffeting" of 
events to which she reacted and lived through without seeking to influence 
them to any great extent. The fact that her decision was a decision not to take 
action would tend to support that conclusion. 
Does it contain all four elements of a decision which have been identified in 
theory (information, choice, debate and consciousness)? Certainly, Gaynor 
identifies a number of concepts which informed her at the time (for example 
*needing salary/mortgage to pay*, *other people had failed grievances*, 
*always met deadlines and expectations*). There was a valid choice for her 
in deciding whether to proceed with a grievance against her manager in that 
the opportunity existed for her to do so. The debate about how to handle the 
situation was ongoing within her life as events occurred and she had to react 
to them. Certainly she was conscious of the problems and was reflecting 
upon ways of resolving them on a regular basis. 
4. Ken's decision 
Ken is a manager within a college of further education who identified that 
data submitted to funding authorities was not consistent or one hundred per 
cent accurate and he made the decision to inform funders of this with a view 
to correcting the situation. In terms of the type of decision, it would appear 
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to fall within the category of rule-based deliberation. Ken is very clear about 
the rules involved (for example, *had seen in other orgs money being 
returned and criminal proceedings*, *getting caught out*, *doing the right 
thing*, *loyalty to funders*). He used information in coming to the decision 
to tell funders about the problem (*a lot of money involved*, *had seen in 
other orgs money being returned and criminal proceedings*). He had choice 
in that he could have kept quiet. He carried out a debate about what to do in 
that his cognitive map shows both positive indicators (for the decision) and 
negative (against). Finally, he made the decision fully consciously and aware 
of the consequences. 
In considering Goldstein and Weber's definition of non-deliberative decisions 
and schema-based decisions, and applying them to the sixteen stories shared 
by this project's informants, it would seem unlikely that we would find 
decisions which are non-deliberative because of the very nature of the 
situations which I sought. Similarly, I would not expect to discover any 
schema-based decisions within the contexts in which I was seeking 
information. In practice, Goldstein and Weber's definitions are upheld by 
empirical data which also confirm the four elements of the construct of a 
decision, being information, choice, debate and consciousness. 
5. Decision-making: the process involved? 
A number of different attempts have been made to identify the nature of the 
process involved within decision-making and specific examples of this were 
given in the introduction to this thesis in relation to moral decision making in 
the workplace. I wish to review here the literature which seeks to describe 
some aspect of process from within the paradigm of decision theory. 
In 1997, Goldstein and Hogarth published a collection of articles, Research 
on judgment and decision making: Currents, connections and controversies, 
which aimed to pull together current controversies and themes within 
research relating to judgements and decision-making. Much of the work 
contained within Goldstein and Hogarth appears to shed some useful light on 
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the process, if such a process exists, of making a decision. It is clear that we 
tend to select aspects of a potential "toolkit" when faced with a particular 
situation; that we need to be able to manipulate the information we require 
and adopt particular strategies to enable that to happen and that a number of 
different factors apply depending on the nature and context of the decision. 
What is also emerging is the lack of structure around decision-making. At 
any time, we might choose to select a particular process to enable the 
argument with ourselves to "make sense". We might decide to consider 
specific elements of a quandary first before proceeding to others in order to 
better measure potential consequences. We might seek further information 
on which to base a decision or we might decide on a "gut reaction". What 
steers the way we handle any one situation is a series of diverse factors. How 
does this affect a decision in the work place? Certainly, we have to reject the 
assumption that managerial decisions can be analysed and explained through 
the examination of "complete data, well-defined objective functions and 
rigorously logical choice processes" (Eden and Spender, 1998, p2). Eden and 
Spender view the manager as making decisions within a framework which 
has been created by that individual, in the light of an inadequate amount of 
information and a degree of uncertainty. 
Instead of defining the manager as a computing device, we define her 
or him as a key actor who invents or creates a bounded field of 
decision possibilities whichý is then navigated in the process of choice. 
Our inquiry must cover both the boundary of this field and the terrain 
to be navigated. By definition, we are not able to assume the nature 
of the manager's answers a priori. We do, on the other hand, assume 
that we are able to gain access to the personal model which the 
manager has created, and in the process through which its creator 
navigates its terrain (Eden and Spender, 1998, p3). 
It has also been recognised that we start, before any particular decision, in 
conflict and, having made our choice, we remain in conflict. The conflict 
does not disappear but we have worked out a way of working through it 
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(Schick, 1997). This returns us to Chia's description of a decision being a 
rationalising of our reality as we attempt to make sense of and find a way 
fonvard through a conflict of situations. 
Turning to the evidence on this provided by informants, in many cases, it was 
difficult to identify a moment in time when a decision was being made. 
Informants came with a story to tell which involved a series of events, 
interactions and decisions within the totality of their situation. One of the 
constraints of the cognitive mapping process was the need to focus down on, 
almost, a moment in time where one could take a "snapshot" of the concepts 
coming into play within, very often, quite a complex series of events. An 
example of this is Gaynor's situation where she lived with the behaviour of 
her line manager over a length of time and, in order to "capture" the decision, 
we had to concentrate on a particular time. Again, the nature of the decision 
brought to the project varied enormously from those which were clear-cut 
one-off decisions (12 of the total of 16) to those which recurred over a period 
of time or on a regular basis (four situations). One of these was a decision 
made every month by Bob to falsely claim the cost of driving business miles. 
Another was a decision not to do something (Gaynor) which recurred over a 
period of time while being subjected to harassment by her line manager. I 
had asked people to talk about a moral decision that they had had to make in 
the workplace and they brought with them narratives which explained the 
historical context and the nature of the relationships involved with other 
"players". They were clear, however, that there was a decision to make or a 
problem to solve but sometimes there were multiple decisions within the 
narrative and we had to choose one in particular. 
The introduction to this thesis drew attention to the attempts to define a 
model of the process of making a moral decision in the workplace. Is it 
possible to impose such models on the informants' decisions? For the 
purpose of this analysis, I intend to take the model offered by Malhotra and 
Miller (1998) who have synthesized previous models and have identified five 
different factors within a moral decision in the workplace which also have a 
temporal order, starting with the first and ending with the last. 
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1. Awareness 
2. Perception of problem 
3. Ethical judgement 
4. Determination 
5. Action. 
This type of model implies that there is a beginning, a middle and an end and 
that there is, therefore ,a process to be followed in some form of quasi-logical 
order. What happens in practice? To begin with, I intend to take what 
appears, on the surface, to be a fairly straightforward decision as an example. 
Penny wanted to keep a colleague in employment within the organisation for 
the colleague's sake and for the sake of the organisation because she was 
good at her job. Along the way, she had other problems around the 
confidentiality of discussions with the colleague's partner. This situation 
continued over a number of months. As it developed, it would appear that 
she would definitely have been aware of the need to make a moral decision 
around her colleague's future and that her perception of the problem altered 
as she gained more information about the situation (for example, the 
colleague's partner's intervention). During the situation, she was making a 
number of moral decisions apart from the overall strategic choice which was 
to try to persuade her colleague to consider a return to her post. An example 
of this would have been not to tell her colleague that her partner had been in 
touchwithher. Following the judgement, Malhotra and Miller identify the 
need for a determination or resolution of the problem which then leads to 
action. When I consider Penny's position, it is hard to see a process which 
starts and ends. Rather, it is a non-symmetrical pattern of all the above 
elements and more which feed into each other, influence each other, almost 
cycle within the situation and result in behaviour of a particular type. 
The more complex decisions seem to confirm that these elements (awareness, 
perception, judgement, intention and action) are present but are all in the 
nature of influences within the particular context. Their significance is 
defined by the individual involved and their relationship to events around 
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them. Sometimes this is a conscious process; at other times, less so. Thus, it 
appears that the levels of awareness and perception change, depending on the 
nature of the problem. For example, does Bob go through all those elements 
of Malhotra and Miller's model every time he completes a travel expenses 
claim form? How did Gaynor's decision not to take out a grievance 
procedure against her manager demonstrate intention or, indeed, action? 
Angela went into an interview intending to take a particular action and 
actually found herself doing another. No pattern emerges from the 
experiences of these sixteen informants which might be deemed to be a 
model. Each individual uses the tools available to them to react as they think 
best and those tools are multiple and infinitely variable. What appears to 
happen in practice is that Malhotra and Miller's elements of the process 
become aligned more with the separate elements of decision-making 
identified earlier in this chapter. 
This leads on to the question of whether it is possible to judge a decision by 
its quality (rather than by the nature of its consequences). What makes a 
good decision? If each individual is doing their "best" within their given 
circumstances (abilities, information available, experience), how can we say 
whether the decision is a good one or not? I am not referring to the moral 
content here (th-e right or wrong) but to the type of structure that the 
individual used in coming to the decision. Should we be asking such 
questions as "did the individual use all the information available to them? ", 
for example? Since it appears impossible to be informed ourselves of the 
evidence on such matters, it therefore becomes a fruitless exercise in 
attempting to make any such judgement around the qualitative nature of a 
particular decision. We cannot say "x was a good decision, but y was a bad 
one" because we will never be a party to all the elements which would need 
to inform ourjudgement. 
Can we then describe the making of a decision as an identifiable process, 
having progress from beginning through the middle to a defined end? No - 
the most we can find is that there is an awareness that a decision needs to be 
made, a development of a way through a plethora of constructs which emerge 
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from the initial awareness and the focussing down to a decision which 
translates into action. I recognise that the above description of decision 
making has tended to concentrate on the complex elements of the social 
construct and that it is important to be aware of other approaches to the 
subject within prevailing literature. In order to redress this balance, I turn to 
the work of Chang (1998) who published a quantitative piece of work relating 
to the ability to predict unethical behaviour. He seeks to test out two theories 
relating to decision theory, both of which are scientific in outlook (theory of 
planned behaviour and theory of reasoned action), quantifying elements 
within a perceived process to seek to establish a predictor for unethical 
behaviour. The theory of planned behaviour developed from the theory of 
reasoned action and brings together within a stated relationship the elements 
identified as "behavioural beliefs and outcome evaluation", "normative 
beliefs and motivation to comply" and "control beliefs and perceived 
facilitation" (Chang, 1998, p1826). He states that "both theories assume that 
human beings are basically rational and make systematic use of information 
available to them when making decisions" (Chang, 1998, p1826). In testing 
the efficacy of the theories, questionnaires were used with university 
students. He concluded that the theory of planned behaviour would be able to 
predict unethical behaviour. However, he was only testing theoretical 
intentions to act. This provides us with a good example of how quantitative 
methods within psychology have failed to "capture" the diversity of the 
nature of the processes around making decisions of all types. It starts with 
the presumption that human beings are basically rational and systematic and 
then fails to overcome the gap between stated intention and resultant 
behaviour. 
6. Decision or dilemma? 
There is one type of decision which I intend to refer to as a dilem"la. Indeed, 
several informants refer to their situation as their "dilemma", for example, 
Angela says "it was a real dilemma because you don't know what sort of 
stance to take"; Colin - "So really the dilemma was the decision whether I'd 
go and do this" and Don "So the dilemma really I suppose was concerned 
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with what is fair and what is just and there was no easy answer to that 
question". In most instances, informants were referring to dilemmas within 
the context of the difficulty of the decision facing them. 
Such dilemmas tend to exist where two moral obligations are in conflict or 
where the outcomes will be equally harmful to others. This is where we 
commonly refer to the "horns" of the dilemma. Thus, an example would be 
whether to steal expensive unaffordable drugs to cure one's partner's 
otherwise terminal illness (Kohlberg, 1981). The two principles of "do not 
steal" and "one should do everything possible to preserve one's partner's 
life" conflict in this situation. Another example might be the decision 
whether to make redundant the most expensive, oldest, longest-serving 
person in a factory section, in order to preserve the jobs of two younger, less 
well-paid, members of staff or whether to use the "last in, first out" principle, 
recognising the value of older employees but setting back the careers of 
younger individuals with families and mortgages. 
The resolution of such dilemmas is usually difficult and unlikely to be 
predictable. They are always characterised by a balancing of two or more 
options which work against each other and which offer differing resolutions 
of a solution, none of which are totally acceptable. As described in the 
previous chapter, I realised that the arithmetic of the cognitive maps was 
allowing me to identify particularly difficult decisions, where the decision 
was finely balanced. I decided to call such situations "dilemmas" and these 
were identified where a total score of strength of influence equalled between 
+6 and -6. There were six dilemmas under this definition from Angela, 
Frederick, Joanne, Leo, Mark and Owen. 
The tightest dilemma (Leo's) concerned the welfare of a colleague who was 
also a social friend thus creating a conflict between values relating to 
employment and private social life. Leo's case is the one situation where a 
decision was not actually made in that he was never asked to make it. He 
worked it all out in anticipation but then was out of the office when his 
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colleagues were being asked the same question. He was, however, very clear 
about what he would have done. 
Five of the six dilemmas concerned specific issues relating to individuals as 
against more general organisational issues from which one might conclude 
that those decisions relating to the welfare of an identifiable individual cause 
greater difficulty when moral principles conflict. While all sixteen 
informants presented situations where there was moral conflict, the six 
"dilemmas" within them expressed particular difficulty in resolution of the 
problem faced by them. 
7. Conclusions 
The decisions which informants have brought to this project demonstrate a 
diverse, ephemeral construct. We tend to conceptualise decision-making as a 
process having a beginning, middle and end. The reality of the informants 
shows that very often the process recurs (Bob) or is cyclical (Gaynor, Penny) 
and can be part of a wider historical situation. I therefore conclude that the 
social constructionist perspective on this concept takes a wide view and 
recognises that the word "decision" can be used within a number of different 
structured or less structured contexts where the resultant meaning can still be 
shared because we accept the breadth of meaning for this concept, holding 
within it at various times both an intention to act and the action, or series of 
actions, itself. It is clear that making a decision involves an element of 
information, of choice between at least two different options, each of which 
being possible to achieve, and that often there is an element of debate 
involved. Further, a decision is usually consciously made and is not made 
without due consideration. However, that does not mean that it cannot be 
repeated. It is not a habit while all factors are being taken into account at the 
point of each decision. At the same time, it has become clear that any 
attempt to make judgements around the quality of a particular decision would 
be futile and potentially unjust to the decision-maker because of the lack of 
available information. 
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This leaves me with a picture of a decision which is not a process, which has 
elements which feed into it relating to identifying the problem, thinking 
through the relevant information, considering the balance of the various 
influences within the situation, and acting accordingly. The nature of what 
happens before the action is multifarious and diverse, sometimes 
unpredictable and elusive to capture. 
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Chapter Six: 
Theories of Individual Moral Development 
1. Introduction 
When considering the process of making a moral decision in the workplace, 
the central "player" is the individual involved and therefore that is where any 
investigation of the process must start. 
What does an individual bring to any moral decision? She has, firstly, a set 
of values which are constantly changing and being influenced by a number of 
"external" factors. Secondly, she has a particular ability to reason through 
specific options for action with a moral content with reference to that set of 
values. Lastly, she needs the capacity to resolve a "moral" situation by 
translating the reasoned decision into action. Within that process, the 
individual carries a number of factors which are personal to her and which 
are (in general) fixed and unchangeable - for example, gender, age, level of 
education, together with aspects of their character such as their locus of 
control. 
The project's research informants all identified sources of influence within 
their cognitive maps of their situations relating to something which originated 
from themselves. In most cases, they referred to individual values as being 
the source of the influence. In others, Isabel, for example, talks about her 
44own emotion" in relation to a number of concepts identified within her map 
while Leo refers to his "personal view". What is implied by all informants is 
something which is inherent to themselves and identifiable apart from other 
influences. 
The question of "moral values" and their philosophical context will be 
considered in Chapter Eight. I want to differentiate here between the "values 
in use" and the structure in which they are being used. I intend concentrating 
on the latter in this chapter. Thus, my current aim is to consider how people 
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acquire such values and the ability to use them rather than the personal 
philosophy they use in assessing their own (and that of others) value 
judgements and actions. In doing this, I am making a distinction between 
content and process. Content relates to the value judgements and moral 
reasoning arguments in use. Process reflects the way in which such values 
are acquired and the ways they are used within the context of reasoning 
through a particular decision. The question of the nature of the content will 
be discussed further in Chapter Eight. This chapter is concerned with the 
nature of the process involved in making a moral decision in the workplace 
and how an individual develops the ability to reason through a situation 
which contains a moral element. 
Theories which seek to answer the question of where we get our moral values 
from can be found within the field of psychology and sociology and they 
invariably relate to or derive from the different paradigms in the relevant 
disciplines. Within psychology, there are theories relating to moral 
development from the psychoanalytical and behavioural traditions. However, 
the most influential theory and that which has directed research in business 
ethics more than any other, is that known as cognitive moral development, 
devised by Lawrence Kohlberg following a series of longitudinal studies. It 
is this theory which I will explore in the greatest depth, referring to other 
theories where they have been used to usefully criticise Kohlberg's work. I 
will then consider how the theory of cognitive moral development (CMD) 
has influenced research work within business ethics, together with a literature 
survey of work carried out on such factors as age and level of education. I 
will then apply an analysis of the stages of moral development to the 
arguments used by the project's informants. The question of how an 
individual's gender affects their moral thinking will be covered in the 
following chapter as it raises a number of specific issues within the empirical 
research. 
Finally, in introducing this chapter, it is helpful to consider as background to 
the work of Kohlberg, two separate theories which preceded him historically 
- the work of Erich Fromm and Emile Durkheim. Erich Fromm, in his book 
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Man foy- Himself: An Enquiry into the Psychology of Ethics describes his 
theories as deriving from within the Freudian psychoanalytical tradition. 
Writing in 1949, he stated that 
the sources of norms for ethical conduct are to be found in man's 
nature itself-, that moral norms are based upon man's inherent 
qualities, and that their violation results in mental and emotional 
disintegration (Fromm, 1971, p7). 
Thus he held that any study of ethics should be a study of the human 
character as a whole in terms of the "orientation" of that character. He 
distinguished between authoritarian ethics and humanistic ethics and in 
relating this to the derivation of the "conscience" he held that the 
authoritarian conscience reflected the voice of the external authority whether 
it be that of parents or State. The "humanistic" conscience is defined by 
Fromm as being "our own voice, present in every human being and 
independent of external sanctions and rewards" (Fromm, 1971, p158). He 
therefore argues that people should listen to themselves in making moral 
judgements. He mentions the question of development through childhood 
from the authoritarian to the humanistic but questions whether the 
authoritarian has to pre-exist the humanistic conscience. 
While Fromm tends towards a sociological perspective, the work of Emile 
Durkheim is rooted firmly within the discipline of sociology. While future 
chapters will be considering in greater depth the societal influence upon 
individuals' moral decision making, it is important to be aware of his work at 
this stage in order to set other theories in a proper context. Emile Durkheim 
saw society as being a power in itself and held that our moral values stem 
from that power and are generated by society. "But attributing to society this 
preponderating role in the genesis of our nature is not denying this creation; 
for society has a creative power which no other observable being can equal" 
(Bellah, 1973, p222). 
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In introducing this subject, the two above contrasting theories serve to 
indicate the range of resolutions of the problem of the derivation of moral 
values. However, before continuing to consider CMD theory, it is necessary 
to outline the work of Jean Piaget as this set the scene for Kohlberg's 
thinking a few years later. 
2. Cognitive Moral Development (CMD) 
(a) Piaget's theories 
In his book The MoralJudgement of the Child, Jean Piaget outlines his 
theories relating to how children gain their moral values (Piaget, 1932). He is 
quite clear that he is investigating mot-alftidgement, rather than moral 
behaviour. Moral judgement is based on rules and where these rules come 
from is where theory begins to diverge, whether it be Kantian philosophy or 
Durkheim's sociological theories. He also makes the distinction between the 
practice of rules and the consciousness of rules. 
From an analysis of discussions with children up to the age of 12 regarding 
the rules of a game of marbles, he draws together data from which he pulls 
out what he calls "four successive stages" (Piaget, 1932, p16). The first is 
when a child picks up the marbles on his own and plays with them on his own 
according to his own wishes. The second he calls egocentric because 
children at this stage, while playing alongside other children, are still playing 
"on their own" without following any coded rules. The third he calls 
cooperation - each child is trying to win but no-one is quite sure about the 
rules. The fourth and last stage is what Piaget calls the codification of rules. 
"Not only is every detail of procedure in the game fixed, but the actual code 
of rules to be observed is known to the whole society" (Piaget, 1932, p17). 
He sees the development as a continuum which cannot be divided up into 
sections. He admits that there is no clear distinction between the stages on a 
small scale of sample but only through increasing the number of research 
subjects does a general pattern emerge. 
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The consciousness of rules develops over three stages that overlap the above 
stages. 
We may express this by saying that the progression runs through three 
stages, of which the second begins during the egocentric stage and 
ends towards the middle of the stage of cooperation (9-10), and of 
which the third covers the remainder of this co-operating stage and 
the whole of the stage marked by the codification of rules (Piaget, 
1932, pp17-18). 
During the first stage, rules are not yet "coercive". In the second stage, they 
are regarded as "sacred and untouchable". "Finally, during the third stage, a 
rule is looked upon as a law due to mutual consent, which you must respect if 
you want to be loyal but which it is permissible to alter on the condition of 
enlisting general opinion on your side" (Piaget, 1932, p18). Piaget therefore 
identifies two sets of developmental stages, one relating to the practice of 
rules and one to the consciousness of rules. 
He refers to the difference between the sociological and psychological 
approach - the Durkheimian approach would state that the respect is for the 
authority of a group while the psychological theorist would state that it is 
directed to individuals and is the outcome of relationships between 
individuals. He argues as follows: 
For the group could not impose itself upon the individual without 
surrounding itself with a halo of sanctity and without arousing in the 
individual a feeling of moral obligation. A rule is therefore nothing 
but the condition for the existence of a social group; and if to the 
individual conscience rules seem to be charged with obligation, this is 
because communal life alters the very structure of consciousness by 
inculcating into it the feeling of respect (Piaget, 1932, p96). 
Piaget carries forward his theory of stages of moral development and reflects 
it within two defined types of morality -a morality of constraint or of 
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heteronomy and a morality of cooperation or of autonomy. In doing this, he 
identifies one "moral notion" (Piaget, 1932, pl95) which relates to the 
concept of justice. He thereby sets a foundation which is later to be picked 
up by Kohlberg when he bases his theory of CMD upon the notion of justice 
reasoning. 
Piaget's work is criticised on a number of counts by Peter Langford (1995). 
He questions whether the rules of a game of marbles can be compared with 
moral rules. He suggests that the complexities of the rules cannot generalise 
into more general conventions and, following analysis of Piaget's interviews, 
questions the way he has used the evidence from them to support his theories. 
Langford's last comment on Piaget is that he concentrated his research on 
children under the age of 13, thereby missing the period of adolescence. It 
will be shown that Kohlberg holds that much development relating to the 
capacity to reason morally takes place at that stage. 
The reason for including a summary of Piaget's theory is to set the 
background for a more detailed description of Lawrence Kohlberg's theory of 
cognitive moral development. 
(b) Kohlberg's theory of cognitive moral development 
The first point to make is that Kohlberg wrote prolifically and developed and 
modified his theory as his research progressed and in the light of criticism. I 
have therefore concentrated on his later published works, seeing them as 
reflecting his thinking as far as it developed. 
Writing in 1984 in The Psychology ofMoral Development: the nature and 
validity of moral stages, Kohlberg acknowledges that in his study of moral 
development in adolescents he decided to use three assumptions derived from 
Piaget's work. The first was to use his concept of justice as being the central 
pillar of a child's moral reasoning according to Piaget. The second was to 
assume that the child was a philosopher, able to construct arguments around 
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questions of fairness. The third assumption was that development progressed 
through a number of stages which were set in an invariant order. 
(C) The stages of moral development 
Kohlberg held that people develop through six different stages of structure of 
moral reasoning as follows: (summarised from Kohlberg (1981)). 
Level A: Stage 1: The Stage of Right is literal obedience to rules 
Preconventional Punishment and and authority, avoiding 
Level Obedience punishment, and not doing 
physical harm. 
Stage 2: The Stage of Right is serving one's own or 
Individual other's needs and making fair 
Instrumental Purpose deals in terms of concrete 
and Exchange exchange. 
Level B: Stage 3: The Stage of The right is playing a good (nice) 
Conventional Level Mutual Interpersonal role, being concerned about the 
Expectations, other people and their feelings, 
Relationships, and keeping loyalty and trust with 
Conformity partners, and being motivated to 
follow rules and expectations. 
Stage 4: The Stage of The right is doing one's duty in 
Social System and society, upholding the social 
Conscience order, and maintaining the welfare 
Maintenance of society or the group. 
Level C: Stage 5: The Stage of The right is upholding the basic 
Postconventional and Prior Rights and rights, values and legal contracts 
Principled Level Social Contract or of a society, even when they 
Utility conflict with the concrete rules 
and laws of the group. 
Stage 6: The Stage of This stage assumes guidance by 
Universal Ethical universal ethical principles that all 
Principles humanity should follow. 
At times, Kohlberg sought to modify the above stages but these modifications 
have not in general been taken on board by any subsequent writers (for 
example, see Weber, 1991). 
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Kohlberg, writing in 1976, refers to Piaget's theories relating to the 
development of the ability to reason logically and the development through 
stages of social perception. He recognises that both abilities need to have 
been acquired before the corresponding stage of moral reasoning can be 
reached. In other words, it is necessary to have the appropriate ability to 
reason logically at a principled level before Stage 6 can be reached. 
However, Kohlberg does recognise that it is possible not to live up to any 
particular stage of moral development in practice although he holds that a 
stage of moral development is a good predictor of behaviour commensurate 
with that stage. He also states that the higher the stage of moral development 
in moral reasoning, the higher the propensity to behave accordingly. Later in 
this chapter, I will be considering the "gap" between a reasoned decision to 
do something and the actual "doing" of it. Kohlberg here is indicating that 
the gap narrows (to continue the analogy) as an individual increases their 
ability to reason morally. 
I refer to Don Locke who gives a particularly adequate summary of 
Kohlberg's theory in relation to an individual's defined stages of moral 
development, quoted as follows: 
1. The different stages constitute structural wholes, which unite a 
variety of different responses to different moral situations, and reveal 
quantitative rather than qualitative differences in the mode of 
response. 
2. The sequence is invariant, always occurring in the same order 
and with no stages omitted, though individuals do not always develop 
at the same rate or reach the same final stage. 
3. The sequence is culturally universal, with the same stages 
occurring in the same order in every society. 
4. The sequence is logically necessary, in that the inner logic of 
moral concepts is such that the order could not, logically, be other 
than it is. 
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5. The sequence represents an increasing cognitive adequacy, in 
that each new stage enables the individual to resolve and reconcile 
moral claims and conflicts arising at earlier stages. 
6. The stages also represent an increasing moral adequacy so that 
progression through the six stages to a final stage of universal moral 
principles provides an appropriate and justifiable goal for moral 
education. (Locke, 1994a, p106). 
(d) Kohlberg's research method 
Kohlberg established his theories initially through a qualitative longitudinal 
study of 58 American boys ranging in age from 10-16 years old. He then 
carried out further cross-cultural research in Turkey and Israel. His method 
was to train interviewers to interview the research subjects around a structure 
which included the theoretical discussion of particular moral "dilemmas". 
The most well-known of these cases is called the "Heinz dilemma" and this is 
reproduced below. 
In Europe, a woman was near death from a special kind of cancer. 
There was one drug that the doctors thought might save her. It was a 
form of radium that a druggist in the same town had recently 
discovered. The drug was expensive to make, but the druggist was 
charging ten times what the drug cost him to make. He paid $400 for 
the radium and charged $4, QOO for a small dose of the drug. The sick 
woman's husband, Heinz, went to everyone he knew to borrow the 
money and tried every legal means, but he could only get together 
about $2,000, which is half of what it cost. He told the druggist that 
his wife was dying, and asked him to sell it cheaper or let him pay 
later. But the druggist said, "No, I discovered the drug and I'm going 
to make money from it. " So, having tried every legal means, Heinz 
gets desperate and considers breaking into the man's store to steal the 
drug for his wife. (Kohlberg, 1984, p640) 
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In the initial study, the boys were interviewed every three years over a twelve 
year period. Kohlberg outlines the system of scoring of the responses which 
identified the stage of moral development which each subject had reached 
(Kohlberg, 1976). He claims that the stages identified are "true" because 
anyone doing a longitudinal study of children based on the discussion of 
moral dilemmas would come to the same conclusions. He also claims that 
they are true because they are not derived from any one particular 
psychological theory. They are the result of "logical analysis" of data. It 
could be argued that, here, Kohlberg is taking a "grounded theory" approach 
from a tabula t-asa using induction in forming his theory from "raw" data 
(see Chapter Two for a fuller explanation of grounded theory). Whether this 
was in fact the case could be the subject of another thesis! 
A student of Kohlberg's at Harvard University, James Rest, developed a 
research method in the Defined Issues Test which is intended to be a more 
structured and rigorous test of stage of moral development (Rest, 1976). It 
uses six moral dilemma situations and requires the subject to rank twelve 
issues in terms of their importance in deciding what ought to be done. The 
Defined Issues Test (DIT, as it will be referred to later), has been used fairly 
extensively in research relating to business ethics (for example, Goolsby and 
Hunt, 1992; Logsdon et al, 1994; Wilson, 1995; Wimalasari et al, 1996). 
Kohlberg recognises its use in establishing moral maturity while questioning 
its relevance to formulating theory (Kohlberg, 1976). 
(e) Kohlberg's philosophy 
Kohlberg identifies "moral categories" which he sees as relating to moral 
philosophy. He describes four possible groups of categories which he calls 
moral orientations. 
1. Normative order: Orientation to prescribed rules and toles of 
the social or moral order. The basic considerations in decision 
making centre on the element of rules. 
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2. Utility consequences: Orientation to the good or bad ivelfai-e 
consequences of action in the situation for others and/or the self. 
3. Justice orfairness: Orientation to relations of liberty, 
equality, reciprocity, and contract between persons. 
4. Ideal-self., Orientation to an image of actor as a good self, or 
as someone with conscience, and to his motives or virtue (relatively 
independent of approval consequences from others). (Kohlberg, 1976, 
p40) 
Kohlberg identifies various philosophers with the above - for example, Kant 
with the normative order, John Stuart Mill with the consideration of welfare. 
He states that he believes that the justice orientation is the most important. 
While all orientations may be used by an individual, we claim that the 
most essential structure of morality is a justice structure. Moral 
situations are ones of conflict of perspectives or interest: justice 
principles are concepts for resolving these conflicts, for giving each 
his due (Kohlberg, 1976, p40). 
As a result of his research in different cultures, Kohlberg adheres to the 
theory that the stages of moral development also stand regardless of the 
nature of the society to which the individual belongs. He does acknowledge 
that he did not locate any persons at Stage 6 outside the US and the problems 
relating to Stage 6 in general will be addressed when Kohlberg's critics' 
arguments are given consideration. 
(f) Development between moral stages 
How does Kohlberg believe that individuals move between stages of moral 
development? He uph olds Piaget's theory that development between stages 
is brought about through interaction with peers and peer influence but he 
argues that adult input is also required. His experiments relating to moral 
education through the implementation of the concept of the "Just 
Community" in schools reflect his theory more clearly (Kohlberg and 
Higgins, 1987). 
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The emphasis of the Just Community is on the rules which the community 
works out together in order that they are commonly shared and all members 
feel responsible for them. In referring to the success of the Just Community 
approach in moral education, Kohlberg and Higgins state that the motivation 
does not come from teacher advocacy or the recognition of the value of 
dialogue and mutual respect but from 
students coming to value a community and membership in it. Feeling 
a sense of ive, of collective solidarity, of being a group, was 
necessary for students to care about fair decision making and moral 
dialogue (Kohlberg and Higgins, 1987, p110). 
Kohlberg and Higgins describe Durkheim's theory of moral development as 
being respect for group authority, together with a feeling of membership of 
the group. As a result of this, their guidance to teachers relates firstly, to the 
use of discipline and punishment to instil respect for the rule and, secondly, 
to encourage a feeling of cohesion within the group. They interpret 
Durkheim's theory as hanging on the need for a group or community's sense 
of sharing certain norms. They then compare this with their experiences in 
the Just Community projects which confirmed this element of Durkheim's 
theory. 
Putting Kohlberg's theory in perspective and developing upon it, James 
Garbarino and Urie Bronfenbrenner expand on the process which is required 
for an individual to move between stages of moral development (Garbarino 
and Bronfenbrenner, 1976). They have their own theory of moral 
development which relates to three levels. Level 1 is pre-moral (no moral 
stage). Level 2 would encompass Kohlberg's stages 1 to 4, and Level 3, his 
staaes 5 and 6 where values, principles and ideas rather than social agents 1ý 
have the greatest influence. They consider what causes a child to move from 
one level to another and assert that any socialisation of a child will move it 
from Level 1 to 2 in terms of social influences whether they are parental or 
peer or other authority. The move from Level 2 to Level 3 has to be the 
result of an element of choice and therefore conflict. The conflict arises from 
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a clash between two different sets of values stemming from different 
"authorities". It is only at that stage that a person has to use principles and 
values in order to choose. Garbarino and Bronfenbrenner see a pluralistic 
social structure as being capable of generating a move to Level 3. They 
define pluralistic as 
a setting in which social agents and entities represent somewhat 
different expectations, sanctions, and rewards for members of the 
society. These differences generate intergroup conflict which is 
largely regulated by a set of "ground rules" (such as a constitution) 
and a common commitment to integrative principles or goals (such as 
a religious ethic) (Garbarino and Bronfenbrenner, 1976, p75). 
They relate this theory to moral development within different nations and 
show that the higher the pluralism factor (as they define it) in terms of the 
socio-political system, the higher children scored in a devised moral dilemma 
test. 
Both perspectives, those of Kohlberg and of Garbarino and Bronfenbrenner, 
give an insight into the answer to the question "how do we gain our values 
and our ability to reason morally? " 
(g) Kohlberg's view of society 
We have already seen a little of how Kohlberg believes that individual moral 
development relates to society through his concept of the "just community". 
He relates the pre-conventional, conventional and post-conventional stages of 
moral development to stages of membership of society (Kohlberg, 1976). 
Thus, the pre-conventional response to the question "Why is it wrong to 
steal? " is "because the police will find you out and punish you". Here there 
is no concept of membership of society. The conventional response to the 
question might be "it's a law that says that we mustn't steal. If society didn't 
have such laws, society would break down. " This indicates a total 
membership and relationship within society. The post-conventional response 
would be to explain that individuals' rights need protecting. Here is reflected 
ill 
a standing apart from society and an ability to make a moral evaluation of 
society's rules and justify them in terms of individuals' rights. 
He then argues that the two stages at each level indicate a development in 
how an individual relates to others and society in particular. Thus, Stage 3 
represents an awareness of individual relationships with others while Stage 4 
takes the point of view of society as the "system" on a more institutionalised 
basis. Similarly, Stage 2 shows more recognition of another individual's 
point of view than does Stage 1. In the post-conventional level, Stage 5 
"distinguishes between a moral point of view and a legal point of view, but 
finds it difficult to define a moral perspective independent of the perspective 
behind contractual-legal rights" (Kohlberg, 1976, p39). Stage 6, on the other 
hand, is able to identify universal principles of right and wrong beyond those 
set by law. Thus Kohlberg's view of the relationship between the individual 
and society would appear to be one of tension - needing the influence of 
peers and adults to be able to develop but gaining the ability to stand apart 
from society at Stage 6 of moral reasoning. 
3. Criticisms of Kohlberg's theories of moral development 
Over the years, Kohlberg's theories have been criticised from a number of 
different points of view. The purpose of this section is to summarise the 
main areas of criticism and place his theories within the context of alternative 
ideas, together with a comparison with the results from this project's 
empirical research. 
(a) Methodology 
The first area of criticism -for consideration is that of his general methodology 
and, more specifically, the nature of the fictional dilemmas used in 
Kohlberg's structured interview settings. To what extent do they reflect 
"reality"? Can an individual really identify with them or are they so remote 
as to become a subject of strictly theoretical reasoning with no link to a 
recognisable situation in the research subject's life? (see Adler, 1987). For 
example, the Heinz dilemma is set in Europe - away from any of the 
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countries or cultures where Kohlberg's research was carried out. Similarly, it 
is argued that the dilemmas are too simplified and that in "real life" there are 
more factors which need to be taken into account (Emler, 1983). 
The second area around Kohlberg's methodology relates to the influence of 
the interviewer and the scoring systems used. It has been questioned as to 
whether there is a problem relating to the consistent interpretation and 
scoring of responses to moral dilemmas in interviews (Langford, 1995). It 
has been suggested that some of the responses to the dilemmas have been 
wrongly scored due to the (unscientific) moral prejudice of the scorers 
(Locke, 1994b). Again, Nicholas Emler criticises Kohlberg's work in terms 
of the influence of the interviewer in seeking to secure the "right type" of 
response from the research subject in discussing the dilemmas (Emler, 1983). 
He maintains that the interviewer would be tempted to push the subject to 
respond in terms of his or her arguments for his or her response because this 
was how the scoring system related to the interview. Langford also makes 
the point that the dilemmas tend to encourage research subjects to become 
involved in the context of the dilemma and not to look beyond it to a wider 
context, thereby not being inclined to argue in the abstract. They would tend 
to become drawn in to the drama posed by the dilemma. Richard Schweder 
and Nancy Much re-interpret the interviews used in assessing stages of moral 
development, using a system of discourse analysis which they argue leads to 
a re-coding of the moral stage (Schweder and Much, 1987). 
For the above reasons, I avoided the practice of using hypothetical scenarios, 
preferring to concentrate on history and "actual" events. Similarly, it was not 
appropriate to use the Defined Issues Test which imposes a very theoretical 
structure on an analysis of moral judgement. However, having heard the 
individuals' stories and collated their maps, it was inevitable that I should try 
to relate Kohlberg's stages of moral development to the nature of the 
arguments being used. This proved very easy to do, bearing in mind his 
guidance. Only in one case was there any doubt and this was clarified by 
double-checking the cognitive map against the informants' narrative. The 
informants were thus "labelled" according to K-stage. 
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Reasoning v action 
It is generally recognised that there is a potential "gap" between what an 
individual might decide to do and what they actually do (Mischel and 
Mischel, 1976; Straughan, 1983). Some of the criticisms of Kohlberg's 
dilemmas relate to the fact that they are theoretical - that they assume that, if 
the research subject were in that particular situation, she would act as 
theoretically determined through reasoning. Thus the "theory of reasoning" 
would become the "theory in action or use". However, it is clear that this is 
very often not the case and that there is a "gap" between a theoretical position 
and the behaviour which follows it in many situations involving a moral 
dilemma. 
Kohlberg considers the relationship between moral cognition and moral 
behaviour (Kohlberg, 1984). He summarises research prior to the mid-1960's 
which was consistent in showing inconsistencies. This led to a belief that 
there were in fact two different systems which did not necessarily relate to 
each other - moral judgement and moral behaviour. Kohlberg, however, 
holds that they are unified. He devises a model of the relationship between 
moral judgement and moral action and identifies a number of non-moral 
elements required to convert the judgement into action. These include 
intelligence (for example, the ability to plan action), attention (avoiding 
distractions), and delay of gratification (e. g. perseverance). He admits that 
more empirical research is required in this field. 
Jonathan Adler is one of many writers to criticise Kohlberg for not 
establishing a causal link between moral reasoning and moral behaviour 
(Adler, 1987). Walter Mischel and Harriet N Mischel make the distinction 
between an individual's competence (capacity) to generate social behaviour 
and the motivational variables for their performance in any particular 
situation (Mischel and Mischel, 1976). They therefore criticise Kohlberg 
because his system of levels of moral maturity does not allow this distinction 
to be made. It can only indicate the subject's preferred level of reasoning. It 
could be argued that, by referring to higher principles of moral values, an 
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individual could be deemed to be indicating thinking at, for example, Stage 6 
level, rather than at the level which his behaviour would indicate that he is 
operating on. 
If moral behaviour diverges from the moral reasoning, what sort of factors 
influence people to behave in a particular way, given their stage of moral 
reasoning? Thomas Lickona (1976) sought to relate moral behaviour to an 
individual's cognitive-motivational base. Mischel and Mischel (1976) 
suggest that an individual's moral behaviour depends on her capacity for self- 
regulation and control. They conclude that so much information is required 
about the variables which apply to any one particular individual that it would 
be extremely difficult to predict the person's behaviour. 
For example, to predict an individual's altruistic behavior accurately 
one may have to know his age, his sex, the experimenter's sex, the 
expected consequences of altruism in that situation, the models to 
whom the subject has been exposed recently, and the subject's 
immediately prior experience - to list only a few of the many 
variables which may be relevant (Mischel and Mischel, 1976, p103). 
More recently, the question of the consequences of behaviour is also raised 
by Krebs, Denton and Wark where they report on research studies with 
university students (Krebs et al, 1997). They begin by questioning whether 
students do, in fact, argue philosophically about moral dilemmas in their own 
lives and their research confirms that they do. However, their research has 
shown that their level of moral reasoning directly relates to their audience. 
For example, their stage of moral reasoning would be higher if expecting to 
discuss an issue with a professor of philosophy than with a professor of 
business administration. Similarly, they question whether Kohlberg is correct 
in assuming that the type of moral reasoning involved in resolving 
hypothetical moral dilemmas is the same as that used to solve everyday 
situations in practice. They demonstrate that people are not "in" any 
particular stage at any one time in their life but invoke a number of different 
stages of moral development - where Kohlberg is correct is in saying that 
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people develop the capacity to argue morally at a philosophically higher level 
but they do not use this capacity to the full most of the time. They list a 
number of factors which they have found to affect the level of moral 
judgement. They argue that the causal relationship between moral reasoning 
and moral behaviour may be reversed in that some of their research has 
shown that people choose a self-centred action and then justify it with moral 
reasoning. Some of the factors they identify in the process of moral 
reasoning include anticipating social consequences to self (the reaction of 
others) and the consequences to others. "The value people place on the 
consequences they anticipate may influence their moral decisions, which may 
influence the forms of moral judgement they invoke to justify them" (Krebs 
et al, 1997, p140). 
Thus, they turn the argument upon its head, suggesting that the consequences 
of behaviour govern the justification for it. Their research has led them to 
propose that the theory of evolution serves as a better basis for an explanation 
of the development of moral judgement. People co-operate and form and 
uphold the rules of cooperation as a means of survival and propagation. 
However, it is also in their interest to cheat the system and to compete against 
those with whom they co-operate for a larger share of resources. 
It might be argued that aspects of the informants' stories would support this 
theory. Bob was employed within a company where he was provided with a 
company car. He discovered that others within the organisation were making 
a regular habit of exaggerating their business miles driven for which they, 
firstly, could claim reimbursement and, secondly, would count towards a total 
mileage which attracted less income tax. He indicates that he was 
encouraged by others to carry out the same practice in completing his 
monthly claim form. His justification for doing this, apart from it being 
common practice within the company, was that he considered that the British 
tax system was inherently unfair and that it compensated him for a low salary 
which he felt should otherwise have been higher. At the same time Bob 
obviously felt uncomfortable about what he was doing (*it feels immoral*). 
It does look possible that Bob was looking after himself first and justifying 
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his actions subsequently, thus supporting the theory of Krebs et al. Is it 
possible that this only happens when the resultant behaviour is "immoral" in 
some way? When one considers other informants' stories, there is only one 
other context in which someone might be deemed to have openly contravened 
common rules within the context of employment. This is Edith's story. She 
was working as a manager in the health services and discovered some 
potentially unethical behaviour in her organisation which she decided to 
expose by going in to the office at a weekend and faxing a confidential report 
to someone who would be directly affected by its contents. When one reads 
her story, there is little justification for her actions in terms of "survival" in 
the sense of the theory of Krebs et al. Her reasons contain what might be 
called "moral" justifications, for example, *felt colleagues being betrayed*, 
*felt loyalty to organisation being betrayed*, *felt people in organisation had 
right to know about it*. The. distinction between Bob's and Edith's stories 
is to be found in the level of moral development which they displayed. Bob's 
arguments relate to a pre-conventional stage, K2, while Edith argues at a 
post-conventional K5 stage, making judgements outside the conventions of 
the organisation to which she belongs. The theory that the need for survival 
within its broadest sense dictates moral behaviour would seem only to fit 
situations where the pre-conventional stages of moral development are being 
displayed. Whether the empirical research of Krebs et al only worked with 
informants working at those stages would need further examination to take 
this further. 
(c) Cultural bias 
Kohlberg claims that the stages of moral development which he has identified 
can be found in individuals in all cultures - that there is a universality about 
them which overcomes cultural or societal influences. However, in practice, 
he found Stage 5 reasoning to be much more common in the US than in 
Mexico, Turkey or Taiwan. Kohlberg explained this in terms of the cultures 
being at a different stage of moral development in themselves. Robin Snell 
(1996) argues that cultural bias is built into Kohlberg's methods. The fact 
that Stages 5 and 6 relate back to the individual can be anathema to other C, 
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cultures, such as traditional Chinese philosophies which, while recognising 
the individual's rights, see them in closer relation to the subordination of the 
individual to society. Similarly, if one examines the concept of American 
rights of property, these would be very different from those in a culture which 
believed in the communal holding of all property (Simpson, 1994). This 
would, in turn, reflect on responses to the Heinz dilemma. By not adapting 
his research methods to take account of other cultures but using the same 
material, Kohlberg created a bias towaras American culture when working 
outside the US. This could well explain why he found less evidence of Stage 
6 outside the United States. 
Lastly, Kohlberg acknowledges the distinction between the content of moral 
reasoning and the structure and states that he is particularly concerned with 
the latter. However, Stage 6, depending as it does on the ability to reason 
within a context of "justice", impinges on content and therefore imports a 
cultural bias in its very definition because Rawls' concept of justice as used 
by Kohlberg tends to relate to particular communities in the world and not 
others. I consider Rawls' theory of justice in greater detail in Chapter Eight. 
I have indicated in an earlier chapter that I regard it as being to the detriment 
of this research project that I did not attract volunteer informants from any 
other cultural background than white European. They would have enriched 
this project and would have tested the research methods. This is an area for 
future work. 
(d) The need for Stage Six? 
Kohlberg's concept of the sixth stage of moral development has been 
criticised widely, using arguments based on research results and on 
philosophical perspectives. It is clear that, as mentioned previously in this 
chapter, Kohlberg himself found no-one outside the US arguing at a level as 
described by Kohlberg as being at Stage 6. A number of writers have 
suggested that Kohlberg's theories are not weakened if Stage 6 is removed 
(for example, Gibbs et al, 1992; Puka, 1994a; Locke, 1994b). They hold that 
there is no philosophical argument for the existence of Stage 6, that it is not 
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possible for someone to be so removed from society that they can reason and 
act according to some "independent" form of moral code based on the 
essence of justice. 
Kohlberg faces the criticism that Stage 6 of his stages of moral development 
need not necessarily be the best or only "highest" moral stage to be working 
at (Kohlberg, 1994) by acknowledging that it is essentially Kantian in 
perspective with its emphasis on duty and obligation as defined by principles 
of respect for persons and justice. He argues that his empirical research 
indicates that people prefer the highest moral stage that they can comprehend. 
He takes a philosophical line of argument which indicates that the two main 
branches of moral philosophy (utilitarianism and Kantianism) can be found in 
Stages 5 and Stages 6 respectively. This movement from Stages 1 to 6 in 
ascending order becomes a pattern of development between Stages 1 and 4 
with a branching out after Stage 4 to either Stage 5 or Stage 6. Harman and 
Thomson (1996) argue that, in fact, individuals have many more options 
around philosophical directions such as moral relativism after Stage 4. From 
a social constructionist perspective, it is hard to envisage an individual 
"elevated" from their societal context and able to be so independent and free- 
thinking as to overcome any influence and work to "universal ethical 
principles" as envisaged by Kohlberg. Whether or not Kohlberg interprets 
the Kantian concept of universalisability correctly is a separate debate not for 
this thesis. 
My main argument pertaining to the distinction between Stage 5 and Stage 6 
relates to the method of its identification. With all the previous stages, it is 
fairly easy to ascertain the stage of moral reasoning an individual is using 
from the content of their argument. There is a similar need to identify the 
distinctive features of a Stage 6 argument which makes it different from 
someone arguing at Stage 5. At this point, it becomes difficult to make that 
distinction. Indeed, it is not easy to make a claim that any argument is guided 
by universal ethical principles as the counter-argument can be made that the 
particular principles involved relate to the society to which the individual 
concerned belongs. For example, if someone says, in a particular situation, 
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that it is wrong to cause any premeditated physical harm to an uninvited 
intruder to one's home, is this a Stage 5 argument of adhering to the values 
and laws of society (for example, the current UK laws) or is it a Stage 6 
argument which implies a principle which can and should be applied in all 
such circumstances within humanity? It is the same stated principle and it 
would be difficult for any researcher to distinguish which stage of moral 
development was being used. Thus, in determining a research informant's 
stage of moral development, it becomes extremely unlikely that any 
distinction could be made in practice between Stage 5 and Stage 6 because it 
is very possible that the informant would be saying the same words at both 
stages. The underlying conception of the individual of their meaning within 
the words would need to be explored in greater depth as to whether they 
believed they were adhering to their society's values or principles which 
should be applied in all similar circumstances throughout humanity. In fact, 
when analysing the position of the informants in relation to their stage of 
moral reasoning, I found no evidence of any line of reasoning beyond Stage 
5. It might appear that Kohlberg has made a distinction here which is 
difficult to prove or disprove in practice. However, there is a little more 
c4scene-setting" to put in place before I consider my findings in relation to my 
empirical research. 
(C) The inflexibility of the stages of moral development 
John Murphy and Carol Gilligan (1994) seek to address the problem which 
Kohlberg found in his longitudinal study that a significant proportion of 
adults regressed in stage of moral development between adolescence and 
adulthood. They reconstructed Kohlberg's research methods with new 
subjects and confirmed these results using his methods and scoring systems - 
of 13 subjects, 3 individuals ended up with a lower score at age 26 than they 
had at age 19. The general pattern showed that approximately one-third of 
research subjects' progress, one-third regress and one-third stay the same. 
This raises the question of whether the problem relates to the scoring methods 
used. They hypothesize that the problem would be resolved if another form 
of post-conventional moral reasoning could be defined which has formerly 
120 
been scored as regression to a lower stage. They put forward the theory that 
as subjects move from adolescence to adulthood they take on a degree of 
responsibility and commitment in their lives. This results in a more 
relativistic, contextual theme for moral reasoning. They therefore define a 
further distinction within post-conventional thinking. The first is 
postconventional formal (PCF) which "solves the problem of relativism by 
constructing a formal logical system that derives solutions to all moral 
problems from concepts like the social contract or natural rights" (Murphy 
and Gilligan, 1994, p8 1). The second, postconventional contaxtual (PCC) 
derives from an understanding of the contextual relativism of moral 
judgment and the ineluctable uncertainty of moral choice. On that 
basis, it articulates an ethic of responsibility that focuses on the actual 
consequences of choice.... According to PCC reasoning, the choice 
of principles for solving moral problems is an example of 
commitment in relativism, a commitment for which one bears 
personal responsibility and which allows the possibility of alternate 
formulations that could be equally or more adequate in a given case 
(Murphy and Gilligan, 1994, p83). 
Again on the question of the inflexibility of stages of moral development, 
Don Locke criticises Kohlberg's structural unity for failing to take account of 
the fact that very few of the research subjects responded consistently at any 
one stage and there was no identifiable transition from one stage to the next 
(Locke, 1994a). Similarly, he also refers to the problem of the lack of 
consistency and regression. 
Kohlberg acknowledges these criticisms and states that the hard sequential 
order of the stages can only be found within the "deontic justice domain" 
(Kohlberg, 1984, p4). Later in this chapter I consider the flexibility of the K- 
stages within the project's informants and whether the individuals involved 
are strategic about the level at which they argue. 
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(f) Alternative approaches to individual moral development 
The introduction to this chapter outlined the two contrasting mainstream 
theoretical paradigms which served to influence Kohlberg in the development 
of his stages of moral development. They were the psychoanalytical and 
sociological traditions. It would be wrong to move on from Kohlberg's 
theories without first considering more modern approaches to his work 
viewed from both these other perspectives. 
James Gilligan (1976) considers moral development within the framework of 
the tradition of psychoanalysis. He identifies two types of morality - shame 
ethics and guilt ethics. As an example of shame ethics, he quotes an Indian 
tribe who are encouraged to promote the self and who fear the shame of 
failure. Guilt ethics, for example, he identifies as being an integral part of the 
religious culture of strict Protestant sects such as the Hutterites. He then 
compares these two types of ethics with Kohlberg's levels of moral 
development, relating shame ethics to that which depends on external 
authority and guilt ethics to that which depends on the internal conscience. 
Further, he argues that the stages reflect a movement from shame ethics at 
Stage 1 to guilt ethics at Stage 5. As a psychoanalyst in the Freudian 
tradition, he holds that both shame and guilt ethics are an indication of an 
immaturity in personality and development, maturity being ways for-ward of 
i-esolving situations. Shame and guilt ethics (morality) create their own 
dilemmas and thus cause their own* problems. The analyst's aim, if she were 
to meet the Heinz of Kohlberg's Heinz dilemma, would not be to enquire 
whether he should steal the drug or let his wife die, but to consider the nature 
of the situation and Heinz's relationship to it: 
to enable him to understand himself and his feelings and wishes; to 
grow beyond the passing of moral value judgements and to make his 
choices on the basis of an honest acknowledgement of what he wants 
to do, coupled with a realistic assessment of the price he may have to 
pay for any given choice (Gilligan, 1976, p156). 
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Gilligan's theory appears to reflect an egocentricity which is associated with 
the psych oanalytical approach. As such, and because ethics is about the 
welfare of others, it does not fit well as a means of establishing principles of 
ethical action. 
On the other side of the spectrum of theories, a number of social 
psychologists have developed theories relating to how children gain their 
moral values, based on influences from peers and adults in their lives. An 
example of this is given by William Damon and Anne Colby (1987) who 
consider various theories relating to developmental change in children 
brought about by external social factors and the way these influences work to 
bring about change in behaviour and beliefs. They prefer a model which 
relates to shared goals between the child and the adult whereby the adult 
works towards a system of influencing through reasoning and demonstration. 
They refer to work which has shown that compliance with rules results from 
rewards and punishment and that an internalisation of rules derives from 
reasoning and acceptance. Thus, if the goals are shared, the reasons and 
ccrules" are also taken on board. They argue that this needs to be a flexible 
process and with the developing person taking an active part in it rather than 
being passively "affected" by it. 
In the light of this theory, they refer to their research which involved a group 
of children trying to decide how to divide a reward, the children being a 
mixture of ages from 4 to 10 years old. What they found was that the longer 
the children were in the group, the more likely they were to opt for equality. 
Where this was a new concept for the younger children, it was explained to 
them by their peers who had previously learned the principle. As a result, a 
majority of children showed an advance in their ability to reason morally as a 
result of the test. Children who engaged in conflict with their peers were less 
likely to change than those who accepted each other's opinions in a more 
positive way. They conclude from this that any goal theory relating to social 
influences for change must also include peer influence as well as those of the 
adult/child relationship. 
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Along similar lines, Justin Aronfreed (1994) considers the socialization 
process whereby children gain the ability to exhibit altruistic and sympathetic 
behaviour. He refers to social cues which transmit information about the 
experience of others and maintains that some of these cues can then act as 
motivators towards a child's altruistic or sympathetic behaviour. Similarly, 
the child gains social cues from seeing the effect of an altruistic or 
sympathetic act upon others. 
In the socialization of sympathetic behavior, for example, dispositions 
which the child already has begun to acquire - such as giving, 
sharing, or the expression of affection - may be more selectively 
channelled into sympathetic action when the child finds that they can 
be instrumental to the reduction of another person's distress 
(Aronfreed, 1994, p154). 
Mark Tappan (1999) takes a social constructionist perspective in seeking to 
identify a dialogical perspective to the development of an individual's moral 
self through the use of narrative and discourse within a social context. This is 
a natural development from Kohlberg's concept of the "just community" 
where the influence of being in dialogue with others in the same societal 
context enables the development of moral reasoning. It provides another 
support for the link between the individual and membership of community in 
providing the influences on an individual's moral thought processes. 
Kohlberg identifies the two alternative strands of theory as already identified 
above and states that both theories agree that "moral development is the 
internalisation of the standards of parents and culture" (Kohlberg, 1984, p2). 
This is regardless as to whether moral behaviour is learnt through 
socialization processes or through a guilt element/conscience identified with 
sources of authority such as parents. 
It will be noted from the above that the behavioural psychologist such as 
Aronfreed will therefore relate theory to action rather than ability to reason, 
whereas the psychoanalyst is more concerned with the thought pi-ocess of the 
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personality involved. This returns us to the question which no writer seems 
to have resolved satisfactorily which relates to the relationship between moral 
reasoning and moral action. The only common agreement on the nature of 
the causal effect of reasoning on action is that the factors are multitudinous 
and complex and, almost without exception, extremely difficult to 
predetermine. 
4. The influence of CMD on research in business ethics 
Kohlberg's theories relating to cognitive moral development are used fairly 
frequently in current business ethics research both as a theory in itself to be 
tested and as one factor of a wider research study. In many cases it has been 
adapted in some way for use within a business context while still providing 
the underpinning theory. 
In the business arena, CMD theory has been tested by Weber (1991) using the 
Heinz dilemma and two scenarios placed within a business context. He 
found that a higher level of moral reasoning was consistently used in relation 
to the Heinz dilemma. However, it is possible that different "rules of 
engagement" are used within the business framework (cf Carr) which might 
tend to have placed a bias upon Weber's research in terms of respondents 
reacting differently to scenarios placed within a business context. 
This appears to be confirmed by Linda Trevino's work in which she refers to 
work done in looking at the contextual influence on the level of moral 
reasoning (Trevino, 1992). This has shown that moral reasoning within the 
business context tends to operate at a lower level than outside that situation. 
She also cites work done in cultural anthropology which has demonstrated 
that individuals can assume highly differentiated roles that allow them to 
accept different values, norms and behaviours in differing contexts, for 
example home and work. 
Both the work of Weber and that of Trevino begins to raise questions of 
whether an individual is strategic in choosing the level of moral reasoning to 
apply in any one particular situation. However, in choosing this strategy, 
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Carpendale and Krebs (1995) argue that a number of different variables work 
to influence moral reasoning such as (a) the type of problem or dilemma (b) 
the social context in which the dilemma is set or in which the audience is 
placed (c) the moral choices people make on the dilemmas and (d) any 
vested interest in the outcome. They conclude 
Although the Kohlbergian model accounts well for moral judgments 
to hypothetical dilemmas about imaginary characters, we argue that 
when individuals make moral judgements with real consequences to 
themselves and others, factors such as vested interest, desired 
outcomes, anticipated reactions of audiences, and the types of 
"accounts" available in the normative structure of social groups to 
justify alternative courses of action affect the choices people make, 
and, in turn, these choices constrain and determine the structures of 
moral reasoning invoked to justify them (Carpendale and Krebs, 
1995, p3O9). 
Lastly, Snell (1996) carried out a piece of research working with managers in 
Hong Kong to establish whether their theories-in-use correlated in any aspect 
with Kohlberg's stages. He used a qualitative approach, interviewing 
managers on self-identified dilemmas. From their descriptions, an analysis 
was done of the value statements to test whether they matched Kohlberg's 
stages in any way. He concluded that there was enough similarity between an 
analysis of ethical theory-in-use and Kohlberg's theory of moral reasoning 
for them not to be totally incompatible while recognising certain differences 
which are enough to suggest that, if analysing theory-in-use, it would not be 
helpful to use Kohlberg's hypothetical dilemmas. The results also showed 
that in 27 per cent of the cases, lower stages of moral reasoning were used in 
action than had been used in theorising about the situation. In 60 per cent of 
the cases, more than one stage was used in reasoning and in justifying action. 
Finally, within the business ethics paradigm, Kohlberg's CMD theories have 
been used alongside other factors in attempts to illuminate the nature of moral 
decisions in business (for example, Trevino and Youngblood, 1990; Goolsby 
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and Hunt, 1992; Wimalasiri et al, 1996; Fisher and Sweeney, 1998; Windsor 
and Cappel, 1999). 
5. Testing CMD in practice 
In Chapter Four, I discussed the method of analysing the informants' 
arguments in terms of their stage of moral development. The following table 
demonstrates the results of this analysis with the 16 informants. 
Stage 1 0 
Stage 2 3 
Stage 3 3 
Stage 4 5 
, Stage 5 5 
IStage 61 0 
It is normal not to find a K6. I have previously drawn attention to the 
challenge within Kohlberg's theory for the possibility for a person at Stage 6 
in terms of moral development to exist. I have also highlighted the 
difficulties inherent in making a distinction in practice between Stage 5 and 
Stage 6. 
Of the five K5's, two were female and three male and of the three K2's, two 
were male and one female. The two professionals and the director were all 
K4 or K5. 
It has been argued that "business" thinking means K2 arguing - "Right is 
serving one's own or other's needs and making fair deals in terms of concrete 
exchange". When one considers the private sector employees within the 
group of informants, of the four, two are K2 and two K3 which involves 
being concerned about the other people and their feelings, keeping loyalty 
and trust with partners, and being motivated to follow rules and expectations. 
It would be difficult to argue as a result, however, that business for profit 
means that individuals argue morally at a lower level from this sample of 
informants. 
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However, of particular interest are the informants working at K5. These were 
Angela, Don, Edith, Neil and Owen. The description by Kohlberg of 
someone working at Stage 5 is as follows: 
The right is upholding the basic rights, values and legal contracts of a 
society, even when they conflict with the concrete rules and laws of 
the group (Kohlberg, 1981). 
In only one (Neil) of the K5 informants did the individual decide to follow 
the organisational influence which might be considered to equate with 
Kohlberg's notion of the group in the above citation. In this particular 
instance, the informant was new into a management post and was re-shaping 
relationships with colleagues as a result. 
What the new job has meant to me is these moral decisions which I 
am now forced to make and some of them do mean a different 
relationship between myself and people with whom I had a former 
relationship at a similar level. (Neil) 
In analyzing the nature of the arguments offered by informants working at 
stage 5, the question arises as to whether these are really stages of 
development or just different types of argument. Is it possible that we adopt 
different criteria for arguing with ourselves, depending on the nature of the 
context? It is helpful to return to Bob at this point who was cheating his 
employer but feeling uncomfortable about it. Does the fact that he is arguing 
at K2 stage in this instance imply that he is capable of reasoning morally at a 
different level but has chosen this level because it is convenient within the 
context, despite the fact that he feels uncomfortable about it? If I were 
making decisions about sharing a cake with three other friends, I would try to 
do so equitably but if I did not manage an exact partition of the cake, would I 
anguish over who should have the biggest piece? Further, would I concern 
myself about whether we should be having the cake at all, given the need for 
food in the Third World? In this instance, I would choose my level of moral 
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strategy. Is this what these informants are doing? It is difficult to resolve this 
issue given that most research on Kohlberg's stages of moral development 
has used a specific test on theoretical dilemmas where it is possible for 
research informants to choose the same strategy for argument, given the facts 
of the case. Since I do not have such conformity within my informants' 
situations, it is impossible to take this argument further but it has served to 
raise interesting questions in relation to Kohlberg's theories and tends to 
support the work of Weber (1991), Trevino (1992) and Carpendale and Krebs 
(1995). 
Similarly, the question has arisen as to whether business pulls individuals 
down to a certain level of moral reasoning by its emphasis on economic gain. 
Kohlberg refers specifically to moral reasoning in business and holds that 
work responsibility in itself, where it involves complex moral issues, 
stimulates the individual to principled thinking (Kohlberg, 1984). 
When the rules of a system or an institution conflict with the welfare 
or rights of an individual within that system, the person who is in a 
position of responsibility for solving that conflict must necessarily 
formulate ideas or principles which recognise the just or fair claims of 
both in order to resolve the conflict and to act fairly and responsibly 
(Kohlberg, 1984, p468). 
Taking the opposite view, Fraedrich, Thorne and Ferrell (1994) draw 
attention to the problems of using theories derived from CMD within the 
business setting. They quote Albert Carr (1993) who suggests that business 
has its own set of rules and they question whether it is appropriate for 
theories relating to personal moral development to be used within a context 
where different rules apply. They also point to the problems of encouraging 
individuals to develop to a post-conventional level of moral development 
where they would inherently question organisational rules. They conclude 
More needs to be known about how personal moral processes enter 
into an individual's organizational ethical decision making, especially 
since peer relationships and organizational culture have been shown 
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to be stronger influences in the organizational context (Fraedrich et al, 
1994, p835). 
Colin's decision to negotiate an illegal compensation from a contracting 
company was one made within a context where business influences were high 
on the agenda. He argued the case at Stage 2. It would be difficult to 
establish whether, in other circumstances (for example, a problem in his 
family life) he would have presented a different K-stage. The methods used 
in this project do not enable me to pursue this further. 
6. The effect of age on the process of making a moral 
decision in the workplace. 
So far this chapter has concentrated on the reasoning processes and 
development of values that an individual holds and that he or she brings to a 
moral decision. There is, however, a number of what might be called 
"invariable" variables which relate to the individual. These include gender, 
age, level of education and locus of control. The issues which arise as a 
result of the consideration of gender are outlined in the following chapter. 
While acknowledging the possibility of factors such as level of education and 
locus of control on an individual's ability to reason through a situation at 
work which contains some element of moral decision, I was not able to 
explore such factors with the project's informants. 
However, the informants' age was canvassed and this is compared with 
theory emerging from current literature. The question of age as a significant 
factor within the moral decision making process has not been clarified by 
research to date in that varying results are being obtained within business 
ethics literature. Given Kohlberg's theory of moral development, it might be 
expected that older people would be found to argue morally at a higher level 
than their younger colleagues. However, existing research does not always 
confirm this. Wilson (1995) shows no significant result relating to the age of 
research subjects, while Wimalasiri et al (1996) indicate that age affects 
moral reasoning with older people arguing at a higher level than younger. 
Deshpande (1997) had a similar result and suggests that not only are people 
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more aware of the consequences of their action as they grow older but they 
have more to lose in terms of the security of their position. This reflects the 
nature of the effect of consequences when making moral choices. Goolsby 
and Hunt (1992), in finding women more "ethical" found that the women in 
their study were actually younger than the men. 
Where a number of factors are involved, it is always difficult to isolate a 
particular one and demonstrate that, all other factors being taken into account, 
this is the case with, in this example, the factor of age and, indeed, I have 
argued previously that the quantitative research approach of isolating such 
elements within a human process is counterproductive in terms of failing to 
take a holistic perspective of the thought processes and subsequent actions 
which are involved. However, since the dominant paradigm within business 
ethics currently supports a quantitative approach, the literature which I am 
reviewing tends to reflect its methodology. 
In practice, the group of sixteen informants involved in this research project 
showed the following age structure. 
Age of informants Number 
Under 30 2 
Under 45 9 
Under 60 5 
The oldest informants were not at the lowest K-stage. One of the youngest 
informants was K5, indicating that K-stages do not necessarily progress or 
develop with age. Both the youngest and the oldest informants all wanted to 
do "right for right's sake" and take a deontological approach to their moral 
argument in the situation. There is no relationship between those informants 
who identified dilemmas and their age. Thus, within the given sample, no 
pattern emerged relating to age as compared with K-stages or nature of their 
decision. From this sample, it appears that an individual's age does not affect 
their ability to reason within a moral decision. 
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The nature of individual values expressed by informants 
In identifying influences within their cognitive maps, informants all coded a 
significant range of concepts as relating to coming from themselves in some 
respect. Within the total group of 16 informants, 91 concepts were revealed 




Individual values (right and wrong 36 
Sense of justice (fairness) 32 
. 
Self-interest 23 
lEmotions experienced 9 
Only one informant (Gaynor) included examples of all four types but she 
revealed the highest number of concepts. 
Examples of these four types are as follows, analysed in Gaynor's situation 
(who was being bullied by her line manager) (a total of 13 concepts): 
Individual values (right and wrong) Not a personal vendetta 
Being seen as weak 
Determined not to let her get to me 
Feels disloyal 
Determined not to be affected by adverse 
behaviour 
Sense of justice (fairness) Other people being treated same way but 
not same intensity or regularity 
Always met deadlines and expectations 
Line manager exhibiting behaviour of 
bullying, destructive, intimidating nature 
over a long period 
Self-interest Needing salary/mortgage to pay 
Creating a difficult work environment for 
myself 
Risk of need to re-locate 
Emotions experienced Felt angry and disappointed 
Feeling extremely anxious and "inside" 
depressed 
When one considers Gaynor's map, the strength of influences varies between 
concepts and it would appear that she has been very honest in indicating that 
elements of self-interest were as strong an influence on her deciding not to 
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take out a grievance procedure against her manager as other influences such 
as *determined not to let her get to me*. For the sake of clarity here, Gaynor 
had identified four different types of influence which I then coded as relating 
to her own individual values and it is my coding which has "bundled" these 
concepts together under a single heading with a subsequent re-coding into the 
sub-headings above of individual values, sense of justice, self-interest and 
emotions experienced. I will consider the nature of the individual values and 
sense of justice in a subsequent chapter when the informants' arguments are 
compared with philosophical theory. In a way, the issues relating to self- 
interest speak for themselves but they do serve to highlight the way 
informants, within their cognitive maps, were open about acknowledging 
such factors as being necessary to be taken into account along with other 
concepts of varying relative strengths. Finally, the significant role of 
emotions will also be discussed in greater depth in Chapter Seven. 
8. Concluding comments 
In conclusion, it is necessary to pull out some common threads that have 
emerged from the above investigation of issues relating to an individual's 
development of moral conduct. 
Krebs et al (1995) argue that individuals devise strategies depending on a 
number of situational factors with which to manage difficult moral decisions. 
They choose the type of moral reasoning which is most suitable for the type 
of decision with which they are faced. Kohlberg (1984) maintains that a 
business context pushes individuals into reasoning at a higher stage of moral 
development while Fraedrich et al (1994) promote the theory that business 
equates with pre-conventional reasoning (stages 1 and 2). There is no 
evidence that individual research informants are adopting particular strategies 
and yet it could be possible. There are two reasons for suggesting this 
possibility. The first relates to the apparent uniqueness and, at the same time, 
the equivocality of the content of the decisions. Each thought or construct 
within the cognitive maps obviously had an inherent value and emotions were 
considered alongside information pointers and moral judgements. The 
content almost seems to be driving the strategy and yet there is no absolute 
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evidence for this process. At the same time, Kohlberg's theory of developing 
skills of moral reasoning is not reflected within the age structure of the group 
of informants. The youngest informant is a K5 and older people are working 
at a lesser level in terms of moral development. These provide a hint that 
individuals may be strategically choosing their level of argument. Bob, in 
cheating his employers, expresses reasons for doing so which fit the 
description of Stage 2. Yet, he has identified this situation as a moral 
decision which he is content to share with the researcher. It cannot be 
inferred from this action that he is capable of applying higher levels of moral 
reasoning within other contexts while, at the same time, it raises the 
possibility of this being the case. 
The fact that no informant was working at Stage 6 comes as no surprise and 
serves to support the argument that there is little practical and recognisable 
distinction to be made between Stage 5 and Stage 6. It is suggested that it is 
not helpful to begin to introduce particular moral theories relating to content 
at this point when what is under consideration is the process involved. 
When one considers the cognitive maps and the place of individual values 
alongside influences from other sources, they become one of any number of 
constructs involved in a decision and their influence is taken on the same 
basis as constructs from other influences. It will be shown in future chapters 
how thoughts which stem from the individual involved relate to concepts 
generated from membership of communities. 
Investigation of how we develop our moral reasoning has highlighted the 
importance of membership of community. Most of the theories studied have 
agreed that individuals are influenced by the people around them and the 
nature of the relationship with them. Membership of groups, organisations, 
professional bodies and society generally were all mentioned by a variety of 
informants. How the various groups and organisations influence the 
informants will be explored subsequently in this thesis. 
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Before I consider the theory and research results relating to the influence of 
gender in the next chapter, it is useful to consider a reminder that this 
research is investigating specific decisions which have supported analysis. In 
many more cases, moral decisions are not so considered, are ad hoc and 
sometimes not so informed. Justin Aronfreed reflects this 
when he says the following: 
Common observation as well as introspection can raise some very 
serious questions about whether any significant amount of moral 
decision-making enters into the internalized control of conduct for 
most human beings (despite the fact that various states of moral 
knowledge may be available to them). Moreover, even when the 
control of conduct takes place through evaluative cognition, it may 
more typically rest on representational thought that is not structured in 
truly moral categories (Aronfreed, 1976, p56). 
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Chapter Seven: 
Gender Issues and the Role of Emotions 
Introduction 
In the previous chapter, I argued that Kohlberg can be questioned in his 
attachment of justice reasoning to Stage Six in terms of confusing content and 
process. In this chapter I intend considering how the justice reasoning 
approach is challenged in a different way through the examination of issues 
raised by gender. I then consider the role of emotions within moral decisions. 
2. The theory of the effect of gender on moral decision- 
making 
In considering Kohlberg's research methods, it is clear that he only 
researched within the male population. This then raises the question of 
whether his theory of stages of moral development can also be applied to 
women. In 1982, Carol Gilligan, a student of Kohlberg, published In a 
Different Voice. This has become a seminal work in this field because it does 
two things. It challenges the validity of Kohlberg's research in that he only 
worked with male subjects and it questions the philosophy to which he 
adhered - the concept of justice as the central core of moral reasoning of an 
individual. 
As a result of her research studies with women, she concludes that women 
take a different perspective from men when reasoning on any moral issue. 
She calls this the perspective of "care" and argues that women view moral 
dilemmas within a context of relationships of care and responsibility. 
Writing later, she refers to ambiguous figures such as the image of the vase 
and the faces (which can be seen as either image) to draw an analogy with the 
way she describes two different approaches to moral conflict (Gilligan, 
1987). She maintains that most people are aware of both perspectives but opt 
to use one rather than the other. The distinction she makes is between the 
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justice perspective so embraced by Piaget and Kohlberg and a care 
perspective of moral thinking. She equates the justice perspective with moral 
reasoning relating to the rights and duties of individuals. The care 
perspective originates from her previous research into the moral processes of 
women and relates to a context of relationships. "Since everyone is 
vulnerable both to oppression and to abandonment, two moral visions - one 
of justice and one of care - recur in human experience" (Gilligan, 1987, p20). 
She says of her earlier work: 
women, especially when speaking about their own experiences of 
moral conflict and choice, often define moral problems in a way that 
eludes the categories of moral theory and is at odds with the 
assumptions that shape psychological thinking about morality and 
about the self (Gilligan, 1987, p2l). 
She further defines the difference between the two perspectives in terms of 
the two questions "what is just? " and "how should I respond? " where the 
latter shows the emphasis on self reacting to a perception of need. She uses 
the example of whether to report someone's drinking problem in the context 
where it should be reported according to organisational rules. The decision 
not to report is seen, firstly, in the context of "mercy" in the light of suitable 
contrition by the drinker and a consequent decision not to follow rules (the 
justice perspective). An alternative view is to decide not to report because 
this would have a negative influence on their relationship and thereby cut off 
a possible source of help (the care perspective). 
Gilligan sees these two perspectives as shedding a different light on the same 
situation - two dimensions of the same problem. She carried out a piece of 
research on 80 educated North American adolescents and adults of both 
genders which involved the resolution of theoretical moral dilemmas. 69 per 
cent raised considerations of both justice and care. Two-thirds focused on 
one set of concerns and of these there was a marked difference between the 
sexes. With one exception, all the men who focused on a perspective, 
focused on the justice perspective. The women were divided with 
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approximately one third focusing on justice and one third on care. Gilligan 
makes the point that if the females had been eliminated from the study, the 
care perspective would also have almost disappeared. Because the research 
subjects were educated, the care perspective could not be explained in terms 
of the context of the subject, for example, a housewife might have a greater 
propensity to use the care perspective than, say, a business professional. 
Both sexes lost sight of the second perspective (care) in reaching a 
conclusion. She concludes that a moral judgement in itself does not show the 
structure or path which has been used in order to reach the resolution. 
Thus, Gilligan seeks to challenge Kohlberg's philosophy of justice upon 
which he bases his Stage Six of individual moral development. This is 
supported by Emler when he refers to the apparent inflexibility of the justice 
approach. 
This interpretation is opposed to ambiguity. It presupposes there are 
no irreducible conflicts of interest in life, only failures of reason. This 
is the justice of a cool, dispassionate, detached perspective. It denies 
the moral legitimacy of an emotional dimension (Emler, 1983, p59). 
On a philosophical level, it is helpful to consider the type of moral theory 
contained in the following statement by Carol Gilligan made in 1982, 
While an ethic of justice proceeds from the premise of equality - that 
everyone should be treated the same - an ethic of care rests on the 
premise of nonviolence - that no one should be hurt. In the 
representation of maturity, both perspectives converge in the 
realization that just as inequality adversely affects both parties in an 
unequal relationship, so too violence is destructive for everyone 
involved (Gilligan, 1982, p174). 
It would appear that here, she is reflecting a teleological viewpoint of moral 
reasoning, viewing the consequence that no-one should be harmed as an end 
result to be considered above all else. In Chapter Eight, I consider the 
differing strands of ethical theory in greater detail. 
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Gilligan and Attanucci define the two orientations of moral reasoning as 
identified above as follows: 
A justice perspective draws attention to problems of inequality and 
oppression and holds up an ideal of reciprocity and equal respect. A 
care perspective draws attention to problems of detachment or 
abandonment and holds up an ideal of attention and response to need. 
Two moral injunctions - not to treat others unfairly and not to turn 
away from someone in need - capture these different concerns. 
(Gilligan and Attanucci, 1988, p73) 
In their study, again, informants were asked to describe a situation of moral 
conflict in which they had been involved. The study showed that both men 
and women showed awareness of both orientations but that women tended to 
present "care focus" dilemmas while men "justice focus". If women had 
been eliminated from the study, there would have been little evidence of the 
care focus. 
Finally, Gilligan used the same type of structured interview as Kohlberg in 
her initial research. Thus, her studies are open to the same types of criticism 
as raised earlier in relation to Kohlberg's research methods. For example, she 
used theoretical dilemmas to be discussed and resolved within the interview 
and she followed the same process of interpreting the data provided by the 
interviews. The latter point is highlighted, in particular, by Langford who 
suggests that perhaps men and women use discourse and terminology in 
different ways to express the same idea (Langford, 1995). This has 
influenced me to steer away from the use of such research methods. 
It should be stated at this point that, as a result of Gilligan's work, Kohlberg 
modified his thinking to assert that the "stages" he defined were only "stages 
of justice reasoning" (Kohlberg, 1984). However, one criticism stands which 
relates to both Kohlberg and Gilligan. That is the question of whether it is 
correct to deny, in the way that they do, the distinction between the structure 
of the process towards moral behaviour and the content. I have made this 
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distinction earlier in Chapter Six and I maintain that both writers fail in the 
respect that their theories confuse the moral content, for example, principles 
of justice, principles of care with the process/structure of reasoning within a 
moral context. If one returns to Kohlberg's stages of moral development, 
these can be read without recourse to philosophical theory. They describe an 
individual's growth in ability to argue morally and they stand to be tested as 
such in terms of the process used. Both Kohlberg and Gilligan then fall into 
a trap of imposing philosophical theory which represents content onto the 
different stages of development with subsequent argument as to how which 
theory fits which stage the best. If one makes the distinction between content 
and process, it enables the stages of moral development to stand alone, apart 
from their philosophical "appendages" and to be tested as psychological tools 
with a validity or not as such in their own right. 
Gilligan's findings have continued to be tested with no serious challenge 
being made to the validity of her theories (for example, Derry, 1987). More 
recent is the work of Nona Plessner Lyons who interviewed 36 people (16 
females and 14 males) in relation to a moral conflict with which they had 
been involved (Lyons, 1988). She used a method of analysing data received 
which related to coding in relation to considerations of response or care and 
consideration of rights or justice. In her sample, 75 per cent of the females 
had response predominating and 25 per cent rights predominating with none 
equal. Of the males, 14 per cent had response predominating and 79 per cent 
rights predominated with 7 per cent equal. In the females, 37 per cent made 
no consideration of rights and in the males, 36 per cent made no 
consideration of response. 
3. Research in business ethics on gender issues 
Gilligan's theory that women argue morally within a perspective of care has 
been tested within business ethics research and it has been found that, where 
the effect of gender is tested as one of many factors in the moral decision 
making process in the workplace, varying results have emerged. In some 
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studies, no difference has been shown between males and females - for 
example, Deshpande (1997), Wimalasiri et al (1996) and Jones and Kavanagh 
(1996). However, Goolsby and Hunt (1992) showed that women were more 
ethical than men and argued morally at a higher level, using Rest's DIT. 
Feleta Wilson (1995) researched a group of nurses, using the DIT and a 
system of assessing the use of "care" reasoning. The results showed no 
difference between genders on levels of moral reasoning but a significant 
increase in the use of "care" reasoning among females. 
However, three interesting pieces of research serve to shed more light on the 
subject. Leslie Dawson (1997) refers to a series of studies on the effect of 
gender on moral reasoning which had shown a total ambiguity as to whether 
such an effect existed or not. He summarises the types of theory which might 
indicate ajustification for the inconsistencies in the research. "Self- 
selection" theory argues that women in business take on different "traits" 
from those outside. "Structural" theory suggests that women may enter 
business with different values but that common training and organisational 
influences will mean that women eventually respond in a similar way to their 
male counterparts. "Situational" theory suggests that differences between 
males and females may relate to the context of the situation in which they are 
involved so that decisions within a setting of problems affecting relationships 
might be addressed differently to those relating to, for example, human rights. 
Dawson reports on research where he used 20 dilemma situations relating to 
sales, some of which he identified as "relational" relating to effects on others 
and the balance as "non-relational", for example, theft by non-disclosure. 
The research supported the situational theory because there were key 
differences in results between males and females on the relational dilemmas 
with little difference on the non-relational situations. Dawson concludes that 
his results refute self-selection theory but support "gender socialization 
theory; namely that women reach ethical judgements with more concern for 
feelings and relationships and less concern for rules and rights" (Dawson, 
1997, pl 150). 
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Smith and Oakley (1997) used 15 different ethical situations which were 
divided between rule-based issues and social issues (those involving social 
responsibility or interpersonal relationships). They found no difference in 
gender in an analysis of the rule-based issues. However, on the social issues, 
the females scored consistently higher. "Female respondents appear to have 
higher ethical standards for behaviour that involve larger social issues, sexual 
exploitation, and the integrity of employee relations" (Smith and Oakley, 
1997, p43). 
Weeks et al (1999) equated career stage with divisions of age in an 
investigation of the effects of gender and career stage on ethical development. 
Their research found that (a) females argued morally at a higher level in most 
cases than males and (b) people in a later career stage argued morally at a 
higher level than those at an earlier stage. However, again, the research was 
based on hypothetical vignettes. 
Thus it would appear that, where issues relate to inducing, for example, 
organisational rules where no relationships are involved (for example, 
dishonest completion of expense claims), male and female employees would 
tend to reason along similar lines or argument. However, where moral issues 
relate to, for example, the welfare of a fellow employee, a female employee 
will tend to see the issue within the focus of a caring relationship. 
4. Results from the empirical research in relation to 
gender 
There were nine males and seven females within the 16 research informants 
for this project. 
ýales 19 
IFemales 17 
Gilligan's work on the distinction between males using moral arguments 
relating to justice and females relating to care and being more concerned 
about the strength and nature of relationships around them was tested here. 
The content of each decision was analysed between issues relating to justice 
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and those relating to care. For example, in deciding to publicise a politically 
sensitive report, Edith identified the following mapping concepts: 
*Felt people in organisation had right to know about it* (Edith) 
*Felt colleagues being betrayed* (Edith). 
In addition, in her story, Edith expresses concern for an incoming new 
manager who does not take up the post as a result of being warned of actions 
being taken. Thus, Edith is indicating a caring for her colleagues, both 
current and future which are a part of her motivation for taking the decision 
that she did. On the other hand, from a masculine perspective, Ken indicates 
two concepts relating to justice in deciding to report problems with data 
collected for the information of funders: 
*Doing the right thing* (Ken) 
*Getting caught out* (Ken). 
88 per cent (14) of the informants conform to Gilligan's theory. Don and Leo 
(both male) appear at first analysis not to comply because of the potential 
caring nature of their decision. However, Don, in seeking to appoint the 
"best" person, regarded the decision as a good management decision rather 
than from the point of view of the individual's benefit as he wanted to get the 
right person in the job. Leo was concerned about a work colleague who was 
also a friend and he expressed the conflicts around that situation which 
brought out some caring aspects. I would conclude from the above that 
Gilligan's theories have largely been confirmed by the evidence of this piece 
of work. While I considered using Lyons' coding methods in relation to 
rights and responses, I opted for a more holistic approach to the narrative and 
map as a "whole", using particular concepts to inform a more general coding. 
However, this project's informants demonstrate that females are also capable 
of expressing concepts in terms of "justice reasoning". A good example of 
this is Helen who had had problems in her relationship with her boss. Helen 
was expected to raise a substantial sum of money (equal to if not greater than, 
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the collections she had recently carried out for others leaving) to buy her boss 
a leaving present. She felt very uncomfortable about this, given the nature of 
their relationship and she expresses her decision in terms of lack of caring for 
her boss. However at the same time, she says 
*Didn't want to try hard for her because she hadn't tried hard for me* 
(Helen). 
Here is an element of justice being expressed in terms of her not feeling it 
would be fair to be more caring to her female boss than she had been to her. 
Similarly, Isabel used a caring perspective in deciding to report a wrong 
procedure for a vacancy where she was working as a human resources officer 
in that she felt she had to report the contravention of the equal opportunities 
procedure to protect not only herself but others who would have liked to have 
applied for the post. One of her concepts relates to a justice perspective: 
*Unfairness to colleagues* (Isabel). 
Thus, it can be shown that female informants were aware of and used justice- 
reasoning within an overall caring perspective. 
One other issue arises from within this group of informants in relation to 
gender and, more specifically, feminist issues. Gaynor and Helen both 
expressed problems with their relationship with a female manager in that they 
both felt abused (using the term in its broadest sense) by her. In my 
experience, this is not uncommon and raises issues which it is not appropriate 
for this thesis to explore in relation to female behaviour to other females 
within a business context. 
Finally, comparisons were also made between gender, stages of moral 
development, the nature and strength of identified influences and 
philosophical theory perspectives and no relationships were found which 
raised issues for one gender or the other. We can conclude that, broadly 
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speaking, this project supports Gilligan's theories in stating that men and 
women take the different moral perspectives of justice and of care in their 
general approach to making moral decisions in the workplace. 
5. The role of emotions 
Our society tends to align the demonstration of emotions with a feminine 
trait. However, both men and women have feelings and the question arises as 
to how they allow them to influence their moral decisions. The following 
section seeks to explore these issues. 
We are all familiar with feelings such as anger, sadness, happiness and pride. 
We also know what we mean by "gut reaction", that feeling that appears to 
come from nowhere but points us in a certain direction in respect of making 
judgements or reacting emotionally in any particular situation. It appears to 
be non-logical, stemming from processes which often cannot be explained or 
justified. At the same time, we seek to be "rational" within our decision- 
making processes and this relates to our ability to reason through the pros and 
cons of a specific problem. There is also an implied requirement when 
behaving "rationally" to seek a solution which is argued logically without 
recourse to our feelings. It is at this point that writers over the centuries have 
sought to set rationality and emotions against each other, seeing them as 
being at the opposite ends of a scale relating to relative objectivity. 
Here I aim to explore existing literature around the role of emotions, firstly, 
in relation to decision-making in general and then, more specifically, with 
regard to decisions with a moral factor within them. I then compare this with 
the way in which this project's informants expressed their emotions within 
the context of the story they were telling and the way in which they were 
accounted for. Where the situation aroused strong emotions, how were these 
dealt with? Were they put on one side as an informant struggled towards a 
goal of objectivity and perceived rationality or were they incorporated into 
the fabric of the decision, acknowledged and an allowance made for them? 
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The role of rationality and emotions in decision-making 
When we make decisions, we often refer to our "gut reaction" and what it is 
telling us. The phrase appears to imply an intuition of some sort which may 
not be based on sound facts or principles but it still has a strong potential 
influence on decisions. Flam (1993) identifies three different "selves" which 
provide checks and balances around decision-making. The first is the rational 
self which aims to take a hard look at costs and benefits behind a particular 
action. The second is the normative self which is conscious of values and 
principles applying within the social context of the decision in question. The 
last is what she calls the "emotional" self and she chooses to concentrate on 
feelings of fear. She suggests that it is fear which will prevent or influence a 
decision which might have been otherwise made by the normative self. 
The question of whether emotions "intrude" into an otherwise "rational" 
process of decision-making has been debated over many centuries and it is 
not my intention here to enter this debate in any great depth. However, it is 
important to recognise that, historically, a distinction has been made between 
what might have been considered to be an "objective", balanced, informed 
process and the influence of emotions which has often been portrayed as 
negative in effect, causing some distortion of what might otherwise have been 
a "perfect" decision. More recently, attempts have been made in different 
ways to bring the two concepts together, recognising that emotions exist and 
can have a positive effect on decisions and it is those arguments which I seek 
to promote here while recognising that others have denied that the two 
concepts are compatible (for example, Sabini and Silver, 1998). 
Etzioni (1993) seeks to show that all decisions are made not "rationally" but 
are influenced by values and emotions. He denies that rationality and the 
science that promotes it accurately reflect the nature of decision-making and 
argues that science, in investigating particular aspects of a phenomenon, has 
failed to consider the nature of the "whole". He describes normative- 
affective choices as "transcending" rationality. Part of his argument relates to 
an individual's ability to manipulate all the information required in certain 
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situations with the result that various strategies are engaged to make the 
thought processes more manageable (see also Hogarth, 1987). These 
strategies, Etzioni maintains, are drawn from value and emotional influences. 
A counter-argument to this would be that both so-called "rational" concepts 
such as "value for money" and emotional and value driven concepts sit 
alongside each other. It is often within the decision-maker's capability to 
assess the relative worthiness of both types of concepts. 
I want to draw finally on the work of Shafir et al who maintain that to analyse 
decisions on the basis of reasons is a more helpful means of illuminating the 
nature of decision-making. 
There is evidence to suggest that a wide variety of arguments play a role in 
decision making. We often search for a convincing rationale for the 
decisions that we make, whether for interpersonal purposes, so that we can 
explain to others the reasons for our decision, or for intrapersonal motives, 
so that we may feel confident of having made the "right" choice. Attitudes 
toward risk and loss can sometimes be rationalised on the basis of 
common myths or clich6s, and choices are sometimes made on the basis of 
moral or prudential principles that are used to override specific cost- 
benefit calculations. (Shafir et al, 1997, p9l). 
Their suggestion that one uses the concept of "reasons" to overcome the 
question of the relationship between rationality and emotions recognises the 
complementariness between the two elements and better embraces the 
ephemeral nature of making a decision. However, when there is a particular 
moral element to the decision, the situation becomes more complicated. 
Philosophers have debated over the centuries whether moral judgements are 
emotive or rational and the next section of this chapter summarises the nature 
of their arguments. 
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7. The role of emotions and reason within a moral decision 
When we are considering a particular moral question, do we only use our 
reason? Do we also listen to our emotions and take them into account? How 
emotive are moral arguments? If I were to say that I "felt" that a particular 
action would be wrong, would I be referring to emotions engendered by the 
thought of carrying out that action or would I be using a process of intuition 
to conclude that a particular way forward would be immoral in the given 
circumstances? Do we make a distinction between "objective" reasoning 
(rationality) and the influence of our emotions? Are the processes in moral 
argument rational in the sense that I have previously described or do they 
defy the definition of rationality to such an extent that their conclusions must 
be confined to being classified as a form of emotional debate. These are the 
issues which philosophers have raised in relation to rationalism and 
emotivism and which I intend to examine at this point. The work of David 
Hume is compared with that of Immanuel Kant before a brief reference to 
theories relating to the nature of moral language illustrated by the writing of 
CL Stevenson and RM Hare. Attempts to move away from the dualism of 
emotivism and rationalism are found in the work of Bauman and ten Bos and 
Willmott. 
David Hume (1751) argued that if someone considers a murder, for example, 
the feelings which are aroused relate to abhorrence and disgust. To say that 
the murder is "bad" is not a factual statement and therefore not within the 
realm of reasoning but the feelings of approbation draw one to conclude that 
murder is a vice not a virtue. Thus morality is sensed rather than reasoned. 
He maintains that, in order to behave in an ethical manner, an individual 
should develop those personal qualities or virtues which make him or her 
personable. A key concept of Hume's work is that of "sympathy", not used 
in the narrow terms of 'compassion' or 'pity' but, rather, meaning a capacity 
to be moved by the suffering and happiness of others. Hume insists that this 
is a human capacity which exists in its own right. The fact that we feel this 
sympathy to others explains why we judge how we do. 
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For Hume, moral approval and disapproval arise from sentiment rather than 
from reason. Hume makes a sharp division between emotions and feelings 
on the one hand and reason (including thought and understanding) on the 
other. Thus moral assertions are not statements of fact. Reason plays a part 
in assessing moral actions, in making judgements about different 
consequences. Reason, however, is not a motivation for action. Rather, 
moral judgements, as feelings or emotions, are the sole motivation towards 
action. 
At the same time as Hume, Immanuel Kant was taking the opposing view in 
maintaining that statements relating to moral judgements were made from a 
rational objective point of view and justifying them through the use of the 
categorical imperative - "Act only according to that maxim by which you can 
at the same time will that it should become a universal law" (Kant, 1959, 
p39). Kant identified three elements to the concept of morality. The first was 
that to have moral worth an action must be done from a perspective of duty. 
The second related to the need to act purely from duty and not for any other 
specific purpose. The third described duty as being a necessary element 
within respect for the law. Thus, there is no room for emotion within 
Kantian moral philosophy. 
The controversy generated between those who believe that moral sentiments 
are felt and those who maintain that moral decisions are rationally thought 
out is reflected in a debate about the language of ethics which has given rise 
to various ethical theories in itself, two examples of which are found within 
the works of CL Stevenson and RM Hare. 
CL Stevenson argues that when a man is talking about the conflicts aroused 
within an ethical decision, he is in fact using emotive language (Stevenson, 
1963). He is not only describing his attitudes but, because he is living 
through them, he is expressing his attitudes and therefore his conflicts. 
Because these attitudes are expressed rather than described, Stevenson argues 
that they are emotive. He distinguishes between descriptive and emotive 
149 
meaning. Emotive meaning has two components - it has a tendency to 
express the speaker's emotions and, secondly, it tends to induce similar 
feelings in others. "Drunken driving costs lives" is descriptive and can be 
proved or disproved. "Drunken driving is wrong" is not a statement of fact 
and therefore cannot be true or false but its function is emotive. 
RM Hare (1981) accepts that there are moral intuitions concerning the 
language that people use to express morality and he asserts that there is a 
logic within it. He denies that he is attempting to break Hume's law (no 
"ought" from "is") and argues that we use a certain peculiar type of logic 
when we talk about moral principles which relates particularly to them. 
Moral judgements are essentially "action-guiding" and are therefore a form of 
imperative. However, the main difference between moral judgements and 
other types Of imperatives is that the former are universal in nature. 
According to Hare, the role of reason is to deduce more specific moral 
judgements from more general statements. Hare draws the distinction 
between descriptive and prescriptive language. Moral judgements are 
prescriptive. No moral judgement can be deduced from descriptive 
statements. Thus, he agrees with Hume's "you can't derive an "ought" from 
an 44is"". 
More recently, in consideration of the dualism of rationality and emotions, 
Bauman maintains that moral phenomena are inherently "non-rational" 
(Bauman, 1993, pl 1) and that morality is bound up with irresolvable conflict 
("aporetic") while not being universalisable or "irrational" (pl3). He 
argues that the principle of universalisability is a concept invented by 
philosophers with little relation to reality and that morality is endemically and 
irredeemably non-i-ational - in the sense of not being calculable, hence not 
being presentable as following impersonal rules, hence not being describable 
as following rules that are in principle universalisable. 
As a moral person, I am alone, though as a social person I am always 
ivith others; just as I am free though entrapped in the dense web of 
prescriptions and prohibitions (Bauman, 1993, p60). 
150 
In a recent article, ten Bos and Willmott (2001) argue that the dualism 
between rationalism and emotivism is not helpful in seeking to reflect the 
reality of human processes. Rather, they acknowledge that both have a part 
to play in the moral situation. They maintain that most of contemporary 
business ethics theory places reason above emotion in a hierarchical way, 
deriving from Kant. In terms of respect for individuals, it is respect for an 
individual decontextualised and seen as an objective which removes or 
dernotes any notion of emotion. 
In conclusion, in summarising the arguments around whether moral 
judgements are made in an objective rational way or, rather, are subject to 
some kind of particular or peculiar logic which relates to emotions or 
intuitions, ten Bos and Willmott take a more holistic approach to the 
processes and influences involved, wanting to generate a perspective on 
moral thinking which relates to the total context of the process with an 
emphasis on the individual within a societal and historical setting. 
The informants' use of emotions 
In analysing the content of the cognitive maps, of the total number of 
concepts relating to emotions (29), 69 per cent were raised by women (20) 
and 31 per cent by men (nine) (total sample 44 per cent women and 56 per 
cent men). Five of seven female informants raised concepts relating to 
emotions. Six of nine males referred to emotive concepts and the number of 
concepts relating to emotions formed 15 per cent of the total number of 
concepts. 
Only one of the concepts relating to emotions is positive (*felt doing the right 
thing* (Isabel)), the rest being negative (for example, *angry* (Isabel), 
*frustrated* (Angela)). The question has been raised as to whether negative 
feelings have an adverse effect on an individual's ability to make decisions 
(Isen, 1997). 1 have already described the potential difficulties around 
making judgements in relation to the quality of decisions. However, it is 
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clear that individuals found, certainly, the dilemmas and, also, other decisions 
difficult to make and the presence of negative feelings would have made 
them all the more hard. Three of the concepts relating to emotions refer to 
fear: 
*Fear of being "caught out" (Don) 
*Fear of lack of support from other colleagues* (Gaynor) 
*Fear of being seen to be involved* (Leo). 
Interestingly, while one might have assumed that the harder dilemmas would 
have contained more emotive concepts, this is not shown to be the case in this 
sample. Angela is unusual in having a third of her concepts relating to 
emotional content (for example, *don't like employee*, *frustrated*, 
*worried about appearing unreasonable*, etc). 
However, when we consider the relationship of the emotive concepts within 
the cognitive maps to other concepts no pattern emerges in relation to 
whether they are a particularly strong influence or not. In the main, they tend 
to have been coded as coming from an individual's own value system with 
the exception of those expressing fear which emanate either from the 
perceived influence of the organisation involved or from peer pressure. The 
strength of influence that emotive concepts exert varies from individual to 
individual. What is common amongst all eleven informants who express 
such constructs is that they are obviously considered alongside concepts 
which inform or are an expression of another influence on an equal basis. 
They are not offered as an afterthought or with an apology. They are an 
essential part of the decision being explored and their contribution is taken on 
board by the informant along with the other constructs being included. They 
are accepted as worthy of consideration per se. 
In examining the informants' narratives, I have searched for described 
emotions or feelings but found none of sufficient significance to be able to 
draw out any generalisations. I can only conclude that, at the early stages of 
the interview when they were asked to describe the situation they were going 
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to talk about, they did not feel it appropriate to refer to feelings, either 
because they were not sufficiently comfortable with me at that stage of the 
interview or because, in telling the story, they were seeking to be as clinically 
objective as possible, deliberately omitting any reference to emotive issues as 
much as possible. 
Conclusions 
This chapter first addressed issues relating to the effect of gender on the 
making of moral decisions. It was concluded that the empirical research 
upheld Gilligan's theories relating to the differing female and male 
perspectives of care and of justice. On the question of the role of emotions 
within the context of a moral decision, eleven informants referred to emotive 
constructs within the moral decisions in the workplace that they described. 
They accepted them as having a value of their own alongside informative and 
reasoning concepts. This tends to confirm the view of ten Bos and Willmott 
(2001) outlined earlier when they seek to justify a holistic balance between 
rationality and emotions within moral judgements. So far as theory around 
decision-making is concerned, if one might refer to all the concepts in any 
one cognitive map as "reasons", then the theoretical approach of Shafir et al 
(1997) is confirmed. They seek to move away from the dualism of rationality 
and emotions by proposing that a wide range of considerations within a 
decision can be referred to as reasons. 
In practice, emotions are included and counted as having a validity as great as 
other concepts within the decision-making process. They are generated from 
a range of influences, depending on their nature. There is one other 
perspective on emotions which has yet to be mentioned. In Chapter Nine I 
will consider the specific influence of being an employee within an 
organisation. An element of that can be found in the promotion of certain 
emotions within the member of staff for the benefit of the organisation and 




The influence of virtues 
1. Introduction 
Up to this point, the focus of this thesis has been concerned with the process 
of making a moral decision in the workplace. It is now timely, before 
moving away from the individual and the influences that she brings to bear to 
a situation, to examine the content of the arguments as presented by the 
project's informants. This is necessary in order to reflect on how the stories 
that they brought and their moral evaluation of what happened actually relate 
to philosophical theory and the way that the latter has sought to describe the 
principles of moral reasoning in searching for the best results for those 
affected and involved. When we make such decisions, what principles are we 
working to, if any? What are we striving for when we look to make an 
ethical decision? 
The aim of this chapter is to seek to establish how closely philosophical 
theory reflects the practices of those making moral decisions in the 
workplace. Its content has been determined by listening to 16 informants and 
has been steered by their language and their thought processes. During the 
interview, I asked a question relating to the ethical theory perspective taken 
in the context of the decision. However, within the decisions, there are a 
number of other elements which relate to ethical theory. The analysis of 
individual values in Chapter Six revealed a near balance between the need to 
do the "right" thing and the need for "justice" to be done (36 per cent and 32 
per cent of the total individual values expressed respectively). At the same 
time, all informants with the exception of one (Frederick) mentioned some 
form of virtue and the need to be virtuous in some respect. An earlier 
exploration of Kohlberg's theories of cognitive moral development in this 
thesis has referred to the influence of John Rawls' theory of justice. In 
Chapter Seven, I have referred to the analysis of gender-orientated 
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perspectives between justice and care and these are picked up within the 
context of philosophical theory. 
What is the role of philosophy in an investigation of how individuals make 
moral judgements within their working environment? Philosophers over the 
centuries have attempted to devise a framework for an explanation of what is 
right and wrong, who is a good person and who bad and how that might be 
judged. They have reflected on their perceptions of the world around them 
and sought an explanation of the processes we go through in making moral 
judgements and assessing the ethicality of others. It is not within the scope of 
this research project to outline the numerous theories relating to the above 
issues. However, it is important, given a broad awareness of philosophical 
theory, to consider particular links between what the informants have told us 
about how they approached making a decision in any one particular moral 
situation and the range of theories developed by moral philosophers. 
MS Singer (2000) has recently carried out a similar project in terms of 
relating philosophical theory to practical decision-making. She identifies two 
strands of academic thought relating to ethical theory. The first is that of 
philosophical tradition which has sought to prescribe behaviour through a 
process of what she terms "reflective deliberations" (Singer, 2000, p187). 
The second is research within the paradigm of psychology which seeks to 
describe "typical" moral behaviour. She portrays these two strands of 
research as running alongside each other until recently when writers have 
begun to recognise that a scientific "objective" approach cannot be entirely 
"value-free" with a resultant questioning of the division between value and 
fact. Indeed, there may be extremely "fuzzy" edges between the two 
concepts. She sets out to discover through empirical research how normative 
ethical theory and descriptive psychology might relate to each other by 
seeking to discover the distinctions between individuals' views of behaviour 
in the workplace which "ought" to happen against their perceptions of what 
"is" seen to be the nature of the behaviour involved. With regard to ethical 
theory, she tries to establish which of five rules people use in practice in 
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deciding on a particular action which might be considered to be ethical. They 
are utility, rights, justice, principlism and care. 
Using devised scenarios and a mixture of repertory grid technique and 
statistical procedures, results are drawn out which indicate that philosophical 
normative theories are reflected in people's opinions about what ought to 
happen at work in terms of moral behaviour. The most important principle to 
emerge was that of justice in treating people equally at work, closely 
followed by the norm of rights, particularly in terms of respect for others. 
She argues that, while it might be maintained that justice is a concept which 
can be absorbed into other ethical theories, particularly deontological theories 
relating to rights, on a daily basis, people refer to the need to treat people 
fairly and for justice to be seen to be done. Singer's work is significant for 
this project carrying, as it does, a number of similarities of approach. She 
aims to compare philosophical theory with what happens in practice when 
someone makes a moral decision. However, her methods are different, 
depending as they do on ethical assessments of fictional situations and then 
analysing the results using statistical procedures. 
Informants have also used evaluative language to describe the type of attitude 
or motivation within either themselves or others which they judged to be 
"good" and this relates very much to the Aristotelian concept of virtues. 
Lastly, many informants were concerned that they should treat others "fairly" 
and that they themselves should receive the same treatment, expressing 
grievance if they felt this was not the case in their situation. This introduced 
the concept of justice and, as a result, I have included a section on the writing 
of John Rawls within the framework of deontological theories. 
Thus, while this chapter could have consisted of a summary of ethical theory 
from Plato onwards, I have chosen to concentrate on particular themes within 
the theory which relate to the intrinsic nature of the moral decision itself. 
Links are then made between what one might term "mainstream" 
philosophical tradition and the contribution of the emerging paradigm of 
"business ethics". 
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2. The deontological/teleological debate 
Literature within the business ethics field has tended to see philosophical 
theory as relating to the normative ethics of the teleological or deontological 
traditions. The purpose of this next section is to outline two ethical theories 
which have emerged as having significance within the moral decision making 
processes of this project's informants, one with a theoretical deontological 
perspective and the other a teleological focus. They are the theory of justice 
as proposed by John Rawls and virtue ethics which originated with Aristotle 
and which has developed further in the 201h century. First it is necessary to 
define what is meant by the deontological and teleological ethical 
perspectives referred to above. A deontological theory assumes that a 
particular moral judgement or statement is right or wrong in itself. The term 
derives from the Greek dei which translates as "I must". Thus a 
deontological philosopher would argue that it is instrinsically wrong to lie to 
someone and it is intrinsically right to do one's duty (part of the Kantian 
principles of universalisability and the moral imperative). In contrast, a 
teleological theory such as utilitarianism and Aristotelian ethical theory 
proposes that an action should be judged by its consequences. Again, there is 
a Greek derivation from telos, meaning "purpose". In the case of 
utilitarianism, such end results relate to achieving the good of the most 
people and, for Aristotle, the achievement of eudainionia or well-being in the 
individual performing the action (a more detailed definition of eudaimonia 
follows later in this chapter). Very often, these two perspectives have been 
defined as consequentialist and non-consequentialist, that is, deontology 
being the opposite of teleology. However, the construct of deontology is 
wider than that in terms of containing both the right and the good whereas the 
right is the pursuance of good within a teleological framework. 
(a) The theory of justice 
John Rawls sees justice within the context of society and social justice. He 
conceives it as being the fundamental underlying principle against which 
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people work in co-operation and conflict (Rawls, 1972). He uses as an 
analogy a mythical situation where people are coming together in a society 
for the first time as equals. They have to decide how they are going to 
regulate their society. He argues that the principle of "justice as fairness" 
ensures in this situation that further institutions such as constitutions and 
legislature can all be chosen based on the principle of justice. From this point 
he argues that it is unlikely that such individuals, seeing each other as equals, 
will choose the principle of utility whereby some will suffer for the good of 
others. He therefore maintains that two different principles will be chosen. 
The first relates to equality in the assignment of basic rights and duties and 
the second holds that inequalities of, for example, wealth and authority, could 
only be just if they resulted in "compensating benefits for everyone, and in 
particular for the least advantaged members of society". 
Inherent in Rawls' theory is the concept of the "veil of ignorance" in that 
starting from base point as Rawls would have us do, assuming equality 
between all, he suggests that the parties should not know their social status, 
wealth, intelligence or anything else about them which might affect their right 
to equality before they decide upon a moral principle upon which to rely. 
"The principles of justice are chosen behind a veil of ignorance. This ensures 
that no one is advantaged or disadvantaged in the choice of principles by the 
outcome of natural chance or the contingency of social circumstances" 
(Rawls, 1972, p12). 
Rawls defines the principles of justice as "those which rational persons 
concerned to advance their interests would consent to as equals when none 
are known to be advantaged or disadvantaged by social and natural 
contingencies" (p19). He sees these principles as being by necessity ranked 
in order of significance when deciding priority of principle. Thus, he offers a 
theory of distributive justice which has influenced Lawrence Kohlberg in his 
psychological theories relating to individual moral development and, also, 
can be seen as the founding theory behind principles of equal opportunities as 
they have developed within the workplace. 
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Secondly, there is a tradition within moral philosophy which stretches back to 
Aristotle and which is now gaining favour within current moral philosophical 
writing (MacIntyre, 1985; Hursthouse, 1999). It is known as virtue ethics 
and it has been perceived as reflecting the teleological perspective (Legge, 
1998). 
(b) Aristotelian virtue theory and its modern developments 
With regard to the virtues in general we have stated their genus in 
outline, viz. that they are means and that they are states of character, 
and that they tend, and by their own nature, to the doing of the acts by 
which they are produced, and that they are in our power and 
voluntary, and act as the right rule prescribes. (Aristotle, 1987, p63, 
original emphasis) 
Thus Aristotle defines virtues and he identifies a number of virtues which he 
outlines in detail. These include courage, temperance, liberality, 
magnificence and virtues concerned with honour, anger and of social 
intercourse. As Norman (1983) and Hursthouse (1999) point out, there are 
three stages to Aristotle's ethical argument. First, the ultimate end of human 
action is happiness; second, happiness consists in acting in accordance with 
reason; and, lastly, acting according to reason is the distinguishing feature of 
all the traditional virtues. 
There are two Aristotelian constructs which require definition at this point. 
They are eudaimonia and phronesis. Thus, the reference to happiness in the 
previous paragraph relates to "eudaimonia" which can also be translated as 
meaning "well-being" or a type of happiness which relates to the concept of 
"flourishing" (Hursthouse, 1999). 
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Alistair Maclntyre offers the following definition. 
It is the state of being well and doing well in being well, of a man's 
being well-favoured himself and in relation to the divine (Maclntyre, 
1985, p148). 
According to MacIntyre, Aristotle links the ability to act virtuously with a 
level of education. Tied up with this concept is that of "phronesis" which 
Maclntyre describes as being an ability to exercise judgement. He perceives 
phronesis as an intellectual virtue in itself within Aristotle's writing. As 
such, it is the foundation of being able to act virtuously. This definition can 
be extended to include phronesis as a type of moral knowledge which is 
gained by being part of a "morally civilised community" (Norman, 1983, 
p54). An example of this is the expression of anger which might be used 
either appropriately or inappropriately according to the requirements of that 
community. In considering the significance of membership of community on 
moral behaviour, it will be useful to recall that, as early as Aristotle, it was 
recognised that the constraints imposed by membership of any group guide 
behaviour and dictate appropriate and inappropriate actions. The concept of 
phronesis also recalls Kohlberg's search for moral knowledge and the learnt 
ability to make moral judgements. As Kohlberg seeks to identify the process 
of the psychological development of the ability to engage in moral reasoning, 
it is that very capacity which is captured by the construct of phronesis. 
Alistair Maclntyre's After Virtue: a study in moral theory seeks to take 
Aristotelian ethics and re-interpret them in the light of more recent moral 
tradition, redefining what has come to be known as virtue ethics (Maclntyre, 
1985). He describes his concept of virtues as follows: 
The virtues therefore are to be understood as those dispositions which 
will not only sustain practices and enable us to achieve the goods 
internal to practices, but which will also sustain us in the relevant kind 
of quest for the good, by enabling us to overcome the harms, dangers, 
temptations and distractions which we encounter, and which will 
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furnish us with increasing self-knowledge and increasing knowledge 
of the good. (Maclntyre, 1985, p219). 
Maclntyre uses the term pi-actice in a very specific way. Whereas the 
concept of a Kuhnian paradigm relates to a whole culture, history, theory and 
practice within a particular academic discipline, Maclntyre defines "practice" 
in terms of a similarly holistic concept of a type of construct relating to a 
particular activity. Examples he gives include the games of chess and cricket 
as well as architecture. However, the practice is not in the playing of cricket 
but in being a competent cricket player and knowing and following its rules 
and customs. 
By a 'practice' I am going to mean any coherent and complex form of 
socially established cooperative human activity through which goods 
internal to that form of activity are realised in the course of trying to 
achieve those standards of excellence which are appropriate to, and 
partially definitive of, that form of activity, with the result that human 
powers to achieve excellence, and human conceptions of the ends and 
goods involved, are systematically extended. (p187). 
The goods internal to the practice of cricket would include obeying the rules, 
practising skills regularly and being sportsmanlike. These, then, are the 
virtues of being a good cricketer to which any cricketer should aspire. 
Inherent in this concept is the Homeric concept of virtues relating to roles in 
society and MacIntyre acknowledges that his concept of practices is designed 
to include linking virtues to identified roles. 
MacIntyre places the individual within a historical and societal context within 
membership of a community while making the point that any individual does 
not need to be limited by membership of such. In doing so, MacIntyre refers 
to the narratives which exist both as fictions promoting values and to 
individual life narratives which also embrace virtues. In the former, 
therefore, he refers to the virtues expressed in Homer's Iliad and within Jane 
Austen's writing while also recognising the need for individuals to relate to a 
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life narrative of their own which makes sense and which includes virtues that 
enable that individual to evaluate their own life. It has already been 
established within this project that the narrative is an important way of 
making sense of moral actions and their evaluation. 
Rosalind Hursthouse (1999) provides a recent analysis of virtue ethics. She 
portrays virtue ethics as not only relating to the qualities of the moral agent 
but also directing actions. For example, being honest should mean "Do what 
is honest". Against the criticism that there is no guidance on what is honest, 
she points to the practice of seeking advice from a more virtuous person. 
Within virtue ethics, she defines "right action" as follows: "An action is right 
if it is what a virtuous agent would, characteristically, do in the 
circumstances" (Hursthouse, 1999, p49). She moves on to consider the 
ethical dilemma in the light of this. It is possible to have two alternative 
actions possible within a dilemma, both of which are not virtuous per se but, 
perhaps, one is less bad than the other. Similarly, two different people can be 
faced with the same dilemma and have two options, each choose differently 
and still have done the "good (well)" thing. Here she makes the distinction 
between what "a" virtuous agent might do rather than what "the" virtuous 
agent might do. Thus it is possible for two agents in identical circumstances 
to act differently and still be virtuous. Given an example of an "irresolvable" 
dilemma, it is possible not just to say that either option might be permissible 
but also that, in some circumstances, the agents acted "well" in terms of 
courage, honesty, justice etc. In relation to such dilemmas where any action 
might be deemed to be less than virtuous because of the circumstances, she 
states the following: 
The actions a virtuous agent is forced to in tragic dilemmas fail to be 
good actions because the doing of them, no matter how unwillingly or 
involuntarily, mars or ruins a good life. So to say that there are some 
dilemmas from which even a virtuous agent cannot emerge having 
acted well is just to say that there are some from which even a 
virtuous agent cannot emerge with her life unmarred - not in virtue of 
wrongdoing (for e-x hypothesi, in making a forced choice, the agent is 
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blameless), and not in virtue of having done what is right or justifiable 
or permissible (which would sound very odd), but simply in virtue of 
the fact that her life presented her with this choice, and was thereby 
marred, or perhaps even ruined. (Hursthouse, 1999, pp74-5, original 
emphasis) 
There is a danger of circularity of argument here in the potential statement 
"being virtuous is doing what a virtuous agent would do". Hursthouse here 
would appear to be taking the Homeric influence in terms of linking virtues 
to roles rather than considering the nature of the "practice" involved as 
previously defined by MacIntyre. Thus the judgement of what a virtuous 
agent should do must be linked to what is required to promote the benefit of 
the context within which she is working. An example from the business 
world would be the practice of being a managing director within a small 
manufacturing company. Virtues associated with this practice might relate to 
justice, courage, honesty, openness, and determination. At the same time, she 
would be expected to be able to compromise within negotiations being 
undertaken on behalf of the business. Comparing this with another role 
within the business, that of quality control inspector, the virtues necessary to 
promote good quality control would include the ability not to compromise on 
the quality of the goods inspected. Thus virtues have a dependency on the 
practice within which the virtuous agent is working and are different 
according to the nature of the practice. 
In the previous chapter, consideration was given to the role of emotions 
within a moral decision. Hursthouse considers their role both within ethical 
theory and within virtue ethics. She refers to Aristotle's distinction between 
the "continent" character who is self-controlled but who, within a moral act, 
acts according to what she knows she should do but contrary to what she 
would like to do and the fully virtuous character whose desires are in 
complete harmony with her actions. Aristotle holds the latter to be morally 
superior to the former. Her interpretation of Kant might hold that he reversed 
this principle in suggesting that the harder it is to do take the appropriate 
action, the more virtuous a person is. She concludes that the nature of the 
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emotions involved indicates which is the more virtuous where the fully 
virtuous character is "better disposed in relation to their emotions than the 
self-controlled" (p107). 
Two main problems remain with virtue ethics. The first is that there is no 
guidance as to which virtue is the more "important". In the face of a moral 
dilemma, it could be possible for two potential actions to oppose each other, 
both virtuous, but underpinned by different virtues. An example of this 
would be the question of whether to inform the requisite authorities of a 
minor crime against an employer such as occurred within the context of an 
informant's narrative for this project. Is it virtuous to uphold the law by 
informing them or is it more virtuous to keep one's promise of privacy and 
confidentiality relating to the identity of the informant? MacIntyre would 
argue that the best action would sustain the goods internal to the practice 
involved. This would mean evaluating the nature of the practice 
(researcher/informant relationship) in terms of the researcher's role in 
working with informants and the virtues which would promote that work. 
The second issue relates to the motivation for being virtuous. Why should a 
virtuous agent be virtuous? Norman phrases it succinctly: 
If there is no guarantee that I shall be any better off for doing so, if all 
I can be sure of is that it will contribute to human betterment in 
general, why should I be virtuous? (Norman, 1983, p233). 
However, both Aristotle and MacIntyre address this in terms of Aristotle's 
search for eudaimonia and MacIntyre's modern interpretation of this through 
a person's achievement of a state of well-being. He defines the "good" life 
as follows. 
The good life for man is the life spent in seeking for the good life for 
man, and the virtues necessary for the seeking are those which will 
enable us to understand what more and what else the good life for 
man is. (p219). 
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Virtue ethics thus takes on a teleological perspective in terms of the 
promotion of the "good" which, for Maclntyre, lies within the historical and 
societal context of the relevant "practice". 
3. The influence of philosophical theory on business ethics 
Before considering the evidence given to the project by its informants, it is 
necessary to examine the work which has been done within the field of 
business ethics in researching how philosophical theory relates in practice to 
processes within individuals in organisations. Ferrell and Gresham (1985), 
for example, argue that philosophical theory itself is an influence on 
individuals and that the more that people are aware of such theory, the more 
influence it will have on an individual's moral decision. Interestingly, they 
see the role of theory as being an influence rather than an explanation of the 
process itself. 
Hunt and Vitell (1986) refer to the deontological and teleological theories as 
reflecting two alternative means of working through an ethical dilemma. 
However, they assert that, depending on the individual, both streams will be 
used to evaluate information relating to the decision to a greater or lesser 
degree. Ak-aah (1996), writing on the influence of organisational rank and 
role on marketing professionals' ethical judgements, relates philosophical 
theory to specific roles within organisations. 
For example, organisational members are believed to rely on 
teleological moral philosophies in ethical decision making if their 
roles/jobs demand evaluation on the basis of attained results (e. g. 
monetary gains/losses). On the other hand, members are believed to 
rely on deontological moral philosophies if their jobs demand 
evaluation on how well they abide by rules. (Ak-aah, 1996, p606). 
165 
Menguc (1998) attempts to ascertain whether teleological or deontological 
considerations dominate within the ethical judgements of sales managers. He 
concludes that Turkish sales managers rely primarily on deontological 
evaluations of subordinates' actions and behaviour but that teleological 
evaluations also play a part. Sligo and Stirton (1998) use a case study to 
research the effect of hindsight on ethical decisions in the workplace. While 
concluding that hindsight does present a bias, they then reflect on the 
influence of normative ethical theories on their research subjects and 
conclude that there was little relation between the decisions taken and 
theories relating to rights, justice and utilitarianism. Finally, one of the 
elements in the integrated model for ethical decisions developed by Malhotra 
and Miller (1998) relates to "ethical judgement". They list six different 
philosophical theories to which an individual might refer: ethical relativism, 
justice, objectivism (defined as a theory which recognises that the world is 
not perfect but that action can be taken to improve it by the use of guidelines 
for ethical behaviour, for example, codes of practice), teleology, deontology, 
and what they refer to as "hybrid" perspectives. They acknowledge that the 
different theories might bring conflicting results and that an individual might 
choose to discard one in favour of another but they give little guidance on 
this. 
Ultimately, for a decision to be evaluated as ethical it must be 
consistent with all the philosophies judged to be applicable by the 
decision maker, or there must be overriding reasons which eliminate 
any inconsistencies between philosophies by excluding those 
philosophies from the judgement process as not being relevant to the 
given ethical dilemma. (Malhotra and Miller, 1998, p275). 
While the above might be seen to be a very quick run through existing 
literature around philosophical theory in business ethics, it serves to 
demonstrate the range of approaches which have been taken in seeking to 0 
relate philosophical theory to moral decision-making in organisations. The 
only generalisation which may be made from this material is that the different 
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traditions of ethical theory provide a menu of approaches on which any 
individual can draw during the process. 
From the above summary of available literature from within the business 
ethics paradigm, it seems that "mainstream" philosophical theory is seen as 
both an influence and a reflection of particular principles used in making 
moral decisions in the workplace but that, in its various forms, it fails to grasp 
the whole range of moral principles used and no pattern emerges which 
appears to reflect the reality. Thomas Whetstone (2001) confirms this when 
he argues that moral theory within an organisational setting should be formed 
through a tripartite theory which combines both teleological and 
deontological approaches with virtue theory. He asserts that philosophers 
have too often in the past sought a mononomic approach, promoting one type 
of theory above others in seeking an ultimate answer to ethical theory 
questions. In recognising that the context is multi-causal and multi- 
contextual, he argues for the contribution of virtue theory, relating to the 
nature of the person or actor to be laid across arguments relating to 
consequences and principles. He sees virtue theory as bringing a personal 
perspective to the more impersonal theories relating to the teleological and 
deontological approaches. However, he fails to recognise that virtue theory 
itself takes a teleological perspective. 
Before establishing how close Whetstone's proposition might be to the reality 
of the project's informants, it is necessary to explore Neil's story. 
4. Neil's story 
Neil was a manager within an academic institution which had recently been 
restructured and which was going through a process of change in working 
practices in order to address an economic situation which had arisen. He had 
recently been promoted into the post and was having difficulty in establishing 
new relationships with former peers who he was now responsible for 
managing. In particular, one female member of staff (a former friend) was 
protesting at the introduction of a new pattern of working. She had a small 
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child and was expecting another. He decided to treat her in the same way as 
other colleagues but lost her friendship in doing so. 
When Neil was asked during the inter-view with him whether he took a 
deontological or teleological approach to the problem, he was clear that the 
perspective was the former as illustrated by this extract from the interview. 
CK: When you were making that decision, were you thinking more 
about the consequences of the decision or more about doing the right 
thing for its own sake? 
Neil: More about doing the right thing, I think. 
Yet, within Neil's cognitive maps of the decision can be found three 
constructs which would seem to imply a desire to be virtuous in some way. 
*Did not want to give in to protestation* 
*She had been a friend* 
*Wanted to treat people fairly as much as possible* 
The first construct implies that he felt that, to be virtuous as a good manager 
he should not be easily swayed by an emotional protestation from doing what 
he had previously decided to be fair and just. The second construct expresses 
his concern at the possibility of losing a friend and consequent loyalty to that 
friendship, the virtue to be found inbeing loyal to a friend. The third 
construct suggests that he saw a virtue in treating people fairly. All three 
constructs express a virtue which Neil identified as being an influence of an 
"individual value" while he also felt that the need to be fair stemmed from his 
perception of organisational values as well. These can be summarised as 
follows: 
(a) It is virtuous to be a good manager (in this case, do not be 
swayed from treating everyone fairly) 
(b) It is virtuous to be loyal to a friend 
(c) It is virtuous to treat everyone fairly. 
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It is helpful to recall MacIntyre's definition of a virtue at this point. He 
maintained that a virtue is a disposition which will enable the sustenance of a 
practice and the goods internal to that practice. This raises two questions in 
relation to Neil's story. If he is expressing virtues, what "practice" does he 
relate them to, if any, and, if so, what are the identifiable "goods" which he is 
seeking to promote within that practice? 
An examination of Neil's narrative provides some explanation of the nature 
of the practice to which he was referring. We know that he was a manager 
within an academic institution. This quotation summarises his perception of 
his role in relation to the moral decisions involved. 
I was responsible for a group of senior counsellors who helped with 
the kind of academic side of the course but relationships were not 
tested in the way in my new job managing staff but I am no longer 
programme manager but I am division leader and my prime 
responsibility is to manage my staff so what the new job has meant to 
me is these moral decisions which I am now forced to make and some 
of them do mean a different relationship between myself and people 
with whom I had a former relationship at a similar level. " (Neil) 
Thus Neil describes the "practice" (Maclntyre) which he is seeking to 
sustain; an academic manager with responsibility for staff and their strategic 
as well as day-to-day management. Further, this can be identified as seeking 
the virtues of the role in society in the Homeric sense. Neil is in the role of a 
manager and identifying the virtues required of a good manager which he is 
seeking to promote. If this, then, is the practice to which he was referring, 
what are the "goods", internal to the practice, which he was seeking to 
promote? The answer lies in the deduced virtues from his cognitive map as 
above, together with an examination of his narrative. The following 
quotations from his story are pertinent. 
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"I felt one of my priorities in terms of what I should do should be to 
do my best without any guarantee of success" (Neil) 
"Now, in doing this to be fair, it seems to me that the first principle, to 
add a kind of moral dimension to it, if I should try to preserve the jobs 
of my staff to the best of my ability -I see that as my first aim" (Neil) 
"The next principle, which I think again has a strong kind of moral 
base to it, is that we should seek to be -I should try to be equitable 
then in terms of the work that one is expecting of one's staff" (Neil). 
Thus Neil describes the virtues which he aspired to hold within his role as 
manager as doing his best (see cognitive map and narrative), being loyal to 
existing friendships (map), treating everyone fairly (map and narrative), and 
trying to preserve jobs wherever possible (narrative). Maclntyre makes the 
distinction between goods internal and external to the practice. In Neil's 
situation, the external goods would relate to the success of the students 
through quality teaching and learning opportunities. What are the internal 
goods here? MacIntyre refers to the element of competition as being a part of 
internal goods but also states that they refer to the whole community of 
people within a particular practice. In Neil's context, this must mean the staff 
for whom he was responsible and therefore he is seeking to promote the 
welfare of his staff to his best ability within the overall framework of 
performing the external goods. In that Neil's narrative relates to his worries 
about his relationships with various members of staff, his concern to treat 
them equally and fairly supports this identification of internal goods within 
the practice of managing within an academic institution which he is seeking 
to Promote. 
Before leaving Neil's situation and in further pursuance of comparison 
between theory and actual process, another interesting point emerges. The 
third construct cited above from Neil's cognitive map relates to the need to 
treat people as fairly as possible. This expresses Rawls' theory of justice 
which Neil is seeking to put in practice. It is an extremely strong construct 
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and Neil identifies it as coming both from his own values and that of the 
organisation by which he was employed. However, it is also expressed as a 
virtue. Thus justice becomes one virtue, confirming MacIntyre's theory that 
justice is one of many virtues and not a primary end in itself. 
It appears that MacIntyre's theories are broadly supported by Neil's map and 
narrative. However this needs to be tested further within the context of 
another informant's situation before any more general conclusion can be 
made. I therefore consider Joanne's situation next in order to enlighten 
further the use of virtues in practice. 
Joanne's story 
Joanne makes four statements within her cognitive map from which virtues 
can be deduced around her role as a human resources officer unable to inform 
employees of the real effects of a proposed TUPE transfer. 
*Unjust situation around pension rights and government plans to 
adjust TUPE regs* (Justice) 
*Didn't want to go against management* (Loyalty to organisation) 
*Dishonest not to tell them* (Honesty) 
*Telling them would have upset them* (Concern for others). 
In the above case, the virtues identified are summarised in brackets after each 
construct. Referring to Joanne's story, the following summarises her anger 
and frustration at the lack of caring that her employing organisation appeared 
to be dernonstrating in its working practices. She was particularly concerned 
about the effect on one specific employee. 
CK: There was never a job there for him 
J: No, but it just felt that they handled the situation so badly that it 
was really really difficult and the fact that they didn't care for any of 
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them they gave the impression that they didn't care. They gave lip 
service to a lot of things when really you know it was very difficult. 
Taking the MacIntyre model and imposing it on Joanne's situation, the first 
question relates to the identification of the practice to which she is referring. 
We know that she is a human resources officer working within a local 
authority and that is the practice which she is seeking to promote. The 
external "goods" within that practice would be the successful administration 
and management of staff according to good employment practice. The 
community internal to the practice would be individuals affected by that 
practice. According to Joanne, there is a definite need to care for them and 
look after their interests. Her distress is caused by two factors in terms of 
MacIntyre's model. Both the external goods and the goods internal to the 
practice being supported by Joanne are not being achieved because she is 
being prevented from doing what she wants to do by a superior authority 
within her situation. Members of staff are going to be worse off after the 
transfer to another authority which goes against the spirit of the employment 
law around the transfer of an undertaking. In addition, she seeks to achieve a 
level of honesty which she sees is a prerequisite of being in her role of human 
resources officer. However, she is not allowed to divulge what she knows. 
As in Neil's story, Joanne uses the concept of justice as one particular virtue 
without making any distinction in terms of its priority over another virtue 
which, again, supports MacIntyre's theory that justice is one of a number of 
virtues. I want to turn now to the philosophical perspective expressed by the 
informants and explore in detail how that "fits" with virtue theory as a 
teleological ethical theory. 
6. The philosophical perspective of the informants 
Due to a technical problem with the tape recorder, I only have the recorded 
answers to the question relating to ethical theory with 13 people. In response, 
two informants indicated that they both considered consequences and sought 
to do "right for right's sake". Of the remaining 11, nine were concerned with 
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"doing right" while two (Joanne and Leo) were more concerned about the 
consequences of their actions. If one were to ask oneself whether this related 
to the consequences to themselves or to others, a check reveals that Joanne 
was concerned both about her own reputation and the effect of upsetting 
employees about their rights under TUPE, while Leo worried both about his 
career and the effect on his friendship with his colleague. There was no 
relationship with gender or any other factor. The general conclusion from 
this is that the deontological approach within ethical theory would appear to 
reflect more accurately the way individuals approach their moral thinking 
processes within this group of informants. However, this assertion needs to 
be tested within the context of an informant's story before it can be justified. 
It has already been stated that virtue theory is teleological in perspective in 
that it seeks to promote goods internal to practices. By considering Isabel's 
case, I seek to throw light on an apparent disagreement between what the 
informants are saying and philosophical theory around the nature of virtues. 
Isabel was a human resources officer within a local civil service institution. 
She was particularly concerned about the way a particular vacancy was being 
handled, feeling that the procedures breached the organisational equal 
opportunities policy. This is the way in which she answered the question in 
interview about ethical theory perspective. 
CK: The last question relates to ethical theory, really. When you 
were making that decision were you thinking more about doing right 
because it was the right thing to do or more about the consequences of 
your actions as to whether it would harm or benefit anybody? 
1: 1 think it was more about doing the right thing although 
consequences did come into it because it had consequences for both 
myself and other people but at the time it was just so against all the 
policies and procedures that we have indoctrinated into us that I just 
couldn't see how they could go ahead with it knowing that it goes 
against everything they dictate to us if you know what I mean. Yet 
because it was what they wanted they were prepared to do it. 
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Isabel here asserts that she is taking a deontological perspective while 
recognising that she was aware of some of the consequences of her actions. 
The following are the constructs within her cognitive map from which virtues 
can be deduced. 
*Unfairness to colleagues* (Justice) 
*Felt cheated* (Equality/justice) 
*Felt doing the right thing* (Reasonableness). 
One can assume that her practice was similar to that of Joanne who also 
worked in human resources and that Isabel perceived the virtues of justice 
and reasonableness as supporting the internal goods to that practice which 
relate, again, to the welfare of her and other members of staff. In this 
instance, she was concerned because the behaviour of others was preventing 
the promotion of the internal goods in that a stated organisational policy was 
being overlooked which gave everyone the opportunity to apply for internal 
vacancies. Yet, Isabel felt so strongly that what was happening was going 
against what was "right" in that she saw herself as acting "for right's sake" 
within a deontological framework. Thus there is a conflict between the 
teleological nature of virtues and the informant's identification of her own 
perspeqtive being deontological. 
There are four potential reasons behind this conflict, none of which are 
definitive answers to the question. However, they are submitted as possible 
resolutions. The first reason relates to the nature of acting in role. If one is 
acting in role is it possible to be totally aware of the influence of being in the 
role? If one is not conscious of all that is required in terms of behaviour and 
actions by being in a particular role, it may not be immediately obvious that 
the role is the motivation for the behaviour. Thus, if one is influenced to 
perform a "good" action, it might be perceived as being done for the sake of 
it, rather than being done because another person in that role would do the 
same or to promote the sustainability of the particular practice involved. 
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The second possible reason relates to the intrinsic nature of virtues as 
expressed by informants. The link between virtues, membership of 
community and sustenance of practices is not particularly obvious to a non- 
philosopher. If one seeks to act in a "kind" fashion, it can appear that this is 
being done for its own sake and, indeed, it might be argued that some virtues 
could be universalisable. If they are rooted within roles and membership of 
community within practices, then the nature of virtues is undoubtedly 
teleological but this is a theoretical step which needs to be made and is not 
immediately obvious to someone not familiar with ethical theory or the 
tradition of virtue ethics. 
A third possibility is that the wording of the question to the informants was 
not clear or helpful. It may have been worded in such a way that "right for 
right's sake" sounded the more acceptable answer than "thinking about the 
consequences". If this was the case, then it could be argued that the 
researcher influenced the response in some way. However, I was extremely 
careful to ensure that the question was not "loaded" in one way or another 
and therefore feel that the possibility of researcher influence is highly 
unlikely. 
Lastly, it is possible that the project's research informants were using a menu 
of different philosophical approaches to their situation and applying Kantian 
or Rawlsian principles as well as virtue theory. However, there is insufficient 
evidence of this to be able to explore it any further to any useful purpose. 
What is clear is that there is a difference in approach between the informants' 
response to the question about ethical Perspective and their use of virtues. I 
can only offer the above reasons as potential resolutions of the apparent 
conflict without being able to come to any overall conclusion. 
7. The informants' use of virtues 
This section seeks to generalise the evidence relating to the use of virtues 
amongst the project's informants. Up until now, specific examples have been 
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used from within individual informants' experiences. However, there are 
some patterns which emerge from the totality which need to be explored. 
Only one informant made no reference to a virtue and it was clear that the 
concept of virtues ran through most people's thinking. In an analytical 
framework, 46 of a total of 197 concepts (23 per cent) related to virtues. 54 
per cent of these came from male informants and 46 per cent from female. 
(Total group consisted of 56 per cent males and 44 per cent females. ) The 
nature of the virtues has been sub-coded as follows: 
Nature of virtue No. of concepts across 16 cases Examples 
Loyalty 14 *Didn't want to go against 
management* (Joanne) 
*Felt colleagues being betrayed* 
Edith) 
*Wanted to back a friend* (Leo) 
Equality/justice/fairness 11 *Wanted to treat people fairly as 
Puch as possible* (Neil) 
*Fair to allow best person to 
continue* (Don) 
*Nobody losing out* (Bob) 
Responsibleness 7 *Wanted funders to know 
esponsible* (Ken) 
*Needed to demonstrate personal 
redibility to existing staff team* 
Don) 
I 
ness/respect of Worried about peers' changed 
erceptions* (Gaynor) 
Worried about appearing 
* (Angela) 
for others 
to be jeaIous 
to take into consideration 
xtenuating circumstances* (Penny) 41 
Dishonest not to tell thern* (Joanne) 
Jealous of officer offered 
(Isabel) 
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It is difficult to quantify the relevant strength of the influence of virtues 
because those concepts in the maps expressing an aspiration towards a 
particular virtue appear to be random with no pattern to them. Their 
influence comes from across the sources identified from society, to peer 
group, to organisational and individual values. 
However, a further point arises in relation to gender. The examples of virtues 
given by informants in the above table were randomly taken to illustrate the 
coding of "loyalty", "equality/justice/fairness", "responsibleness", 
"reasonable ness/respect of others", "compassion/respect for others", 
"morality/honesty" and "not to be jealous". The nature of the codes can be 
described as pertaining to Gilligan's concepts of justice and care as follows: 
Nature of virtue Justice/care perspective 
Loyalty Justice and care 
Equality/justice/fairness Justice 
Responsibleness Justice 
Reasonableness/respect of others Care 
Compassion/respect for others Care 
Morality/Honesty Care 
Not to be jealous Care 
If the justice/care labels are then compared with the former table giving 
examples of virtues expressed by informants, there is a very strong 
relationship between the justice or care perspective and examples provided by 
males or females. For example, the virtue "reasonableness/respect of others" 
is expressed mainly by females. The virtue of "equality/justice/fairness" is 
propounded by males. It is not appropriate to analyse the influence of gender 
any further in terms of justice or care because there is always the possibility 
that, for example, females will act "in role" of a male model as has already 
been identified within this group of informants. Similarly, some virtues can 
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be difficult to allocate to males or females such as that of "loyalty" which can 
be seen as a male-oriented concept or as a means of caring within 
relationships from a female perspective. Rather, the whole menu is available 
to all. 
To explain this in a different way, the greater majority of informants refer to 
virtues and the desire to be virtuous. Depending on whether they are male or 
female, these virtues tend to take a justice or care perspective. 
8. Emotivism and the virtues 
The previous chapter outlined the debate between emotions and rationality 
and indicated a need to move away from an unhelpful dualism in recognition 
of the way in which informants had demonstrated their use of emotions 
against other influences within the totality of the moral decision. MacIntyre 
describes the history of moral philosophy as a series of swings between 
emotivism and rationality. He defines emotivism in terms of relating to the 
use of moral language rather than its meaning. At the same time, he 
perceives modern ethical theory in use as being primarily emotivist in 
character and argues that what is lacking is the telos of Aristoteleian thought. 
Thus he seeks to tie virtues into moral tradition and into the influences of 
membership of community while defining the good life as being the overall 
purpose to be sought in exercising virtues. The question is then raised as to 
whether this project's informants' use of emotions alongside virtues 
challenges Maclntyre's theory in any way. In order to examine this in more 
detail, I draw on the example of Edith's cognitive map. 
Edith was a financial director within a health-related agency. Within the 
structural changes being made within the National Health Service at the time, 
she became aware of a dubious practice being promulgated in relation to a 
fellow director's appointment. She decided to fax the evidence to the person 
concerned, breaking organisational confidentiality. Within her cognitive 
map, she identifies four constructs all of which relate to her individual values 
and all of which include a reference to the way she felt about the situation. 
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*Felt colleagues being betrayed* 
*Feeling contempt for line manager* 
*Felt loyalty to organisation being betrayed* 
*Felt people in organisation had right to know about it* (Edith). 
When one considers the above four statements, it is clear that they are a 
mixture of emotions and statements relating to a moral evaluation of the 
situation which imply virtues. For example, the first construct *felt 
colleagues being betrayed* implies the virtue of loyalty and honesty. The 
second, *feeling contempt for line manager*, while implying some form of 
moral evaluation, relates more to her general emotions in terms of contempt 
within the situation in which she found herself. The third and fourth 
constructs imply different forms of virtues. The consistent use of the term 
"feeling" could lead to an argument here in favour of the emotivist approach. 
However, MacIntyre's identification of the purpose of the use of the virtues 
overcomes this, together with his definition of emotivist theory in terms of 
the use of moral language. This serves to overcome any movement away 
from a conclusion that, again, the duality of emotions and rationality is not 
helpful and that emotions and moral evaluative language are both factors 
within a given moral decision in practice. 
Conclusions 
A further examination of the relationship between emotions, rationality and 
moral judgements has supported the conclusions of the previous chapter that 
the dualism between emotions and rationality is not useful and, further, that 
emotions and evaluative moral statements are both included as relevant 
factors within a moral decision. It has also been demonstrated that the nature 
of the moral statements made by the project's informants is accurately 
reflected within MacIntyre's theory of virtue ethics and that his framework of 
the use of virtues can be successfully imposed upon the situations 
encountered by the informants. An apparent disagreement between 
informants and philosophical theory as to the philosophical perspective of 
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their decisions has been examined and a number of reasons submitted for this 
incongruity such as to sufficiently weaken any argument that the informants' 
perspectives are not compatible with Maclntyre's teleological view of the 
virtues. 
In an examination of the virtues, the concept of justice has been shown to be 
used by informants as one of a number of virtues, rather than one end to be 
sought above all others, thus undermining Rawls' theory of justice. In a 
previous chapter I have considered the nature of Kohlberg's Stage Six in 
levels of moral development. This depended heavily on the search for justice 
being the prime motivation for moral judgements and this becomes yet 
another reason for denying the likelihood of the sixth stage existing in 
practice. 
Virtues can be seen to have a justice or care approach relating to the gender 
of the decision-maker. This supports Gilligan's theories. 
Finally, I need to reflect back on existing literature around applying 
philosophical theory to what happens in practice when someone makes a 
moral decision in the workplace. This project has provided evidence for 
support for the teleological perspective dominated by virtue theory reflecting 
best the content of the processes involved in making a moral decision. 
Singer (2000) identified five norma tive rules for study against ethical 
behaviour at work (utility, rights, justice, principlism and care). Following 
empirical research around devised scenarios, she concluded that the most 
important rule to emerge was that of justice, followed by the norm of rights. 
While I have found evidence of justice and care, there is little evidence of 
Singer's principlism, reference to any argument with an element of utility, or 
of a reference to the need for an individual's rights to be upheld. However, 
Singer appears to have failed to include virtue theory in her research. 
One of the factors pertaining to virtues identified by Maclntyre relates to an 
individual's relationship with members of their community, using the term 
180 
"community" in its widest sense, alongside the moral tradition embraced by 
society. The next step in this project is therefore to investigate how 
membership of various communities has influenced the project's informants 
in the making of their moral decisions. 
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Chapter Nine: 
Membership of Community: an individual in an organisation 
1. Introduction 
Previous chapters of this thesis have considered the process of how we obtain 
our moral values as individuals in relation to making moral decisions in the 
workplace. Theories have been outlined which seek to suggest that it is 
membership of communities which provide us with a framework of values to 
which we can refer when faced with a moral judgement to be made. 
However, an individual can be a member of a variety of communities, all 
with differing value frameworks, some of which may conflict with others. 
The purpose of the next two chapters is to explore the influence of 
membership of communities; how those communities work and exert their 
authority. This thesis is about moral decisions in the workplace so I start 
with the organisational influence in this chapter and outline current theories 
relating to the influence of an employing organisation upon an individual 
employee when she is faced with a moral "dilemma" within the context of 
employment. A number of issues are raised in relation to the nature of an 
organisation and its relationship with its employees. I also consider the 
contribution of the field of business ethics in considering the tensions 
between employer and employee. Finally, within this chapter, is the question 
of the influence of society as identified by some of the project's informants. 
The following chapter considers membership of groups and the influence of 
peers as well as what it means to be a professional when making a moral 
decision in the workplace. 
We are expected to behave in particular ways and not in others when working 
for a particular organisation. How do we learn these rules and how much do 
they influence us when they might potentially conflict with what our personal 
values are telling us to do? When we join an organisation, we become a 
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member of a "community" of individuals who have come together to achieve 
a specific purpose. 
Within the relationship between employer and employee, there is an issue of 
power which, however one looks at it, has to be seen as being heavily 
weighted in favour of the employer. This, too, raises questions of how much 
this imbalance of power affects the nature of moral decision making in the 
workplace. As part of this issue, it is recognised that organisations often 
expect their employees to demonstrate particular emotions as part of their 
role (Hochschild, 1983). The stresses which arise from this requirement will 
also be addressed. 
Kohlberg summarises the problems of the potential conflicts between 
employer and employee thus: 
When the rules of a system or an institution conflict with the welfare 
or rights of an individual within that system, the person who is in a 
position of responsibility for solving that conflict must necessarily 
formulate ideas or principles which recognise the just or fair claims of 
both in order to resolve the conflict and to act fairly and responsibly 
(Kohlberg, 1984, p468) 
Kohlberg argues that the role of the person and the responsibilities within it 
stimulate that person into more principled thinking. Whether this is the case 
will be explored further in this chapter. 
What exactly is the nature of the conflict between a business organisation and 
an individual? Milton Friedman's work has epitomised the attitude towards 
business as being to make a profit for its shareholders (Friedman, 1993). 
Within this context, is there room for individuals to act in an ethical way or is 
business like a game of poker with its own rules as Carr (1993) suggests? 
Various writers have attempted to reconcile the potential conflict. Dekker 
argues that profit-making can be of value to the wider society or environment 
within which a corporation is placed (Dekker, 1990). Jones (1995) suggests 
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that ethical principles within a corporation (trust, trustworthiness and 
cooperativeness) enhance a firm's competitiveness. While acknowledging 
that this debate is taking place, this thesis is more concerned with the effect 
of that conflict on the individual. For this reason, no mention is made of the 
wider issues relating to the role of business organisations within the 
community or society where it operates. 
Kohlberg's theories have been applied in the literature by a number of writers 
to the development of organisations (Maclagan, 1996). Logsdon and Yuthas 
(1997) apply Kohlberg's individual stages of moral development to 
organisations and argue that organisations develop along similar lines, 
converting individual behaviour within stages to corporate behaviour. They 
identify types of organisational. actions as commensurate with Kohlberg's 
stages. This line of theory exemplifies a quantitative approach to 
organisations, identifying them as a separate construct to the individuals of 
which they are comprised with a "mind" of their own and a "will" of their 
own. Does an organisation have its own "personality"? Intuitively, one 
would answer in the affirmative. Yet, this fails to acknowledge the essential 
humanity and complexity of such structures. The concept of the organisation 
becomes a social construction which means something different to each of us, 
depending on our individual experiences. 
This theme will be taken up in greater detail in this chapter which begins by 
considering the nature of what is meant by an organisation. Consideration is 
then given to the literature around organisational culture and organisational 
climate, how they are related and their influence on corporate and individual 
values. This leads to a discussion of the significance of the influence of 
written codes of ethics within organisations. 
Much has been written on the ethical behaviour and consequent moral 
responsibility of corporations which not only lays down prescriptions for 
actions but also considers the philosophical arguments around corporate 
moral responsibility. While acknowledging its significance, I have chosen to 
omit this as not being totally relevant to the point of this project which is to 
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enlighten issues around the individual in relation to the communities of which 
she is a member. 
The next section of this chapter investigates the relationship between the 
individual and the organisation. Maclagan (1996) raises the problems of 
different individuals within organisations working at different levels of 
individual moral development. He also raises the question of whether an 
individual influences an organisation or whether the stronger influence is by 
the organisation itself. I also consider the intrinsic power relationships 
involved and emotions in organisations. The issues around the subject of 
what has come to be known as "whistleblowing", the publicising of practices 
considered to be unethical by employees are examined before, lastly, 
recognising that, ultimately, we are all members of a larger community which 
can be loosely termed as "society", I have briefly covered issues relating to 
influences on individuals from "society", before drawing to conclusions. 
2. The nature of an organisation 
What do we mean by the term "organisation"? Much has been written about 
organisations, motivated by a need to understand how they function and how 
their performance can be improved in order to increase profits and/or quality 
of service. In order to "make sense" of the concept, various definitions have 
been offered, many of which tend to generalise to such an extent that the 
multifarious nature of organisations is lost. Thus, Hinton and Reitz offer the 
following definition: "Organisations can be defined as social systems 
composed of two or more groups and deliberately designed to achieve a 
common goal" (Hinton and Reitz, 1971, p403). They maintain that an 
organisational structure imposes authority and the potential resolution of 
intergroup conflict. It offers common goals. Schein takes a broader view, 
offering what he calls the "traditional" definition of an organisation: C, 
An organisation is the planned co-ordination of the activities of a 
number of people for the achievement of some common, explicit 
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purpose or goal, through division of labour and function, and through 
a hierarchy of authority and responsibility (Schein, 1988, p15). 
This fails to offer a definition sought by this project in terms of social 
groupings and influence. PB Smith, on the other hand, recognises that 
'gorganisations are for the most part made up of overlapping systems of 
innumerable small groups" (Smith, 1973, pl). Within these systems, he 
identifies two main sources of social influence, namely, social comparison 
and control. Social comparison occurs "in any situation in which one uses 
another person as a reference point in determining one's own actions" (Smith, 
1973, pl). Smith makes the distinction between organisations which he sees 
as being directed towards a single goal and groups which he defines in terms 
of face-to-face membership. This distinction can be criticised in that his 
definition of groups fails to recognise the factor of shared goals and values. 
It does, however, serve to reinforce the strength of Hinton and Reitz's 
definition of organisation in terms of a group of groups. More recently, 
Granitz and Ward's research supports the theory that organisations consist of 
a collection of groups (Granitz and Ward, 2001). This raises the question of 
the potential for inter-group conflict within an organisation which very often 
exists and which is obviously a factor to consider when investigating an 
individual's situation within a Moral decision in the workplace. 
Moving away from a quantitative approach, others offer no definition as such 
but, rather, an intuitively more real perspective on the multifariousness of 
organisations with an emphasis on issues of power (including gender), the 
social interdependence of their members and the fluidity of the shapes and 
forms which are organisations, denying the possibility of objective 
knowledge and reality while painting a picture of interweaving narratives 
(Hassard and Parker, 1993). 1 would hope to be able to capture some of the 
flavour of this perspective in considering the nature of the relationship 
between individuals and organisations. 
I shall confine the rest of this chapter to the study of business organisations. 
By that, I intend to include corporations in business to make a profit and 
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those not-for-profit organisations which employ personnel such as 
government departments, local authorities and some parts of the 
independent/voluntary sector. The common factor is that individuals are 
employed in paid work. 
3. Organisational culture and climate 
Values are the bedrock of any corporate culture. As the essence of a 
company's philosophy for achieving success, values provide a sense 
of common direction for all employees and guidelines for their day- 
to-day behaviour. These formulas for success determine (and 
occasionally arise from) the types of corporate heroes, and the myths, 
rituals, and ceremonies of the culture (Deal & Kennedy, 1981, p2l). 
The above quotation, while being relatively early in the recent literature, 
summarises the nature of quantitative-based theory around the relationship 
between an organisation's culture and its values, the implication being that 
values then provide the underpinning checks and balances and steer the 
pattern of acceptable behaviour of an organisation's members. It would 
therefore appear from the above citation that the concept of corporate culture 
is significant in providing an influence on individual employees' moral 
behaviour. There is much literature about organisational culture which 
attempts to analyse it and to offer suggestions to managers for its 
modification. Before considering this further, there is a linguistic problem to 
be clarified. 
(a) Culture v climate: a linguistic problem 
Some of the literature within organisational theory refers to "culture" when 
talking about the underpinning shared creeds of an organisation which govern Cý 
its relationships between its members, its stakeholders and its procedures 
(Chen et al, 1997; Key, 1999; Parker, 2000; Sinclair, 1993). Other literature 
refers to "climate" (Agarwal. and Malloy, 1999; Barnett and Vaicys, 2000; 
Victor and Cullen, 1988). 
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Dennison (1996) identifies two different streams of literature relating to 
organisational culture and organisational climate respectively and suggests 
that there are different characteristics relating to research methodology and 
epistemology, with climate research stemming from Lewinian field theory 
while culture research derives from symbolic interaction and social 
construction perspectives. However, in investigating the literature, the 
distinction is unclear, particularly when at times there has been a crossover 
between qualitative and quantitative research methods. Denison finally 
concludes that the two research traditions relating to climate and culture 
should be seen as two different interpretations of the same phenomenon, 
rather than differences in the phenomenon itself. Indeed, in two instances in 
the literature (Sims, 1992; Weber, 1993), the words culture and climate are 
used interchangeably without separate definition. I shall use the term culture 
as an all-embracing term while referring to climate as that element of the 
culture which relates to shared values and norms, for example ethical 1vork 
climate which has come to have a particular meaning within business ethics 
research following the work of Victor and Cullen (1988). This is not to say 
that when culture is used in the literature it does not include the normative 
element (Key, 1999). Rather, the use of the word climate appears to 
emphasise the significance of that evaluative element. 
Organisational culture 
I intend to concentrate on three authors in considering the nature of 
organisational culture. The first is Hofstede who takes a modernistic 
anthropological perspective and develops it within an organisational context. 
He depicts culture as mental programming, the "software of the mind" 
(Hofstede, 1991, p4). Culture is learnt from an individual's social 
environment. At the core of culture is the individual's value system. Other 
aspects of culture relate to symbols, heroes and rituals. He defines layers of 
culture which people hold depending on their membership of different groups 
and categories in their lives. These include a national level, a regional level, 
a gender level and, for those employed, an organisational level. 
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What does he mean by organisational culture? He lists a number of attributes 
which he suggests are commonly held. Organisational culture is "holistic" 
(pertaining to a whole more than the sum of its parts), "historically 
determined", "related to the things anthropologists study" (symbols and 
rituals), "socially constructed", "soft" and "difficult to change" (Hofstede, 
1991, ppl79-180). He therefore defines it as "the collective programming of 
the mind which distinguishes the members of one organisation from another" 
(Hofstede, 1991, pl. 80). 
In a later publication, Hofstede describes culture as "the collective mental 
programming of the people in an environment" (Hofstede, 1997, p224). He 
considers it to be difficult to change because, not only does it "belong" to a 
number of people, but it has become enshrined within institutions and their 
life experience. In this article, Hofstede is concerned about the influence of 
national culture, that is, the culture of a particular nation. He argues that a 
management theory is the product of a nation which may not be appropriate 
or acceptable to another nation. 
However, given my definition of an organisation as relating to a number of 
interdependent groups, Hofstede's construct of organisational culture strikes 
one as particularly monistic in approach. It apparently fails to recognise the 
diverse nature of organisations and the unique culture which they have 
developed. 
Harris (1994) offers a different perspective on an individual's relationship to 
the organisation and the elements of organisational culture which serve to 
influence this relationship, applying the principles of schema theory. He 
defines schemas as "mental maps which enable individuals to traverse and 
orient themselves within their experiential terrain" (Harris, 1994, p310) and 
describes five different types of "in-organisation" schemas which are 
pertinent to the sense-making of organisational culture. 
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1. Self schemas: relate to a description of self within the context 
of the organisation, for example, I am a white female 
accountant who is honest and hardworking. 
2. Person schemas: these relate to other individuals and groups 
of individuals within organisation, for example, management 
cannot be trusted, the boss likes black coffee, etc. 
3. Organisation schemas: organised thoughts relating to the 
organisation of which the individual is a member, often 
referred to as an "other", for example, "headquarters". 
4. Object/concept schemas: relate to such objects as "offices" or 
concepts such as "quality". 
5. Event schemas: often capture scripts of events such as an 
ideal staff meeting. They also offer guidance to behaviour in 
celebrations and other organisational rites. 
All these schemas add up together to collate information relating to life 
within an organisation. These are shared through common experiences. 
Given that members of organisational subgroups are likely to share 
more immediate experiences with each other than with members of 
the entire organisation, it is not surprising that the schemas which 
emerge in such subgroups (subcultures) tend to be more specific, 
more well-defined, and more generally shared than those emerging 
across an organisation's entire membership (Harris, 1994, p313). 
Schema sense-making can occur either consciously or unconsciously. Newer 
members of an organisation are more likely to make a conscious effort to 
make sense of new experience. Harris refers to theory that people gain their 
social cognitions of organisational. schemas through "mental dialogues" with 
other people within the situation. He asserts that the arguments supplied for 
those persons are, in fact, the direct expression of normative and cultural 
pressures. He gives the example of a newcomer to a company who spots a 
good idea for increased productivity. In deciding whether to express this 
idea, the individual might refer to her schemas relating to her supervisor (who 
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would support her) and her peers (who would not like her "rocking the 
boat"). In the light of the dialogue between these schemas, she might decide 
to keep quiet until she has been there longer. 
Harris refers to the two types of commitment to organisations which have 
been identified: normative (or attitudinal) and compliance (or calculative). 
Normative commitment would be displayed within mental dialogue as "we" 
because it implies an attachment to the organisation based on an acceptance 
of the values and beliefs characterising that organisation. Compliance 
commitment would be a decision to comply with accepted behaviour for pay 
or continued employment. The mental dialogues would relate more to an "I" 
and "they" scenario, thus highlighting the tensions between employer and 
employee. 
Harris' work is illuminating for three reasons. Firstly, it recognises that there 
is a cross-influence between individual and organisation. Secondly, it 
assumes that organisations consist of a number of sub-cultures and that these 
sub-cultures influence both their individual members and the organisation 
itself. Thirdly, it relates individual conceptualisation of membership and 
experiences of organisations very closely to concepts within cognitive maps, 
theory which is being used in the empirical part of this research to illustrate 
the process of moral decision-making in the workplace. However, while 
recognising the fact that we all tend to classify experiences, events, people, as 
a part of that sense-making process, the process of applying that to theory of 
organisations seems to force what happens in practice into an unhelpful 
categorisation with the result that the fluidity and diversity of the processes is 
lost. Our classifications are ever-changing from hour to hour and our 
perception of our "environment" changes constantly. 
Parker (2000) gives an alternative perspective on organisational culture and 
identity from a "radical humanist" stance. He recognises the diverse nature 
of intraorganisational cultures and the multifariousness of the identifications 
generated. Thus, an individual employee can identify with a number of 
different classifications within the organisation. He tells the story of three 
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organisations based on his experiences of working with managers in a setting 
of a number of semi-structured interviews. These stories themselves are 
evaluative but the values underpinning their narrative are not identified. In 
order to clarify classification, Parker sees culture as a continuing "us" and 
"them" situation and identifies three particular groupings which appeared to 
be common within the three organisations he studied. These were 
spatial/functional, generational and occupational/professional. Thus, within 
an organisation, different groupings can be identified around their workspace 
(the people in the upper office), their length of service (rather than age) and 
their occupation. The following is a definition which he offers of 
organisational culture: 
Organizational culture is a continually contested process of making 
claims of difference within and between groups of people who are 
formally constituted as members of a defined group (Parker, 2000, 
p233). 
What this description of organisational culture offers is the element of shared 
membership of community with all its implications and a sense of the 
diversity of organisations both internally and externally, between each other 
as each has built up its own history, traditions and norms in relation to the 
individuals which have contributed to this process. If one adds to it the 
concept of a type of corporate "sense-making" of events and behaviour 
relating to a set of causal beliefs (Silvester et al, 1999), then the total picture 
begins to reflect the type of socially-constructed reality which we refer to as 
organisational culture. 
(c) Culture and values: ethical work climates 
In considering the definition of organisational culture, it has become apparent 
that culture and values are very much interlinked and that values help to 
define the nature of the culture, underpin it and are inextricably bound up in 
it. Indeed, Hinings et al (1996) conclude that because of the close 
relationship between values and structure, it is better to refer to shared values 
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rather than culture. However, the work on ethical work clinzates sheds further 
light on this relationship. Victor and Cullen are generally recognised as 
being the main protagonists of the concept of ethical work climates. They 
define them as follows: "The prevailing perceptiODS of typical organisational 
practices and procedures that have ethical content constitute the ethical work 
climate" (Victor and Cullen, 1988, p101). They make the distinction between 
work climate and culture in that they see an ethical work climate as being an 
element of the overall culture which is more comprehensive including, for 
example, "patterns of behaviour, artefacts, ceremonies, and special language" 
(Victor and Cullen, 1988, p103). They recognise that there can be a number 
of ethical work climates within an organisation as they relate to the 
organisational sub-cultures of sub-groups within the corporate whole. 
Victor and Cullen carried out a piece of empirical research with employees of 
four different companies in order to identify the nature of the ethical work 
climate which was prevalent. They uncovered a wide range of climates 
within the companies, finding that the majority of workers developed some 
level of satisfaction with their organisation's climates. They assumed that 
those that did not tended to move on. They recognised, however, that a lack 
of fit would cause stress, turnover or dissatisfaction. 
Victor and Cullen drew conclusions relating to the influences on the climates 
from their results. They identified three sources - societal norms, 
organisational form and firm-specific factors. Social norms tended to 
influence towards a caring framework. A more structured, bureaucratic 
company tended towards a climate which was law and code-orientated. They 
recognised that it is unlikely that any one firm will have homogeneous 
climates across different work roles, lengths of employee tenure and sub- 
groups. 
Even if it is possible to modify such an ethical work climate as identified by 
Victor and Cullen the question then arises as to how much that very climate 
affects an individual when faced with a moral decision within the 
organisational context. Is there a link between a positive climate and a 
pattern of ethical behaviour within a workforce? A number of studies have 
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been carried out in an attempt to establish the answer to this question. In one 
case a strong link was discovered (Bartels et al, 1998), in others very little 
relationship was established between climate and ethical behaviour 
(Wimbush et al, 1997; Barnett and Vaicys, 2000; Fritzsche, 2000). It tended 
to moderate behaviour to a certain extent in some conditions; Fritzsche found 
some evidence that an ethical climate working at a lower level of moral 
development would be more likely to produce more unethical decisions. 
However, all these studies were carried out using quantitative methods 
involving artificial vignettes of potential situations with a moral element, 
together with questionnaires, methods which I have argued are fundamentally 
flawed in seeking to address the complexities of such research questions. 0 
It seems that any attempt to capture this unique, ephemeral, condition of an 
organisation is bound to place it in a straitjacket where it loses some elements 
and becomes distorted. The acknowledgement that any organisation will 
contain a number of different ethical work climates according to its informal 
groupings of members means that the totality becomes too diverse and 
complicated to be able to "analyse". The reality of it will vary depending on 
individual people's perceptions of it and there is therefore no "absolute" 
object to grasp. The Concept demonstrates that it is socially constructed and 
we can know what we are talking about together but our experiences of it will 
all differ. 
4. The significance of corporate codes of ethics 
For those who promote the ability to modify organisational culture, written 
corporate codes of ethics become a potentially significant tool for a manager. 
Much has been written on the efficacy of corporate codes and it would be 
remiss to ignore that group of writing without summarising it and 
commenting on its general conclusions. Issues which arise around the 4n 
introduction of an ethical code relate to the adequacy of communication 
processes (Kohut and Corriher, 1994) which include training (White and 
Lam, 2000), availability of any document, familiarity with content (Somers, 
2001; Schwartz, 2001), relevance (Wotruba et al, 2001) and relationship to 
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individual values (Nwachukwu and Vitell, 1997; Sims and Keon, 2000). At 
the same time, the production of an ethical code is acknowledged to have a 
separate purpose of providing a positive image for the organisation involved 
to its external stakeholders. But does it make any difference? The literature 
appears quite balanced between writing which promotes the effectiveness of 
ethical codes in moderating unethical behaviour and that which denies the 
efficacy of such codes. 
Pierce and Henry (1996) devise a model of ethical decision making related to 
computer technology. They propose that the main influences on an 
individual relate to their own personal code, the informal code in the 
workplace (acceptable behaviour of peers and workgroup) and the formal 
code of the employers. Alongside these primary influences are also those of 
the law and professional codes. They sent questionnaires out to people 
working in the computer industry. One of the questions they asked related to 
the relative influence of personal, informal and formal codes. The strongest 
influence came from personal codes (49%) followed by informal codes (34%) 
and formal codes (17%). 
Brien (1997) acknowledges this failure of formal codes to influence 
organisational members and identifies the reasons as relating to both internal 
and external factors. Internally, they may be inconsistent, impracticable, 
ambiguous and, therefore, lacking in internal authority. He identifies two 
strands of inadequacies relating to a code's external authority. The first 
relates to an inherent ethical weakness within the organisation. This 
manifests itself in either or both of (a) leaders failing to endorse it and 
support it and (b) employees failing to internalise it. The second weakness 
relates to an unsuccessful institutionalisation of the code. "Codes may fail 
because the structure and culture of the organisation is not conducive to 
ethical action" (Brien, 1997, p23). From this, Brien concludes that the 
organisational climate and the institutionalisation of codes have more effect 
on the "ethicality" of an organisation than do written codes. 
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There is an issue about the ethicality of imposing such a means of control on 
employee behaviour. This is expressed most strongly by Schwartz (2000, 
2001) who argues that since there is no "right" code of ethics, taking a 
relativistic stance, it is difficult to justify the production and promotion of 
corporate codes. It is also recognised that their existence adds to the 
potential conflict between individuals and their employers when different 
moral values exist between the two (Sims, 2000; Wilmott, 1998). 
It is apparent, then, that the use of corporate codes of ethics to change 
organisational members' behaviour is fraught with problems. This is 
confirmed by Baron (1999) whose research with nurses indicated that they 
tended not to use formal professional codes per se because they consisted of 
universalisable statements which could not always be applied to their 
particular context. Yet it serves to highlight the potential conflict within the 
relationship between an employee and her employer where moral values are 
concerned. 
In analysing the research informants' cognitive maps, those concepts which 
related to organisational values were considered in the light of theory relating 
to the influence of institutionalised (overt) codes and informal organisational 
culture. Of the 13 concepts involved, seven related to what appeared to be an 
overt code. For example, 
*Can I substantiate the recornmendation? * (Frederick) 
*Loyalty to funders* (Ken). 
There was no specific reference to any written code or policy, (for example, 
equal opportunities policy). However, the existence of written policies and 
procedures is implied at least within Isabel's situation where she was 
challenging the process of an appointment. Examples referring to an 
underlying organisational culture include the following: 
*Other people had failed grievances* (Gaynor) 
*Had happened before - expected norm/industry standard* (Colin). 
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Another point to note around the distinction between codes and cultures is 
that the situation described by Neil appears to be indicating a conflict 
between a past culture and a new code. He talks of people being employed to 
teach for different numbers of hours in the past depending on a wide variety 
of circumstances and a newer code that, because of pressures to make 
economic savings, was aiming to ensure that everyone shared the teaching 
burden in an equitable way. It was part of his role to change that 
organisational culture through the introduction of a new code. The nature of 
the organisational culture which emerges from the cognitive maps of the 
project's informants appears to be non-ethical and relating to expected 
behaviour, actions and beliefs rather than having any specific moral content. 
5. The tensions between "business" and "ethics" 
The discipline of business ethics has identified the potential moral tensions 
between an employer and employee. Most students of business ethics in 
talking to a stranger to the subject will have been faced with the jokes about 
"ethics in business?! " implying that the phrase is an oxymoron and that 
business has its own set of rules of behaviour which might not be considered 
ethical within other contexts. They would have their supporters 
academically. Albert Carr likens business to a game of poker with its own set 
of rules (Carr, 1993). Martin Parker recognises the tension between business 
and ethics and that the language and theory of ethical theory appears to mean 
little within an organisational setting where the "bottom line" matters (Parker, 
1998b; Pearson and Parker, 2001). 
It is a majority public opinion that business exists to make a profit. Indeed, 
sometimes it pays such business not to be ethical in order to achieve a greater 
profit. Is it right that an individual should be expected to lie about the nature 
of a product in order to achieve greater sales? Is there an argument that 
greater profits benefit the country's economy in general and that therefore 
everyone gains? These are the dilemmas of behaviour in business and it is Cý 
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these dilemmas that the relatively new discipline of business ethics has 
sought to address. No longer are we considering an individual and her 
personal codes of conduct in isolation. She is faced with organisational aims 
and objectives and rules of behaviour which may or may not be at variance 
with his or her own. How this conflict is resolved in practice will be the 
subject of empirical research. It is, however, helpful to consider a sample of 
writing within the field of business ethics in order to analyse this approach. I 
will confine my research here to questions of individual moral decision 
making in business. The field is large on macro-moral issues relating to the 
morality of the economy, morality within an international business setting, 
and environmental issues, among others. These problems are not directly 
relevant to this particular piece of research. However, I would recognise that 
how an individual deals with influences on her moral decision making does 
have implications for macro-moral issues. 
One approach to this conflict is that of Albert Carr who, in his well-known 
article "Is Business Bluffing Ethical? " likens business to a game of poker 
with its own rules outside of morality (Carr, 1993). Ethics in business brings 
its own perspective to aspects of moral behaviour. The relationship between 
the individual employee and the corporate employer involves the employee's 
obligation to obey the instructions of the employer. This raises particular 
ethical questions around degrees of responsibility and accountability. 
While almost pre-dating the development of the discipline of business ethics, 
Downie considers the problems of individual responsibility, authority and 
corporate responsibility (Downie, 1970). He maintains that, if someone is 
compelled to do something, they then could not be held responsible for it. 
He describes a "role" as being a "cluster of rights and duties with some sort 
of social function" (p128). He argues that it is not possible to separate the 
person as an individual from that person in a particular role, that the person 
has chosen to take on a role and that this can cause some conflicts between 
the "person" and the "role". He defines two attitudes as being "ignore your 
own views" and "resign if you disagree". However, he feels that the latter is 
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normally qualified by the former and argues that an individual is seldom 
responsible for "the total content of an action" (p142). 
More recently, ten Bos (1997) considers the responsibility of individuals 
within organisations and describes the theory that organisations attempt to 
subsume the individual moral responsibility by setting down guidelines and 
rules which are superimposed upon individuals. Morality in organisations 
becomes a question of obeying corporate directives rather than taking 
individual responsibility. "The horizon of a particular action is thus not 
determined by how the actor herself thinks about its effects, but by its being 
in conformity with the rules laid down by those who occupy a higher rank in 
the bureaucratic hierarchy" (ten Bos, 1997, p999). The overall effect of this 
ten Bos summarises as an alienation of the individual in an organisation with 
their own moral nature and he identifies three particular elements within the 
actions of organisations which generate this alienation. 
They remove the proximity of any action. He gives the example of Shell's 
activities within Nigeria and describes how, in a large corporation like Shell, 
an individual's actions are judged by their loyalty to the employer. "The 
result is that individual moral scruple is rendered predictable by not allowing 
it to come to the fore" (p1002). 
A process of dehumanisation occurs which ten Bos terms the "effaceinent of 
Face". Those who might be harmed or benefit from a company's actions are 
removed and discounted as being incapable of being considered within a 
moral context, justified either by the claim that they themselves are immoral 
or by using the business "paradigm" of business for business' sake. "The 
moral capacity of competitors, customers, and other stakeholders who do not 
belong to the team, is mangled in the wringing-machine of efficiency and 
speed" (pl003). Ten Bos argues that, in reality, business competitors, for 
example, come to accept and anticipate such effacement. 
There is a reduction to traits in that people in organisations are encouraged 
not to see people holistically as individuals but as a collection of traits to 
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which no moral quality can be ascribed. One example he gives of this is 
hospitals where people are treated as bundles of nerves, muscles, and bones. 
Ten Bos concludes that the tension between the individual and the 
organisation can be beneficial for two reasons. First, some rules can be 
"good" rules, for example, a health and safety rule which gives permission to 
usurp authority for the safety of others. Secondly, he argues that individuals 
do not follow rules to the last word. This element of choice ensures that 
individuals within organisations retain their own morality. 
Other writers have struggled with the problem of conflicts between 
"family/individual" and "employee/business" roles. Such are Robert C 
Solomon (1993) and Joseph Desjardins (1993). They both apply an 
Aristotelian approach. Solomon refers back to Aristotle's emphasis on the 
cultivation of individual responsibility and virtues in character and argues 
that business ethics should look more to the responsibility of the individual 
rather than utilitarian or Kantian theories to justify decisions. He argues that 
we should take a contextual view of business ethics but in a holistic way, 
remembering that an individual, as well as being an employee, is also a 
member of a family, a community, and so on. Desjardins, on the other hand, 
takes this approach further in arguing that if companies develop "good" 
people this works towards breaking down the barriers between personal life 
and life in employment. 
An example of how recent work in the field of business ethics has looked to 
moral philosophy to explain individual behaviour is that of Glover et al 
(1997). They review the literature relating to philosophical theory and its 
influence on individuals. They refer to three different pieces of research 
which come to different conclusions relating to predominant influences, 
utilitarian, deontological or no single principle. They put forward the 
proposition that individual values determine moral judgements and that an 
individual weighs up conflicting values. They recognise that moral dilemmas 
come from either a conflict between individual values or a conflict between 
individual and institutional values. Glover et al are concerned with the 
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former. Hypotheses are tested that strong concerns for honesty, fairness, or 
concern for others, would induce higher levels of ethical decision making. 
However, none of these hypotheses were confirmed. 
Martin Parker acknowledges the tension between "business" and "ethics" and 
comments on the prevalent modernist approach to business ethics as follows. 
Much of the project of 'Ethics' in general can be seen as an attempt to 
develop knowledge about how we (or they) should behave through 
employing some version of (the scientific) method (Parker, 1998b) 
pS32). 
However, Parker argues that, given a rejection of any final state of 
"knowledge", it seems impossible to ever prescribe for business any universal 
types of rules. This means that ethics reverts to a description of practice, 
which leads to the question of "what is ethics? " He concludes by stating that 
his scepticism should not imply a despair for the future of business and 
ethics. 
Recognising the paradoxes within 'Ethics' and 'Business Ethics' is 
one way to stop these words from having so much hold on us. 
Perhaps then we can begin to develop ways of expressing our dreams 
and nightmares that do not fall back into the agon so easily. (Parker, 
1998b, pS35). 
Given the theoretical tensions which exist between the individual and her 
employing organisation, I seek next to explore in greater depth the 
relationship between the two parties. 
6. The relationship of the individual with the organisation 
What, then, is the relationship of the individual with the organisation? Which 
influences which or is there a constant exchange of influences between the 
two? 
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This literature review spans approximately 25 years of work and in that time 
companies and individuals do appear to have become more aware of the 
significance of moral issues in business. The best support for this statement 
is the evolution of the whole discipline of business ethics which is now a 
recognised field in itself. Early work includes that of Lincoln et al (1982) 
who begin with a literature review of the problems of the conflicts between 
individual and corporate values, between family values and organisational 
commitment and personal values and climbing the corporate ladder. Their 
research consisted of mailed questionnaires relating to 11 topics designed to 
test attitudes to commitment to organisation, to the family and to attitudes 
relating to climbing the corporate ladder. Executives reported "frequently the 
case" for statements relating to resorting to "dirty tricks" in order to progress 
in one's career, that all personal values have to be set aside in order to 
advance and that "to climb the ladder, one must not only be prepared to 
aggressively move past those who stand in the way, but may find it necessary 
to "clear the way" (Lincoln et al, 1982, p484). On a more positive note, the 
most ethical belief exhibited related to a statement which came up as 
"infrequently the case" which described organisational goals as relating more 
to making money than to providing customer satisfaction. 
The question of how much the results of the same research would have 
changed if carried out again in the early 21st century would be the subject of 
an interesting thesis in itself. I suspect that there would be greater reluctance 
to admit the 1982 results even if the behaviour had not changed significantly. 
What it shows is that the organisational influence was so great as to 
overcome any individual moral values in the chase for economic goals. 
Can the very nature of an organisation influence the propensity for ethical 
behaviour? This was tested by Schminke (2001) in relation to the size of an 
employer. He assumed that ethical behaviour would be more encouraged 
within small, organic organisations but, through a questionnaire method, 
discovered the opposite. Individuals in larger, more formal organisations 
indicated a greater ethical predisposition (Schminke, 2001). However, 
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Smigel (1970) found the opposite and this has been confirmed by Bob's 
story. Smigel carried out a research project to determine how the size of a 
victim organisation, (small business, large business and government) 
determined their attitude towards stealing. "If obliged to choose, most 
individuals would prefer to steal from, and be more approving of others 
stealing from, large-scale, impersonal rather than from small-scale, personal 
organisations" (Smigel, 1970, p15). This was confirmed by Bob when he 
stated part of his justification for falsifying his travel expenses claim in his 
story: 
It's the accepted norm now not to be too outrageous and because S are 
in the UK its expenses are coming to something like fl. million a year 
it gets lost in the scheme of things and it's not traceable, really, and 
no-one ever questions it (Bob). 
If one is faced with a moral dilemma in a work situation, where might the 
conflicts lie? Trevino (1986) identifies the two influences of individual and 
organisational when she devised a model for the process of taking a moral 
decision in the workplace. Under individual influence, she refers to ego 
strength, field dependence and locus of control, as well as the individual's 
stage of moral development (Kohlberg). In organisational influences, she 
includes those relating to the particular job situation, the organisational 
culture (normative structure, referent others, obedience to authority, 
responsibility for consequences) and the characteristics of the work (the 
duties of the role which might include the resolution of moral conflicts). 
In order to illuminate further the potential for conflict which appears to be 
inherent in the employe r/employee relationship, sections later in this chapter 
will consider what an individual brings to an organisation, the role of 
emotions in organisations, the justifications for unethical behaviour in 
organisations and alternative ways of resolving moral conflicts. The 
following quotation very adequately summarises the problem. 
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If one's identification with both one's job and one's home life is 
significant, then it is plausible to hold that following rules in one 
sphere that one cannot follow in the other is not just a psychological 
problem but a moral one, since one cannot occupy both spheres with 
integrity, and integrity may be part of living life honestly or 
flourishingly - where both honesty and flourishing have moral 
content. (Sorell, 1998, p23) 
Leo's story is a good example of these tensions. 
7. Leo's story 
Leo worked in a small private company as a manager. It was generally felt 
amongst staff that the current managing director was not making the correct 
decisions, particularly in relation to redundancies within certain sections. 
Leo was approached by a colleague who he also counted as a friend to join 
him in taking industrial action in protest. However, Leo was also concerned 
about the effect of doing so on his career and family while, at the same time, 
he wanted to support a friend to whom he had offered help in the past. 
Leo identified three sources of influence within his cognitive map: "personal 
view", "hierarchy pressure" and "peer pressure". I have coded the first two 
influences as "individual values" and "organisational influence" respectively. 
At the same time, I have recognised that "peer pressure" is an influence from 
within the employing organisation (one construct *Most managers had not 
backed him*). 
In interview, Leo not only gave his perceived sources of influence but also 
their relative strength, either for or against the decision not to back his 
colleague. When these relative forces are added up (from a total of 11 
constructs), one is left with a total of +1 for those influences internal to the 
organisation and -1 from his individual values. This, then, is a dilemma 
within the definition previously offered in Chapter Five when the nature of 
decisions and dilemmas was examined. It demonstrates the fine balance 
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between what the organisation is telling him to do and what he wants to do as 
an individual. In his situation, he follows the organisational influence in 
making a decision not to back his colleague. 
8. The influence of the organisation. on the project's 
informants 
Fifty-five concepts which were shared and identified as originating from 
organisational sources were sub-coded as follows: 
per cent 
Powcr of management 31 
Organisational values 24 
Managcment issues 20 
Fear for career prospccts 13 
Relationships of power within the organisation 13 
(a) The strength of the organisational influence 
Before considering the strength of the organisational influence, it is helpful to 
examine the work of Stanley Milgram on obedience to authority. Milgram 
(1965; 1974) seeks to establish the necessary conditions for an individual to 
deliberately cause pain to another individual while following orders from a 
third party in authority, in other words, actions particularly common in war 
crimes. Using a laboratory-based experimental procedure, involving the 
simulation of shock treatment to learners who failed to learn under instruction 
from an authority, research subjects surprised Milgram and his associates by 
their willingness to obey and to deliver "harsh" treatment upon instruction to 
do so. However, this was tempered by the degree of proximity that the 
subject had to the learner. The closer they were, the less shock they were 
likely to inflict. Within the results obtained, 62 per cent of all research 
subjects obeyed fully the instructions of the authority. Milgram concludes as 
follows: 
A substantial proportion of people do what they are told to do, 
irrespective of the content of the act and without limitations of 
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conscience, so long as they perceive that the command comes from a 
legitimate authority (Milgram, 1965, p75). 
Milgram (1974) refers to the same experiments as in his earlier work. He 
introduces the concept of "agency" being that state of an individual where she 
becomes the agent of an authority without reference to her own values. He 
quotes research subjects as saying "I wouldn't have done it by myself. I was 
just doing what I was told" (Milgram, 1974, p8). 
Milgram's work has been criticised on four fronts (Blass, 2000). The first 
relates to the nature of the authority. Is it seen as a legitimate authority or is 
it, rather, an expert authority? Blass suggests that the expertise of the director 
of the experiments led to obedience using an authority different to that of, 
say, a dictator. Secondly, the question is raised of the apparently dramatic 
inability of people to predict the level of obedience which would be 
demonstrated within the experiments. For example, one group of academics 
predicted an obedience rate of 1.2%. Was the result of the experiment pure 
destructive obedience or was it a more well-meaning compliance based on 
participants' trust in the experimenter? Blass concludes that the two 
approaches here are not incompatible by suggesting a comparison with 
employees working on unsafe products in the belief that their employer could 
not be risking its consumers just to make a profit. The third issue on which 
Milgram is criticised is that of whether there is a gender difference in the 
propensity to obey authority. While Milgram conducted very few 
experiments involving women, those he did showed no difference. Blass 
demonstrates that within ten studies, nine showed no difference. The final 
area of contention raises the question of whether obedience rates have 
changed in the thirty years since Milgram's work. Blass suggests that rates 
should decrease with increased awareness of the potential effects of 
obedience. However, he replicated some of Milgram's experiments and 
obtained the same results. 
Being enlightened about the unexpected power of authority may help 
a person stay away from an authority-dominated situation, but once he 
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or she is already in such a situation, knowledge of the drastic degree 
of obedience authorities are capable of eliciting does not necessarily 
help free the individual from the grip of the forces operating in that 
concrete situation, (i. e. to defy the authority to charge). (Blass, 2000, 
p53, original emphasis). 
Given Blass's success in replicating Milgram's results, we are left with the 
reminder of the strength of the forces within the power relationship between 
authority figure and person subject to that authority. It also demonstrates the 
way in which this can over-ride an individual's otherwise normal propensity 
to behave in accordance with the moral requirements of their social and 
historical situation. 
Returning to the informants' cognitive maps, an analysis was made around 
the distinction between organisational influences being in theory stronger and 
those which actually prevailed. One did not lead to the other in two cases 
(Angela and Joanne). These were both dilemmas and they both went in 
opposite directions between theory and practice between individual and 
organisational influences. In other words, the total sum of the strength of the 
influences indicated prevalence of individual values in one case and 
organisational influences in the other. Yet, both followed in practice the 
negative influence on the decision. At this point, there are two possibilities 
as to why this happened. Firstly, I would raise a caveat against the dangers of 
taking the relative strengths of the influences as identified by the informants 
themselves too literally. The arithmetic of the strengths of the influences is 
helpful but may not stand up to close scrutiny. Secondly, even if the 
assessment of the influences by the informants is correct, it only serves to 
confirm the complexity of the decision-making process in terms of its 
spontaneity and illusiveness. 
However, it is clear that the relationship between an individual and the 
organisation in which they work is critical in nature. It is also apparent from 
the dilemmas that the harder a decision is to make, the closer the balance 
between organisational and individual influences. There is also a relation 
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between a person's level of moral reasoning and their propensity to be 
influenced to a greater extent by their own values, rather than those of their 
employer. 
(b) The individual in the organisation 
A previous chapter has outlined some of the factors around the way an 
individual faces a moral dilemma. From within a quantitative framework, 
they include aspects of personality and stage of moral development. Some 
work has been done in terms of considering the effect of both these aspects 
when the individual is faced with moral conflict in organisations and this will 
be summarised in this section. First, consideration is needed of the effect that 
placing an individual within an employing organisation might have. She is 
there by duty, to earn the salary or wages that she is contracted to receive. 
The relationship is governed by a legal contract and there is an underpinning 
commitment of loyalty to the employer which includes confidentiality and an 
obedience to the authority to which she is responsible, whether it be a line 
manager or the head of the organisation. She is expected to behave in certain 
ways in the performance of her duties, in line with any code of practice or 
specific instruction. In addition, she might be committed to her work, 
believing it to be of an intrinsic value to society. What happens when she is 
instructed to do something which she believes is wrong, either in terms of 
competence or because there is a moral element involved which makes her 
unhappy to collude with the practice being suggested? She can look for 
another job, she can hand in her notice immediately, but the financial 
consequences of the latter might well mean problems with keeping up with 
the mortgage. What is at issue here is a question of power and the way that 
an organisation imposes its authority upon its members. While it can be 
argued that an individual always retains the capacity to choose one action 
which might be considered to be more ethical than another, the constraints of 
working within an organisation with its own sets of rules and procedures are 
strong and powerful. Could an action be supported if it was totally unethical 
but done to preserve the welfare of the individual's family by keeping her job 
and consequent income? The power of the organisation within the 
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employer/employee relationship has sometimes been overlooked. Marxist 
theory and feminist theory serve to support this but give little prescription to 
the individual within that relationship except to say that there is an unequal 
power relationship present. In the work context, most organisations are 
hierarchical which, by their very nature, imposes a structure of power on 
individuals working within them. In his later writing, Foucault recommends 
a form of self re-modelling in relation to the power situation, maintaining that 
it is possible for us to consider change in our perspectives on life which have 
the potential to re-align the relationships of power. Thus, such relationships 
are worked out on an individual basis and he has no prescription for structural 
change or any particular ethical practice. This concept is summarised by 
Brewis thus: 
To conceptualise power as Foucault does allows us to resist, as 
individuals working against the effects of power in our own lives, in a 
way that insisting on power as structural (and the corollary of global 
ethical projects, such as those suggested by the established workplace 
feminisms) does not (Brewis, 1998, p65). 
However such power relationships are worked out existentially, it is a 
significant factor within any employer/employee relationship. Turning to the 
project's informants, this is confirmed in practice. Thirteen per cent of the 
concepts relating to organisational influences concerned the power 
relationship between the individual and the organisation. Examples of these 
are: 
*Powerless to influence situation on own* (Edith) 
*Restructuring will happen anyway* (Mark) 
*Need to give report to someone more influential* (Edith). 
These were all concepts which influenced a moral decision where the 
individual appeared to express the limitations of their power within the 
situation and in comparison to the overall context within their employing 
organisation. They indicate a pragmatic realism about the nature of the 
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relationships of power, together with an implied desire to rectify a potential 
injustice despite the imbalance of relative power for the individual involved. 
What is the relationship, if any, between an individual's stage of moral 
development and their moral reasoning within a work context? Mason and 
Mudrack (1997) conclude that individuals who are reasoning at a higher stage 
of moral development are more likely to come into stronger conflict with 
organisational norms of putting organisation interests before those of society. 
However, Carpendale and Krebs (1995) maintain that while Kohlberg's 
stages of moral development may stand, there are a number of variables 
which affect the stage which is adopted within different contexts. These 
variables include the type of moral dilemma (business versus philosophical, 
for example), and the social context. While the research methods employed 
are questionable in that they depended on the "scoring" of hypothetical 
dilemmas, they confirm their own previous finding that individuals in 
business contexts tend to reason morally at the level of Kohlberg's Stage 2, 
using justifications for principles such as "You shouldn't tell them anything 
because you have a right to make a profit". Thus, Carpendale and Krebs 
suggest that individuals might adapt their own moral values according to the 
context within which they find themselves. In Chapter Six, I explored the 
possibility that informants were choosing to use a K-stage of moral argument 
appropriate to the situation in which they found themselves and found little 
evidence of this. As a result, it would not be possible to argue that being part 
of a business organisation influences an individual to reason around a moral 
judgement at a lower K-stage than thei r ability. 
(C) Emotions in organisations 
Any individual confronting a potential conflict between two differing sets of 
values is going to feel a range of emotions but, at the same time, she could be 
in a situation in employment where her employers prescribe emotions to be 
displayed within her job role. At a fairly basic level, as consumers, we do not 
much like coming across a "grumpy" service provider such as a ticket 
collector or a shop assistant. It is expected in their role that they should at the 
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very least be polite if not cheerful. Previous reference has been made to the 
role of emotions within life as an employee making moral decisions but what 
is the influence on such emotions from organisations? Arlie Hochschild's 
The Managed Heart published in 1983 has become a key work on this 
subject. She focuses on the need within service industries for organisations 
to train employees to "manage" their emotions in a particular way. By 
example, she examines the training of airline staff in enabling them to smile 
and remain cheerful despite difficult or aggressive passengers. She maintains 
that the way a company wants an employee to feel can successfully transmute 
to the employee adopting the emotions felt as their own. However, this is not 
always the case, creating a tension between the acted emotions and the actual 
emotions within an individual very clearly demonstrated from this quotation 
from a member of Delta Airline staff. 
"I guess it was on a flight when a lady spat at me that I decided I'd 
had enough. I tried. God knows, I tried my damnedest. I went along 
with the program, I was being genuinely nice to people. But it didn't 
work. I reject what the company wants from me emotionally. The 
company wants me to bring the emotional part of me to work. I 
won't. " (Hocbschild, 1983, p128) 
Hochschild points to the stress caused by the "task of managing an 
estrangement between self and feeling and between self and display" 
(Hochschild, 1983, p131). Workers tend to develop a number of "selves", in 
particular, the home "self" and the work "self", recognizing that both 
identities are meaningful but separate, thereby emphasizing the potential 
conflict between organisation and individual. 
The messages coming from an organisation concerning appropriate and 
inappropriate emotions can be found both in overt methods such as training 
programmes and more subtle communication from those such as leaders in 
organisations, leading by example and reward. The role of emotions and 
feelings in organisations is identified as being an essential part of the 
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constraints placed upon individuals within a particular social grouping 
(Fineman, 1993). They provide a form of social control on behaviour. 
However, within organisations, it is recognised that negative emotions have 
been traditionally treated as being an element of individual behaviour to be 
discouraged; a sign of weakness, an indication of a lack of objectivity, a 
move away from a logical approach to decision making (Putnam and Mumby, 
1993). Emotion has been portrayed as a value-laden concept which is 
inappropriate for the assumed rationality within organisations. 
If emotions are seen as a part of the social constraints within organisations, 
what effect do they have on individuals' moral decision making within the 
organisational context? It is suggested that the role of emotions is 
particularly significant and that they can be seen as a product of values which 
dictate appropriate and inappropriate emotions (Fineman, 1993). However, if 
emotions are also considered to be spontaneous and reflective, it is unlikely 
that all feelings can be deemed to be value-driven. This would have the 
effect of pushing the concept into a rational, logical, process which, by its 
very nature, it is clearly not. 
In a recent study by Gaudine and Thorne (2001) it is argued that emotions 
should be viewed as a positive influence on moral decision-making in 
organisations and an attempt is made to relate the influence of emotions to 
the four-stage process of moral decision-making identified by Rest. They 
refer to the association of positive affect and arousal with the likelihood of an 
individual being sensitive to the existence of a moral dilemma (Isen, 1997) 
but acknowledge that more work needs to be done around the effect of 
negative emotions on moral decisions. Positive emotions are identified with 
the enhancement of an individual's propensity for acting ethically through the 
moral decision-making process but they are again unclear about the effect of 
negative emotions. This study reflects a quantitative perspective of 
attempting to impose a logic or pattern to a process which appears not to be 
consequential or logical. 
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Two further articles help to shed light on aspects of the emotional factor 
around working in organisations. Putnam and Mumby (1993) refer to the 
duality between rationality and emotions within organisations and they 
conclude that this has a particular effect on moral behaviour. They link the 
duality between rationality and emotions to the prevalence within Western 
culture to promote rationality and eschew emotive influences while the 
concept of bureaucracy and its implied rationality is seen as taking over 
emotional labour and rationalising it for the purpose of the organisation. 
They make the point that sharing emotions ("work feelings") encourages and 
builds a sense of community but they take a moral stance in asserting that 
work feelings should be allowed to emerge and be recognised without 
prescription from authority. 
From the above literature, a picture can be drawn of powerful organisations 
attempting to control not only employees' actions but also their emotions 
(Hochschild's concept of "emotional labour"). A clear example of how 
organisations can influence employees' emotions is provided by Helen's 
story. She was obviously under a great deal of pressure, firstly, to be seen to 
be supporting her manager and, secondly, despite her treatment of her, to try 
as hard as for previous collections in raising money for a leaving present. 
She felt she had to decide how she should behave when she was doing the 
collection and how much time she should put aside for it while, at the same 
time, asking herself the question *Do I want to do it at all? * (Helen). 
I have previously commented on the apparent lack of emotional content 
within the informants' narratives and speculated as to the reason for this. It 
could be argued that the informants were complying with a culture that saw 
emotions as non-rational and therefore unacceptable as they told their story. 
It was only when we began to explore actual thoughts that the emotions 
within the situation appeared. 
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(d) Unethical behaviour in organisations 
We have already seen one suggestion for the rationalisation of unethical 
behaviour being an ethical cynicism which denied individual responsibility in 
the situation. A number of writers have focussed on the reasons and 
"justifications" for unethical behaviour within organisations. Kelman and 
Hamilton, for example, define crimes of obedience as being "an act 
performed in response to orders from authority that is considered illegal or 
immoral by the larger community" (Kelman and Hamilton, 1989, p46). They 
can range in scope from mass genocide to the Watergate affair. They identify 
crimes of obedience as being unique in arising from a conflict of duties: the 
duty to obey and the duty to disobey. 
Gellerman identifies four commonly-held rationalisations for managers 
performing unethical actions on behalf of their company. 
1. A belief that "really" the action is acceptable ethically. 
A belief that the action is in the individual's or corporation's 
best interests. 
3. A belief that the action is "safe" because it will never be 
discovered. 
4. A belief that "because the activity helps the company the 
company will condone it and even protect the person who 
engages in it" (Gellerman, 1986, p88). 
Colin's story can be described as involving a "crime of obedience". Colin 
was faced with a situation where he was being encouraged by his employers 
to go out and negotiate what he knew to be an illegal compensation payment 
from a contracting company which had gone into liquidation overnight and 
set up as a new company, leaving the debts of the business behind in the old 
company. His "personal values" were saying 
*It's illegal* 
*Attitude of contractor showed no concern for actions - pre-planned* 
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*Lots of other creditors without same opportunity that would have 
done the same thing*. 
His "own organisation" was saying 
*Not sure what would happen if refused* 
*MD thought a good idea* 
*Had happened before - expected norm/industry standard* 
*New with company*. 
The total strength of the organisational influences far outweighed others in 
favour of negotiating the payment and that is what he did. This would appear 
to be an example of a situation where the power of the organisation is used to 
push an employee into an illegal act. 
The informants provide two further situations which describe a behaviour 
which most people would agree would be against normal organisational rules 
and conventions. Bob is clear that he is cheating in claiming his car expenses 
on a monthly basis. Edith decided to send a politically sensitive confidential 
report to a party who would not have otherwise seen it. How do they justify 
these actions? 
Bob is honest about his reasons for his actions; he cites the taxation system 
and fact that he believes it to be the "norm" that individual employees within 
the organisation with company cars regularly overclaim on business miles in 
order to cover private mileage. His justifications imply the fact that he is not 
alone in doing this. Edith uses the word "betrayal" in two key strong 
concepts: 
*Felt loyalty to organisation being betrayed* 
*Felt colleagues being betrayed*. 
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Thus, she justified her action through loyalty to her colleagues and in a belief 
that her decision to send the report out was in the best interest of her 
employing organisation. 
(e) Resolution of the conflict 
Taking a quantitative perspective on this subject, work has been carried out 
on a number of psychological factors which might cause conflict between 
employee and employer. For example, personality types such as "High- 
Machiavellian" (characterised by a strong sense of self-interest), strong 
adherents of the Protestant work-ethic and those who had an external locus of 
control were all found to be more willing to bend rules to serve the 
requirements of their employing organisation (Mudrack and Mason, 1996). 
In another study, Sims and Keon (1997) considered the nature of person and 
organisation "fit" and found that individuals are attracted to organisations 
whose value systems best reflect their own, employees are best satisfied with 
their employment where the ethical climates are similar and that individuals 
show the greatest commitment where organisations are similarly committed. 
Similarly, there is some evidence that individuals develop coping strategies 
for dealing with conflicts between their personal values and the perceived 
organisational codes. Lovell (2002) reports that in two-thirds of the sample 
of cases they examined, informants had resolved their personal conflict 
through taking a stance of ethical cynicism involving convincing themselves 
that resolution of the problem was not their responsibility but that of others. I 
found no evidence of such a strategy being used by this project's informants. 
They were very clear that they owned the decision which they brought to the 
interview. 
I conclude this section by considering two writers who have attempted to 
highlight possible resolutions of the potential conflict between employee and 
employing organisation, or, alternatively, reasons for the conflict's existence 
as a light on its potential removal. Schein outlines the differing stakeholders 
to which a business manager has responsibilities in his or her role. They 
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include the individual and his or her profession, the boss, the peer, the 
organisation, the stockholder, the customer, the consumer, the country and 
the subordinate or employee. He concludes that this very number means that, 
firstly, there is no overall guidance on prioritising within this list and, 
secondly, "we cannot specify a single set of values and moral behaviours for 
the manager. The search for such a single value system is doomed to failure 
until we define to whom we ultimately want the manager to be responsible" 
(Schein, 1971, p549). If one applies a consequential ist approach to the 
context as perceived by Schein, it would be difficult to prioritise "benefit". 
Similarly, a deontological argument would hit like problems - to whom does 
one owe first duty? 
De George attempts to resolve this problem by effectively removing it from 
the individual. He argues that a number of levels have been defined within 
the field of business ethics. He lists them as being "the level of the 
individual, the level of the firm or corporation, the level of the industry or of 
other groups of firms, the national level, and the international level" (De 
George, 1990, p27). He seeks to show that a true ethical dilemma (that is, 
one for which there would appear to be no truly ethical solution) for an 
individual in an organisation can be caused by what he calls ethical 
displacement. Ethical displacement is caused when the solution to the 
problem can be found through another ethical level. For example, the 
resolution of an individual's moral dilemma may be found in changing a 
corporation's structure at another level. This argument leaves unresolved 
what an individual might do in practice when faced with a conflict. It is often 
not practical to start trying to influence an organisation at a higher level than 
oneself, particularly in the short term. 
Sorell identifies the potential conflict between an individual's home life and 
their business life as highlighted earlier in this chapter. He relates this back 
to the tension between the concepts of business and ethics where it is implied 
that business may not be able to be as ethical as might be desired because of 
its very nature (Carr, 1993). He considers the possibility of keeping them 
separate and recognises that both virtue theory and utilitarianism are able to 
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justify the compartmentalising of business and "personal" but concludes with 
a philosophical resolution of the conflict through stakeholder theory. 
None of the above proposals offer a practical solution to the potential conflict 
between employer and employee and, indeed, that is part of the essence of the 
conflict itself. When one turns to the experience of 16 individuals, it is 
helpful to consider the nature of the six identified dilemmas to explore how 
they resolved their situation. In four of the six dilemmas, adding up strength 
of influences which were internal to the organisation on the one hand, and 
external influences on the other, the results indicated a near balance with an 
exact balance in Leo's situation (see table below). 
Int/ext to org Total score 
Angela -4/3 -1 
Frederick 1/1 2 
Joanne 5/-7 -2 
Lco 1/-l 0 
Mar, 41-10 -6 
Owen 0/-l -1 
Values internal to the organisation prevailed in three of the dilemmas with 
one balanced and one against the organisation. In the sixth dilemma (CC), 
the conflict was between individual values and those of the union (peer/group 
external to organisation). In the latter, individual values prevailed. I have 
previously referred to the inherent dangers in reading too much of 
significance into the arithmetic around the strengths of influence. There 
appears to be no generalisable pattern on the above basis. 
However, there is one particular type of conflict which has now been 
recognised in law. Its colloquial name is "whistleblowing" and it is an 




"Whistleblowing" is a comparatively recent term which has become part of 
the vernacular language outside that of business ethics. Perry (1998) takes a 
fairly narrow definition in terms of referring exclusively to "external" 
whistleblowing: "the process by which insiders 'go public' with their claims 
of malpractices by, or within, powerful organisations" (Perry, 1998, pl). 
Near and Miceli have contributed the most of all academic writers to the 
subject (Near and Miceli, 1995; Near and Miceli, 1996; Miceli and Near, 
1994). They offer the following definition of whistleblowing: "the 
disclosure by organisation members (former or current) of illegal, immoral or 
illegitimate practices under the control of their employers, to persons or 
organisations that may be able to effect action" (Near and Miceli, 1996, p2). 
They describe the actions of a whistleblower as reflecting two variables. The 
first relates to personal variables which tell her to believe that whistle- 
blowing behaviour is appropriate and the second to situational variables that 
cause her to believe that it is warranted. 
Perry (1998) refers to the strengths of rituals and rites within the organisation 
and concludes that whistleblowers are the equivalent of heretics - "a 
ch allenge to the prevailing symbolic order and through it to the social order 
itself. The unclothed emperor may be deviant, but it is heretical to say as 
much in public" (Perry, 1998, p16). 
It is clear that whistleblowing involves disobedience and disloyalty to the 
organisation involved (Jubb, 1999), thereby theoretically breaking the 
contract between employer and employee as described previously. In the 
UK, there is now some protection for employees who divulge confidential 
organisational information around particular issues to enforcing authorities in 
the interest of the public through the Public Interest Disclosure Act 1998. 
The concept of whistleblowing illustrates the severity of the conflict that can 
exist between employer and employee values and the resultant, often 
desperate, measures which can be taken in an attempt by the employee to 
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draw attention to the "unethical" behaviour of the employer. In terms of this 
project's informants, Edith's actions, in terms of informing someone about a 
confidential paper, were very close to "whistleblowing". 
10. Restructuring: the common context for Mark, Neil and 
Owen 
There is a need to analyse any common factors which emerged from the three 
situations shared by Mark, Neil and Owen. They were employed by the same 
organisation and identified decisions to talk about which came from the 
historical context of restructuring the department of which they were 
members. Two of the informants (Mark and Owen) were involved within a 
union capacity, as a result of which both indicated a willingness to follow a 
nationally laid down policy although not without question. Owen did not 
identify any organisational influence within the context of the decision. The 
only common factor identifiable between all three informants is that both 
Mark and Neil were saying "it is right to treat all employees equally and 
equitably". It is apparent from the above that three informants from one 
particular context are not enough to be able to generalise in any constructive 
way 
11. More background information on the project's 
informants 
Before drawing any general conclusions from the above experiences of 16 
informants, it is helpful to outline a little background information about them 
and to consider whether any other organisational factors have influenced 
them. 
(a) Type of employer 
Private sector 4 
Education (HE or FE) 7 
Local authority 3 
Public sector (other) 2 
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Organisational values prevailed with 75 per cent (three) of the private sector 
employees while the fourth informant was neutral on this. This raises the 
question of whether these employees were concerned in particular about job 
security. Up until fairly recently, it has been generally perceived that job 
security is less high within the private as opposed to the public sector. All 
four private sector employees (Bob, Colin, Helen and Leo) expressed general 
concern around career prospects and status. Thus, Bob's organisational 
influences in relation to his monthly decision to "cheat" on his travel claims 
pertained to status within the organisation. 
*Perception that commercial staff have larger cars and more 
opportunity to boost mileage* 
*Need to justify having car for business* 
*A way of equalling imbalance in reward and recognition and status 
between commercial and manufacturing*. 
Colin was fairly new in post and was concerned about the repercussions if he 
did not conform to the requirements of his employer to seek an illegal 
compensation. Helen was concerned about other people's perceptions of her 
behaviour within the organisation as she sought donations towards her boss's 
leaving present and Leo explicitly did not want to risk his career and the 
welfare of his family in deciding not to support a friend and colleague. It is 
apparent, therefore, that where employees are concerned about their current 
or their future job prospects, these concerns are manifested as influences 
within their moral decisions at work. Where a particular type of employment 
is more vulnerable to potential redundancies, then it can be expected that 
such worries appear within moral decisions of employees working in that 
field. 
Length of time with employer 
Less than 1 year 1 
1 to 5 years 4 
6 to 10 years 3_ 
Over 10 years 8_ 
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This question was asked within the background information sought because I 
was looking for a possible relationship between length of time with an 
employer and a propensity to support organisational values. However, of the 
seven cases where organisational values prevailed, four were employed for 
less than five years and three over five years. There would appear therefore 
to be no relationship. However, 13 per cent of all organisationally influenced 
concepts related to a fear of effect of decision on job prospects. No 
informant who expressed such fear had been employed more than five years. 
Lastly, there was no perceived pattern between the length of time an 
individual had been with the employer on ethical theory perspective nor on 
K-stages. This includes Colin's construct relating to his newness with the 
company. 
(C) Length of time in post 
<6 months 1 
<1 year 3 
1-5 years 11 
6-10 years 1 
Again, this question was asked because TCSearch has been done on the 
influence of role within an organisation in relation to length of time in it 
(Kohlberg, 1984). While Neil referred to his recent promotion into his 
current post, I could find no relationship between informants' length of time 
in post and their propensity to favour particular influences. 






The nature of employment was coded by me according to level of 
responsibility, job title and affiliation with a professional body where the 
informant referred to a professional influence. In fact, both professional 
informants were employed by local authorities. 
Organisational influences prevailed with five of the nine managers and, in 
addition, a sixth manager was balanced between organisational. and individual 
influences. Both the professionals and the director were K4 or K5 and 
therefore arguing at a higher level when considering moral issues. Within the 
total of three individuals (the professionals and the director), two were 
influenced more strongly by individual sources with the third being balanced 
with organisational influences. Kohlberg has argued that being in "role" 
pushes an individual into higher levels of moral argument. Certainly there is 
a relationship here between higher management and higher K-stages. 
However, it is impossible to know which influences which. Are individuals 
appointed to higher status positions because of their ability to argue morally 
or do the roles influence them to argue at a higher level than they would 
otherwise do? 
12. The influence of society on individuals 
However many communities we are members of, we are also members of 
what is known as our "society". Implied in this is a national perspective with 
a relationship to the State. Our identity with society in general can also 
influence an individual's decision-making. Ultimately, society imposes its 
own values on individual members through sanctions (Durkheim, 1957). At 
the same time, it is recognised that society can influence organisational 
values (Schminke, 2001). 
Thus, in any moral decision, the parameters will be marked out by the nature 
of the sanctions and the strength of the "message" coming from society in 
general. The distinction between society and State needs to be made here in 
that society relates most closely to one's national identity while the State is a 
part of that identity acting out (in a true democracy) the corporate will of the 
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society it serves. While not wishing to embark on a political science debate 
here, I maintain that the laws of the State provide the final sanctions to many 
moral judgements. It is a crime to steal property from another and the 
potential nature of the punishment, depending on the scale involved together 
with other factors, is known by most. 
At the same time, it is possible to identify points at which society's general 
view of moral issues is changing away from current statute. At the time of 
writing, two examples of this might be the debates around legalisation of the 
use of cannabis for medical purposes and the introduction of euthanasia in 
certain circumstances. 
Where do we get our messages from in relation to societal values? I maintain 
that they come from all aspects of society - the economic context, education, 
religion, political movements, writers, TV and film "stars", as well as the 
media. The latter plays a strong lead in influencing us. However, we do 
have an element of choice as to which media we read, watch or listen to, even 
though access to it might be restricted due to such factors as levels of literacy 
and numeracy. In addition, we learn the values which are acceptable within 
particular groupings within society. For example, support for voluntary 
repatriation of Asians might be acceptable at meetings of the British National 
Party but would be abhorrent in most other circles, not least that of the 
Socialist Workers' Party. Is it possible to identify values of "society" at 
large? Are they not a collection of disparate and conflicting codes which 
change, mutate or develop daily according to particular influences? Can they 
be linked to the laws of the State which might be seen as some kind of 
backbone from which values devolve? This argument then turns on the 
possibility of maintaining and supporting universal laws which is debated 
elsewhere in this thesis. 
Thus, there'is message coming from society concerning acceptable and 
unacceptable behaviour but how strong it is within particular circumstances 
and how uniform is demonstrated by the empirical research with informants. 
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Three informants identified an influence from society (Angela, Joanne and 
Ken). In the case of Angela, it was a negative influence and for Joanne and 
Ken, a positive. Ken's concepts relate to society's values around money and 
the law in deciding whether to report problems with data to funders (*A lot of 
money involved*; *Had seen in other orgs money being returned and 
criminal proceedings*). Joanne's concept refers to the influence of law when 
she was deciding how much she could inform employees of the effect of their 
TUPE transfers ffelling them could not affect the TUPE transfer*). Angela 
identified the need to appear reasonable when deciding to blame the manager 
at a disciplinary hearing as coming from society. 
There is one time when it would appear in particular that an informant had 
coded his source of influence incorrectly. This occurs in relation to Bob's 
reference to UK tax laws being unfair. Another person might code that as 
originating from society. However, he saw this as reflecting his own 
individual attitude towards tax laws. From a social constructionist 
perspective, it is important, and more informing, to respect the informant's 
assessment of their situation. 
Thus, in terms of influences on this project's informants, it has to be 
concluded that society plays a very minor role in these three particular 
decisions. It is not identified as having any influence within 13 of the 
informants' cognitive maps. 
13. Conclusions 
Finally, I wish to summarise the points which have emerged within this 
chapter. Firstly, it is clear that the nature of the organisational culture 
appears to relate primarily to expected behaviour, actions and beliefs rather 
than having any specific moral content. Secondly, a relationship appears 
between informants in higher management who also reason morally at higher 
K-stages although it is not clear whether they are influenced by their role to 
do so or whether they are in that role because they have an ability to use 
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higher K-stages in moral reasoning. Thirdly, within this group of informants, 
the influence of society in general was non-existent or minimal. 
The informants' stories and cognitive maps reflect a realism about the nature 
of the power relationship that exists between employer and employee, 
together with, in a number of cases, a determination to ensure that a 
potentially unequal situation is resolved fairly. Further evidence of this 
power relationship is indicated by the frequency with which informants 
indicate their concern at any detrimental effect on their careers. Emotions are 
also present within this relationship and there is evidence that organisations 
sought to control these, at least in one instance. 
However, it is clear that the relationship between an individual and the 
organisation in which they work is critical in nature. It is also apparent from 
the dilemmas that the harder a decision is to make, the closer the balance 
between organisational and individual influences. There is also a relation 
between a person's level of moral reasoning and their propensity to be 
influenced to a greater extent by their own values, rather than those of their 
employer. Certainly those informants arguing at K5 stage of moral 
development were able to take a more detached view of their situation and 
able to listen to their own individual values in the situation in which they 
found themselves. I hesitate to take this argument further because it might 
lead down the route of K5 stage employees not being "good" employees so 
far as organisations are concerned in that they might tend to challenge 
organisational values if they conflicted with their own beliefs. However, 
other organisations would welcome that quality within an employee. 
In conclusion, in examining the nature of the influence of an employing 
organisation on an employee, what emerges is the diverse nature of 
organisations and their cultures and the complexity of the relationship 
between an individual and her employing organisation, together with an 
awareness of the framework of power around employees which can serve to 
influence their behaviour and their emotions. 
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Chapter Ten: 
Membership of community: An individual in relation to 
groups 
1. Introduction 
Previous chapters have argued that, within theories relating to cognitive 
moral development, individuals gain their moral values from some form of 
social contact with other individuals, either in a one-to-one setting or, more 
usually, a group. The previous chapter offered a definition of an organisation 
involving a collection of groups. The purpose of this chapter is to review 
theories of how people in groups behave and what the influence is of a group 
on its members or adherents in terms of having an impact on an individual's 
moral values and her moral decision-making process in the workplace. We 
have now identified individual values, organisational values and society in 
general as influencing such decisions. Where social interactions have worked 
to modify existing beliefs or values and, also, served to enhance an 
individual's ability to reason around moral issues (Kohlberg and Higgins, 
1987), much of this has occurred within the context of a group of people. It 
is therefore acknowledged that the influence for change in moral reasoning 
comes from social interaction. In inquiring into the nature of these sources 
of inhuence within a workplace setting, it is necessary to investigate the 
nature of what it means to be a member of a group of individuals or to seek to 
become such a member in order to understand more fully the influences 
which are present in making decisions around moral issues. 
Much literature has been written around the dynamics of the group process 
and the major works on this will be outlined and explored. Much more 
literature relates to the practice of working with groups within either a 
therapeutic, training, educational or business decision-making setting as well 
as a research context (focus groups). The latter has contributed to a limited 
extent to psychological theory and reference will be made to it whenever 
appropriate. 
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Why do groups form? It would appear that most people have social needs 
which can only be met by interacting with others (Cartwright and Zander, 
1968). For example, many people going through an anxiety-arousing 
experience would seek comfort in the company of others. This provides them 
with a group evaluation of their environment and what is happening within it 
which consolidates their perception of social reality. Similar processes apply 
with respect to values in that people tend to check their own moral norms 
against those of respected groups (Scott, 1965; Radloff, 1968). 
Finally, Durkheim (1961) makes the point that humans are only moral at the 
point where they become social beings because morality relates to other 
people, although environmentalists might argue that, while being a major 
component of the concept of morality, it can also be extended to include the 
care and the sustainability of our universe. 
This chapter will consider the effect of affiliation with a group on an 
individual's moral decision-making process. In doing so, it will consider the 
nature of a group and the processes within it, its development and its resulting 
cohesiveness which includes the development of norms and what happens if a 
member is in conflict with the group. In this chapter, I also review literature 
around research on group influence within business ethics, together with 
theories relating to being a member of a profession as this is one particular 
potential source of influence within a business setting before moving on to 
compare the experiences of the project's informants with the theory 
expounded. Finally, I consider the question of membership of multiple 
groups and how that potential conflict is resolved in practice. However, the 
first question that needs attention is "What is a group? " 
2. What is a group? 
It is inevitable that that question should be answered in terms of a collection 
of a number of individuals. The problem which has been addressed by 
various writers in the past has been whether a number of individuals collected 
together can ever be anything more than the sum of its parts. Is there such a 
thing as a "group mind"? Muzafer Sherif (1936) sought to show that the 
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social environment influences individuals to behave in a different way, 
modifying behaviour. He carried out a piece of empirical research using the 
autokinetic effect. Individuals were placed in a dark room and a motionless 
bright light was shone at them. They were asked to press a key when they 
saw the light move. The purpose was to establish how individuals operated 
when they had no frame of reference. The results showed that individuals 
built up their own frame of reference peculiar to themselves based on their 
own perceptions and experience and to which they referred in further tests. 
The tests were repeated in a group situation. This time, when an individual 
had previously done the test alone, the range began to converge. However, 
where the tests were done for the first time in a group situation, the 
convergence was far closer within the group and peculiar to that group. 
Sherif saw this as confirming the theory that "new and supra-individual 
qualities arise in the group situations" (Sherif, 1936, pl. 05). Finally, when an 
individual faced the test having previously undergone it in a group situation, 
his results fell within the range and norm previously established. In interview 
after the test, some of Sherif's subjects recognised the influence of discussion 
within the group while others were unaware of it. 
Sherif's work set the scene for the study of group dynamics. Thus Kurt 
Lewin is able to state with confidence: 
there is no more magic behind the fact that groups have properties of 
their own, which are different from the properties of their subgroups 
or their individual members, than behind the fact that molecules have 
properties, which are different from the properties of the atoms or ions 
of which they are composed (Lewin, 1947, p8). 
This analogy is further used by Rupert Brown (1988) when he refers to the 
properties of water consisting of the elements of hydrogen and oxygen which, 
when combined, create something different -a third entity. Lewin expands 
his thinkinc, on this in a slightly different way when he states: tD 
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The whole is not "more" than the sum of its parts but it has different 
properties. The statement should be: "The whole is different from 
the sum of its parts". In other words, there does not exist a superiority 
of value of the whole. Both whole and parts are equally real. On the 
other hand, the whole has definite properties of its own (Lewin, 1951, 
p146). 
Having shown that there is such an entity as a group but before going on to 
define what is meant by a group, it is important to acknowledge that not all 
activity between individuals takes place within a group setting. Brown refers 
to the distinction between interpersonal and group activity. He alludes to the 
situation in Northern Ireland where Catholics and Protestants can work 
together in harmony as individuals but where, entrenched in their group, 
different opinions and values proliferate. He distinguishes between personal 
identity summed up by "I like jazz music" or "I am a friendly sort of person" 
and social identity "I am a woman" or "I am a member of a sailing club". He 
sees these as being at two ends of a continuum. Most social situations will 
contain both interpersonal and group interactions. 
There are a number of definitions of the word "group" within available 
literature (Brown, 1988; Cartwright and Zander, 1968; Hinton and Reitz, 
1971; Lewin, 1951). We frequently group individuals together in order to 
refer to them as having one or several particular characteristics. We 
categorise them as having common traits. Examples of this might be a 
classification of people with the same hair colour (redheads) or people who 
have all passed a first degree (graduates). These tend to relate to collective 
nouns. So, for example, if one takes the term "racists", this is a collective 
noun for people with certain beliefs rather than referring to a group of 
individuals in the sense that is meant by the term "groups". In using the term 
groups within the context of the psychology of groups, we imply that much 
more is involved in membership. Rupert Brown offers the following 
definition: "A group exists when two or more people define themselves as 
members of it and when its existence is recognised by at least one other" 
(Brown, 1988, pp 2-3). This "third party" would be some person or group of 
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people which does not so define itself in the same way. This would appear to 
be sufficient at first glance but when we begin to consider the nature and 
structure of groups and members' motivation for joining where joining is 
appropriate, the above definition then becomes a little simplistic as it fails to 
take into account the multitudinous reasons for groups of individuals coming 
together. Hinton and Reitz touch on the need for a broader definition when 
they write of groups satisfying individuals' needs, including affiliative needs, 
social needs, security needs and power achievement needs. They state that 
"they also provide a medium by which an individual can test his perception 
of, and if need be actually create, reality" (Hinton and Reitz, 1971, p32). 
This theme of groups fulfilling their members' needs is best reflected within 
Kurt Lewin's definition which relates to the interdependence of its members 
rather than a similarity between them (Lewin, 1951). The latter type of 
definition might include a shared goal but he argues that the shared goal is a 
symbol of one aspect of their interdependence. "The kind of 
interdependence of the members (what holds the group together) is equally as 
important a characteristic of a group as the degree of their interdependence 
and the group structure" (Lewin, 1951, p148). 
Cartwright and Zander draw from Lewin's definition and expand on it, 
offering the following: 
A group is a collection of individuals who have relations to one 
another that make them interdependent to some significant degree" 
(Cartwright and Zander, 1968, p46). 
The type of interdependence may be a form of interaction or shared norms or 
the reception of a reward (psychological) in being a member - they get 
"something out of it". It can also be a shared goal or it may be defined in 
terms of the perceptions of the group's members as being a recognised 
collective. From these definitions, they draw out such characteristics as 
group members having frequent contact with each other, recognising 
themselves as members and being so recognised by others, sharing common 
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attitudes to matters of common interest, participating in recognisable specific 
roles, sharing goals with other members and seeing themselves as being a 
collective unity which can be identified by others outside the group 
environment as such. This last definition appears to be the most appropriate, 
embracing, as it does, the diverse nature of groups but recognising the 
interrelationships and interdependence of their members. 
(a) Membership v reference groups 
The above definitions very much relate to identifiable groups of which 
individuals would claim membership. The word "group" can also be used to 
signify a collection of individuals who might not be so interdependent but 
who might be similar in other qualities, for example, "bikers" whose only 
link together might be the ownership of a motor bike. If an individual aspired 
to become a biker, she might not be able to afford to buy a motor bike but 
would be seeking in other ways to behave according to her perceptions of 
what it means to be a biker, for example, beliefs or style of dress. Thus the 
group of bikers becomes that individual's reference group. Reference groups 
can also be groups that an individual uses to compare his or her behaviour to. 
Their perceived standards or norms are used by an individual to judge his or 
her own behaviour with either a positive or negative result, in other words, as 
an assessment that it either conforms or does not conform to the reference 
group's perceived standards. The influence on individuals of reference 
groups as well as membership grou ps is significant and will be considered 
later in this chapter. 
Norms and values 
In Chapter Eight I offered a definition of the term 'values' as relating to the 
desirability of a particular mode of conduct or end state of behaviour. The 
word "norm" is used extensively throughout the literature relating to group 
dynamics and, for example, Cartwright and Zander (1968) refer to common 
norms as being a fundamental characteristic of a membership group. 
However, it is used differently by different writers and it is therefore 
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important to consider a working definition of the word at this stage for the 
purposes of this project. 
Josephine Klein defines norms as follows: 
When in a group a man will consider his actions with respect to others 
in the group. He learns to conform to their expectations and so to 
their way of life. Their ways have value for the individual, he may 
make them his own, internalise them and therefore conform to them. 
Or they may be experienced as external pressures to which he must 
yield to gain other ends. Such pressures, whether internalised or not, 
we are calling norms (Klein, 1956, p77). 
As an indication of the problem of definition, Brown's definition of a norm is 
as follows: "a scale of values which defines a range of acceptable (and 
unacceptable) attitudes and behaviours for members of a social unit" (Brown, 
1988, p42). 
Johnson and Johnson offer this description of group norms: 
... The group's common beliefs regarding appropriate behaviour, 
attitudes, and perceptions for members. They are the prescribed 
modes of conduct and belief that not only guide the behaviour of 
group members, but also help group interaction by specifying the 
kinds of responses that are expected and acceptable in particular 
situations (Johnson and Johnson, 1997, p2l). 
Sherif initially appears confused about any differentiation between norms and 
values and uses the words virtually synonymously. Social norms include 
"customs, traditions, standards, rules, values, fashions, and all other criteria 
of conduct which are standardised as a consequence of the contact of 
individuals" (Sherif, 1936, p3). However, he begins to differentiate when he 
considers a definition of social values which he defines through the examples 
of "the glory of the flag, the value of a diamond, the sweetness of home, the 
sanctity of property and the sacredness of the constitution" (Sherif, 1936, 
p113). Thus, according to Sherif, social values are social norms with an 
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element of value judgement. He sees social values as affecting the attitude of 
an individual. Social values may start within one individual member of a 
group but they have to become standardised within a potentially critical 
group. They become internalised within individual group members and 
become their frame of reference for attitudes. Sherif makes no differentiation 
between social values and moral values. 
Is it possible to distinguish between norms and values? Johnson gives us the 
clearest distinction between the two when he describes them as follows: 
"Norms can be defined as the general expectations of a demand character for 
all role members of an organisation. Values are the more generalised 
ideological justifications and aspirations of the organisation" (Johnson, 1970, 
p26). However, he makes no distinction between norms and n(les. It is 
therefore clear that working definitions need to be devised for the sake of 
clarity. 
While norms and values are mentioned a great deal by writers on group 
processes, less is said about rules and it is the use of rules which puts a 
clearer perspective on the relationship between rules, norms and values. I 
would argue that rules are underpinned by values to which it is hoped (by the 
rule makers) that people will aspire. A norm would reflect what happens in 
reality and on average thus reflecting its alternative interpretation of being a 
mean or average of what happens in practice. This theory is best amplified 
by example, 
Value: It is wrong to steal from your employer 
Rule: Do not steal postage stamps from company stocks 
Norm: It's OK to take a few stamps for personal use as long as 
it is not so many as to risk being discovered. 
As an alternative example, it was written in my terms and conditions of 
employment (a national standard) that every member of staff should take a 
half hour lunch break. In practice, this did not happen locally as everyone 
was employed part-time and was carrying a heavy workload. The 
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relationship between the rule, underpinning value and the norm was therefore 
as follows: 
Value: It is good for the welfare of employees to take a break 
during the working day 
Rule: Every employee must take a lunch break of half an hour 
Norm: No-one takes a lunch break because everyone works 
part-time, carries a heavy workload and wants to go home half an hour 
earlier. 
Thus, it is intended to adopt the following three definitions within this piece 
of work. Norms are described as being a guideline or standard relating to 
acceptable or unacceptable behaviour within a group. They may relate to 
rules for procedure of discussion (for example, a written constitution) or they 
may proscribe certain social behaviour, for example, eating pork. 
Values are principles and beliefs that serve to underpin a set of group rules 
and goals. Thus, for example, "All political prisoners should be freed" would 
be a value of a local group of Amnesty and would justify the specific task of 
writing letters to governments on behalf of imprisoned individuals towards 
the specific goal of freeing all political prisoners. They have a "moral" 
element to them and thus have an important role to play in the influencing of 
individual members of the group. Rules are the specific consequence of the 
values and principles. For example, a local Amnesty group might have a rule 
that each member is required to write at least three letters per week in relation 
to the rights of political prisoners. There is no moral element in that rule per 
se but that it is underpinned by the value accepted by all members of the 
group. 
In order to investigate the nature of the influence of group membership, the 
processes within a group which take place will be considered next, followed 
by the nature of an individual's influence on a group and the group's 
influence on the individual. I will then seek to outline current research in 
235 
business ethics on group influence and theory relating to membership of a 
profession. 
The processes within a group 
Kurt Lewin introduces his field theory as being "a method of analysing causal 
relations and of building scientific constructs" (Lewin, 1951, p45). It 
recognises that in any process a number of variables are at work, a change in 
any of which would alter the outcome. It also recognises the fact that they 
are interdependent and interrelational. Earlier, in 1947, Lewin had used this 
theory to consider the forces working in opposition on groups to gain 
knowledge of the dynamics within the group. Thus, he attempted to quantify 
the relative strength of the various forces for change on groups. He 
recognised the forces on an individual who might hold different beliefs to 
those of the group to conform to its standards. Not to do so would mean that 
the individual might suffer ridicule, sanction, or rejection. Would the forces 
for change be stronger than those for conformity? 
It can be seen that there are a number of different variables within a 
membership group (at least as many as the sum of its members) which ensure 
that a group functions in a particular way. Consideration will be given in the 
next section to the question of how a group develops and two concepts 
referred to a great deal in any study of group dynamics - cohesiveness and 
conformity. In selecting literature to review at this point, the main interest is 
in the role of norms, the way they develop and the means by which they 
influence individual group members. 
(a) The development of groups 
Norms have a significant role to play within the development of groups but at 
a later stage of the life of a group. In the beginning of a group, Hinton and 
Reitz state that membership groups form in two different ways, either 
spontaneously or deliberately (Hinton and Reitz, 1971). According to them, 
spontaneous groups tend to be less formal and more social while groups 
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which are planned have more structure with a more autocratic style of 
leadership. How do groups agree their norms? It is part of the process of 
development according to Bruce Tuckman (1971). He analyses the 
development of small groups in terms of a series of stages (Tuckman, 1971, 
pp 76-77). He identifies the following stages relating to group structure. 
Stage 1 "Testing and dependence": Members tend to be more 
dependent on the group which tends to have fairly rigid norms while 
individuals test out roles and boundaries - to join or not to join? 
Stage 2 "Intragroup hostility": Groups pass through an early stage of 
conflict and this tends to feature the testing of autonomy and independence of 
individual members. 
Stage 3 "Development of group cohesion": this includes discovering 
common interests, the growth of an interlocking network of friendships, role 
independence, mutual involvement between members with a concomitant 
increase in harmony, and the establishment of group norms for dealing with 
areas such as discipline. 
Stage 4 "Functional Role-Relatedness": this is a stage which reflects a 
mutual interdependence of members "a simultaneous autonomy and 
mutuality" where the structure has been internalised. 
Writing as a practitioner, working with small groups in the voluntary sector, 
this translates into more colloquial language as "forming, storming, norming 
and performing" and is taught as such in any learning setting on the 
psychology of groups. Tuckman's Stage 3 summarises the concept of 
cohesiveness to include the agreement of group norms which, in turn, dictate 
acceptable and unacceptable behaviour within a group. 
(b) Cohesiveness 
The above description of a development model of the group process indicates 
the importance of the strength of cohesion within a group membership. 
Various writers have considered the nature of this cohesion and the factors 
which affect its relative force. Thus Hinton and Reitz (1971) argue that the 
strength of cohesiveness depends on the strength of the group's goals but that 
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there has to be some element of cohesiveness or mutual attractiveness for the 
group to exist at all. 
Two sets of component forces have been recognised as acting on group 
members - those which attract the individual and those deriving from the 
attractiveness of alternative memberships (Cartwright, 1968). Some of the 
possible consequences of strong group cohesiveness include the ability of the 
group to retain its members, the power of the group to influence its members, 
the degree of participation and loyalty of members and, lastly, the feelings of 
security on the part of members. 
The need for shared values which underpin the cohesion of a group has been 
identified, together with the shared perspective inducing members to be 
motivated to do that which, if not done, might incur sanctions (Scott, 1965). 
Shared values also limit the amount of intra-group conflict. They prescribe 
priorities among goals and set standards of appropriateness for selecting 4D 
means to attain the goals. Shared values also justify sanctions against those 
who deviate while reference to the group's collective moral values steers 
feelings in members of guilt or self-righteousness, enabling them to judge 
themselves against the requirements of the group. 
Thus it can be seen that a number of factors work towards a group 
functioning effectively and in a cohesive way. One of the major forces 
within that process is the need for members of the group to conform to its 
agreed standards and goals. What does this mean in practice? 
(C) Conformity to norms 
The effects of conformity and the existence of a set of group standards are 
interdependent. Johnson (1970) recognises the significance of norms in the 
need for conformity within the group. He sees norms as having the general 
function of tying members of the group into the system and its various roles. 
Power accrues, therefore, to norms because the people involved give 
up some of their individual power to the norms. Individuals allow 
themselves to be influenced by norms in ways in which they would 
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never allow themselves to be influenced by other people, as norms 
often assume the characteristics of moral obligations (Johnson, 1970, 
p213). 
He describes norms as being of relative significance within the system, those 
which are less important attracting fewer sanctions than those which are more 
significant. Thus conformity is ensured on the norms which are more 
fundamental to the group's goals. However, Johnson makes the point that the 
degree of conformity given by the individual will depend on whether the 
group is also a reference group of that person in a positive framework, there 
being more incentive to conform if there is strong motivation to adhere to the 
identified norms of the reference group. 
How does the individual learn the group's norms? Brown (1988) relates this 
process to the observed behaviour of his child joining a nursery class for the 
first time. The new children spend some time watching the others to see what 
they are doing. They are encouraged by the others to join existing activities 
rather than impose new ones. Klein describes the individual as attempting to 
learn the norms of a group in order to seek their approval (Klein, 1956). This 
is done by observation of "average" behaviour which is then imitated. Where 
an individual is uncertain of the acceptable way to behave, they will be 
influenced by information supplied by the group. She holds that the greater 
the uncertainty, the more likely the individual is to aim to conform to an 
estimate of the group's average. 
It is generally recognised that there is a process of socialisation which an 
individual goes through when joining any new group or organisation (Schein, 
1971). Schein identifies the elements of such a process as including the 
learning of the basic goals of the organisation and the preferred methods of 
obtaining them, the responsibilities of the role which the individual is to take 
up, together with expected behaviour and the set of rules relating to the 
maintenance of the group. 
The strength of pressure to conform in any group can be extremely high. The 
work of Sherif has already been outlined earlier in this chapter but another 
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piece of research on this which is cited widely is that of Asch (1971). He 
describes an experiment which induced individuals either to conform to or 
resist a majority view of a fact which was totally incorrect. He found that 
there was a marked move towards the majority (who were incorrect) to the 
extent that one third of research subjects sought conformity. However, 68 per 
cent remained independent. He therefore considered the individual 
differences which led them either to conformity or independence. Those who 
remained independent displayed a certain confidence in their own perceptions 
or were independent and withdraivii from the process in an emotionally 
detached way. Some people who remained independent indicated a need to 
complete the task in a proper way regardless of the strength of the argument 
of the majority. Of those subjects who yielded to the incorrect majority view, 
in a few there was an actual distortion of perception under the stress of the 
group pressure. In the majority, there was a distortion of judgement in that 
individuals decided that "they must be wrong" in the light of the majority 
viewpoint and did not have the confidence to hold on to their original belief. 
Lastly, there was a "distortion of action" where subjects knew they were right 
but were concerned to behave with the majority and therefore conformed. 
Asch then considered the effect of changing the degree of incorrectness of the 
majority opinion and found that independence did increase with the degree of 
incorrectness. However, there were still some subjects who were prepared to 
go along with the majority. He concludes that, among the factors that 
influence independence or yielding is the character of the group forces 
including the size of the majority and the character of the individual. 
Brown (1988) draws attention to the possibility that cultural differences may 
affect the degree of conformity required by a group. For example, certain 
tribes require unanimous decisions while other societies work on the basis of 
majority decisions. The range of acceptable behaviours within a group can 
also vary depending on the individual's status within the group and whether 
any deviant behaviour threatens the core of the group's beliefs system. 
Leaders are expected to lead by example although high-status members are 
able to deviate from the norm more than subordinates. 
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Johnson and Johnson (1997) see group norms as varying in significance 
depending on their relationship to the overall function or aim or objective of 
the group. They recognise that a norm can become internalised that a group 
member is following it unconsciously. They hold that group norms help a 
group maintain behavioural consistency, enabling a member to predict 
behaviour as well as conforming. There are only norms relevant to the 
group's functions. They can apply to some members and not to others, 
depending on the individual's role within the group. Group norms can often 
serve as substitutes for direct influence over members. 
Norms are a protection against the capricious or inconsistent use of 
influence by high-power members, but they also free the high-power 
members from constantly checking the behaviour of low-power 
members to make sure they are conforming" (Johnson and Johnson, 
1997, p433). 
Norms can be introduced to a group directly by stating the case for the 
adoption of such a norm, or indirectly, by modelling behaviour or importing 
from another group. 
What happens if someone deviates from the established standards? 
Consideration will be given to the role of the deviant later in this chapter but 
the following quotation from Cartwright and Zander gives an indication of 
the strength of group conformity in one particular workplace: 
First we would talk about her unfairness among ourselves. If that did 
not reach her, we talked about her where she could overhear us. If she 
still did not change, one of us would approach her in the lounge and 
ask her if she was trying to kill our jobs. That usually did the trick 
(Cartwright and Zander, 1968, p141). 
Theories around conformity have been criticised in two respects. Firstly, 
Hollander and Willis define conformity as being "behaviour intended to fulfil 
normative group expectancies as presently perceived by the individual" 
(Hollander and Willis, 1971, p234). They deny that the concept of 
241 
conformity contains any element of movement towards a standard. They also 
argue that the level of conformity is not homogeneous throughout any one 
group. 
Serge Moscovici summarises the main threads of literature on the theory of 
conformity at the time when he was writing as being covered by the 
following six main points (Moscovici, 1976). 
1. Social influence in a group is unequally distributed and is 
exerted in a unilateral manner. 
The function of social influence is to maintain and reinforce 
social control. 
3. Dependence relations determine the direction and the amount 
of social influence exerted in a group. 
4. States of uncertainty and the need to reduce uncertainty 
determine the forms taken by the influence processes. 
5. The consensus aimed at by influence exchange is based on the 
norm of objectivity. 
6. All influence processes are seen from the vantage point of 
conformity, and conformity alone is believed to underlie the 
essential features of these processes. 
Moscovici argues that the emphasis on conformity in the above paradigm 
does not permit recognition of the role of the individual or deviant in 
influencing a group. It has the effect of minimising the role of the deviant in 
a negative way. He states: "Surely independence is itself a quest for 
"difference" or the defence of difference, which carries with it the risk of 
isolation and deviance and which calls for unusual strength and qualities" 
(Moscovici, 1976, p63). Here Moscovici is seeking to redress the balance of 
power between a group and its individual members, emphasising the value of 
an individual's contribution to the totality of the group. 
Thus, to perform at their best, groups need to maintain their membership 
through a process of cohesiveness and, in most cases, conformity. The 
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purpose of highlighting the above variety of literature has been to indicate the 
strength of power that there can be in a group to exercise constraint on the 
behaviour of its members. 
(d) Deviance and dissonance 
The strength of the forces on the individual to conform has already been 
stressed above. How does an individual resolve differences between herself 
and a group when it is known that the ultimate sanction might be exclusion? 
Deviants are those members of the group who seek to move away from 
accepted norms relating to behaviour and actions within an established group. 
Cartwright and Zander (1968) state that deviants may find ways of protecting 
themselves from the potential results of this conflict by choosing to listen 
only to arguments which agree with their own position. They may also bide 
their deviant behaviour or behave to the minimum standard required. 
It has been argued that where an individual has a conflict of values she will 
attempt to resolve them and "make them fit better (dissonance reduction)" 
(Festinger and Aronson, 1968, p125). Dissonance can be aroused by 
disagreement with others. Festinger and Aronson (1968) suggest that the 
degree of dissonance will depend on two factors - firstly, the relative 
importance of the person who voices the disagreement and, secondly, the 
significance of the issue upon which the disagreement is based. They 
summarise the research demonstrating the ways in which a person will seek 
to reduce such dissonance: 
In general, he may attempt to convince himself that the content area in 
which the disagreement exists is relatively unimportant; he may 
attempt to derogate the person or group that disagrees with him; he 
may attempt to eliminate the disagreement either by changing his own 
opinion or attempting to influence the disagreeing persons to change 
theirs; or he may seek additional social support for the opinion he 
holds, thus, in essence, adding new cognitions which are consonant 
with his own opinions" (Festinger and Aronson, 1968, p130). 
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They also recognise that dissonance can be caused by group influence in 
forcing a person to behave publicly in a way with which she would not agree 
in private. They consider the situation where someone is asked to do 
something for a reward with which she disagrees, and then demonstrate that 
if someone is offered a small reward for stating publicly something which she 
does not believe to be true, the private belief will tend to move towards the 
position of the public statement. However, if a large reward is offered, the 
opposite tends to result. 
Moscovici (1976) disputed the validity of seeing conformity as a movement 
towards a standardisation of a group's norms. He questioned the need to 
devalue the influence of the deviant and recognised that the deviant has an 
important role to play in influencing the group. Part of that influence relates 
to the very fact of being a minority which, by its very nature, can be more 
attractive to other members of a group. 
However, it is clear that, as far as the project's informants are concerned, the 
influences on them to conform to group requirements of which they are a 
member are potentially great. At this point, it is useful to recall the 
distinction made between spontaneous and organised groups. Spontaneous 
groups are more informal and unlikely to have as great or as detailed 
demands upon their members as those which are more organised. An 
example of this in practice in the voluntary sector might be whether the group 
has a formal written constitution or set of rules or not. The creation of such a 
document, in my experience, often raises the question of acceptable norms 
which have not been needed to be addressed previously. 
4. Current research in business ethics on group influence 
Having considered relevant literature within general theory around groups, I 
now examine the contribution of research within the field of business ethics. 
There is a recognised paucity of work which has been carried out on the 
group influence in business ethics (Abdolmobammadi et al, 1997). Partly, 
this problem arises because the field of "business ethics" is a relatively new 
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one. However, research exists which has used the context of business in 
which to discover theories relating to the influence of group processes on 
moral decisions in the workplace. The main points which emerge are as 
follows. 
Groups of workers in a factory have been found to set their 
own norms around acceptable and unacceptable levels of 
pilfering from their employer. Donald Horning (1970) 
established that workers in a particular factory identified three 
types of ownership of property in the company: that owned by 
individuals, that having corporate ownership and that which 
was uncertain. The last category tended to comprise 
company-owned goods which were of little value and of large 
quantity. He discovered that there were workgroup norms 
which identified the types of goods which were acceptable to 
pilfer and those which were not. These norms tended to be 
conveyed through the relation of stories ("folklore") about 
"heroes and recreants" (Horning, 1970, p62) and laid down 
guidelines for the potential pilferer. Those who exceeded the 
limits were no longer given the support of their colleagues. 
2. The role models of peers and top management within the 
organisation are the major predictors of ethical/unethical 
behaviour, together with the availability of opportunity (Zey- 
Ferrell and Ferrell, 1982). 
3. Peer influence was significant in influencing unethical 
behavioural intentions in the workplace (Jones and Kavanagh, 
1996). 
4. Younger people were more likely to be influenced by group 
norms while an older group were more subject to the influence 
of their managers (Jones and Kavanagh, 1996). 
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Members of groups are more likely to modify their value 
framework under the influence of the group (Schminke and 
Wells, 1999). 
6. Individuals are more likely to refer to their group within their 
department than other groups who are outside it but still within 
the organisation for a sharing of ethical reasoning and moral 
intent (Granitz and Ward, 2001). 
If one brings together the theories relating to groups from the generalised 
literature, together with the specific points raised by research within business 
ethics, one generates a picture of the influence of being a member of a group 
as potentially extremely strong, the fear of exclusion providing a pressure to 
conform with what is required by membership of a group, following 
acceptable behaviour patterns and norms. Ten of the 16 informants identified 
at least one influence from either a peer group internal to their employing 
organisation or from peers outside that organisation and I intend to treat the 
two separately, making that distinction. 
5. The nature of peer/group influence (internal to 
organisation) 
Nineteen concepts have been identified in total as relating to a source of 
influence of peers within the organisation. All relate to some aspect of 
conforming to peer expectations. 
1 per cent 
Conforming 60 
Perceptions of peers 20 
Support from peers 20 
Examples of concepts which show a desire to conform to the norms imposed 
by the peer/group influence include the following: 
*Acceptance that other people do it* (Bob) 
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*Repercussions from immediate colleagues* (Gaynor) 
*Had done two previous collections for others with enthusiasm and 
success* (Helen). 
Informants' concern for how they would be perceived by peers is 
demonstrated by the following examples: 
*Losing face* (Gaynor) 
*Fear of being seen to be involved* (Leo). 
The need to recognise peer support is evidenced by the following: 
*Fear of lack of support from other colleagues* (Gaynor) 
*Supported by own manager and team* (Angela). 
What was the nature of the group which was exerting this influence within 
the employing organisation? Broadly, it related to "colleagues", "team", a 
non-defined, non-specific grouping within the informants' cognitive map of 
their situation at their employment. However, it appeared to have a common 
"voice" and was identified by eight of the 16 informants as having an 
influence within the context of their decision. While I did not explore the 
exact nature of this influence with individual informants, it was clear to me 
that they could have named a list of individuals who they would see as being 
part of that grouping and that they would see it as being a form of informal 
membership group rather than a reference group. 
Having considered the question of obedience to authority within 
organisations within the literature review, I have sought evidence of such 
obedience from within the informants' cognitive maps. It does appear that 
the nature of the moral decision in many cases relates to the potential need to 
be disobedient. Bob and Edith have already been discussed because of their 
overt behaviour against apparent organisational rules. It could be argued that 
problems brought by Colin, Don, Frederick, Joanne, and Mark involved the 
consideration of disobedience to known authority requirements. Colin, 
Frederick and Joanne decided to conform to the requirements of their 
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employers while obviously feeling a degree of discomfort about their 
decision. Don and Mark both decided to go against organisational procedures 
in their situations. It would not be appropriate to attempt to draw any further 
conclusions from the above pattern. All that can be said is that obedience to 
authority was obviously a major factor within the decisions brought to this 
research project. 
When one comes to consider the nature of the influence of peer groups on 
individual situations, it is illuminating to consider the example of Leo. Leo 
identified 11 concepts within his cognitive map concerning the question of 
whether to back a colleague (and friend) in protesting about current working 
practices. Two of these related to organisational influences, totalling -1. 
Eight related to individual values totalling -1 (negatives being against the 
decision). In addition there was one concept which he related to "peer 
pressure" which had a value of +2 (promoting his decision). Thus, this sole 
influence can be identified as being a counteracting factor in the resulting 
balanced decision. This example also serves to demonstrate the effect of 
membership of different groups. Leo is concerned about his family and their 
welfare (*Didn't want to risk career and farnily*); he brings with him his own 
values relating to interpersonal relationships (*Wanted to back a friend*). 
However, his peer group are not supporting him (*Most managers had not 
backcd him*) and the organisational pressures were telling him not to get 
involved (*Fear of being seen to be involved*). Thus conflict appears to be 
created by membership of different groups which he is seeking to resolve. 
The literature review around influences of groups raised a number of 
questions including those relating to the strength of influence, the nature of 
the groups identified and the effect of obedience to authority. From the 
above analysis, it can be concluded that the strength of influence of 
membership of groups is less relatively speaking to those of individual values 
and organisational pressures. However, it can be the balancing factor within 
the decision as illustrated above. With regards to the nature of the groups 
identified, they would appear to be a mixture of peer groups, work groups, 
membership and reference groups but all with a clear identity of the 
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individuals involved within the informants' cognitive map. In terms of the 
nature of the group determining the degree of conformity, this research 
appears to suggest that more informal groups exert less pressure to conform 
on their members. None of the groups referred to by the project's informants 
appeared to be to any degree formal. 
It is identified that the need to maintain obedience to organisational rules and 
their authority form a major part of the internal debate of the decision-making 
process within these informants. Finally, there would appear to be no 
relationship between age and the propensity to be influenced by group 
processes. 
Peer/group influence (external to organisation) 
Four informants draw on the influence of a group of peers which is external 
to the organisation to which they belong (Bob, Colin, Mark and Owen). Bob 
and Colin are both within the private sector and are looking towards what is 
an industry norm in their situation. Mark and Owen's decisions both relate to 
their role as representatives within a union and the union is perceived as 
being external to the organisation. In both these latter cases, this influence is 
either the strongest or the equal strongest above all other influences. In 
Owen, no concept deriving from an organisational influence is identified. 
This tends to indicate the relative strength of the influence of union 
membership. 
7. The influence of being a "professional" 
The above section has begun to highlight the nature and influence of various 
groups which exist in the "business" world and within organisations. One 
type of social grouping which needs particular attention in this project is that 
of professions, their organisations and their influence. By professions, I 
mean those types of employment which provide member organisations which 
may monitor quality, provide "standards" and disciplinary procedures where 
necessary. Examples would include the medical profession, lawyers, 
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engineers, teachers and environmental health officers. To what extent does 
perceiving oneself as being a "professional" influence one's moral decisions 
in the workplace? 
Some of the literature around professionalism identifies that one of the 
characteristics of the concept of professionalism is a link with a system of 
moral values. Members of a particular profession commit themselves to 
complying with a code laid down by their organisation (Durkheim, 1957; 
MacDonald, 1995; Baron, 1999). At the same time, recognition is made of a 
potential conflict between being a member of a professional grouping and, 
also, a bureaucratic organisation. An increasing number of professions are 
working within employing organisations rather than being sole practitioners 
or partners in, for example, a firm of solicitors or medical practice (Friedson, 
1994). 
It is acknowledged that different disciplines have viewed professionalism 
differently (Friedson, 1994; Flynn, 1999). Thus, sociologists have identified 
professionals as being linked by the concept of serving the public need and 
good while economists expressed concern about the monopolistic nature of 
their market and political scientists saw them as "privileged private 
governments" (Friedson, 1994, p13). He concludes that it is impossible to 
propose an all-purposeful definition of what is meant by professionalism. 
There are a number of elements within the concept which change according 
to the historical societal context. Those elements include the nature of the 
occupation, the organisation, the training involved and its organisation. in 
order to reach a nationally recognised qualification and the monitoring of 
quality standards by an external body or peers. 
Professionalization might be defined as a process by which an 
organized occupation, usually but not always by virtue of making a 
claim to special esoteric competence and to concern for the quality of 
its work and its benefits to society, obtains the exclusive right to 
perform a particular kind of work, control training for and access to it, 
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and control the right of determining and evaluating the way the work 
is performed. (Friedson, 1994, p62) 
Adherence to a common values system is seen as giving a professional 
grouping particular authority (MacDonald, 1995). For example, the General 
Medical Council exerts its moral authority in declaring its position on 
particular medical ethical issues and expects its members to comply with its 
guidance. However, while the concept of "professional" values might be 
seen to include an emphasis on quality of service and qualifications, public 
service and altruism, a negative aspect of such value systems reflected in a 
respect for fellow members can often result in a tendency to protect each 
other against the overall interests of the public at large. A recent example of 
this is the problem with children's heart surgery at Bristol where medical 
colleagues apparently were aware that lives were at risk as a result of 
particular practices but did very little to prevent a continuation for some time 
(Barrowclough, 2000). Barrowclough interviewed Stephen Bolsin who spent 
some time while working at Bristol as an anaesthetist recording the results of 
heart surgery on children and who consistently expressed concern to various 
authorities about the quality of the surgery and the higher than average 
mortality rate. As a result of his intervention, he had to move with his family 
to work in Australia and the inter-view with him identifies the way in which 
he has been excluded by fellow professionals. 
Professor Stephen Bolsin was recently made aware of just how much 
he is still reviled by elements within Britain's medical world. His 
enlightenment came when an Australian doctor who had just returned 
from a conference in England telephoned a colleague of Bolsin at 
Geelong Hospital, near Melbourne. "I think you should know that 
you are employing one of the most hated anaesthetists in Europe, " he 
said. (Barrowclough, 2000) 
Thus the negative effects of professionals acting together would appear to be 
in direct conflict with the public interest. Just as members support each other 
within membership of a profession, they are as unsupportive in rejecting 
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someone who no longer appears to adhere to their requirements in terms of 
ethical behaviour. 
Durkheim perceived the influence of professional ethics as being a positive 
example of adherence to a values system, contrasting it with the context of 
the economic/business community where he could identify few common 
values. However, in an unpublished MBA thesis, Heyes (1996) studied the 
impact of professionalism on the decision-making process in librarianship. 
He concluded that the influence of professionalism was greatest when the 
issue involved professional values but assumed that this was a negative effect 
upon an otherwise rational process. In other words, he did not perceive the 
nature of the professional values as expressed as being "objective" or 
"rational" because he could not perceive any particular logic to them. 
One particular piece of writing highlights the role of ethics within a 
profession at work. Quallington (2000) describes a qualitative piece of 
research carried out around ethical issues for nurses using an interview 
process. She surnmarises the issues which arose as follows: 
1. Ethics are a big issue within nursing care. 
1) Ethics are "felt rather than thought" (p6) - 100 per cent 
identified feelings as being a predominant indicator that the 
situation they were involved in involved ethical factors. 
However, all the respondents were women (and she refers to 
Gilligan). 
3. Their ethical responses tended to rely on gut feelings, on 
intuition that something felt inherentlY either right or wrong. 
4. Their frustration within ethical dilemmas related to their 
relative powerlessness to act differently. This often related to 
a clash with other professions, e. g. doctors. 
Quallington comes from a nursing lecturer background and concludes that 
ethical dilemmas can be seen in general as being a struggle between 
individual and professional values. 
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In summary, the influence of being a member of a professional body is likely 
to be greatest when its value system relating to both quality of work and 
ethical practice is being brought into the context of a particular decision. 
This may or may not conflict with other values and can be perceived as being 
outside the influence of being an employee within an employing organisation. 
The influence of being a professional among other professionals appears in 
four cases (Angela, Colin, Frederick and Neil). Angela and Frederick were 
both professionals by type of employment while Colin was a manager in 
industry. For Angela, Frederick and Neil, the professional influence was a 
force for the decision made while in the case of Colin, it was against the 
decision. Colin's concept related to a technical query around a "professional" 
assessment to be made. Both Angela and Frederick had organisational 
influences which were the strongest influence for them but also working 
against the decision they made. For Neil in higher education, it was initially 
unclear whether the professional influence which he identified was internal or 
external to the organisation. Subsequent contact with him clarified that it was 
internal in his case. However, for Angela, Colin and Frederick, I have 
assumed that the influence of being a professional among other professionals 
is external to the organisation. 
Neil was using professional values to judge a fellow professional. The 
implicit values relate to standards of behaviour and performance as well as 
being fair to others. Frederick referred to being a professional as a means of 
testing his technical knowledge and doing a "proper" job. Colin was using 
professional knowledge to assess the situation in relation to whether to 
negotiate an illegal compensation. Angela referred to professional influence 
in the values implied by the practice being discussed (*People at risk by 
withholding of info*). 
From the above, it can be concluded that informants identified the influence 
of being a "professional" which, in this instance, is self-defining, as relating 
to either the technical knowledge implied or the underpinning values which 
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governed behaviour and performance. Being a professional brings an 
additional potential influence to a moral decision in the workplace. 
Membership of multiple groups 
This chapter seeks to outline the varying factors which influence the 
relationship between individuals and groups. It also demonstrates that the 
relationships are complex and are themselves influenced by a number of 
differing factors which vary in weight and strength. Hinton and Reitz (1971) 
consider these relative influences and conclude that the influence of the group 
on the individual member is, in most circumstances, greater. Thus, according 
to them, the group is more powerful than the individual. But does the group 
have more influence over an individual's behaviour than the individual? 
There are two concepts which need to be mentioned before concluding this 
chapter. The first is the question of multiple membership of groups. This is 
recognised by Cartwright and Zander who conclude that it causes potential 
conflict. The values or norms of the different groups may differ to such an 
extent as to be incompatible or contradictory. They state that 
it is commonly observed that the majority of people function 
efficiently as members of many groups. Often they may be only 
vaguely aware of the inconsistencies of their beliefs, acting in accord 
with the standards of the group that is most salient at the moment or 
managing to resolve the conflicts without being aware of them at all 
(Cartwright and Zander, 1968, p5l). 
How do we reconcile the different influences of the disparate groups to which 
we, as individuals, belong? Halford and Leonard (1999), in considering the 
influence of professionalism, conclude that we change identities depending 
on the social context. They admit that they are not clear as to whether 
external influences allow this to happen or not but what emerges is a type of 
fluidity between different identities and their particular influence and 
discourses. Do we "change our skins" as they suggest or do we retain 
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influences from all our group membership and apply them as appropriate 
within a certain context? What can we learn from the project informants' 
experience? 
Each informant was asked to name the source of the influence of a particular 
construct within their cognitive map. They were remarkably consistent in 
doing so and an analysis has been made of the strongest influence in each of 
the 16 informants' situations. Three informants had "ties" in strength of total 
influence (Frederick, Mark and Penny). Of the remainder, the strongest 






Peer/group internal 1 
Peer/group external I 
Both peer group instances were in cases of dilemmas. Where the 
organisational influence was strongest, in five cases, the influence was 
positive and in one case, negative (against the eventual decision). Where the 
individual influence was strongest, in four cases, the influence was positive 
and in one case, negative. There appeared to be no relationship between the 
strongest influence and gender, K-stage or type of employer. The pattern 
which appears to be emerging thus shows individual values on the one hand 
and organisational values on the other, with peer/group influences coming 
into play where the problem is particularly balanced. The suggestion that we 
might change identities depending on the context when different group values 
are in conflict does not appear to be supported here. Rather, informants are 
aware of the differing influences within a particular situation and they take 
account of the varying conflicting constructs in making a moral decision in 
the workplace. 
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In terms of membership of groups, it can be stated from the above data that 
such membership becomes a significant influence. However, in making the 
distinction between employing organisations and groups, it is clear that the 
fine balance is between values emanating from oneself and one's own life 
experience and those of the employer. 
9. Conclusions 
This chapter began by considering what is meant when we talk about a 
"group of people" and concluded that the following definition best fits our 
normal construct: 
A group is a collection of individuals who have relations to one 
another that make them interdependent to some significant degree" 
(Cartwright and Zander, 1968, p46). 
The distinction was then made between membership and reference groups 
and their varying significance to individuals explored. At this point, as norms 
emerged as being pertinent to the life of groups, it became important to define 
what was meant by the term and this was done in terms of "what actually 
happens in practice" and "on average". 
Consideration was then given to the theory of the development of groups, 
their cohesiveness, the role of norms within a group and what happens when 
a member is in conflict with a group. The literature review concluded with a 
summary of salient points from the field of business ethics, 
In reflecting on the experience of the project's informants, it was clear that 
those who referred to an influence deriving from their peers/group which was 
internal to the organisation revealed constructs relating to conforming to the 
required behaviour of their peer/group, their need to be perceived in a 
particular way to meet the expectations of peers and their need for or 
acceptance of support from that group. 
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The influence of membership of a peer/group was significant in holding the 
balance in one particular dilemma but its strength was less relatively speaking 
to those of individual values and organisational pressures. With regards to 
the nature of the groups identified, they would appear to be a mixture of peer 
groups, work groups, membership and reference groups but informants 
referring to such a group could have identified its members. Those 
informants who identified the influence of being a "professional" related the 
nature of that factor as deriving from the required technical knowledge or the 
underpinning values which governed behaviour and performance. 
In terms of membership of multiple groups, the strongest influence was 
considered which emerged as that emanating from the employing 
organisation, followed by the influence from an individual's personal values. 
In addition, it was clear that informants are aware of the differing influences 
within a particular situation and they take account of the varying conflicting 
constructs in making a moral decision in the workplace. 
In conclusion, the influence of membership of groups when making a moral 
decision in the workplace is weaker than that coming from the organisation 
and the individual. It is clear that the fine balance in such decision-making is 
between values emanating from oneself and one's own life experience and 




It is time to return to this project's aim and objectives and to reflect on the 
conclusions reached in relation to each. In investigating the process of 
making a moral decision in the workplace, I have sought to find out "what 
happens". Every day, people in the workplace are making moral decisions 
which have an impact on other people's lives. Is there a specific process 
which individuals go through? Is it identifiable? What are the influences on 
such decisions? Are there common factors involved? How do people deal 
with really difficult and tough decisions? At the same time, whilst the overall 
aim has been to explore the process of making moral decisions in the 
workplace with a view to enlightening others I wanted to get away from the 
majority quantitative approach of much of the writing of business ethics. I 
have sought to use a method which enables the project to take a holistic 
approach, rooting the research in the totality of an individual's experience set 
in its social and historical context. It felt that there were a lot of factors 
involved, including emotive issues, and I needed to find a way that would 
allow all the elements of the decision to be explored with the informant. 
Chapters Two and Three set out the adopted methodology for the project in 
the light of this aim and presented the argument for a social constructionist 
ontology and epistemology, together with the identification of two research 
methods which enabled the underpinning methodology to be reflected in 
practice. The overall purpose of a social constructionist project is to describe 
the concept being researched. Cognitive mapping proved to be a useful 
interviewing tool for drawing out the fine detail around recalling the thought 
processes within a moral decision and, at the same time, was an innovative 
use of the technique in exploring decisions of this nature. It also generated 
the arithmetic of the dilemmas and the identification of relative strengths of 
influence. Narrative theory enabled the informants to tell their own story as 
they saw it and provided a different form of data to that gained through the 
mapping process for subsequent analysis. Both methods enabled the 
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"holistic" approach that I sought while also providing the opportunity to 
analyse in greater detail. At the same time, the mapping process placed a 
structure and form on the decisions which gave them common elements 
which could lead to comparison, for example, of the influences identified and 
their relative strengths. 
Chapter Four outlined what happened in practice in working with a group of 
16 research informants using the above methods and the methods used to 
analyse the information gained. The historical perspective which was taken 
proved to be an extra strength within the methods used in that it meant that 
the informants reflected on their own reality and experiences rather than a 
scenario. It is concluded that the methods used enabled a richness of data. 
The caveat remains that any common elements that arise from the data gained 
from the 16 informants' stories and maps can only be generalised within that 
group of 16 individuals. 
In Chapter Five, I examined the nature of the process of the decision as 
described by the research informants. I concluded that making a decision 
involves an element of information, of choice between at least two different 
options, each of which being possible to achieve, and that often there is an 
element of debate involved. Further, a decision is usually consciously made 
and is not made out of habit. However, that does not mean that it cannot be 
repeated. A decision is not a process where it is considered to have a defined 
structure. It has elements which feed into it relating to identifying the 
problem, thinking through the relevant information, considering the balance 
of the various influences within the situation, and acting accordingly. The 
nature of what happens before the action is multifarious and diverse, 
sometimes unpredictable and elusive to capture. At the same time, I was able 
to make a distinction between a decision and a dileninza and, through the 
development of simple arithmetic within the cognitive maps, I demonstrated 
the fine balance within dilemmas of constructs for and against the making of 
the decision. 
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I considered the question of how we obtain our ability to reason morally, 
together with our values, in Chapter Six and outlined, in particular, the work 
of Lawrence Kohlberg in this field. The evidence was considered on the 
question of whether informants were strategic in their choice of level of 
moral reasoning. It was concluded that, while there was not sufficient 
evidence that this was happening, it was a possibility which might be 
investigated further in future work outside the scope of this thesis. In relation 
to Kohlberg's work, it is suggested that the experience of working with these 
informants supports the argument that Kohlberg's Stage 6 may not exist in 
practice because of the difficulty of identifying it. The distinction between 
content and process within the moral decisions described was made. There 
was no evidence that an individual's age affected the level of their moral 
reasoning. It was also clear that individual values became one of any number 
of constructs involved in a decision and their influence was taken on the same 
basis as constructs from other influences. Finally, this chapter served to 
highlight the importance of membership of community, both in helping us to 
gain our values and in influencing us within moral decisions. 
Chapter Seven explored the way in which an individual's gender affects the 
way they approach a moral argument. Consideration was given of Carol 
Gilligan's theory in relation to the justice and care perspectives and it was 
concluded that, broadly speaking, this project supports Gilligan's theories in 
stating that men and women take the different moral perspectives of justice 
and of care in their general approach to making moral decisions in the 
workplace. However, it did highlight evidence that women are capable of 
showing a justice perspective if deemed by them to be appropriate and there 
was a small amount of evidence that males, similarly, were capable of 
demonstrating a care perspective. Issues were raised in relation to the 
situation in two cases where women were experiencing bullying behaviour 
from female managers. Chapter Seven then addressed the question of how an 
individual's emotions affect moral decisions. Informants were shown to have 
accepted their own emotions as having a value of their own alongside 
informative and reasoning concepts. It was also demonstrated that they were 
260 
generated from a range of influences, depending on their nature. More 
constructs implying emotions were expressed by women than by men. 
In Chapter Eight, I considered the specific sub-objective of this project 
relating to how ethical theory is reflected in the practice of 16 individuals. I 
concluded that virtue theory provides an overall explanatory theory of what 
happens in practice within 16 different moral decisions in the workplace. The 
ability to impose MacIntyre's virtue theory on the experience of informants 
as a philosophical explanation for their moral reasoning was demonstrated. I 
further concluded that, within that context, virtues can be seen to have a 
justice or care approach relating to the gender of the decision-maker. 
However, within the context of virtue theory, the concept of justice became 
another virtue to be promoted, alongside others. Consideration was given to 
the apparent discrepancy between the majority of informants' description of 
their ethical perspective as deontological while referring to virtues which 
have a theoretical teleological framework. 
Chapter Nine then considered the nature of the influence of an employing 
organisation. Five points emerged. The first related to the nature of 
organisational culture appearing to relate primarily to expected behaviour, 
actions and beliefs rather than having any specific moral content. Secondly, 
this research found a relationship between informants in higher management 
who also reason morally at higher K-stages although it is not clear whether 
they are influenced by their role to do so or whether they are in that role 
because they have an ability to use higher K-stages in moral reasoning. 
Thirdly, within this group of informants, the influence of society in general 
was non-existent or minimal. Fourthly, it was concluded that informants 
arguing at higher levels of moral reasoning had a greater propensity to follow 
their own values when they were in potential conflict with those of their 
employing organisation. Finally, the whole picture of the relationship 
between an employee and her employing organisation was illuminated as 
being one involving power, entotions and tension. 
261 
In Chapter Ten, I considered the nature of the influence of membership of 
groups, both within the employing organisation and outside it, together with 
the influence of being a professional and a member of a union. The nature of 
the influence of being a member of a group related to conforming to the 
required behaviour of the peer/group, the need to be perceived in a particular 
way to meet the expectations of peers and the need for or acceptance of 
support from that group. The strength of this influence was less relatively 
speaking to those of individual values and organisational pressures. The 
influence of being a "professional" related to the nature of that factor as 
deriving either from the required technical knowledge or the underpinning 
values which governed behaviour and performance. In terms of membership 
of multiple groups, the strongest influence emerged as that emanating from 
the employing organisation, followed by the influence from an individual's 
personal values. Individuals were aware of conflicting messages and took 
account of them. 
In concluding this thesis, I aim to show, firstly, its originality in terms of 
what it seeks to do and the research methods employed. I then review the 
objectives of the project before summarising the results which emerged from 
the empirical work with informants. I re-visit the four themes relating to 
membership of community, emotions, virtues and gender issues before 
finishing with three questions which emerged from the methodology - "does 
it make 'sense'? ", "does it inform the reader, building on existing 
knowledge? " and "does it make a difference? " However, the aim of the 
project is not to offer generalisable conclusions as such. It has not sought to 
demonstrate pre-conceived hypotheses about the likely nature of the process 
of making a moral decision in the workplace. Rather, in line with its social 
constructionist approach, it seeks to illuminate the subject for the reader and 
to offer pointers for future research. The nature of that illumination will be 
different for each reader, depending on the level of her previous knowledge 
and awareness. Some of it will confirm what is already known and other 
parts will inevitably, because of its originality, offer new information. 
Whether this "new" information is, in fact, new to the reader will depend on 
whether she comes to the subject intuitively or with a level of knowledge of 
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previous academic research. Because most of us are in, or have been in, 
work, much of the data brought to the project by its informants is familiar in 
that we can relate to it through our own experience. However, that does not 
mean that it has previously been captured within an academic context and its 
elements examined and treated in the way in which this project has 
approached the subject. The method of analysing familiar material has 
thrown new perspectives upon it. It has also thrown up potential patterns for 
future investigation. In doing so, it is not the purpose of this research to 
surmise on the potential reasons for such patterns. As the researcher, I would 
have no additional authority with which to voice such opinions. My role is to 
place the results before the reader for her to draw such conclusions as she 
might wish. To take an example, I found that, in referring to the requisite 
virtues, informants were taking a justice or care perspective according to their 
gender. This "makes sense" in the light of Gilligan's theory but is "new" 
information in relation to existing research at the time of writing. All I can 
say is that this is what happened within the context of 16 stories. 
It has been demonstrated throughout the literature review that most of the 
work relating to the nature and process of moral decisions in the workplace 
has used a quantitative approach to elicit information in relation to influences 
and factors on such decisions. The fact that this project looked towards a 
qualitative perspective within its methodology and resultant methods puts it 
in a minority situation within the existing research framework. Whilst others 
have attempted (as, indeed, I have) to take a holistic approach to the subject 
(for example, Derry, 1987; Vyakarnam et al, 1997; Crane 1999), it has tended 
to result in an inappropriate formalising of a process or a dissection of its 
parts. In seeking to describe what happens in such situations, to "paint a 
picture", through taking a social constructionist standpoint, sharing the reality 
of others, I have sought to illuminate our current knowledge of the whole. 
Certainly, I have been unable to find evidence elsewhere of the use of 
cognitive mapping and the Decision Explorer software in the investigation of 
this area of research. Much of what has emerged from the experiences of 16 
informants has confirmed existing theory but it has also raised questions and 
tended to highlight other aspects of individual moral decisions in 
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organisations which may have been passed over in the past. An example of 
this would be the role of emotions within a moral framework in 
organisations. 
At the same time, my aim has been to let the informants' voices "speak for 
themselves". While recognising that there is an inevitable element of 
influence from the researcher, I have deliberately sought to avoid imposing 
too many interpretative layers upon what they had to say. The maps and the 
narratives belong to the informants and I have shown the nature of the 
subsequent coding and analysis in order to attempt to remain as honest to the 
original material as possible. 
The limitations of the project relate to the nature of the sample of informants. 
I have justified the size of the sample as being appropriate to the methods 
used. However, the work would have been enhanced with a wider range of 
background of informants including cultural diversity. It was difficult to 
control this, given the voluntary nature of the informants' involvement. The 
second limitation of the project relates to the generalisability of its findings. 
It is not possible to universalise any particular results. Instead, it presents a 
rich picture of 16 moral decisions in the workplace which enlightens others as 
to the nature of their predicament and the way they approached its resolution. 
It is pertinent to return to the original aim and objectives of this project at this 
point. The title of the thesis is "Bu siness Ethics: the process of making a 
moral decision in the workplace". Its aim has been to investigate how people 
work their way through such decisions in practice, to identify the various 
influences upon them and to compare the way they work through a decision 
with philosophical theory as it has developed around moral and ethical issues. 
How has the work with informants informed us as a result? 
Firstly, it is clear that, while there might be said to be some form of process 
around making such decisions, there is no one particular identifiable pattern 
except that, at times, aspects are revisited and repeated. The factors within 
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such a process vary as much as the context to which they refer. How one's 
behaviour is influenced in such situations is haphazard and, often, not 
deliberated. The range of perspectives on the situation is subject to the 
influences around an individual who adopts a strategy to make sense of the 
situation in which she finds herself. Included within the potential factors to 
be considered are one's emotions and feelings and one's awareness of the 
power relationships within the societal context. As important, would appear 
to be a common desire to behave "for the good" of others and to be perceived 
by others to be doing so. 
The nature of the identified dilemmas points to the difficulties involved in 
making moral decisions in the workplace, in particular, situations where 
individual values are in conflict with those of organisations. The influence of 
the organisation is powerful. Much of the concepts deriving from an 
organisational influence relate to fear either explicit or implicit. To ignore or 
to undervalue the role of emotions in that situation would be to distort the 
informants' stories which tell of stress and strong feelings within the 
decisions that they shared. Thus, job security is shown to affect the content 
of moral decisions and the tensions between an individual and their 
employing organisation confirm how difficult it is to decide to "blow the 
whistle" publicly on an employer's malpractice. Implied references to the 
existence of an organisational culture tended to refer to the nature of 
appropriate behaviour. However, such behaviour did highlight underpinning 
values within that culture as in the case of Helen who was expected to collect 
enough money to enable them to give someone leaving a gift of a particular 
monetary worth. At the same time, this particular sample indicates that the 
higher the level at which an individual is arguing morally, the less likely she 
is to conform to organisational influences without question. 
The project also sought to compare individual practice in making moral 
decisions with philosophical theory. Broadly, it demonstrated that informants 
were using virtue theory and that Maclntyre's model of virtue theory could be 
successfully imposed upon their thought processes. At the same time, it 
failed to identify anyone arguing at Kohlberg's Stage 6 which, again, serves 
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to question whether it is possible to identify someone reasoning at Stage 6. It 
has also highlighted the tension between business and ethics - the agon. The 
decisions which were the hardest for the project's informants demonstrated 
the tension and conflict between organisational and individual values. The 
individual does not leave her values behind when she takes on a job within a 
place of employment. She brings them with her and when they conflict with 
those which the organisation is demanding of her, she is faced with this 
discord. We have had the privilege of seeing the reality of this within the 
informants' experiences at work. 
The research has raised four questions which remain currently unanswered. 
The first relates to the nature of the content and strategy of any one particular 
moral decision. Do individuals choose their moral strategy to fit the 
particular context? Are they choosing to argue at Kohlberg's Stage 2 (the 
stage of individual instrumental purpose and exchange), for example, because 
it best suits the situation when a conventional business attitude is being called 
for by others? Do we control and make choices about how we consider our 
moral decisions or do we carry them all through at our best ability in all 
cases? There is the potential for an individual to use a strategy here. While 
this project found no direct evidence that informants were working in this 
way, it is possible that it was happening and therefore this issue needs further 
exploration within other contexts. 
The second issue arises within the relationship between the role within which 
an individual works and the K-stage that they use. It is unclear whether a 
particular role within employment and the way that an individual is required 
to behave within that role dictates the K-stage used in making moral 
decisions or whether the fact that an individual is using a particular K-stage 
indicates a specific ability and suitability for that role. While I have 
maintained that individuals tend to express virtues commensurate with the 
requirements of their role, it is not clear whether the role also demands of it a 
particular level of moral reasoning. 
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The third issue relates to the apparent conflict between the theoretical 
teleological nature of virtues within current philosophical theory and the fact 
that the majority of informants identified their perspective on their decision 
as deontological in nature while also referring to a general aim of conforming 
to particular virtues. While a number of possible reasons for this were raised, 
no one solution was found to be totally acceptable and so this provides 
another area for further investigation. 
Lastly, one issue which might have been picked up from the narratives 
brought to me has deliberately not been investigated further. This is the 
apparent high incidence within the sample of women apparently bullying 
other women (mentioned in two instances). While gender issues are 
explored, it seems to me that this is an issue which might usefully be 
investigated further from a feminist perspective. The underpinning values of 
feminism relating to the concept of sorority and fellowship between women 
within a perceived male-dominated society do not sit easily with the evidence 
of women bullying others. As a practitioner, I am aware that this can be a 
common occurrence but it also raise questions relating to Gilligan's theory of 
justice and care in that it would be expected that women would be seeking to 
build working relationships founded on the principle of care for colleagues. 
In addition, it would be interesting to investigate further the nature of the 
leadership style being displayed by the perpetrator of the bullying. 
At this point I return to the four themes which have run through the thesis 
which are membership of community, emotions, virtues and gender issues. 
The tension between being a "good" employee and ethics within a work 
situation relates to membership of different communities. Informants have 
identified the communities from which they draw their influences when 
making moral decisions. They include their own individual values (which are 
adopted as a result of membership of communities such as family and 
school), peer groups and professional groups and their employing 
organisation. All seek that their members conform to their particular set of 
values and it is this conflict which results in the tensions within moral 
decisions in the workplace. Others have sought to address this problem by 
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identifying the type of community which would better synchronise with the 
values of an individual (for example, Kohlberg's just community and the 
Marxist approach of Wray-Bliss and Parker (1998)) and the experience of the 
project's informants points to the need to work out a more supportive 
organisational framework through structural innovation. 
Secondly, emotions have been shown to have a place alongside rationality 
and objectivity, whether it is within the philosophical theory relating to the 
nature of ethical statements or the use of an individual's emotions to promote 
effectiveness in the workplace by an employer. Emotions are present in 
many situations where hard choices are being made in relation to the 
ethicality of any particular action and they are taken into account by the 
decision-maker alongside all the other factors being considered. 
Thirdly, while Aristotle set out to describe how we reason through moral 
decisions in terms of the virtues necessary to gain eudahnonia, the empirical 
research has shown how informants have tended to identify virtues to which 
they have aspired within the context of their situation. The necessity to act in 
accordance with such virtues has been demonstrated to be a significant 
influence within moral decisions in the workplace. In addition, the analysis 
of virtues in terms of justice and care has enabled an additional perspective 
on virtue theory in terms of demonstrating how Gilligan's theory relating to 
the way males and females argue ethically can be translated into males and 
females tending to refer to justice-orientated or care-orientated virtues 
according to their gender. 
Fourthly, it is clear that this project supports the theory that men and women 
do approach moral decisions from differing perspectives, those of justice and 
of care. It is for others to draw conclusions from this in relation to the nature 
of a particular workforce within an organisation and the involvement of 
different genders within its decision-making processes. 
As stated previously, the aim of this research has not been to dissect the 
moral decision in the workplace, to discover patterns and seek to explain 
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them. Rather, as a social constructionist project, the object has been to 
explore and eypose informants' experiences in order to broaden our 
understanding of what is involved. As stated in a previous chapter, in the 
context of considering the nature of a constructionist scheme, it is the process 
of analysis which is the enlightenment rather than any specific conclusions. 
Thus, it is not the social constructionist's purpose to speculate on what is 
discovered and why it has occurred. It is sufficient to describe in a new and 
different way and to let that very description speak for itself while raising 
questions for future research. In doing this, it seeks to comply with the 
example given in other social constructionist projects such as those cited in 
Sarbin and Kitsuse (1995) previously. However, it does need to comply with 
certain tests identified as being appropriate for research with such a 
methodology and these are outlined next. 
There are three questions which have been suggested by Denzin and Lincoln 
as a test of a social constructionist research project. Does the way in which 
the informants' stories have been captured and presented "make sense" to the 
reader? Do the issues which they raise add to the reader's existing 
knowledge about making moral decisions in the workplace? As a social 
constructionist project, it should seek to enlighten the reader by building on 
their existing knowledge base in such a way that it "makes sense" in the light 
of what was known before but adds some element of new information. A 
third test identified by Denzin and Lincoln asks the question of the research 
"Does it make a difference? " For example, might it stimulate or empower 
action for change as a result? 
1. How this project "makes sense" 
This question can be addressed at two different levels; firstly, in terms of 
getting to know the research informants and their stories and, secondly, in 
terms of the points being illuminated appearing to be a logical or "sensible" 
progression on what was known before about the subject, both intuitively and 
academically. Does what is being said about moral decisions in the 
workplace "strike a chord" with the reader? 
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To consider first the question of becoming familiar with the informants' 
stories, this project has walked a fine line between the need to expose what its 
informants were saying and the requirement to justify academically all 
aspects of the underpinning methodology and resultant methods. A specific 
example of this tension has been the decision not to re-write the informants' 
stories to any great extent because of the potential danger of directly 
imposing the researcher's interpretative framework upon what they were 
saying. While the quantitative approach remains dominant to work within 
this field, any project which uses an alternative methodology faces the need 
to be able to justify its ontology and epistemology and its consequent 
methods of exposing information sought. This inevitably means that the 
"rules" imposed on working with research informants can constrain the 
eventual format of presentation. I was keen that the informants should "own" 
their maps and, obviously, their stories and that these should be made 
available to the reader in a form which was as close to the original as 
possible. This is not to deny the inevitable researcher influence which takes 
place in any project of this kind and the introduction to this project presents a 
little of my background in order for the reader to be able to assess for herself 
the nature of any influence placed on the project. However, the question 
remains of whether, for example, Bob's cognitive map and his story about 
how he regularly cheats his company through claiming extra business miles 
for his car actually "make sense" to the reader. Is it really possible to get to 
know Bob through these two texts without the benefit of meeting him and 
seeing him? I maintain that the research methods have exposed his reasoning 
in a holistic way and that the texts speak for themselves. However, they are 
not easily accessible. For example, we do not write as we speak and the 
narratives needed to be transcribed honestly in relation to the way they were 
spoken. The written style, then, stands as a potential barrier to listening to 
the story. Considering his cognitive map, we can see easily that Bob is 
concerned about justice and fairness and is worried about his lack of honesty 
while wishing to justify it. What we do not have is a profile of Bob in terms 
of his age, employment, and other relevant factors. These facts have been 
subsumed into a general analysis of the informants' backgrounds to protect 
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their privacy and confidentiality. While this practice is necessary and very 
justifiable, it is another barrier to us getting to know Bob and the 
circumstances around the moral decision which he tells us about. 
Moving on to the second aspect of the question of this project "making 
sense" to readers, the stories which the informants have brought relate to 
normal employment-related situations and paint a rich picture of everyday 
life in a wide range of work settings in the UK. The question remains of 
whether the pointers made by this project "make sense" in terms of providing 
a logical extension of knowledge. Does what has been found to be the case 
within the experience of these 16 individuals "strike a chord" with us as 
readers? I suggest that there are no issues which have emerged which cut 
across existing knowledge to the extent that they do not fit our pre-existing 
constructs of making a moral decision in the workplace. For example, all 
informants identified similar sources of influence within their cognitive maps 
and those might have been hypothesized with little difficulty (although, of 
course, they were not). The prevalence of the use of virtues supports our 
experience of most people wanting to be "good" in a virtuous way and, also, 
the motivation for being "good" being found within the roles within which 
they function. While emotions have traditionally been treated as non-rational 
and therefore to be sidelined wherever possible, this project has highlighted 
our use of emotions within the context of a moral decision as being a relevant 
factor to take into account but within a rational perspective. In other words, 
these 16 informants kept a healthy balance between the influence of their 
emotions and other aspects and issues within their situations. Finally, this 
project "makes sense" to all employees who have been faced with difficulties 
within the power relationship with their employers in the way that it 
highlights the tensions within that relationship and the influence of the 
organisation on moral decisions being made. 
2. How this project adds to existing knowledge 
Next I seek to answer the question of how this research project has added to 
existing knowledge. There are five different areas where I argue that it has 
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contributed an addition to existing knowledge which relate to the nature of a 
decision, the influence of membership of communities within a moral 
decision, the philosophical perspective of virtue theory, the role of emotions 
and the usefulness of cognitive mapping as a potential research tool. 
(a) Nature of a decision 
Against literature reviewed relating to the structures of decisions and the 
particular models offered for making moral decisions in the workplace, this 
project has highlighted the nebulous nature of such decisions. There is no 
process, only a gathering of ideas, information, influences and a continuing 
sense-making of these. At some points it was difficult to identify an actual 
decision, at others, the same decision was being made on a regular basis. In 
one example, Angela went into a meeting having determined to take one 
action and found herself taking another. This glimpse of 16 decisions has 
served to emphasise the lack of structure involved. It would be difficult to 
pull out common factors which could point towards a process. Similarly, it 
would appear that each of the 16 individuals involved in this project deals 
with his or her decision in a different way appropriate to his or her own 
circumstances. While I have not sought to make any assessment on the 
relative quality of the decisions explored, it is clear that each informant has 
come to their own conclusion in a reasoned fashion. Having said that, the 
fact that we were dealing with historical decisions meant that the individuals 
had the opportunity to impose a rationale subsequent to the decision being 
made. This only serves to emphasise the unpredictability of the nature of the 
process of making moral decisions in the workplace. 
(b) Relative influence of membership of communities 
While not unanticipated, it was a pleasant surprise to find all 16 informants 
identifying similar sources of influence within their decisions. What is of 
particular interest is the relative nature of the influence. The fact that the 
organisation prevailed over the group process as did the influence of the 
values of individuals offers new insights on the influences within the making 
of a moral decision in a work setting. Underpinning this discovery has been 
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the innovative research method devised for this project in using the potential 
arithmetic of the graphic elements of cognitive mapping. Giving informants 
three choices in relation to the relative strengths of the influences served to 
provide the mathematical evidence required in order to ascertain the 
dominant influences. 
(C) Virtue theory as theory in use 
While the overall deontological perspective of the majority of informants 
complied with existing literature, the surprise came from the very clear 
message from informants that virtue theory is useful and used and in a way 
which can fit with the theoretical teleological perspective placed on it. 
Concepts expressed within the cognitive maps and the narratives were 
demonstrated to comply with Maclntyre's interpretation of virtue theory as 
relating to the promotion of the internal "good" of a "practice". 
(d) Role of emotions 
The way in which informants related their emotions within their cognitive 
maps to other constructs has shed new light on how we work with our 
emotions in moral decisions. This has already been described in more detail 
above in considering the question of whether the work of this project "makes 
sense". Not only does the exposure of the place which emotions have within 
moral decisions make sense but it is a new revelation to see evidence of how 
emotions are treated in practice. 
(e) The effectiveness of cognitive mapping 
While cognitive mapping has not been used before to map moral decisions in 
the workplace, this study serves to demonstrate the effectiveness of cognitive 
mapping in enabling an analysis of the decision being explored. The use of 
graphic features to assess the relative strengths of influence within a decision 
has added another tool to the menu of research methods and enabled the 
subsequent mathematics around the balance of the decision. This, in turn, led 
to the identification of the dilemmas where the "scores" between individual 
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and organisational influences were near to perfect balance. A further strength 
of the cognitive mapping process related to its use as a strong interviewing 
tool. It enabled me to work with the informant to gather all relevant 
information and allow disorder where that existed and reflect order where 
there was an identified logic by the informant herself. 
While the above five elements of the project all add to existing knowledge, I 
have previously maintained that the project itself in seeking to take a holistic 
view of its subject also adds an element of additional knowledge as a whole. 
3. How this project makes a difference 
The third question to be answered relates to how this project makes a 
difference. This is addressed by recognising that its impact will differ 
according to whether it relates to an academic or a practitioner context. 
Taking the academic point of reference first, in seeking to investigate an area 
of knowledge that has previously been treated through a quantitative 
approach, this project demonstrates that rigorous research can still be effected 
through the use of qualitative methods, provided that they are used within the 
discipline set by the methodology. Qualitative methods ensure that the 
differences between individuals can be expressed and taken account of in a 
much more holistic way than the quantitative approach. In this respect, this 
project seeks to promote such methods as being more suitable for use in 
research within a business ethics framework. 
I turn now to the difference this project can make within the context of a 
practitioner. What can an employer or employee do differently as a result of 
this research? The findings of this research raise a number of issues relating 
to practical steps which can be applied in the workplace. 
The use of cognitive mapping 
The first point relates to the use of cognitive mapping. This proved to be a 
very helpful tool in enabling informants to recall the detail of their moral 
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decision within the context of an interview with the researcher. Indeed, 
informants appeared to enjoy and appreciate the process and indicated that, as 
a result, they understood the nature of the situation they presented better. 
This raises the question of whether it would be suitable for exploring current 
moral decisions. If someone is in the "horns of a dilemma", it could be 
useful to be able to understand where the "messages" are coming from, their 
individual strength and a little more about how they relate one to the other. 
This would need some development work to explore the potential of using 
cognitive mapping in this way. However, while I was using computer 
software, the method is just as effective using a piece of paper and a pen, 
once one understands the basic process of identifying constructs, their 
underpinning influence and their relationship to the decision. 
(b) A new context for training in ethical behaviour 
It was quite clear that the project's informants were very aware of what was 
acceptable and unacceptable behaviour within the workplace. At the same 
time, no reference was made to any written code of conduct. Previous 
research (for example, Baron (1998)) has demonstrated that many employees 
find such codes irrelevant and unhelpful because of their lack of specificity. 
MacIntyre's analysis of the virtues in terms of working towards the goods 
inherent in a particular practice raises issues in relation to the content of 
training for different roles within business. The values and virtues that the 
informants declared in many cases related to their perceived model of 
behaviour within the role which they fulfilled. Both Neil's and Joanne's 
stories confirmed this when examined closely in relation to the pertinence of 
virtue theory. It therefore follows that if one is seeking to influence 
employees' ethical behaviour, the place to do it is within a training session 
specifically for their job role where there is an opportunity to explore 
appropriate and inappropriate behaviour and underpinning values and virtues. 
This is probably common practice within existing training establishments or 
departments but the significance of such an exercise is highlighted by this 
research. It should give additional confidence to practitioners that this is a 
necessary part of any training programme related to particular roles in the 
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workplace, whether it is learning good practice as a managing director or how 
to fulfil the role of shop steward. 
(c) Individual and organisation ethical "fit" 
Finally, this project serves to raise awareness of, on the one side, the potential 
strength of individual values and, on the other, the nature of the power 
relationship between employer and employee. Because of the nature of the 
strength of individual values, there needs to be an opportunity for an 
assessment of "fit" by a new recruit into an organisation by both sides. The 
individual needs to feel morally "comfortable" within the business in order to 
prevent the possibility of finding themselves within a possible "whistle- 
blowing" situation, both for their own sake and that of the business. 
Returning to Joanne, her dilemma demonstrated the nature of the tension 
between employee and employer in terms of the fear generated by the power 
relationship that exists between an individual and the organisation for which 
they work. If this project raises awareness of the nature of that relationship to 
any degree, then it has "made a difference" in terms of alerting the reader to 
the potential harm which can be suffered by individual employees within the 
employer relationship. 
In summary, learning from 16 informants who have shared their experiences 
of making moral decisions in the workplace, we are left with a picture of a 
decision-making framework which is not a given process, which contains 
certain common influences which, in themselves, have the capacity to cause 
tensions if they are in conflict. At the same time, individuals seek to follow 
the virtues that they find implicit within the role which they fulfil at work. 
Moral decisions in a business setting are made within the context of a 
relationship between employer and employee which, at the extreme, is based 
on power and fear, the power deriving from the fact that the employer 
provides the employee with a living and the fear from the possibility of losing 
that living. This project has served to draw attention to the potential dangers 
and problems when this relationship is exploited. It has also promoted the 
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significance of the consideration of the required ethical elements of the 
performance of any role in business alongside the skills and knowledge 
required while raising a number of questions for further research and 
development in the future. 
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Appendix A 
Informants' cognitive maps 
(Information given below in italics is my summary of each informant's 
situation. ) 
Angela To blame manager at disciplinary hearing. Angela is an environmental health 
officer who has concerns about a site locally and a colleague's apparent 
failure to take sufficient action. Giving evidence at her colleague's 
disciplinary hearing she has to decide where to lay the blame. 
Bob Boost business miles. Bob admits that he regularly cheats his employers in 
making a false claim for miles driven on business. 
Colin Whether to negotiate an illegal compensation from a contracting company. 
Colin describes the insolvency of a supplying company which re-forms 
leaving a number of creditors unpaid but which then offers an illegal payment 
to his employing company. He has to decide whether to accept this and 
negotiate on behalf of his employers or not. 
Don To bend the rules to give preference to someone in an appointments process. 
Don is involved in a major restructuring within his employing organisation 
and is keen that the best person for a particular post is appointed despite it 
going against stated organisational procedures. 
Edith To publicise a politically sensitive report. Edith is the finance director of a 
health organisation who is concerned about what is happening with regards 
to a fellow director's appointment in the light of a secret fiiture restructuring. 
She decides to fax the confidential report to the person offered the 
appointment. 
Frederick Recommend refusal on grounds of inadequate access. Frederick is a local 
authority highways engineer who decides to go against a planning 
recommendation because of his concerns about access to the site. 
Gaynor Not to instigate grievance procedure against line manager. Gaynor is a 
public sector middle manager who is being severely bullied by herfemale 
boss. 
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Helen How hard to try in a collection for the boss - average. Helen has had a 
difficult relationship with her boss and is then expected to enthusiastically 
collectfor a leaving present for her. 
Isabel To report a wrong procedure for a vacancy. Isabel is employed in human 
resources and is concerned about the way an internal vacancy has been 
filled. 
Joanne Not to tell employees known information around their TUPE transfers. As a 
human resources officer, Joanne is faced with knowing more than she can tell 
about the potential detrimental effects on personnel as they transfer to 
another employer. 
Ken Reporting problems with data to funders. As a manager in a college of 
further education, Ken is concerned to be honest about anomalies he 
discovers relating to data used to obtainfivuling. 
Leo Not to back a colleague in a risky decision. Leo decides not to support a 
friend who is also a fellow manager in the company when he asks his 
colleagues to follow him in taking industrial action against their employer. 
Mark To overrule stated redundancy policy. Mark is a union representative who is 
faced with a question of who to support in relation to redundancies within 
their organisation. 
Neil To treat one colleague the same as others. Neil is newly appointed to his 
management position and isfaced with problems in implementing change in 
working practices when a former colleague (and friend) complains to hint 
about his treatment of her. 
Owen To apply for job currently doing. Owen finds his way through a potential 
conflict of interest in being a union representative and also wanting to apply 
for a particularjob vacancy. 
Penny To try to persuade colleague to consider return to post. Penny is managing a 
department where a member of staff has given notice of her intention to leave 
but whose partner is indicating that the post should be kept open for her 
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M7anscription of interview with Angela 
A: OK the thing I thought about to talk about was quite a complex situation 
so I thought I'd better try and explain it. It involves - part of my job involves 
dealing with land that is contaminated and in particular landfill sites which 
you might have read about there's been quite a lot of publicity about landfill 
gas that can sometimes migrate off these sites and in looking at one particular 
site I became a bit concerned about the possibility of there being very high 
levels of gas on this one particular site in our area and I discovered that 
another person working for the council had known about this situation for a 
considerable period of time. She does a similar type of job to me - in a lot of 
respects we're very different but in this sense our roles are quite similar but 
she hadn't let me know and when I wanted to try and find information out to 
try and find out exactly what was going on she refused to give me the 
information. There was reports and so on that had been produced that she 
had got copies of but wouldn't let me have them and I tried for weeks to get 
hold of information getting more and more concerned. It finally turned out 
that in fact the gas was actually very high and actually migrating off the site 
towards some houses so through not letting me having the information she 
was potentially, I felt, putting those people at risk because we should have 
really known about it to make sure that nobody's property was affected and 
not at risk. The situation sort of went on from there and I eventually felt that 
I had to raise it with her manager well in fact two managers above her in fact 
-I went right up to the head of service in the end. And had no joy with him 
either a nd sort of became quite frustrated and ended up quite a lot of 
subterfuge writing notes on my computer and confidential file notes for 
myself so that I had a record of what was going on because I was getting 
more and more concerned about it and then the next thing I heard was that 
she'd been - that this particular officer had been suspended and they asked 
me to go along and, well they didn't tell me she had been suspended they said 
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they wanted me to go and have a chat with her manager and the personnel 
officer and it subsequently turned out that they were looking to take 
disciplinary action against her and they wanted me to, I don't know how to 
express it really, to use this example as one piece of evidence against her and 
the person conducting the interview was this particular manager who I'd also 
had a bit of a problem actually getting through to as well so I was then faced 
with a decision do I tell the whole truth and really drop her in it or do I blame 
the manager or you know it was a real dilemma because you don't know what 
sort of stance to take because I felt she was really wrong in what she'd done 
and I felt he was wrong because he didn't do anything to sort the problem out 
and it was do you drop her in it? Do you drop him in it and jeopardise your 
own position because he's in a much more senior position than I am and 
potentially could do my career damage or whatever. I felt that was quite an 
ethical dilemma, well the whole situation was how to deal with it, but it is 
quite complicated. I don't know if that's too involved. 
CK: No, that's fine, that's good. How long ago are we talking about? 
A: It's quite recent, I basically I did blame him and I said that I felt that it 
was down to him, that I had told him what was going on. I thought she was 
wrong in what she had done but that in other respects, other contact I had had 
with her she'd been. She's a very aggressive person, she is very difficult to 
deal with so I tried to avoid saying anything subjective and tried to keep it 
just to that particular issue but I did end up saying that I thought he was 
responsible because you know he had been advised about it and I thought that 
you know the head of service should have reeled her in really. He should 
have sorted it out and he sanctioned it as far as I was concerned but it didn't 
go down well at all. Since that time I would say the relationship between not 
just me and him but my whole section and his section has deteriorated really 
so it has had quite a lasting impact. But I felt I have said the right thing and I 
felt like I haven't been.... I felt otherwise I was going to get dragged in to 
sort of ... I felt like they were using her as a scapegoat. I felt it didn't just 
stop at her - it went to a higher level. She was getting the rap for either 
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something they knowingly went along with or that they failed to control 
really. They were aware of the situation. 
CK: Was it one of their sites? 
A: Yes - it's not actually owned by the Council but the Council wants to 
redevelop the whole area so they didn't want us to have the information 
because they knew we'd say they couldn't redevelop it so there was a bit of a 
vested interest as well. It's not actually owned by the Council but if that site 
couldn't be redeveloped the rest of the Council scheme would have fallen 
apart and there was a lot of political will for that to go through so they were 
trying to sort of conceal how serious it was really. So it was a bit iffy as well 
I felt you know to do that because somebody might either have ended up 
living by it you know even closer to it because they were planning to 
redevelop it. So it's quite complicated but I mean I am just trying to sort of 
summarise it really and hope it makes sense. 
CK: Yes - it does make sense. What happened to her? 
A: Well, it's still sort of going on and I think 
CK: What, she's sort of under a warning or something is she? 
A: Well this is another problem in that he didn't really tell me what the 
purpose of the interview was. I sort of found out through other sources that 
it was a disciplinary thing. They said "oh, this is just a chat, we're taping it 
and we're writing it all on our keyboards but you don't have to worry about it 
but you might have to come and give evidence at the tribunal" and it wasn't 
really clear what the position was but it turns out that they are looking to take 
disciplinary action. They're just trying to get enough evidence together and 
that was a position I felt very uncomfortable with really. But having said 
that, I couldn't say I had had a good relationship with her so there was an 
element of me that thought "well, yes, she is difficult to deal with, she is, you 
know, she has acted unprofessionally" and this sort of thing. But then I ZD 
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thought it was wrong that they were sort of using her at her level to take the 
blame for something that I felt went a lot higher so it was quite difficult. 
CK: Great -I am going to stop it there. 
(1-aptop computer set up with Decision Explorer software loaded) 
CK: We're talking about influences - no we're talking about concepts in our 
head when we're thinking about a decision. Let's not think about influences 
at the moment. 
A: So do you mean, so are we saying, I was concerned say if I blamed her 
manager that that might affect my career 
CK: Yes 
A: ... prospects and that sort of thing because he was senior to me. That 
was one thought in my head that I was sort of coming up against someone 
who was more powerful really if you like in the hierarchy. I don't know how 
you would put that. 
CK: Yes. In actual fact this decision has to be not how to handle a 
disciplinary procedure but the actual decision which was to decide to speak 
the truth. 
A: Yes - whether to apportion blame on her or at a higher level, really. 
CK: Well, the decision was to blame her manager wasn't it? 
A: Yes. 
(typing) 
CK: So here, the thought was the manager was more powerful. 
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A: Yes. When I did try and speak to him about it previously well I actually 
sent him a formal memo because I was I felt I needed to put it in writing to 
him and he actually didn't reply but he spoke to me at a social event outside 
the ladies' toilet and told me not to send him memos how he didn't want 
memos from the likes of me and this sort of thing. And I didn't even know 
him. I didn't know who he was and it was a bit sort of outputting. He was 
sort of trying to say "back off" and I felt a bit sort of uncomfortable about 
that. 
CK: So you felt a bit threatened, yes? 
A: Well, I just thought it was inappropriate. I thought he was using his 
position a bit really which I think he was saying "I'm the head of service and 
you're just a pleb" kind of thing. "Don't send me memos, don't get in my 
face" and I said to him that if I had to do the same thing again I would do it 
because I thought he needed to know what was going on. 
CK: (with typing) So manager had instructed not to send 
A: I think also on that one "manager more powerful" also you probably 
know from your contact with local government that there are managers 
around who sorne are very well thought of in the sense of being sort of 
groomed for something higher and he's one of the very politically favoured 
very ... I mean he's just been given extra responsibilities and that sort of 
thing so he's quite politically favoured. I mean he's as powerful as anyone 
else at his level but he's also quite high profile. So you do think about these 
sort of things. If I say anything bad about him will that be accepted because 
he has got this quite high profile. He has always worked in the organisation 
so he's well known. He's gone up all the way through and this sort of thing. 
Then the thing that made me decide that I should say that I thought it was 
down to the ... it wasn't just down to the particular individual. I 
felt it was 
wrong that someone at her level should take all the blame for that situation so 
I don't know how you'd say that. And that I felt they were trying to stitch her 
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up basically. Something had gone wrong and this is one of a number of 
things that has gone wrong and we're blaming it all on this one person and 
we'll get rid of them and that'll be it, type of thing, and I didn't really want to 
see her being scapegoated or whatever the expression is. 
CK: And that's when she wasn't partly to blame because it was her that you 
initially had the problem with but it was her job to do something about it. 
You don't know that she hadn't actually and that she was stopped from doing 
anything? 
A: Well, yes - well when I really pushed her about it she said "I've been told 
not to but I can't tell you who told me". But you just don't know whether 
that's correct or not. She was maintaining that it wasn't her who had made 
the decision not to release the information which is another reason why I 
wrote to him to try and say "look, I've got this problem" and I thought if he 
isn't withholding it he'll make sure I get the information which will sort the 
problem out. I thought it was one way to find out, so it did seem to tie in with 
what she said to some extent but it's one of those situations where you don't 
really know what's going on. 
CK: There was something around all that information being withheld, wasn't 
there? 
A: I suppose I felt people had been put at risk by the information being 
withheld and that's why it's important to say something. 
(Typing) 
Yes. I was a bit concerned about, um, how it might impact on the people in 
the team because it was like a team of people like myself -a team of people 
on our side - and I thought it might damage the relationship and in fact it 
wasn't very good to start with because as I say she in particular is quite a 
difficult person to deal with and her manager can be quite awkward as well so 
our relationship wasn't very strong but I would say it's got worse. So I was a 
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bit concerned about that. Not concerned enough not to do what I eventually 
did in the end. 
CK: (typing) Concerned about the quality of the relationship with a parallel 
team, is that all right? 
A: Yes - and then I thought that the other thing was that there were other 
people left from my side to talk ... because the person who actually 
conducted the disciplinary interview was the manager and I actually rang the 
personnel person and asked for someone else to do it because I would have 
felt more comfortable talking freely if he didn't do the interview. She said "is 
that because you feel he is partially responsible? " and I said "well, I'd rather 
not say but I would just be more comfortable particularly after the incident I 
referred to where I felt a bit 
CK: Threatened? 
A: Yes, I don't think that's the right word, I just didn't feel his behaviour 
was very appropriate really. I didn't think it was then appropriate for him to 
interview me about the situation but she said he's got to do it because he's 
done all the others. My initial response was to try and get some neutral 
person there say the director who's above him to do it so that I could speak 
freely about both people but because he was actually going to be doing the 
interview that left me with the straight choice "do I almost confront him and 
say I actually think it's your fault. He was asking me the questions and I had 
to sort of put my money where my mouth was type of thing. I think that 
could inhibit somebody - it's more difficult to say when someone's actually 
there and they're the ones who are asking the questions. What else? 
CK: I'm just putting in something about the career. 
A: Yes, because there was him doing the interview and there was a personnel 
officer there. And I thought this is going to make me sound awful saying 
this. I was quite, to be honest with you, it was a situation I found quite 
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frustrating really. I got quite upset about it and I didn't want it to come 
across that I was being unreasonable. I didn't want the personnel officer to 
think that. It ties in with getting a reputation of someone being awkward or 
something like that. 
CK: What about "appearing unreasonable". 
A: Yes. And also that I felt that I had support from my own managers. 
CK: Did you - from your own team? 
A: Yes. 
CK: They knew what was going on, did they? 
A: They knew what was going on. They were quite supportive. In fact Ian 
actually had to go and do something similar and he had had similar 
experiences with both the individuals concerned and I knew that though he 
had asked us not to discuss it I knew he was pretty much saying something on 
the same lines to counter that that if another person said something similar 
and his manager who was head of service was comparable to this manager 
was again interviewed and I felt he would again say something similar so at 
least on our own we were fairly consistent by different degrees but I think 
there was an element of consistency. 
CK: By manager and team, yes? 
A: Yes. My other two colleagues didn't actually have to go and give 
evidence because it was me who had the most contact with this girl. They 
were quite supportive and sort of ... they were aware and they were quite 
supportive. Just trying to think if there's anything else. There's quite a lot 
there 
CK: Urn -go on 
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A: I was quite concerned about the implications for the girl concerned really. 
I felt she could lose her job and I was weighing up in my mind "is what she's 
done bad enough for me to Say, you know, so much that she's going to lose 
her job? " I mean, I didn't like her and I didn't particularly like the way she 
did her job but I didn't think as though she should lose her job. 
CK: What about "worried about effect of evidence on employee's job 
future"? 
A: Yes. I mean you don't really like to feel that you are responsible for 
mean you could say that she's responsible for herself in what she did but you 
have to weigh that up. 
(Pause for thought) 
I think that's most things. Drying up now 
CK: No, it's all right. Others might come so it's not a question of "this is it". 
What we'll do is we will now think about how strong those thoughts were in 
relation to the actual decision OK? 
A: Yes 
CK: And we'll take them randomly I think. So "worried about appearing 
unreasonable" was really something against blaming the manager. It was an 
influence not to do anything. 
A: To do nothing really, to say oh, well, it's not my problem. 
CK: So what we've got here is we've got lines and it's either a weak 
influence which is 1, a medium influence or a strong influence. 
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A: Weak, I would say, weak ... I don't think I particularly. I do think what 
people say but I don't think it would have got me doing what I thought was 
right or the appropriate thing. 
CK: So this was something that was really quite strong. 
A: Yes 
CK: So you would say that one was very strong? 
A: Yes 
CK: That's where you got your support from really wasn't it? 
A: I think you need that 
CK: Yes 
A: Because that outweighs that. That makes that a weak influence because 
you would feel more unsure of yourself if you were in the wilderness 
wouldn't you? 
CK: Yes, that's right. "Worried about the effect of the evidence on the 
employee's job future"? 
A: Medium, I would say, against it. Because I mean, like I say, you go to the 
balance that I could end up contributing to her getting the sack and then the 
other side comes in to it as well "yes, if she gets the sack it's because she 
deserves it. In local government to get the sack you've got to do something 
fairly bad so I didn't think it would be just what I said or whatever so it was 
the pros and cons of that. 
CK: What about this one here? "Manager high profile" - that was one 
against saying something wasn't it? Medium or strong? 
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A: Medium -I felt more worried about that initially. Before the interview I 
felt quite worried about that. That's why I asked for someone else to do it. 
But when I actually got there I thought right I am going to have to see how it 
goes and I actually didn't really decide until I got in there. My initial actually 
what I was going to do was to go in and just answer the questions with as 
minimal answers as I could get away with and then I thought "no, I am going 
to have to say actually" because he was asking me things like "who do you 
think is to blame for the situation? " and you can't say "nobody". I'm going 
to have to decide so I didn't really decide until I got there. So, it's a sort of 
fading influence, medium probably. It started off strong and then became not 
important once I got there and decided what to do. If that makes sense. 
CK: Yes: "Concerned about quality of relationship with parallel team"? 
A: Weak because it wasn't very good anyway, to be honest. But then I 
suppose you don't want to be seen to be making it worse. 
CK: No 
A: I felt that it needed to improve and that this wasn't going to help. 
CK: This one: 
A: This one's quite strong because the question's actually asked "you're just 
upset because we didn't give you stuff when you asked for it - you were just 
having a bit of a paddy because you asked for something that wasn't 
immediately supplied". I said "no, it's not that, my job's to make sure that 
people aren't at risk and I couldn't do that and I thought I think that's wrong 
and that's why I am upset. 
CK: At the same time, I think that's a concept that should be on the map, 
about not being given the information. 
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A: Yes, I suppose so, because it's sort of frustrating and also. 
CK: "Not given important information in the past", yes? 
A: Yes, there's been a bit of history of sort of information not being shared, I 
suppose. 
CK: So that was a reason for doing it, a reason for blaming the manager? 
A: Yes, I suppose so. Yes, I mean. 
CK: I don't want to twist it. 
A: I'd probably more be blaming her for that because she was the person I 
had regular contact with. I thought he was mainly to blame in this one 
situation I had raised with him as a particular problem and he had not only 
not sorted it out but he had told me to b* **** off, you know what I mean? 
This one time, I'd ploughed on with her and eventually got what I needed but 
this was the one thing where I felt because of this aspect this was more 
significant to me because the implications were much more serious. 
CK: So that's really a free floating thing that's around in your head but it's 
not an influence either way on that particular thing? 
A: I don't think in terms of blaming him, no. 
CK: So "manager had instructed not to send memos"? Was that something 
that was deterring you from blaming him? 
A: No, I was angry about the way he'd done it. 
CK: So how strong an influence was it? 
A: Medium - which probably shouldn't be an influence at all. 
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CK: Why not? 
A: Because you shouldn't allow your own personal emotion to come into it. 
I felt that the way he'd dealt with me over it ... The other thing I suppose I 
was angry about was when I went into this interview he pretended he'd never 
met me before. He said "I don't know you, I don't really deal with people at 
your level". And I said "we have met, we met at ...... and he was really 
saying "you're nothing to me" and he did know who I was lie knew very well 
because the personnel woman had just told him that I didn't want to have him 
for the interview and why which I'd asked her not to do and as I walked in 
she was saying to him "she doesn't want you to do the interview" and I went 
"oh, no" it was just horrendous. He said "I don't understand this, I don't 
even know you, I don't even deal with people at your level" and I thought 
"oh, blimey", you know and so it was all really awkward. It became really 
wrong in the interview I felt because I felt that by asking him not to do the 
interview it looked like I was being unreasonable. I was just trying to be 
more objective about it. It was quite difficult really. 
CK: What about "career prospects"? That was a reason for not blaming the 
manager. 
A: Yes - weak because he worked in a different sort of area to me so it was 
unlikely ... well, you can never say. As I say, he could become, it is likely 
he would be our next director. So, that could significantly, I mean, it would 
because he is not at all happy with me so I am sure it would damage my 
prospects with the current employer. 
CK: "Manager more powerful" - that's against, really. 
A: Moderate -I mean you probably know yourself local government is very 
hierarchical and it's very you know this and that level don't really mix. 
CK: I forget sometimes because I work at all different levels. 
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A: Yes, I mean a lot of the work that I do I go out to industry and I deal with 
managing directors and I deal with people on building sites, all different types 
of people. To me that's a ridiculous way to operate but within the internal 
system it's very. 
CK: I thought it was supposed to be breaking down. 
A: Supposed to be, yes, they've got a flat structure but it's still very 
structured. 
CK: "Employee being scapegoated"? 
A: Yes - that was quite strong 
CK: To blame him? 
A: Yes, because I didn't feel that was the true picture. I felt that he was 
partially to blame if not... She said someone had told her not to give me the 
information but whether she was just saying that to get herself out of trouble 
or whether there was truth in it I don't know. 
CK: So how strong an influence would you reckon that was? 
A: Strong - 3. 
CK: So you were being quite protective of her? 
A: Yes, and if you'd said to me the year before of any of that, I would have 
said "no, I wouldn't". I don't actually like her as a person but having said 
that just because you don't like somebody doesn't mean you should turn a 
blind eye, you know. I had the opportunity to really shaft her, I suppose, but 
I didn't think it was the right thing to do because she had got ... 
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CK: Can I put something in there about "don't like employee". 
A: Yes - as I say she is unlikeable and very aggressive, very aggressive. 
CK: So that was really 
A: That sort of linked her 
CK: Where are we going to put that? 
A: Linked to employee being scape-goated because they are blaming her but 
she is a pain in the a***. I've been in a lot of meetings with her where she 
really intimidated people. Grown men were cowering, you know. She's 
quite a fearsome lady. 
CK: Is that a weak arrow across there? 
A: Yes, I think so. If I hadn't been presented with the situation I would 
probably have said "no, I wouldn't" but there's more to this particular 
situation than just personalities isn't there? 
CK: That arrow goes the other way there. That arrow is saying blame 
manager but this one goes the other way, yes? 
A: Yes - you don't blame the manager you blame her. And I suppose there 
was the fact that I thought that she was partially to blame. And like I say if 
she had done her job properly in the first place the whole thing would never 
have happened. So that's a separate box. That would go against the blaming 
the manager, I suppose. 
CK: How strong? 
A: That's moderate, I think. 
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CK: I've got one here that's not tied up to anything. "Manager high 
profile"? One going from there to there presumably, how strong is it? 
A: That was probably more significant than how he was actually treating me 
at the moment because his position at the moment doesn't really have any 
impact on me apart from the fact that I know that there's a chance that other 
directors are coming up for retirement and he's being groomed for that 
position and that would then significantly impact on me and the work that I 
do. 
CK: Do you want to make that one bigger or that one smaller? 
A: That one smaller I think. That's the key thing is that not only does he 
have the profile but he's sort of well regarded. It's more difficult to speak out 
against somebody who is well regarded. 
CK: How are we looking? 
A: OK - Can I just put one about how I felt angry or frustrated about it. 
Frustrated, I think. So although I was trying to be objective there were 
personal emotions coming into it as well which perhaps shouldn't have but 
they did. 
CK: No, that's all right. 
A: It actually went on quite a long time, the initial phase of trying, constantly 
ringing up and saying "look, I need information, you did promise me". t: l 
CK: So is that a reason for blaming the manager "feeling frustrated"? 
A: Urn, probably yes, because when I wrote to him, sent the memo to him, I 
had got to the point when I felt I could do no more, I was banging my head 
against a brick wall. What happened was it all sort of came to a head and I 
said "look, I really need the information, it's putting people at risk" and she 
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said "no, I'm not giving it to you" and I said you have to legally give it to me 
and the solicitor says you have to give it to me because it's a legal thing and 
she just stormed out and it just came to a big head and still nothing happened 
so I thought I've got nowhere else to go with it now, I've tried talking to her, 
I've tried asking her nicely, I've tried getting a bit more confrontational, I've 
tried every sort of way around it I could and I reached the peak of frustration 
and I felt he sort of let me down really because it is a bit unprecedented and 
it's back to these levels, me at my level writing to him at his level. That was 
his point "you shouldn't be writing to me, you should sort it out with the 
person". But then, a few months on, he admits himself that there was a 
problem with this person so it's a difficult one, isn't it? Yes, I would say it 
was a weak one. Does that make sense? 
CK: Yes. (Pause) Good this thing, isn't it? 
A: But does it come out with the right decision at the end? 
CK: I don't know. It doesn't matter about the right decision. It's your 
decision. 
A: I mean in terms of the strengths. 
CK: I don't know. Since this is a qualitative study, I am trying not to get 
into adding and subtracting. There are an awful lot of strong forces - one, 
two, three. 
A: I think that's what it is. The strongest thing - there's probably more 
things going out but the strongest influences are the ones going in, aren't 
they? 
CK: Yes - so do you think we're OK to date, so far? 
A: Yes, that's about it I think. 
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CK: What I'd like to do now, if you can spare a bit more time, is to think 
about where these messages were coming from. The actual concepts. I am 
trying not to lead you but what I am trying to look at is - if you could think of 
something on your shoulder saying those things, how would you classify it? 
A: Like where's it coming from? 
CK: Yes 
A: Do you want me to do each one? 
CK: Yes but I need to just look at. I can code it but I need to know what the 
codes are. 
A: I see what you mean. Well, there's my own sort of personal values, what 
I think are right and wrong. 
CK: OK so let's identify those first. 
A: Number 31 think that's something that I've ... that was from within 
myself I think. 
CK: The fourth one - that's you. 
(Pause) 
A: That's my own value system saying she was partially to blame. 
CK: And that was personal? Don't like employee? 
A: Yes. 
CK: It doesn't matter. What about that? 
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A: Frustrated, that was, yes. 
CK: What about "career prospects"? 
A: I think that's like an organisation. Frustrated like a feeling was definitely 
personal values. Like a lot of these things where I said he's high profile that 
comes down to a perception that I have but it's inherent within the 
organisation really that certain people have more power than others and that 
you should only deal with people either on your own level or slightly higher 
perhaps. 
CK: Yes, so where would you say the organisational ones were? 
A: Those few there - "manager high profile", "manager more powerful". 
Those are things that I have observed within the organisation, I suppose. 
CK: OK. 
A: That's the same kind of thing, that there's a sort of feeling that if that 
person is powerful and important and you accept them it's all linked with 
your perception of how the organisation works really. 
CK: "People at risk"? 
A: That is a personal thing but it's also to do with my training and 
background and the nature of the job I have, being professional. It's a 
separate one from your personal value. 
CK: It's a professional value. 
A: That's me saying I don't think this is right from a professional point of 
view not a moral point of view. That was a technical decision. 
CK: So that's a third source, OK. 
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A: I don't know about that one "manager had instructed not to send memos". 
I suppose that's again me. That's a personal thing in that I'd been told not to. 
I felt sort of upset about that, that he wasn't taking it seriously, and then 
coupled with the fact that he pretended he'd never met me. Things like that. 
I mean you could say he'd genuinely forgotten but 
CK: Do you think that's personal? 
A: Yes, I think that's more personal than anything else. "Manager involved 
in carrying out interview" - that's a sort of practical thing that I felt I couldn't 
speak freely. 
CK: Is that organisational? 
A: Yes, could be organisational because I did ask if somebody else could 
come but they said it had got to be him. Then there's like team things. I 
knew the team believed it wasn't right. 
CK: Peer pressure? 
A: Yes. And number seven as well. 
CK: Worried about appearing unreasonable? 
A: Well, it's sort of like a society thing. It's like society doesn't like people 
who say "it's his fault". It is much more comfortable and easy to just go 
along and not really blame anybody and say I don't really know what 
happened. It would have been a lot easier. It would have been less stressful. 
(Inaudible) 
A: This is personal same as scape-goating. My personal value whatever. 
That's professional. 
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(Pause: obviously working on the software) 
CK: Do you think that sort of actually summarises it? 
A: Urn, I think so, yeah. You never actually realise it when you're involved 
in it. No wonder you get a headache when you've got all these things milling 
about. 
CK: It's actually quite useful to see it all written down. 
A: It's quite a good way of representing it, I think, especially with the 
different arrows because it does clearly show where the strongest difference 
made me do that because it doesn't feel very logical on the surface of it 
because there are more reasons not to but when you look at the strengths I can 
see now because it was more instinctive really. I thought, I know this isn't 
right, I've got to say this, you know what I mean? 
CK: Yes 
A: Even though I knew it was a bit suicidal really! (Laugh) 
CK: Not necessarily. Not necessarily, someone might have valued it. 
A: Well I wasn't the only person who said it but that doesn't mean that he 
liked me. Nobody likes to hear themselves being blamed for it even if it is 
right, do they? 
CK: No. 
A: Especially when they are presenting this front of "we're very concerned 
about this, we want to get to the bottom of it, we want to find out what is 
going on". He knew very well what was going on because he'd been told 
about it. And it does sort of rankle when you think "hold on a minute". 
Those strong influences won over at the end of the day. Perhaps if I had done 
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a little map I would have said there's more arrows coming out perhaps I 
won't say anything! 
(Offered a print out of the map to be posted to her and she agreed. ) 
A: Interesting that I haven't put anywhere here about concerns about effect 
on manager. I have put concern about impact on career but not on the 
manager -I wasn't really. It never even occurred to me. I think I assumed it 
wouldn't actually have any impact on him. I only thought about the impact 
on me and her. I didn't actually stop and think. It wasn't because I didn't 
care or anything, I just didn't think about it. And doing that, I never thought 
it could have had bad consequences for him and his career. Because I don't 
actually think it has made any difference at all so perhaps I sort of knew that 
instinctively. It never occurred to me to think what if the personnel women 
says to the chief executive "he's terrible" it never occurred to me. Interesting 
-I don't know why not. 
CK: Were you more concerned about telling the truth or were you more 
concerned about the consequences of what you did? 
A: Beforehand I was more concerned about the consequences and then when 
I was in there I was more concerned about telling the truth, really. 
CK: Right - why do you think it changed? 
A: I'm not sure -I think when you're confronted with questions like "well, 
who do you think was to blame? " you know "what exactly did happen", yeah, 
quite closed questions, you do have to say you know whatever the 
consequences you do have to give an answer, you can't say "I don't want to 
answer" well, I could have said I don't want to answer but then that's back to 
not wanting to appear unreasonable isn't it. To appear unreasonable if you do 
and you appear unreasonable if you don't - it's a bit of a "no-win" situation 
and then you think about refusing to do the interview in the first place - you 
can be required to do it so that's appearing unreasonable again isn't it? 
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OK the thing I thought about to talk about was quite a complex situation so I 
thought I'd better try and explain it. It involves - part of my job involves 
dealing with land that is contaminated and in particular landfill sites which 
you might have read about there's been quite a lot of publicity about landfill 
gas that can sometimes migrate off these sites and in looking at one particular 
site I became a bit concerned about the possibility of there being very high 
levels of gas on this one particular site in our area and I discovered that 
another person working for the council had known about this situation for a 
considerable period of time. She does a similar type of job to me - in a lot of 
respects we're very different but in this sense our roles are quite similar but 
she hadn't let me know and when I wanted to try and find information out to 
try and find out exactly what was going on she refused to give me the 
information. There was reports and so on that had been produced that she 
had got copies of but wouldn't let me have them and I tried for weeks to get 
hold of information getting more and more concerned. It finally turned out 
that in fact the gas was actually very high and actually migrating off the site 
towards some houses so through not letting me having the information she 
was potentially, I felt, putting those people at risk because we should have 
really known about it to make sure that nobody's property was affected and 
not at risk. The situation sort of went on from there and I eventually felt that 
I had to raise it with her manager well in fact two managers above her in fact 
-I went right up to the head of service in the end. And had no joy with him 
either and sort of became quite frustrated and ended up quite a lot of 
subterfuge writing notes on my computer and confidential file notes for 
myself so that I had a record of what was going on because I was getting 
more and more concerned about it and then the next thing I heard was that 
she'd been - that this particular officer had been suspended and they asked 
me to go along and, well they didn't tell me she had been suspended they said 
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they wanted me to go and have a chat with her manager and the personnel 
officer and it subsequently turned out that they were looking to take 
disciplinary action against her and they wanted me to, I don't know how to 
express it really, to use this example as one piece of evidence against her and 
the person conducting the interview was this particular manager who I'd also 
had a bit of a problem actually getting through to as well so I was then faced 
with a decision do I tell the whole truth and really drop her in it or do I blame 
the manager or you know it was a real dilemma because you don't know what 
sort of stance to take because I felt she was really wrong in what she'd done 
and I felt he was wrong because he didn't do anything to sort the problem out 
and it was do you drop her in it? Do you drop him in it and jeopardise your 
own position because he's in a much more senior position than I am and 
potentially could do my career damage or whatever. I felt that was quite an 
ethical dilemma, well the whole situation was how to deal with it. 
Bob 
The story is I've been working with S now for seven years. Approximately 
three years ago I was given the position I'm in now - process manager. 
Obviously there was a salary increase and also there was a company car 
involved. Initially what we have to do is we pay for our fuel by Dialcard 
basically so every time we refuel the car we use the Dialcard and then we log 
personally our business miles. Our business miles are paid for obviously 
through the company - private miles you fund yourself and we put in an 
expense claim for logging on these miles every month, well, every month 
normally and we pay for the private miles by cheque. Now, it's fine and it's 
quite clear and obvious what we're supposed to do. What happened was I 
went with another guy in his car, in his company car we went to Swindon, on 
a site visit if you want and the subject was company cars and mileage etc and 
it transpires that it's quite common pract ice to, well, what's the word, invent, 
I suppose, business miles and then obviously it reduces the amount of petrol 
you're consuming whereas if you're not actually doing the business miles it's 
actually private mileage. So for instance I could say I'm going to Swindon 
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today - sorry I could put on my expense form I had been to Swindon today, 
that would be about 191 miles which would then obviously give you 191 
miles worth of fuel free so I was a bit - at the first I thought it was just - 
perhaps it was just him but as time has gone along it's now, it's not 
uncommon for it to happen if you want. It's the accepted norm now not to be 
too outrageous and because S are in the UK its expenses are coming to 
something like El million a year it gets lost in the scheme of things and it's 
not traceable, really and no-one ever questions it. The general manager, my 
direct manager, just signs the authorisation and that's it really. So that's 
basically the story in essence. 
CK: So are you doing the same thing? 
B: Yes 
Colin 
In fact it's something that actually happened, it's occurred. The situation is at 
work. I'm the regional manager for a company that operates all over the 
world. My region is the north of England. Part of the business that I'm 
involved with is a new business venture working through a major distribution 
company supported by international steel producing mills. Our venture is a 
distribution of smaller volumes into different customers through major 
contracts - people like "N', power stations, those sort of people. So the 
ultimate customer is some of the major national and international businesses 
and we're trading with people like fabricators, contractors at a lower level 
who are actually doing the installation work. The situation that we have is a 
site we operate from in the northwest is in Northwich and the company in 
Northwich who we have leased the site from or part of the site from is a 
company called "B" who are a fabricator. They are a fabricator and operate 
for "A" and they have managed to achieve the contract for the total 
fabrication for "A" in the northwest of England. We are a supplier to "A" on 
a contract. We supply to "B". We took on board the site before I started with 
my company originally took on board the site to "N"s recommendation that 
we should go on board totally with "B" so obviously there are good strong 
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links between "A" and "B" which we knew which we did so "B"'s pension 
fund are actually our landlords so a very close relationship. "B" overnight 
went bust and reformed as "B" Ltd owing lots of people lots of money as in 
these circumstances actually wrote off all the debts and started up again. Not 
a very pleasant thing to do but it happens unfortunately all over the place and 
all the time. The situation I was in was that the company I was working for, 
that I work for, stood to lose a considerable amount of money and quite 
legally we had insurance cover which would pay us some of the money back, 
insurance premiums would be increased and we would recover some of the 
money but we were expected by "B" to carry on and trade with them. We 
spoke to "A" about it and "X', although very uncomfortable at a certain level 
about the situation, were told that we bad to go on trading with them - that 
they had the contract. But word came to us through "A" that "B" had been 
told to look after the major suppliers so I went back to "B" to find out what 
"looking after" meant and they had been told to make payments to the 
suppliers. 
CK: Did that include yourselves? 
C: Including us. But not many suppliers - handpicked - those suppliers who 
were needed, to compensate them for the losses they'd incurred with the bad 
debt. So my dilemma was simple really - the company's interests on the one 
side were obviously important to me. I knew the company was covered by 
insurance I also know the way insurance works that over a period of time the 
insurance company will recover whatever it paid out by increased premiums 
or whatever, percentage reduction etc. So I realised I must fight for the 
company. On the other side, these payments were illegal. This company that 
was paying us this money, we had no rights to anything. They had no legal 
right to pay it to us and we are actually being paid for no service by the new 
company on the basis that the old company took us for a bad debt. To make 
matters worse, we would be one of the chosen two or three 
CK: Out of perhaps 20 creditors 
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C: Out of perhaps probably a lot more and an awful lot of money. On the 
other side of it our managing director who is Italian (our immediate line 
company is an Italian company) saw it as an excellent opportunity not only to 
collect the money from the insurance that would be paid out but to screw the 
"B" for as much as we could out of them and make ourselves a nice profit. 
So my job was to go and negotiate the deal with "B". 
CK: What happened? What's the decision? 
C: Well the decision was would I be prepared to go and do it knowing the 
facts and what I came to the usual conclusion I went back to my own 
company and discussed it with several people about the situation all of whom 
felt (other than in fact the managing director) a little bit uncomfortable with 
this. "Oh, I've got to admit this is .. ." "Ooh", "ooh" are we er? Ooh "We 
don't want to be transmitting e-mails about this, we don't want to be 
presenting memos about this, what are you going to be doing? So, well, you 
know, it's up to you, boys, we go in and take your pick. The managing 
director was quite adamant "This is a wonderful opportunity to make some 
money and I'd be a great shining light if I went off and did it for him". And 
then when I got to see - my thought process went through "this isn't the right 
thing to do". I'd been in the situation before but whereby we weren't going 
to get paid so my dislike for what the "B" company had done was historical. 
I'd seen the situation in the past. I spoke to "B" and their attitude I found 
appalling. They'd planned this for some time. They'd worked out that if you 
paid corporation tax you won't lose as much because you'll be able to claim 
back your corporation tax and all this sort of thing and really they were being 
so bloody-minded about the whole thing that I was appalled. In fact I was 
more appalled by their approach to it than I was by the approach of my own 
company so in fact really their attitude to it confirmed what I was going to do 
and I went out and screwed "B" for every penny I could get out of them 
which everybody at my company thought was unbelievable - they couldn't 
believe I got so much money out of them but it was just simply their attitude 
and the way they thought everything through to this point and tried to work 
out cover all the bases and all the angles to minimise their losses. I think 
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what really appalled me most of all was in one of the meetings I had with the 
chap I was negotiating with a personnel manager but obviously was feeding 
information back and forwards to their directors. He had to go back when we 
came to any agreement and his view was "well, there's lots more business to 
be had from "B" and we've got a much stronger balance sheet now". Well, 
they would have because everyone else has just financed it! So really the 
dilemma was the decision whether I'd go and do this but the attitude of the 
company that had instigated the whole situation really was well hang on 
there's no one got any morals or ethics in this lot and this lot the "B" lot are 
the worst of a bad bunch. 
Don 
It is related to the situation of the organisation I'm working in which has 
performed catastrophically in the last two or three years. There's no other 
words to describe it. It's a supposed educational institution that got involved 
in all kinds of unsustainable commercial activity and it got to the point where 
as a college of further education there were something like close on 1000 
staff. We had 250 managers and we had less than 80 lecturers so that gives 
some indication I think of how much education was taking place and how 
much activity which you could hardly describe - by no measure of 
description could it be called education. That led to absolutely catastrophic 
financial performance and it led to variously, the college having to make 
hundreds of people redundant to get down to what was a sustainable staff 
group and change the structure of the staff group as well so that it became an 
educational institution again and that's what we've been doing for, I would 
say, the last six months to nine months. That meant people being er leaving 
on a voluntary - it's all been done through voluntary redundancy, through 
generous packages. But the whole structure has actually changed as well and 
that meant er almost everybody has or will have to apply for jobs in the new 
structure. Now it started at the top and worked its way down and some 
people left voluntarily and some people were persuaded to leave. What you 
were left with were a number of management posts - you have the senior 
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level and the next level down and I was in the next level down so I am the - 
I'm either a senior manager or a middle manager, depending on which 
terminology you use. Under me there are a number of other managers and 
other staff and each were allocated a particular grading for the post. Now in 
an agreement with the trade unions one thing that was forbidden under the 
agreement with the trade unions that anybody should benefit from this 
restructuring - that no-one could get promotion out of it as people were 
losing jobs no-one could get promotion so that curtailed the possibility of 
appointing the best people to the job because it couldn't be done on merit. It 
could be done on merit within a band but you had to be in a band to apply 
within the same band or you could apply lower down than the band you were 
presently in. Now - I'm getting to it now ... 
I had a number of posts that I had to appoint people into at a particular level. 
Now one was manager of what we called student support services which 
covers student advice and information, receptionists, telephonists. It includes 
counselling, student counselling, managing the hardship and access funds, 
careers advice. Everything you could call welfare, information, guidance and 
so on so one of those posts was to manage that that would work under me as 
manager. The person who had been doing the job for a year or two - very 
very skilled, very good, because of a quirk in the way that she'd been 
appointed two years ago had been appointed at a level which was too low for 
her to apply for the job. If the job was at, say, a level four, she was actually 
at a level two so couldn't apply for her job at a level four which was basically 
her job except it wasn't because no-one could claim any job was theirs but it 
covered everything she'd been doing. So that seemed to me to be a 
somewhat in breach of natural justice but it was with the agreement with the 
trade unions that people cannot benefit from the restructure. However there 
were other people in my view less suited who could apply for that job in fact 
there were people clearly less suited who could apply for that job and one or 
two of them set out in particular. Now all the staff in that area, not 
collectively but one by one, managed to get my ear and they all said "if any 
of the people applying for it get it there will be a mass protest because we 
want the person who has been managing us for the last two years". Now I'm 
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not the sort of person to be intimidated by that but I mean it did confirm my 
own view that that was the person for the job. So what did I do? The post 
was graded to - I'll call it four - and that was the grade that was merited so 
the person deserved a four but the person who was doing the job couldn't 
have it. So what could I do? Well I manipulated the situation in such a way 
that I got the post downgraded to a two which allowed a particular person 
who'd been doing it to apply, which she did, and she got the job. But in so 
doing what I effectively did was make sure that other people didn't get the 
job. In other words I intervened in the system, I got things changed and 
consciously discriminated against some people in favour of other people in 
the spirit of what I thought was natural justice - against the spirit of what the 
agreement was with the trade unions and the consequence of that decision 
was I think I got the best person for the job. The people who could have 
applied who were effectively debarred from applying by changing the 
category of the job subsequently left the organisation and took redundancy 
because there wasn't a place for them in the new organisation. So the 
dilemma really I suppose was concerned with what is fair and what is just and 
there was no easy answer to that question. 
Edith 
E: It is difficult to phrase it or put it into words if you don't know how the 
NHS is structured so I'll work on the assumption that you don't know 
anything about the NHS as an organisation. 
CK: Well I know about health authorities and trusts, health trusts and the 
various sorts of other trusts. I participate in the collaborative process in 
Shropshire. 
E: My previous employer, I worked for a community trust and it was just 
before it became a trust and I actually, when I was on maternity leave with 
my eldest child, while I was away I was rung and told that there was going to 
be a merger between the community trust the organisation that I worked for 
and the FHSA (before FHSAs were part of health authorities). It was going 
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to be a pioneering scheme within the country because nowhere else was it 
being done. It was all they talked about FHSAs joining with the health 
authority and it was quite an innovative thing to do. I think what became 
clear to me ... I worked very peculiarly after the birth of my child for lots of 
different reasons which I think are all linked with why I did what I did but I 
worked in a very peculiar way because I didn't have a proper maternity leave 
because the organisation hadn't covered my post and therefore I was going in 
and doing my job with my baby - it was an awful time. Anyway, my post 
was extremely, was a senior post and because of this merged organisation, 
because it was a finance post, it was the only post that was actually advertised 
- everybody else was kind of slotted in. The chief executive that I worked 
with went off and was found a job in the health authority. The chief 
executive of the FHSA moved over and became chief executive of the new 
organisation and what quickly became clear I think is that the motivation for 
the merger was not necessarily in terms of providing benefits in terms of 
health care but was probably around increasing certain persons' salary. I 
applied for the job in the new organisation and I got it. I had a very difficult 
time I think because merging two organisations is not a very pleasant thing to 
be doing, particularly when you've got a big chunk of it that actually doesn't 
want to do it and unfortunately one of the big chunks in FHSA is admin. The 
big chunks are admin and finance and I was left with a rather large chunk that 
really didn't want to be part of the whole thing. After about, I don't know it 
was about 18 months, two years, of sort of working in this environment, the 
chief executive announced that he was going to be looking at different 
models that were going on elsewhere with a view to protecting his salary and 
seeing how the future of the organisation ought to look like. He announced 
this to the senior management team and there was quite a lot of disquiet - the 
fact that he was brazen enough to say "I've had an extra L5,000 out of it and 
of course I don't want to lose it". He then went on a fact-finding mission to 
try and find out what was going on elsewhere and then came back and said 
that he thought that the best thing to do was to split the FHSA between the 
purchaser and the provider role in the same way that the rest of the NHS was 
being split and that he was going to take away part of the FHSA and go into 
the health authority and leave part of the FHSA behind within the health care 
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trust and therefore this was going to happen within the next week or so and 
they were going to advertise for a new chief executive for the new primary 
health care trust which would retain a lot of the innovative practice which 
was seen as being of benefit originally. So they advertised and they got 
someone else who was going to come along and then, while we were waiting 
for her to come, we had a few meetings with her the senior managers talking 
about what she wanted us to be doing and what she saw as the direction in 
which she was going to manage it and she was brilliant after the one that we ID 
had had who hadn't really been up to scratch she was absolutely superb. And 
then I heard a whisper - my office is we had two houses next to each other - 
the one house has the chief executive in, human resources and other bits and 
pieces and then the next house is all my staff, finance, and I'd picked up a 
whisper when I was in the chief executive's house about a report that was 
being written and I found out I saw something about it and it looked as 
though it was potentially quite explosive to me. So I went in at the weekend 
because I knew the codes to everywhere and I went in at the weekend. At 
that time there was no security on the computers. If you knew how to operate 
a computer you could find what you wanted and I found it -I found the 
report that was going and it was going to the FHSA because the FHSA was 
still a legal entity and met on its own. I pulled off the report and effectively 
he was backing away from everything he had said he was going to do. He z: 1 
was going to pull out the entire FHSA and not leave anything behind and 
chuck everything into the health authority which was the complete reversal of 
what he'd said he was going to do. So I sat with it and I was looking at it and 
I thought I can't let this happen - we've got this new chief executive coming 
and it's a betrayal of everything that we've been working for over the last 
couple of years and he's not saying of this to anybody. So I thought about it 
- this was obviously on a Saturday - and I took it home with me, realising 
what I'd got, and on the Monday morning I went in -I went to a fax machine 
in another office because I wasn't sure how much was traceable and how 
much wasn't traceable! I went to a fax machine in another office and I rang 
up the prospective chief executive and told her what I'd got and that I would CP 
be faxing it over to her and that she was to stand by the machine. So I faxed 
the whole thing over to her and then proceeded to eat well destroy the copy 
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I'd got! And waited. As soon as she read it she realised that it was a 
complete reversal of what had been said to her and she then got in touch with 
the chief executive of the health authority and shared it with him. He was up 
in the air because he didn't know anything about it. He then - the political 
machinations were considerable. Our chief executive called us all together 
because he knew it had to be somebody senior well I think he guessed it 
because of the way it had gone through and basically said that he had 
cancelled all his appointments and was sitting in his office all day waiting for 
the guilty person to own up because whoever it was had betrayed him and it 
was a terrible thing to do. Needless to say I didn't go and confess and it went 
on for another week or so. Ultimately the prospective chief executive 
withdrew because she said "this isn't the post which I was actually applying 
for and appointed to -I wanted something far more exciting than what this 
actually is. So she withdrew so the health authority chief executive appointed 
the second person on the list who was an absolute disaster and the FHSA did 
withdraw in total and the relationship broke never to mend in many areas and 
the chief executive was awful and went through and absolutely decimated the 
organisation. So I was left feeling if I hadn't told then the chief executive, 
the prospective one who would have been very good, would have come and I 
know she wouldn't in hindsight because they only had a week's notice earlier 
of the FHSA meeting in a week or two and I'd sent it off in the hope that 
somebody could do something to stop what they were doing and that actually 
didn't happen. 
Frederick 
The taping of this interview failed -a blank tape. The following is therefore 
a summary from my notes of the initial explanation of the problem. 
F works as a civil engineer on highways and he is consulted on planning 
applications and makes recommendations in the light of his professional 
assessment. In this instance, a complaint was received from a member of the 
public that a company on an industrial estate was running a business for 
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which there was no planning permission (a gym). He went out to investigate 
and talked to the applicant and noticed, on his way out, that the access to the 
property was not inappropriate and very difficult. He therefore recommended 
turning down the application. The applicant went to all the chief officers 
complaining, particularly because the planning department was 
recommending granting the application. When the application went to 
committee, the local ward member had received a complaint so the 
committee decided to carry out a site visit. On the basis of the site visit, the 
committee decided to turn down the application. The applicant went to a lot 
of expense, employing a planning consultant and appealed. The appeal was 
dismissed. 
Gaynor 
In 1992 1 moved down to A from, well immediately prior to that I was in 
Stretford, to work as Service Manager Mental Health Developments and 
everything was fine, moved back to my home county, that was no problem it 
was found somewhere to live, the job was great, the job was great, it seemed 
as if it didn't quite fit because A Social Services as it was then was in the 
process of developing community mental health teams and it was quite, it was 
almost embryonic really and the fact that I'd worked in different areas 
seemed to my line manager at the time a benefit. I'd worked in developments 
and policy areas so that seemed to be OK and for the first 18 months, 
everything was fine - we did quite a lot of developmental work and obviously 
with the Community Care Act and various other things lots of struggling 
because there weren't any guidance documents that I could go to because we 
were actually trying to work out what was going to happen within A with the 
budgets within A with the community mental health teams, Community Care 
Act and all the rest of it but, you know, it was very enjoyable. 
Then my line manager for some reason took a dislike to me overnight and, 
even now, I can't complete what the problem was although I've got some 
vague ideas. One was we had some infrastructure money to develop 
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community mental health teams and she wanted to develop particular teams 
and I thought it was better to actually bolster the teams that were already in 
existence because they were already struggling particularly with the ? of 
social workers under the Mental Health Act. And although we didn't have 
this disagreement in public it seemed as if that had really upset her because 
up until then I was this person who had worked very very closely with her. 
When she was off on leave or sick I sort of took on her responsibilities and 
yet there was another two colleagues that were on the same level as me - one 
who had direct responsibility for community mental health teams in terms of 
management of individuals and another who had responsibility for care and 
residential services. At the same time I'd also got a place at Aston to do a 
MSc in Public Sector Management and I'm wondering whether that sort of 
upset the apple cart a bit because my manager was in her late 50's. She had a 
reputation for being extremely difficult to work with - she certainly didn't 
have any problems in putting people down in public and I'd seen it and 
cringed. Almost to the point of seeing our training officer come out of her 
office in tears, most unfortunate. Anyway, I started with the Masters and I 
was told that my workload would not be reduced that I would have to 
continue to do five days work plus the Masters. My funding was from 
CCETSW the social work training board so the local authority had no issues 
and difficulties there so I carried on. I worked Saturdays to keep up with the 
workload because she, at that stage, she was becoming quite a bully. At the 
end of the following year, so the end of that first academic year that I was at 
Aston, previously in the February we had had one of our regular meetings 
which was for service managers and divisional manager and at that point in 
February I decided I had some exams in June and could I book leave which 
was minuted and I requested that and thought nothing of it. The atmosphere 
between my manager and myself got worse to the point in May when I put 
my leave card in she said "I'm on leave those two weeks in June" and I said 
"well, I'd already booked them in February" and she said "I'm the divisional 
manager - I'm on leave, you're not on leave, that's it" and I said "well, 
they're my exams, you know they're my exams" and she said "no" and she 
said ... and I said "well, I want to go on leave". Anyway, we had not a 
heated debate because she terrified me I have to say she's the only person in 
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my life that has actually frightened me, bullied me, which perhaps we'll go 
into in a bit more detail in a minute. But she really did intimidate me so my 
view was, inside, well I'm taking that time off because they're my exams and 
I know I'm right. I tried to find the minutes of the meeting where this was 
agreed and they weren't available. In fact nobody had a copy - my other two 
colleagues at the same level also didn't have a copy. Anyway. .I said to her I 
was going on leave. She said to me that if I went off sick she'd discipline me 
and I said well that's your choice but they're my exams, and the commitment 
of the department, and all the rest of it. Anyway her son became quite poorly 
and she seemed as if she became slightly more relaxed so as my exams were 
approaching like in a week's time she said well take the week off because I'm 
going to need some time off in July and I want you to be here so it was 
almost a sort of backdown I guess so of course I did the exams and that was 
fine. 
Things then continued to be particularly difficult for another year. She used 
to set me deadlines to do huge reports within 24 hours so I was working until 
2.00 in the morning here and I'd go in and it would have to be right and then 
she'd obviously take the credit - fair enough, she's my manager - that's up to 
her. During that second academic year at Aston, I began to get quite 
distressed by this. I mean, I actually dreaded going into work, my stomach 
was in a knot, I started to feel anxious. I never knew what was going to 
happen. I had gone to my personnel officer to ask "is there any chance I 
could move to another division". He said it wasn't possible, that there were 
no similar jobs so my own choice was either to stay or leave the authority. I 
didn't actually go into any detail about the treatment I was receiving from my 
line manager because, I suppose this is where the dilemma comes in, I had a 
gut feeling that because my line manager was such a strong personality and 
quite frankly frightened most people if they were to admit it but they did 
allude to it. But my - sorry, I've lost my train of thought. The view was I 
either put up and shut up or got out. 
I then in the March of 1997 applied for a post as a lecturer in organisational 
studies at Salford University and I had an interview and I told my manager. I 
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mean in retrospect I shouldn't have done but I told her that I was going to go 
for this interview and I took a day's leave. When I got back from Salford, my 
colleague who was responsible for community mental health teams rang me 
up and said "my manager's been making plans following your departure" so I 
said "well they didn't appoint at Salford so I'm still a member of staff' and 
he said "oh, well, she's been having a conversation with me about how really 
you're not fitting into the department and how it would be a lot easier to 
actually restructure the division if you weren't around. The fact that you're 
doing this course, you're trying to sort of bring into the workplace the stuff 
you've learnt on the course" and I said "yeah, I mean that's what it's about". 
Anyway, it all got very unpleasant and I was a little stunned as to why this 
guy was ringing me. The reason I'm avoiding names is because ou'll know y 
the names. 
CK: yes, I'd guessed them anyway 
G: I couldn't understand why this guy was phoning me and I didn't know if 
he was part of the sort of stooge network that the line manager had developed 
which she did because there were certain people that she had as close 
confidants, I guess, all men. Anyway, the next day I went into work and I 
had had two years now of being bullied and threatened and undermined and 
made to look small and I went in about 8.00 in the morning and she was there 
and I said "now look, I've had a conversation with B last night which quite 
disturbed me and I wondered if you could have a similar conversation with 
me. Well she absolutely hit the roof, everything on the desk went on the 
floor, it was "how dare I confront her, who did I think I was" and I said 
"look, I'm just trying to understand you know because for the last two years 
she'd made my life very difficult" and my heart was in my mouth and I was 
in a terrible state and you know basically I got the "how dare you come up 
with all this, I'm the manager, I'm the one in the position of power, you 
know, who do you think you are" and she said "I want to see you both at 8.00 
tomorrow morning". So during the day I was in a terrible state thinking 
"what am I going to do, I've got a mortgage, I need the job, I don't want to 
just walk out" and she was almost engineering as if I was going to walk out. 
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Anyway, the following morning arrived and there was two chairs which I 
assumed was going to be for B and I on one side of the wall and one chair on 
the other side of the wall but B and the divisional manager sat together and I 
sat opposite and it was horrendous I was so or felt so humiliated because 
there were things like "just because" no, "I have no authority within a 
particular division" and I said "well on occasions when you're not here I 
delegate for you" "no, that's not true, no you don't" and I thought well this is 
most odd. She had said to me the previous morning that she saw a lot of her 
in me which I didn't quite understand at the time but what she said was that 
I'd gone into social services straight after I'd graduated and I'd qualified as a 
social worker and gone back in and things and what she had done was she'd 
done it twenty years later than I'd done it and although she said that she saw a 
lot of her in me which really insulted me I guess. I thought "blimey, I'm sure 
I don't behave like this", I think it was actually an attempt at a compliment. 
Anyway, going back to this morning when I was being humiliated, she was 
coming out with all this business I was lucky to be in the right place at the 
right time -I should be grateful to her for giving me an opportunity to fulfil 
my post and I should be grateful to her that I was able to do a Masters degree 
and that she'd supported me and all I'd done was thrown it back at her and 
I'd been ungrateful and I was actually applying for jobs. And I said "well, I 
told you, I needn't have told you, I could just have taken a day's leave and 
gone". Then she said that just demonstrated the fact that I was untrustworthy 
that the fact that I'd even thought of just going without telling her. At the end 
of the hour long conversation which really went along those lines she said 
you've got until tomorrow morning to make a decision and I thought well I 
don't know what decision she wants me to make because I'm certainly not 
going to leave because she wants me to. Anyway, I was extremely angry and 
very upset and I thought well I'm going to have to go to her boss I'm going to 
have to try to her boss about what's going on knowing really in my heart of 
hearts that this wouldn't actually get me anywhere. So I went to see C later 
that afternoon and I tried to explain what had been going on. He had 
obviously been primed by D because he said that it was all nonsense, that I 
was making it up that what the division didn't want and certainly what Social 
Services didn't want was someone who was actually going to cause trouble. 
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D had a reputation which was very strong, she had done a lot for mental 
health services and, really, I shouldn't be making derogatory remarks about 
her and just go back to your job pat on the head and go and get on with it. 
The following morning came again I saw her at 8.00 in the morning and it 
was almost as if she had had a personality change but not a real one. It was 
almost like a complete false ... I went in and her words were "I think I was a 
little hard on you yesterday" and I was just dumbfounded after the treatment I 
had had the previous day and she said "clearly, this is not going to work out 
and you need to look for another job" and I said "yes, possibly so, but it 
would have to be one that I actually want, I'm not just going to go". She 
apologised for being unhelpful and rude and said let's just forget it and move 
on. 
A couple of months later there was a job that came up at the Mental Health 
Trust as a Quality Assurance Manager and I decided I was actually going to 
go for that because it was in mental health. It wasn't anything I particularly 
wanted to do but I thought well I can at least get out of this horrible mess and 
I'd spoken to the director of mental health services over there and he said 
"yes, that's fine, that would be great yes, we'll give you some... this is the 
information that we're giving out to all applicants" and I went along to the 
interview and I got the job and I was a bit - driving into work to tell D that I 
was leaving was probably even harder than confronting her. I thought I was 
going to have a heart attack, my neck .. I thought clearly this is the right way 
to go about it because she's obviously causing so much anxiety and stress. 
Anyway I got the job and I handed my notice in and I had to give three 
months' notice which was torture, absolute torture. I mean all the things 
which she made me do in 24 hours I was now doing in 18.1 was 
doing ... everything that could possibly go wrong was my fault but then I 
thought. . my dilemma was "what do I do about this? Do I take out a 
grievance procedure against her or do I just ignore it and bide my time and 
go? " and I think that the issue about the grievance procedure had been there 
since the initial incident with the annual leave being blocked because 
although I didn't feel .. well I did feel that it was grounds for a grievance but 
I really felt at that time that this was silly that it would just ruin my career. 
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You don't take out grievances against line managers unless you want to leave 
and forget your career. So during those three months when I was actually 
giving my notice in it was torture. And I really thought I'd got rid of her in 
my psyche. 
Anyway, some time later, there was a post that had come up in the Trust that 
was Director of Child and Family Services and I felt that I would apply for it. 
Now nobody knew I'd applied apart from my own manager in the Trust plus 
E who was the Director and close associate of D. I'd met a colleague from 
social services about two weeks before the interview for this post and 
apparently, according to him, D had made comments fairly publicly in front 
of a number of people that she knew I was applying for the post and she 
would do her damnedest to stop me getting it, that I had no right to be a 
Director of Child and Family because I'd only been a social worker for six 
months and that six months I'd worked in a children's home. Well I was 
saying to my colleague, K, "well, she knows that's not true, because she 
interviewed me, she saw my CV she knew the experience I'd had and she 
appointed me and if she felt I hadn't had the experience in the first place then 
why was she appointing me? " Needless to say I was advised by the Chief 
Executive of the Trust to withdraw my application. Now I can only base that 
on the assumption that D had done her damnedest to do things. So another 
dilemma was "what do I do with that? How do I deal with that sort of 
situation? " So even when she's no longer my manager she's still got or felt 
she had enough power to disrupt if not ruin my career. I talked through with 
my line manager at the Trust F and she said "well, whatever you want to do 
I'll support you" because she was Director of Human Resources and Quality 
and F's view was this was well out of order. But, knowing that A's so close, 
I felt again I didn't want to disrupt things. Because I'd moved down here 
from Manchester and because I'd then later bought the house, my family are 
from A, I didn't particularly want to start moving around again but I felt that 
I'd have to leave if I actually took this action any further. So again I just tried 
to deal with it. 
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Just before I started in Birmingham about a year ago, I worked for a couple of 
months for a voluntary organisation which in itself was a bit bizarre but 
anyway that's bye the bye. Anyway, it was for three months, actually, and I 
had a contract and I worked for G. Now, there were all sorts of issues there. 
One of the voluntary counsellors for G, his wife was investigating a circle of 
abuse that happened in A in the late '80's, and I said just in conversation I 
wasn't here I was up north and he said well you have worked with D and I 
said "yes" "well, she is part of the investigation" and I said "that's as maybe, 
but I can't help up because ... " and he said that his wife was actually 
looking for people who bad had experience of working with this woman 
because his wife, who was a solicitor leading the investigation, felt that there 
was something not quite right about D's responses to the questions involving 
the allegations. So this voluntary counsellor said that this woman that she 
actually wanted to speak with people who had worked with D and she was 
actually speaking with B and with other people who worked with her in the 
'90's. So she phoned me up and said could she talk with me and I said yes 
but I want to make it quite clear that I know nothing about that so she said to 
me what was she like as a person and I suppose in a way all the dilemmas I'd 
had about grievance, about taking issues further, about confronting her 
because I didn't have the courage and various other things, I felt that I'd now 
got an opportunity to tell somebody what an absolute evil woman she is and 
when I spoke with this woman I said to her I could give her ten names of 
people who I'd seen her publicly humiliate including a consultant 
psychiatrist, colleagues from the health authority, training officer I've 
mentioned, community mental health team managers who she had actually set 
out - all of them women, I might add, who she almost had set out to destroy 
and although we were on the phone for about an hour and I did keep 
reiterating the fact that I didn't know anything about what had happened, this 
was my impression of her as a manager, because a lot of the questions were 
about things like "would she cover things up? How would she react in 
certain situations? " and she gave me a number of scenarios and asked me 
how she would react and I responded to that and I just felt so much better but 
she still haunts me and although it's now been three, three and a half years 
since I worked with her I dread seeing her because the other dilemma is that 
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she actually gets on the train and I am on the way to Birmingham and sort of 
says "oh, hello H, can I sit next to you" I don't know how I would respond 
because I'd like to say to her "no, I don't want you to sit by me" and I'd 
actually really like to tell her what I think of her because now I'm distanced 
and I feel that I'm .. but I probably won't do and the other 
issue is that I'm 
probably wouldn't be strong enough to actually say but I'd love to because 
she's such an evil woman. 
Helen 
It was with regard to my relationship with my boss and it was in so far as she 
well I didn't have a very good working relationship with her and she handed 
her notice in. I got on with her quite well for a long time and for about six 
months before she handed her notice in the relationship the relationship 
deteriorated because of work pressures. It was really the last month of how to 
deal with the situation as far as the relationship and when it came to a head 
really was when I was doing a collection for her. The relationship between us 
had deteriorated quite badly and there was complete communication 
breakdown which was not very good for HR personnel. It was really just a 
question of at the time I actually had three colleagues leaving and she was the 
HR manager and I had to do collections for all three within a very short space 
of time and it was really a dilemma how much effort I put into it and my 
reaction to her and the feeling of doing the collection because I was aware 
that other people were aware that we weren't getting on and I felt that their 
eyes were on me and how I behaved in the situation and the collections went 
and I wasn't very happy with doing it at all I have to admit and I got a very 
poor response which I probably didn't help. As I say, I did three collections 
in about a week and a half. The first two I got a lot more money and I got 
less for her but it was also the dilemma - the problem was it was the end of 
the month and people were short of money and I wasn't very encouraging and 
enthused to ask people to give money. 
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CK: What were the reasons for that? Do you want to talk about the 
breakdown? 
H: I didn't feel, I didn't feel that I was really bothered as to whether she was 
going or not, I suppose, and but obviously, with hindsight to a degree, I 
should have been more professional because the outcome was that she had 
quite a poor response and there might be a time in the future when I need to 
work with her and it's that breakdown in communication that's caused the 
problem and how much it would have affected her leaving and the opinion of 
others - not directly for myself but the fact that people could see this 
breakdown occurring. 
CK: How did it sort of manifest itself? What 
H: It originated from her professional - um, how can I put it? When I started 
working with her it was her first managerial job and we got on very well for 
about the first year. I'd worked with her previously - she worked for a 
temping agency and I'd temped through the agency and I got on very well 
with her - you know - she's a nice person out of work and um and then the 
pressure was getting on both of us and she -I felt that she didn't trust me -I 
felt she wasn't telling me anything and then I actually approached her about it 
and basically said, very tactfully because I didn't want to cause a problem, 
and I said to her that I felt that she didn't trust me and she obviously said that 
that wasn't the case but what came out was that she said to me that she 
needed to be in control and it was obvious that it wasn't that she didn't trust 
me it was either she didn't feel that someone else could do the work as well 
as her or felt that if she didn't do it it wouldn't get done and that was like the 
basis of it and things picked up for a while and then as the pressure increased 
it sort of went back to that and I spoke to her about it quite a few times and it 
was evident that she had an issue of doing it all herself rather than trusting 
someone else to do it and ensuring it was either done to her standard or done 
at all I suppose. 
CK: Right - so she hadn't got any delegating skills. 
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H: No but I was conscious that we were an HR department and supposed to 
be approachable and all the rest of it and you should have a professional 
working relationship. I am aware that I was conscious of this and tried to rise 
above it and it just became very difficult and then in the last month instead of 
handing stuff over to me she just closed down completely and then because I 
was then left on my own I got a lot of hostility for her the fact that she didn't 
help me with the handover. 
CK: So she dropped you in it when she went, really? 
H: Yes and then there was... the ultimate thing was how I dealt with that 
collection because that was going to be obvious to everybody and what came 
out. The sequel is that I collected a lot more for the first one but she'd been 
there a long time - the second one had only been there a year and I collected 
the same amount for her as I did for my boss and she'd been there three years. 
And when it was spread down between flowers and a present and it became 
apparent that there wasn't much money and I was also not (?? Dog bark) I 
was also not in on the last day which didn't help - it was a day I'd had 
booked off for a long time because I had family coming to stay but I think 
that didn't go down well either - it wasn't perceived as a good thing. And 
then when I came in on the following Monday I actually got reprimanded by 
the general manager for not collecting enough money so that really made me 
more hostile and of course the situation is still going on now with people 
asking me if I've heard from her or spoken to her and I haven't. I'm to sort 
of wound up to do otherwise but, at the same time, I don't feel she acted 
totally professionally towards me either so but it was all but I felt very much 
that the eyes were on me and it was how I dealt with the situation and I have 
to say with hindsight that I probably didn't deal with it as professionally as I 
should have - you know - my feelings got carried away. 
CK: Perhaps more honestly? (Laughter) Is she still with the company in 
another capacity or has she gone? 
H: No, she's completely left. But it's the fact that I am still there and people 
will view me as behaving in a certain way and it was very difficult how to 
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behave I suppose and what became apparent from speaking to my general 
manager was that he'd been he'd understood or been given information of 
certain things occurring that hadn't so all these things that have come out 
since have obviously not helped my feelings but it's just the fact that there is 
a possibility in the future that I might have dealings with her because she 
works for a temping agency again. So that was it really, the stance and how I 
was viewed and what effect it had on her. 
Isabel 
Fairly recently, we had an incident at work where there was the availability 
for temporary promotion to take place. Now normally for temporary 
promotion we hold a Board as you would for any other promotion because 
temporary promotion can last for six months before it has to be either 
declared a vacancy or and obviously somebody's getting a ten per cent pay 
rise for whoever gets that position and obviously you get experience in the 
higher grade. I went out to college on one day knowing that there was a 
vacancy for this coming up and when I got back to work the following day 
there was a notice for me to issue to all staff telling me that a member of staff 
had been temporarily promoted into this vacancy without any Board having 
taken place. So I was quite angry because I also should have could have had 
the opportunity of that post along with a lot of other people that were also 
eligible to apply. So I was told that, yes, everything had been done, they'd 
been to see the management and the decision had been made - that was it. 
And I said, well I'm not accepting that and I went to our Equal Opportunities 
Officer who took up the case and got the management to turn round their 
decision. The post was then advertised correctly. The person who was 
originally given the job got the job which we always knew he would but at 
least we were given the opportunity. I have had a disciplinary action taken 
against me because I stood up for my rights and for the rights of other people. 
I was told that I shouldn't have interfered because I was only privy to that 
information because of the position that I held. But I feel morally that I did 
the right thing towards myself and the Test of my colleagues and I think for 
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the person who was actually being promoted because had that notice have 
gone out and then we'd have picked up an equal ops and turned it round that 
person would have suffered just more even than the fact that he'd been given 
it in one hand and taken away with the other even though he got it back again 
but it was all fixed but I think it's wrong that discipline was taken against me 
when I was actually sticking by the rules and making sure that everyone had 
the equal opportunities. 
CK: Do you have the means of appealing against that decision? 
1: My union rep is coming in on Wednesday to see my manager with me. I 
took it straight to the union and they are now asking for an informal meeting 
to try and sort it out but I suppose if we don't get the outcome we want we'll 
take it to formal grievance but I just think it was unfair when I was trying to 
stand up for everybody that I then got a disciplinary action against me for 
doing so. 
CK: What decision did you have to make in all of that? The decision was. . 
1: 1 made the decision to tell the Equal Opportunities Officer what was going 
on. 
CK: It's that decision that we need to explore really, isn't it? 
1: Yes, I made that decision to speak to the Equal Opportunities Officer and 
to bring it to her attention for her to follow it through. I think my manager's 
biggest problem was that the Equal Opportunities Officer wouldn't wear it - 
she wouldn't listen to her. I feel that was her biggest problem why she took it 
out on me. When I challenged it I got somewhere and when she challenged it 
she was told "go away" politely. So I think that is why she took it out on me. 
CK: What did she challenge, sorry? 
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1: Well, she had challenged with the management about not advertising the 
post. She was told to "go away, the decision had been made end of story". 
But you see when I challenged it although the final outcome was the same we 
were actually given the opportunity to apply and were boarded. 
CK: So you succeeded where she hadn't? 
1: Yes and I think that's why she took it out on me if you know what I mean. 
CK: Why do you think you succeeded and she didn't? Was it just the fact of 
a second person having a go? 
1: 1 think because I have more credibility that she had with the manager 
involved because I've been in the service 11 years and she's been in less than 
six months and has got no previous history within the service and doesn't 
have a lot of credibility with the management or anybody else because she 
doesn't know the rules and regulations. 
Joanne 
Right, fine, um ... Obviously it's work related, there's a couple of areas 
really. Recently, we did um we had a transfer, a TUPE transfer at work 
whereby we used to work for, or we used to do work on behalf of (public 
utility). The (public utility) set up an agency with (local authority) to do 
drainage works that needed doing within the borough and they would pay the 
authority a sum of money, quite a large sum of money and (local authority) 
would then carry out this work and not too unexpectedly but much earlier 
than expected they cancelled the agency. Last June they gave notice that as 
from 31 March this year the agency would be cancelled and really from that 
point on management attitude towards the staff and the things that were going 
on were very different. There are certain rules and regulations that are 
required connected to TUPE transfers - certain things that have to happen - 
and when it's TUPE it's unavoidable but there was also sorts of toings and 
froings about their pensions. First of all they would be able to stay in the 
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local government scheme then they wouldn't. Then they hadn't got to =1 
transfer, there was a separate clause that was going to be OK'd and so they 
told all the people quite close to the end "no, you haven't got to go, you can 
stay with (local authority) if you want to" and then two days ... some people 
actually rang (public utility) and said "no, we're not coming, we're going to 
stay with (local authority), we don't want to work for you" and then two days 
later (local authority) said "no, TUPE applies, you've got to go". And there 
were a lot of things going on which as part of my job I knew about but wasn't 
actually able to tell these people and it affected their lives, their livelihood, 
where they worked, how they worked, who they worked for. There were a 
number of people who wanted to retire - early retirement - they'd got their 
years in with (local authority) and there were huge debates going on behind 
the scenes as to whether these people would be allowed to, whether (public 
utility) would pay, whether (public utility) wouldn't pay and really all of 
these things were going on and the fact that this was people's livelihoods, 
everything that they knew to be secure in their work terms was all being 
thrown out of the window it appeared on the whim of three or four people in 
the board room, you know, and I found that very difficult. It was hard to do 
my job because it was hard not to tell them what was happening because I felt 
quite strongly that they had a right to know and that it was, to some degree, it 
was more than my job was ... In the position that I am in as a personnel 
person I wasn't able to tell them and I was liaising with people who were also 
in a similar sort of position at (public utility) but also the senior management 
within (local authority) seemed to be riding roughshod over people's lives 
and it was really hard to ... In the end, everybody did transfer, some of them 
happy, some of them not very happy but the one guy virtually had a nervous 
breakdown over it. The divisional manager was one of the ones that was 
strangely - he was almost desperate to stay at (local authority). He was 46 
and he'd got 20 odd years in with (local authority). He'd always paid into the 
pension scheme which meant that he was faced with... He'd also planned to 
retire early, probably in about ten years time but of course he was then faced 
with the issue that he could either take his pension out of (local authority)'s 
pension scheme and transfer it into (public utility) whereby he would lose 
something in the region of about nine years on his pension or leave it where it 
344 
was and freeze it by which he wouldn't be allowed to received it until he was 
60. He was one of the people who when they said that there'd been a clause 
in the actual transfer agreement which meant that they had the option to stay 
was one of the people who phoned up (public utility) immediately and said 
"we've been told we don't have to leave (local authority), I'm going to stay - 
I don't want to come and work for you, I want to stay here". Of course he 
then had to backtrack on all of that and was forced almost - well - if it had 
come to the wire (public utility) would have been forced to take him because 
it applied and he was trying to find all sorts of ways not to go and really, at 
the end of the day, there was just no way he could stay and it was obvious 
that there was no way that he could stay to everybody else but him and it was 
really difficult to deal with because it almost felt that because the authority 
had messed him about so much that they really to some degree - well you 
can't say that they owed it to him to let him stay because it was never really 
possible. 
CK: There was never a job there for him ... 
J: No, but it just felt that they handled the situation so badly that it was really 
really difficult and the fact that they didn't care for any of them they gave the 
impression that they didn't care. They gave lip service to a lot of things when 
really you know it was very difficult. 
CK: We need to focus on one particular decision - in a way you were 
making a decision about not telling the people all that you knew. You knew 
that there were things going on in the background. 
J: That's right. 
CK: And we need to concentrate around that decision in that whole context. 
Is that OK? 




OK, um, well there are sort of several -I seem to have been faced with lots of 
dilemmas over the past five or six years but the one I thought I'd describe 
was that a year or so ago well for some years I actually ran a department 
within a college whose purpose it was to really run the college's access to 
European funding and the college actually was inspected in the January and 
the report came out in March and it found that there were areas where it 
lacked quite a little bit, well, quite a lot of professionalism really I suppose. 
For instance, the data that it collected was found to be very suspect, not 
necessarily, I don't think anyone was suggesting that it was um that the 
college was trying to defraud the system or anything like that, it was just 
really incompetent at collecting the data properly, that's what it boiled down 
to. We weren't actually involved in any way with the collection of that data 
so didn't feel responsible for that although obviously it impinged on what we 
were doing because we relied largely on that data or people we were talking 
to in the college relied on that data. Therefore, we had just collected the data 
we needed to collect for that year's returns. We had to make returns every 
year and we had to collect it. We collected it in January and February so we 
collected it whilst the college was being inspected and then we continued to 
collect it and to manipulate it and then when we discovered that there was a 
problem with the, not necessarily our data but data per se in the college, we 
were actually then faced with a dilemma as to what we would do because, I 
mean we'd collected the data, we'd done it in good faith but we knew, 
suspected that some of it was, well may have been suspect in some way or 
another so the dilemma was as to whether we should actually go back and 
revisit the whole lot or whether we should actually ignore it and submit the 
data. It would have been easier to submit the data, I guess, because there's no 
work involved in that. However, we had got consultants who were being paid 
not by us but by the Further Education Funding Council to look at the 
situation so there was a little bit of pressure to conform, to actually say "well 
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there is a problem there" but nonetheless the easiest thing would have been to 
ignore it. Also, in highlighting the problem I guess we held ourselves up to 
be sort of examined that little bit further so it was the hard thing to do to say 
"hang on we think we might have a problem or in the light of the findings 
over there we feel we have to in all honesty reexamine this data" and that was 
essentially the dilemma, really. 
I 
CK: What did you decide to do? 
K: We decided to hold our hands up and say "we think we have a problem 
with the data" and so we went back and we revisited it and where we hadn't 
got any collaborative evidence for individual claims as it were we didn't 
submit the claim so essentially we had two pieces of hard evidence for every 
claim we made or two lots of data, one of which collaborated the other and 
that went through without any problem and eventually it wasn't actually apart 
from the pain of sort of reconstituting the data and re-examining it, apart from 
that there was no sort of aftermath, there was no sort of reexamination of it, 
which turned out to be OK - that worked out well I think. 
CK: And the data related presumably to people attending courses did it? And 
the nature of their background and so on if you were aiming to hit certain 
types of people and you were wanting to gather data around that? 
K: That's it - very important really, I mean, and the amount of money was 
significant by anybody's standards it was a lot of money and to be seen to be 
doing the right thing was really quite important for your own sake really, as 
well as anyone else's, more for your own sake really. 
Leo 
The situation at work, where a colleague who was more of a friend as well 
which is part of the problem was having problems with his boss and basically 
the end result was that he would attempt to rally round and ask colleagues 
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and friends to back him in the decisions he was going to make in terms of not 
rebelling but putting up a stance against the management or the directorship. 
Those are the basics of the problem. Do you want that fleshing out? 
CK: Yes please. 
L: He's been there quite a long time the chap has - he knows the job quite 
well. The chap that he was working for, the MD, had made various decisions 
because of the previous sales director leaving. The MD took over the sales 
directorship and general responsibilities and made various decisions based on 
his experience and his knowledge of the company as it stands. The problem 
there was that his knowledge of the company wasn't as vast as the people that 
had been there a long time, this chap being one of them. Over a period of 
time, the questions were asked of the group from the MD and slowly they 
began to realise that he wasn't going to make the right decisions so they tried 
to put their points forward, made recommendations, give ideas of what the 
results would give, to no avail really, he still got his own way. So the chap 
himself I think it became more personal than anything else. It was a crusade 
for him. I think the other people were in the same boat but weren't as direct 
as him in terms of their daily contact with the MD. So he was in a position 
that he could see, the company could see, certain people could see that 
possibly there would be because of some of the decisions made a need to 
reduce numbers. While he saw there was a need to reduce numbers, he also 
saw that it would possibly be in his department which he wasn't happy with 
based on the fact that the reason for reducing numbers was avoidable, if you 
like, if the decision hadn't been made. And the instance where I knew that 
I'd have to make a decision was I'd done a lot of work for this chap in the 
past in terms of personally and a couple of times he's wanted some reports 
doing for him and I've helped him with those. 
CK: That's not the MD, that's the person we're talking about? 
L: That's T. So he became a good friend and colleague and I'd always said 
that if there was anything he needs, give us a shout and I'd help, and I 
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remember the day he said "yeah, I will need some help". I said "not a 
problem". He says, "well, it'll be a bit more than help". I didn't really know 
what was coming, to be truthful. But then a couple of weeks later he did tell 
me that what he was going to do was to try to rally round and rebel against it 
and basically go on strike. There's no union at work so it made it all that 
much more difficult. I am sure that he's the sort of chap that thinks things out 
but I think under that sort of animosity, under that sort of pressure, he may 
make the wrong decision. I had a feeling because we did later on have 
redundancies. I had a feeling that something was going to happen in terms of 
him speaking because he spoke to two or three of the other managers as well 
and to be truthful they just shrugged it off and said "no, we're not going to do 
this". I think one person did and it was a really awkward situation for me 
because this was a friend, you know, and that's no reason for doing it but I 
basically believed he was right, by the way, that the MD should have listened 
to him because at the end of the term of redundancies, and when things 
settled down, he went back to him and said "what can we do now, I've made 
a mistake". I thought he was right before that happened because of the fact 
that we were losing customers. The day of the redundancy was a Monday 
and I was at college and be rallied round a little bit on that Monday, I believe, 
to the other managers and they refused him from which he has recently been 
calling them spineless and things like that which again that's his animosity 
talking. 
CK: So the MD put the redundancies into action? 
L: And got rid of two from his department without asking who they were. It 
being a Monday, I wasn't there, I was at college, I was here. So I didn't get 
asked which made the decision very easy for me because if he'd have come 
up to me and asked me that question I'd have had to say "no". 
CK: Would you? 
L: Yeah, because of -I mean he's a friend, a colleague, we have been out 
together but I am not too sure what I'd be risking and the way it worked out - 
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I mean I say I'd say "no" without the evidence of what's happened with the 
rest of the people well I suppose that has some sort of bearing on it what the 
other managers did, but I wasn't put in that situation, thankfully. Our 
friendship has remained albeit I mean I question whether my friendship is 
true or not, my loyalty true or not but to a point you know I will help and 
assist him more than most people and vice versa. I mean can you measure 
friendship by that decision? I don't know, I don't know. I didn't think too 
much about it because I wasn't put in that position. It may have been that if 
he'd asked me that question, I'd have said "let me think over it" because he 
hasn't got a family either. He's also got a situation where in five years his 
wife will take over a shop and he may go and help run the shop. He'd got 
some security and we'd got nothing like that. What we've got is what we've 
got and there's lots of things come into it. I didn't really have a chance to 
think too much about it which pleased me because I didn't want to. If he'd 
asked the question I think I'd have considered it quite deeply. I didn't have 
to answer the question or think about the consequences. He's still there, he's 
looking elsewhere now and he will do for a long time because he's not happy 
there while he's under the regime of the MD. We've now employed a new 
sales, senior sales manager -I think he's a director designate - who is 
carrying out the tasks and putting into action some of the things that they said 
should have been done. It creates more a feeling that they weren't being 
listened to. It wasn't just one of them, there was a group of them - two 
people internal sales and we've got external agents as well who were 
included in the advice to the MD. 
CK: So this T was he a peer of yours or was he, you know, in terms of the 
level of 
L: We were all managers. It's ever so difficult at W's because it was built up 
owned by two brothers, a private company, and it is very sort of autocratic - 
it's a word I heard every day when I first started, autocratic. They used to 
call them Mr J and Mr P so they hired a consultant to come and put 
technology in, new advances in manufacturing techniques and he swept out 
the managementship. When I first started there I was a business analyst, 
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things like that, you know, sort of rather than the level of a manager you've 
got a responsibility level which included lots of people's roles rather than just 
managing people. The management structure's now been embedded back in 
because that chap's since left two or three years ago and there are some that 
have took the managementship on and run with it in terms of how they've 
handled it and there are some that can't handle it to be truthful because of 
their background. They were never expected to do that. A lot of what was 
said at where I work was that if people aren't told to do it they won't do it 
and that was the sort of ethos if you like, the philosophy of the way some 
people work. We're trying to get them now to think for themselves and to 
sort of take their own actions and get involved. A long process but... 
Mark 
It was as a result of the restructuring processes that began over a year ago - 
began in the summer and autumn of 1999. One of those restructuring 
processes was in one particular (department) which was being merged and as 
a result of that decisions were taken at the management level which didn't 
affect me about a new structure which meant a reduced number of posts at 
Principal (of division) level compared to the number of postholders that there 
currently were in the two parts of the (department). We as the union accepted 
that argument because we knew we supported the merger - the merger was 
by and large being run correctly with full consultation and everybody in the 
(department) theoretically recognised the problems that would result, the 
difficulties of putting a quart into a pint pot. I suspect that everybody of 
course thought that it won't affect me so in theory accepting the logic of it 
and everybody also realised that with one half of the department in particular 
losing vast amounts of money that there would be cuts at some point. The 
slight unfairness of the whole situation is of course that as the re-structuring 
was only done at management level that is to say division manager, subject 
leader and so on, that it wasn't really a clear out of surplus staff, it was a clear 
out of surplus managers only and the issue of there being too many staff was 
still bound to crop up at some stage but that was something everybody put 
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off. In this particular division it was decided that there would only be one 
Principal. There were currently two Principals and that was just purely 
historic because of situations that had happened in the past, transfers in from 
other (firms) that we merged with, and so on. And so a post had been 
protected and was still there. The logic was however that there should only 
be one (Principal post) there. Now, that's the background so far - do you 
want me to go into details now? 
CK: Yes, now go into details, thank you. 
M: Well, specifically what happened was that we had a union policy internal 
to the union here although following national principles which is that when 
we negotiated a procedure for restructuring in different (departments) and this 
was established in one of the other (departments) entirely separate from this 
that when current Principal postholders were applying for the new Principal 
posts that the permanent Principals should be given first bite and if there were 
any posts left over as a result of that the temporary Principals (because there 
were quite a few, a minority, but a few people who were on two-year 
Principalships, Acting Principalships, and so on, that they should then be 
given the second bite of the cherry. You can see all sorts of arguments for 
that being unfair but it was national policy about defending core staff and so 
on. So, we went with that. That of course meant that in this particular 
division the historic Principal of the division would have the right of choice 
which would exclude therefore and quite logically from that post the other 
Principal who was temporary who was currently running the division. Now 
that straightaway created a dilemma but we had to follow the policy. 
However, there's another side to all this that we knew, we just knew from 
word on the ground, from attitudes of management, that in fact that they 
would turn the permanent Principal postholder, because it was historic, 
because s/he hadn't been doing a Principal's job for quite some time but 
taking a Principal's salary, that they would find an excuse to turn her/him 
down and then in the second swathe they would offer that post to the 
temporary Principal holder who was currently running the division. So, in a 
sense, we were taking the easy option of following policy knowing that in the 
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end they would get who they wanted. Now the complication came when the 
temporary Principal holder took out a grievance complained against the union 
policy, (this person is a union member) and decided to take out a grievance. 
S/he wasn't sure who s/he was taking the grievance against exactly but on the 
grounds that s/he considered that it was unfair that s/he should be excluded as 
a temporary postholder. Now there were very specific dilemmas in that 
situation and I'm sorry it's going to get more and more complicated. 
CK: It's all right. 
M: Namely, that I was away at the time -I was chair of the union and I was 
away at the time on a research visit and the immediate advice that was given 
by the local union branch officers was that s/he had a case and should be 
included in the first swathe of applications that s/he should have equal rights. 
Now when I came back I discovered that this advice had been given and it 
was actually contrary to what the policy we'd agreed so I overruled it, 
knowina that that would mean that s/he would be excluded from that first 
choice but I still knew s/he'd get the job. I'm not stupid, I knew s/he would 
get it but I also knew that s/he would then possibly take out a grievance 
against us although that actually is not allowed in the (college) there isn't a 
structure that allows you to do that but I knew that there would be some flak. 
Sure enough, there was. The complication then arose that she then produced 
a letter from the (head of department) that had gone to all the Principals, 
including only two temporary Principals in the whole (department), 
indicating that they had the same rights to apply for all these jobs as 
everybody else so she was actually getting contradictory advice. I then had to 
take a decision, there and then, right I have no choice but to go with what the 
(head of department) effectively has by breaching the procedure that s/he has 
effectively given his/her rights which I am sure in the Industrial Tribunal 
would be upheld. And that, in a sense, that's what I had to think. Whenever 
there's a grievance you have to think ahead and think "how would this play in 
an Industrial Tribunal? " and I was convinced that that letter was a smoking 
gun, that it would effectively give this person the right to challenge that 
policy and to be considered in the first round. A la that of course then there 
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was a dilemma, because would they hold up all the applications while this 
was sorted out? I couldn't see it. Then it was going to create a mess 
somewhere along the lines so I had to take a quick decision that s/he should 
be allowed to apply even though it went against several principles I bad little 
choice but to do that I felt and I of course produced the inevitable effect 
which was s/he got the job, the permanent postholder didn't and was 
aggrieved and there was no place for her/him and we knew the rules which 
were people who were displaced at that level had several choices which were 
"do you want to be hanged or garrotted? " really. The choice was either 
voluntary redundancy, are you downgraded if there is a post for you as a 
downgraded post for you, or can we try and find another job for you 
somewhere else in the (college)? That was the dilemma. Except that I 
convinced myself that that was the dilemma this person was going to have 
anyway, that once s/he'd not been appointed which I knew was going to 
happen, because they clearly fixed the job descriptions in such a way that 
they could appoint who they wanted so I knew it was going to happen it was 
just a question as a result it made us as the union and me in specifically look 
the guilty party and in a way we were for agreeing that policy in the first 
place, but that's the dilemma. 
Neil 
I think the main exercise which I am engaged is having taken over this new 
job at a time of new recruitment and restructuring. The main aim was to try 
to work our way through that period of transition with at one level the least 
damage to staff and hopefully as a result of any rationalisation and 
restructuring that went on to get ourselves on a firmer basis therefore for 
moving forward out of that rather critical phase. That would be the situation 
when I started my job on 1 January when the division heads were all 
appointed at roughly the same time so there are five division heads within the 
school and this is an experiment this is a university experiment. We're not 
really (deputy heads) although one of the difficulties is precisely how we are 
seen and what our status is. It was made very clear to me in my interview 
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that I was now management. Well that I accept but precisely what level of 
management I am I am not absolutely sure and I am not sure the other 
division heads are absolutely sure either. At one level there is quite a high 
degree of uncertainty which derives in part I think from the fact that these are 
experiments but the restructuring is finally the result of the merging of two 
schools within the (institution). In my own division there are numerable 
awards, lots of awards relating to different subjects, history, politics, urban 
studies, war studies, European studies, Latin American studies and applied 
theology which is somewhat more marginal because of the particular state 
and position of the applied theology staff who are first and foremost 
chaplains in the (institution) so their link with my position is not the same as 
the other subjects. But the situation for instance this year with the last 
recruitment was not encouraging - history took a 25% drop in recruitment 
and has always been a very strong recruiter within the university. Politics has 
been declining for some time and has almost disappeared out of sight. 
European Studies and Latin American Studies who are subjects inherited 
from the W... end of the (department) are also very low recruiters. American 
Studies is certainly nowhere near recruiting what it was say five or six years 
ago. The only subject really which has held its own is war studies. So the 
position I inherited is one which -I won't use the word crisis - but it was one 
of certainly a situation which had a number of serious problems which had to 
be addressed. One of my concerns and, in a sense, I felt a moral base to this. 
I felt one of my priorities in terms of what I should do should be to do my 
best without any guarantee of success, realising I am just one cog in a fairly 
complex machine, I felt that one of my concerns was to try to protect the jobs 
of my staff or at least as many staff as possible and that has a moral basis to 
it. They are people who I know work very hard, are very good on the whole 
at what they do and it is not necessarily though any fault of theirs that they 
happen to be in a position of declining recruitment. The new (department) 
when it was set up had a combined debt of something like 11.5m. Now that 
meant we had to make economies. We have lost LO. 5m of that debt over this 
last year. One of the things that we've done is to reduce our dependence on 
visiting (teachers) by a very considerable degree. Now that up to a point has 
moral implications because you have to make a choice. I mean they are 
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people just like everyone else. You have to make a decision that you can't 
employ everybody who do you have to let go and I think the decision has to 
be you have to let go those staff who are most loosely attached and that was 
the decision that was taken though not with any relish from my point of view 
because I know quite a number of the (visiting teachers) who have worked for 
us over the years and have had to say to them "look, as from this academic 
year which began in September, we cannot guarantee you will be employed 
this year" and that was a difficult thing to have to say knowing the kind of 
contribution, essential contribution many of them had played over a number 
of years. And even when we have kept people on, for instance, we have had 
in a number of cases to seriously reduce the amount of hours that we can 
offer them. Now I think in a way we have found ourselves between a rock 
and a hard place on that one but there is a real issue that real choices have to 
be made. They are not easy ones because they affect people's individual 
careers and condition. At one level that's a factor. But then the corollary of 
that is that we've had to use staff we've had to the fullest extent and that's 
just meant being much tougher on people teaching up to their banded hours. 
We've implemented very strictly within the (department). This is not my 
idea although I've gone along with it believing it to be right in the present set 
up. The idea of a banded hour - if someone is on a banding of 400 - the 
contract is 550 - most people do research in our division or everybody or 
almost everybody is a personal tutor. That, together, is 150 hours. The 
average teaching load is 400 and people then get other things taken off for 
special responsibilities so I am actually on 200 because of the division 
management and so on. There are a number of people but not necessarily as 
low as that but with considerable administrative roles over and above the 450 
but whatever the figure that is the figure those are banded hours between 450 
and 150 and so there is a tremendous amount of slack and you could say 
waste in the system which partly contributed to the fact that the deficit was 
such so we have tried to be both lean and very spare. One of the hardest 
things that soine people who have not been worked terribly hard or where it 
didn't matter too much before the merger, if somebody was banded for 450 
and only did 250 it didn't really matter because there wasn't the pressure 
then. Now there is the pressure and what it means is that some people have 
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actually a very severe increase in their teaching load up to their band because 
you know the difference between their band and what they were actually 
doing last year was far too wide and we've had to give them extra teaching. 
Now, in doing this to be fair, it seems to me that the first principle, to add a 
kind of moral dimension to it, if I should try to preserve the jobs of my staff 
to the best of my ability -I see that as my first aim - the other way to look at 
that is to say we've immediately got to start and say we've got to slim down 
and we'll identify those whose services we feel are less valuable and we'll 
chop them off at source. Now I'm actually not prepared to do that and I have 
to say that I am supported in that by senior management within the 
(department), at least for the time being. We are trying to make the 
economies within the division and look for the benefits whilst retaining such 
staff that we have. So that, I have no problem with that as trying to work to 
preserve the jobs of the people who have them. But the next principle, which 
I think again has a strong kind of moral base to it, is that we should seek to be 
-I should try to be equitable then in terms of the work that one is expecting 
of one's staff and therefore it isn't fair if some people are working hard right 
up to their banding, but one of the key factors is to try to be transparently 
even-handed. That seems to me to be a fundamental principle here that 
people should not be saying "eh, hang on, so-and-so, they are 50 hours or 
even 100 hours below their band" and we have had a problem there because 
some people were well below their band and the reason we've done that - 
we've tried to bring them up to their band as close as possible - is partly 
because of losing (visiting teachers) and we also lost four people through 
voluntary redundancy as well so we've actually had little choice. One reason 
is because we need to use them in order to deliver but the other reason is so 
that there is equitability within the division which is open and accepted. 
Those have been my kind of two principles. Actually implementing it has 
been quite difficult because people have, not many, I have to say this and 
perhaps for the first five months I was on my own. There were no subject 
leaders it was me supported by other colleagues. In a few cases it has been 
very difficult and some have actually not been prepared to accept the hours of 
teaching which they have been given. And one or two members of staff have 
been particularly persistent in their opposition to that claiming things like 
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"this is unfair" "I can't do this" "I should not be expected to do this". Now 
when they say things like "this is unfair" that raises a moral issue so far as I 
am concerned and that places me I would say in a dilemma because I think 
there is a moral issue but I think the moral issue is whether to say "OK " and 
keep everything sweet and I understand what they're saying and I'll give in to 
them which in terms of popularity would be easy but what I tried to do and it 
has happened with a very close friend who hardly speaks to me now - 
whether she was seeing that because of the personal friendship I would be a 
soft touch I would be indulgent towards what she wanted I don't know but I 
find I can't have a kind of rational discussion about these kinds of matters, 
that it has become now very much a kind of correspondence by email. I 
mean I have the support of my senior colleagues and those immediately 
below me so it's not as though I feel in a sense myself isolated but my stance 
is that that would be the easy way, that what I think the moral principle 
overriding this is actually the transparent equitability of that ... and my own 
feeling is that this person, if I were to give in to this person, it would be unfair 
on the rest but when you're confronted by that and you realise that your 
relationship with that person is being detrimentally affected then that is 
actually the nub - hang on - do I want to go this way? It has presented 
actually some difficulties. In my previous job I was as a principal (teacher) 
but my main responsibilities was as a programme manager as a course 
manager so my responsibilities there were primarily to manage students not 
staff. I was responsible for a group of senior counsellors who helped with the 
kind of academic side of the course but relationships were not tested in the 
way in my new job managing staff but I am no longer programme manager 
but I am division leader and my prime responsibility is to manage my staff so 
what the new job has meant to me is these moral decisions which I am now 
forced to make and some of them do mean a different relationship between 
myself and people with whom I had a former relationship at a similar level. 
You realise that people are treating you rather differently now, perhaps a little 
more suspiciously about what you are going to do and maybe not trusting. 
You know I would like to think that people could trust me but it's unclear as 
yet. 
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CK: You're an unknown quantity still 
N: About that. But the easy way in the short term view is to remain friends 
and it is easier to do that but morally I don't think I should actually and I 
think I should stick out for the underlying principle which is to try to protect 
the interest of staff as best we can and secondly to try to ensure that so far as 
is humanly possible that there is a kind of equitability about the way I 
manage so that people really feel that they are not being exploited more than 
anybody else but that has not been easy. 
CK: Are you going to focus down on that decision in relation to the 
particular person who was a friend? 
N: Can do - yes. 
CK: That seemed to bring about some moral dilemmas around that situation. 
N: OK. 
CK: The constraint of my project is that I need to look at a moment in time 
while understanding the complexity at the same time. You'll see how it 
works 
N: OK I'll change the subject. 
CK: Are you going to talk about that a bit more? 
N: I'll go into more detail. 
CK: Yes, that would be helpful, thank you. 
N: You need to understand the context, I think. She has not worked full-time 
for over four years. She has had a child who is now 4. She had her maternity 
leave. She came back for 2 years or more. She didn't resume full-time work 
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until this semester. At Easter and Easter as you well know is half way 
through the semester so when she came back after Easter there was no way 
that because of the operational exigencies that we could give her a full-time 
job. But I think what happened is that she hadn't been full-time for over 4 
years and when she was full-time before life was much gentler and now, of 
course, it isn't gentle at all because of the situation that we find ourselves in. 
So she's a very devoted mother. She's also having another baby and in fact I 
have had an email today to say that she will be taking her maternity leave 
much earlier than she originally planned but she's not young so for her own 
welfare, I understand that. I think she used to be a senior counsellor and she 
got an allowance for that. She decided I am not sure why that she didn't want 
to continue counselling in the new merged (department) -a slightly different 
kind of organisation which came in last September which worked quite well 
but because of that she was one of the people who was working well under 
her banding. I suspect for the last four or five years she hadn't done more 
than 150 or 175 hours. She is in her 40's, she's very devoted (which I 
absolutely applaud) but I think she was overwhelmed by the prospect of 
having to do considerably more teaching than she had done and she let me 
know initially what areas she was prepared to teach in. She no longer wished 
to teach in the specialist area she was appointed to teach in because she said 
there were ... ... . The problem in that situation is that where we have got 
expertise we have to use it. There is no way that people can say "well, I am 
only going to teach that" - we have to use the range of expertise that we have 
got. So she hasn't quite got what she wants in that respect. She is having to 
do teaching which otherwise she would have preferred to have given up. But 
if she had given up I would have had to pay an outsider to come in and I am 
not in the position to be able to do that so that was one issue. But the other 
issue was just simply the sheer volume of teaching that she was being offered 
and she compared herself with another female colleague who at the time - 
she felt she was doing more than this other colleague so she wanted parity 
with this other colleague. The other colleague was in a different situation 
because she was actually on sabbatical and therefore what she was doing 
... ... .... But she must have got hold of the hours and it was like a red rag to a 
bull "I must be doing more than ... that's not fair. I want to see other 
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people's hours. Why should I-I don't think it's fair that I should have to do 
five modules a semester. " I had to point out that there were eventually - she 
wouldn't take my word for it which was difficult - and I had to produce 
evidence that teaching five modules for somebody on 400 or a little bit less 
was actually the norm rather than the exception. But she still wasn't very 
happy, it has to be said and first opportunity she got to in a sense try to put 
me on the spot around her introductory module where we have as many staff 
as we possibly can on board in order to give the students the opportunity to 
meet, she had a Friday afternoon along with another colleague who happened 
to be a (visiting teacher) and this year we weren't able to keep her on. Her 
contract was a temporary one and we had to say "sorry we can't .. " you 
know, and that was actually very difficult because she had been a tremendous 
colleague and we had to say "no more work, this is the end". Another 
colleague was teaching on Friday afternoon and he asked through the 
Research Committee for a bit of extra time so that he could do some proof 
reading, corrections and so on and I said "yes, there aren't enough students to 
justify three seminar groups on a Friday afternoon due to the recruitment 
situation". Anyway, this particular individual came marching in here to say 
"why has so-and-so been taken off Friday afternoons? " and I began to try to 
explain although I was completely put on the spot because I'd been doing 
something else and she said "I don't think it's fair, I don't think it's fair" and 
she walked out. What do you do in that situation? What the subject leader 
said was where recruitment is low and we can't justify the extra seminar 
group across the year, we will ensure that that is evened out. We will try and 
ensure that one person doesn't lose 50 hours and everyone else finishes up. 
We will track this and make sure and sure enough ... I didn't think it was 
any of her business the fact that we had taken this other colleague and given 
some relief because of his special circumstances. There are times when 
however open and consultative one wants to be, one just has to make a 
decision. You can't forever keep things open for approval to 30 odd people - 
that's not management, that's chaos. So I felt she was out of order. Then 
only about a fortnight later, when we looked at the evidence, the returns of 
the students for a series of optional case studies, one of which she was down 
to do, we found that when we looked at student registrations hardly any 
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students had adopted the case study so we took a decision that to have a 
group of two was not viable in that situation and so for those reasons we 
pulled her out of the case study and my concern there was in case she thought 
that this was because of the pressure she had put on before that this was my 
softening response. It wasn't at all it was for purely logistical reasons but it 
was also - we thought (the subject leader and 1) consistent with our principle 
that we would try and even out any kind of little benefits which might accrue 
which would bring people right up to their limit. The subject leader was then 
responsible for this person's appraisal and also responsible for sorting out a 
timetable for her going in the light of her pregnancy which she announced to 
us in October. But it has been since then it has been very -I hate to use the 
word "frosty" but that's how it's been and she has been saying things I would 
say is a bit out of turn which is kind of casting aspersions on the way that we 
have in fact, for instance, she should originally have had a sabbatical for the 
second semester and they're like golddust but she didn't seem terribly 
enthusiastic about it compared with other people who were almost crying 
their eyes out because they didn't get it, anyway and so we had to reconstruct 
the timetable so we used the timetable for last year for the basis for that. It 
happened that we had to put in a little extra because otherwise it would have 
looked so impossibly low compared with everybody else. By this time, 
interestingly, she wasn't actually making the point about unfairness because I 
think she'd had it instilled into her very firmly by the subject leader that in 
fact she was very low. She was one of those people who wanted the hours 
published across the division so that she could see what everyone else was 
doing but this would have the reverse effect because it would show that 
because we had had to make such significant amendment to Semester Two 
teaching in the light of some seminar groups and some modules not running 
that ... But we offered her two modules, Thursday morning and Thursday 
evening but I guess we ought to have thought about this a little bit more but 
she wrote to say that "I can't do a twelve hour day, starting at 10 and going 
on to 9, because of my condition". So the subject leader came to see me and 
we decided to accede to this and because we actually needed her on both 
modules because of her expertise, when she was an in a morning, she would 
not do the evening, and vice versa and this was settled. Two days after that 
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was settled she told another colleague who reported it to the subject leader 
"oh, she said, I am being asked to teach a twelve-hour day". Well, that was 
it, and that had been resolved and we had dealt with it. So it has been very 
difficult and I know we haven't heard the last yet. It has been the most, there 
have been other problems which have been of the same kind but less in 
degree but that is the most acute problem. It does throw into sharp focus, I 
think, it forces you to think about the principles on which you're acting. In a 
kind of more informal social situation one would be going out of one's way 
to accede to the kind of request - she's quite an old woman and I wouldn't 
want to jeopardise anything, that would be awful and yet, at the same time, 
there is I think that wider view about fairness and that whilst there are 
extenuating circumstances, we will obviously be professional. I have 
consulted, because I have not been sure how to handle this, increasingly, I 
have spoken to two of my female senior colleagues to get their advice and 
offered the opportunity to talk to them if that is what she would like but 
basically they are in sympathy. Both of them have had babies, three in each 
case I think and have done similar things, carried on working, etc, and both of 
them are saying that if they carried on working they could not make the 
babies the excuse. That's been a difficult one because it has placed quite 
strong personal tension against a moral issue. I have gone with the moral 
issue, my view of the moral issue -I know there are other views of the moral 
issue - but I have gone with the moral issue as I have seen it and that I am 
afraid has had a detrimental effect on the friendship. 
N: Thank you very much indeed, I think it would be helpful if we could 
focus on the time when she came in and walked out and your decision at that 
point to stay with it and the fact that she hadn't challenged it and to look at 
the thoughts in your head at that particular point because that's what I am 
needing to do I am afraid. 
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Owen 
OK - so it is the restructuring process, begin with that. The (department) of 
which I am a part was originally two (departments) which merged about a 
year and a half ago. That restructuring, the coming together of those two 
(departments), led to a restructuring of the management (sections) that 
existed. One of the changes in the structure was because now that the 
(department) was going to be quite a large (department), in fact the largest in 
the (educational institution), it was decided that having divisions 
corresponding to (sections) as the basic unit of the (department) was 
inappropriate. There were too many of them and it was decided to have 
(sections) gathered together into larger divisions organised to some extent 
according to commonality and a whole lot between (sections). So, for 
example, (s) went together with (m) and 0 (s), the (1) came together and so 
on, into the five divisions. The senior positions within the (department), well, 
there was a (head) for each (department) and this was replaced by one (head) 
and one of the two (heads) got that job. There were various associate (heads) 
within the (department) and people who already were associate (heads) under 
the ... ..... were invited to apply for those posts and that was sorted out. Then 
there were the heads of the divisions. That meant that those five jobs 
applications were invited from existing principal lecturers who might be 
interested in those five jobs and with the proviso that if any post were not 
filled there would then be - applications would then be invited from other 
members of staff, academic staff, and if not filled then presumably they 
would have gone outside. In the event, four of those were filled. What 
wasn't one person applied for it and didn't get it. Following that a couple of 
things kind of came together. There was the issue of what to do about the 
remaining head of division post and then there were the various posts at 
principal lecturer level within the (department). I think the real thorny nasty 
issue really because it was a restructuring the (department) management and 
the (educational institution) wanted to interview for the various senior posts 
within the (department) including all the principal lecturer level posts and the 
union was advised I understand that in a restructuring that that had to happen 
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because there was a change in management structure. There couldn't be just 
a straightforward carrying over of existing posts. But what it opened up was 
the possibility of people who had been principal lecturers for years having to 
apply as it were for a job at their own level and if they were unsuccessful that 
they might be either demoted or even might take redundancy or whatever. 
Now I think that position was worked out between the union and the 
(educational institution) after a restructuring of another (department) there 
had been quite a few (department) restructurings recently. Actually the first 
one was this one and so the union's position was worked out with the 
(educational institution) and was established following that. I was a member 
of the union coordinating committee but I wasn't actually involved in 
working out the principles for restructuring at all but certainly I became 
involved when restructuring started to work through in my own (department). 
As I say, the nasty possibility really arose of people having to apply for their 
own jobs and then not getting them and then having to either take redundancy 
or be demoted or find a PL level post outside of the (department) so you 
know a pretty messy process. Well of course yeah, I can't remember what 
the timing of this was but the (educational institution) also introduced a 
voluntary redundancy scheme and quite a few people went as part of that and 
there was quite a lot of unhappiness particularly in one of the (departments) 
that went into the merged (department) about how it looked and so forth. 
CK: How many posts were they looking to lose? 
0: They were looking to lose about 40 to 50 people at (educational 
institution) level about half the academic staff. In the event I think they got 
more academic staff than they wanted. I think about nine or ten went from 
our (department). But, you know, it was indicative of the demoralisation 
particularly in one of the (departments) which had a deficit. Both 
(departments) had a deficit but one of them had a larger one and it was one of 
the tasks of the restructuring to get the (department) making a profit. So you 
know there were different tensions over all of that. 
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Now coming back to the heads of division posts when I sitting with my union 
hat met for one of several meetings with management in the course of last 
year and proceedings to discuss restructuring that post came up. The head of 
(department) announced to the three (union) reps that were there that that job 
would be advertised nationally and I said "well, hold on a minute, you said it 
was going to be advertised internally if it wasn't filled". He said " oh, well .. 
. ." and put up a little bit of an argument for it and I said "well that was what 
you said and people are taking redundancy and if the job goes outside of the 
(educational institution) that's one more potential redundancy or two more 
even". And we talked about it for a while and we moved on to something 
else and at the end of the meeting he came back to this and he said "look, is it 
(union)'s position that this job should be advertised internally? " And that 
really put me on the spot without a doubt because I was interested in the job. 
So I said "well, look, you know, I don't think the union's got an agreed 
position, all I'm doing is reminding you what you said you were going to do 
but I will make inquiries and I will give you a decision later in the afternoon". 
So I came out of that and I went for a coffee with the three other (union) reps 
and I said "look, I am a bit on a back foot here because I am actually 
interested in applying for this job" and they said "OK". I said "this is what I 
propose to do - the union secretary for the (educational institution) as a whole 
was away at the time so I said I'd go and talk to him deputy the person who 
was standing in for him so I got on to him then and their immediate response 
was that it absolutely should be advertised internally if we are expecting 
people to take voluntary redundancy and if there is even a possibility of 
compulsory redundancy if we don't get enough. So I got back to my head of 
(department) and he said "OK, I'll take that into account". Now, I suppose in 
a way there's not a dilemma in that but that could certainly be seen and I was 
concerned that it shouldn't be seen as my getting an advantage from my 
union position but I talked to a few people about it and I thought "well, you 
know, it was in the interests of any of our members to be able to go for that 
position and we were keeping the (department) leadership to what they had 
said they would do" and the normal equal opportunities issues in advertising 
nationally were being set aside because of the redundancy issues. So the fact 
that I personally stood to gain from it was no reason for me in my union hat 
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to not pursue that. I would have done so even if I hadn't been personally 
interested. Two other people did actually apply for it. So I wasn't too 
worried about it from a moral point of view but what I was worried about was 
concerned was to talk to other people and discuss it and make sure that I 
wasn't seeing things too much from my own point of view and that other 
people thought I was doing the right thing, people from the union. So it was 
all resolved amicably enough. I suppose within the (department) that became 
part of the picture around the PL level posts as well and as it turned out 
something like six or seven people at that level going for head of subject 
posts. Some of them, one at least, had actually occupied that post previously 
and I think only two of them in the end of the existing ones were actually 
appointed so they had to get jobs outside the (department) or be demoted, or 
take redundancy. Some took redundancy, some were demoted, some got 
posts outside the (department). While that was going on, the management, 
the head of (department), had the opportunity to bring on certain people and 
to let certain people go who had been doing the job. I must admit again I felt 
pretty bad about that I mean it seemed to me that if you got promoted and it 
was a permanent position which these posts had been then it shouldn't be 
revisited x years further down the line and your job suddenly up for grabs and 
you having to reapply for it and I thought it was very bad certainly what 
happened to some of the PLs. I even represented one of them in a meeting 
with Personnel but there was nothing the union could do against that process 
in general. It had been advised by regional office and as I say well before I 
became involved in things but certainly you know some of those who fell foul 
of this process thought the union should have done more to prevent it 
happening. Then, once people hadn't been appointed to certain posts they 
generally were thrown open to interview to other staff in the (department) and 
filled and I think two or three of those posts were filled by people who were 
involved with (union) in one way or another or had been involved in (union). 
People would say "bloody (union), they've let this happen so that their own 
people could benefit" which was absolute rubbish, it was just coincidence and 
in fact the two or three people who moved into head of subject posts hadn't 
really been involved in discussions about (department) restructuring anyway. 
They were (union) people but they weren't involved in that stuff so they 
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hadn't had any effect on it. But there was that general commenting. 
(Confidential section not relevant to main narrative) 
All the other people in the union knew about it just said "bloody ridiculous - 
they can't say that just because someone's a union rep they can't have 
ambition" so again, for me at any rate, the people who counted didn't think 
I'd been in the wrong at all. The only thing I feel bad about it was that I have 
been a beneficiary of the process that I wasn't entirely in agreement with. I 
mean I can see why certain people were reappointed but at the same time if 
you get a ... ... .... job that should mean something and a lot of restructurings 
that have taken place have taken place not because of demands of the market 
or anything but in order to get rid of people they wanted shot of. I sit with 
various interviews with the management at the (Department of E&BE) and 
that's what happened there. They got rid of a bunch of people that they 
didn't like and got a different ... So from that perspective I wasn't very 
happy about the whole restructuring process that went on but in the end, yeah, 
I was a beneficiary. 
CK: Within all that context, the process of the mapping of a particular 
decision has to focus down on a moment in time. So I think it should be up to 
you to choose the moment in time that you would want to select as being a 
decision. 
0: The key decision I suppose for me was to go for this particular job and it 
happened at the point that I noticed for myself "ah, they've opened these 
posts to PLs in the first place but said that they'll be opened up to other 
members of staff if a PL doesn't go for it and well, in that case, I might do". 
I mean I didn't think too much about it because I assumed all posts would be 
filled and I was quite surprised when one of them wasn't. But certainly, 
having looked in that way previously, when it came up that that one was to be 
filled I immediately thought "yeah, if that's advertised, I am going to go for 
it". But that just followed on from what happened previously. 
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Penny 
It was a case of a very good member of staff in the F department who - she'd 
been with us for three years, she'd actually applied twice to come to us from 
Birmingham and looked very good and at the end of three years and 
something had happened and it did seem from what I could glean - in fact I 0 
know because her partner came to see me - that she'd actually tried to 
commit suicide and thereafter she did say to me "I think I want to leave" and 
I suppose the decision I was involved in was that she herself seemed quite 
certain about this - she did actually resign - but it was her partner who came 
up to see me and said "I don't think M knows what she wants to do. Can you 
please hold the job open? " and with a lot of wangling we managed to get 
personnel to hold it open for a year towards the end of which I had to keep 
nagging her to say "are you going to come back or aren't you going to come 
back" and I was getting different stories from her and different stories from 
her partner. I mean over that year in which - it was a long decision. The 
difficulty was that while she was still on our books we couldn't actually 
employ anybody else so I suppose that was a decision that was affecting the 
department and running of the department and in a sense there was the 
quandary about going behind her back to whom I felt loyal as a kind of 
member of staff and her partner who had come to me in secret and sort of 
said "well you don't quite understand what's going on" and feeling torn. 
Now whether that can help you - off the top of my head. 
CK: Yes, thanks very much. Do you want to give me any more details at this 
stage? 
P: Well, the only other, I'm not quite sure what other, I mean, I'm not sure 
what other detail you want. 
CK: That's the story as far as you're concerned. 
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P: That's the story. I had to hide from her the fact that her partner had been 
to see me privately and had told me that she had tried to commit suicide and 
that as a result I talked to her and said "do you know how much you're going 
to be missed? " so I suppose I was playing that double game which was 
absolutely true, I didn't go against anything that was true, you know, "we will 
really miss you, you've been an excellent member of staff, wouldn't you like 
to reconsider or leave the door open perhaps" and reluctantly, clearly, she did 
leave the door open but then couldn't make up her mind and I found myself 
with the shoe on the other foot saying "you really will have to make up your 
mind, M", when it was coming to the Easter time before the summer because 
she had a year in which to make up her mind and eventually she did, finally, 
after a couple of letters from me, she did actually resign and hasn't been seen 
of since that I know of. And I think it was that double game between her and 
her partner which was a little bit difficult especially as he was absolutely 
insistent that she shouldn't know that he'd come to see me and in fact I 
actually had to pretend not even to know him. So in the back of one's mind 
is always that question "am I being too led by what his perception is and not 
sufficiently led by her decision which was her decision to resign? Am I 
doing it for that particular reason or is it because she was a very good 
member of staff and if there was any chance of her coming back it would be 
very nice if she could? " So those are my particular thoughts. 
CK: Very interesting, thank you. We're going to need to focus on one 
moment in time so if you could think back over that. Very often things are a 
process or a series of events that come together to be the situation. If you can 
think back over one moment time where you were actually thinking about all 
the sort of dilemmas around that moment time 
P: The main one was the middle of June when her partner had rung me up at 
home and said "can I come and see you about MT' and this was probably 
only about a week after she'd given me her resignation sort of all of a sudden. 
This was fairly soon after she had disappeared for a week and we heard she 
was in hospital with her partner ringing up and saying she will be so 
obviously. . there was no indication she was going to have a breakdown, 
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actually. I saw her in the day and she apparently went off that evening and 
went into a hotel and, what he said, took pills and a bottle of whisky and tried 
to commit suicide and how they found her eventually I don't know so I 
suppose it was that evening where I had to engage with him sitting in my 
lounge -I wasn't feeling too bright myself - and having to enlist the support 
of a senior member of the school and saying "for reasons I can't divulge I 
think there might be reasons for going to personnel and saying could we hold 
the job open even though she might not feel she wants to and then obviously 
having to speak to her and say "you know, how would you feel about this? " 
and the fact that she was doing it reluctantly and as I say going behind her 
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Analysis of Angela's narrative relating to moral decisions in 
the work-place in relation to the underpinning 
values/principles identified. 
Extract from narrative Value/Principle relating Value/Principle relating 
to the behaviour of to the actions of self 
others 
Angela: To blame manager 
at disciplinary hearing 
he hadn't let me kno; v ... she It is wrong to withhold 
refused to give me the information which potentially 
information. There it-as reports puts the public at risk. 
and so on that had been 
produced that she had got 
copies of butwouldn't let me 
have them 
I ivent right tip to the head of It is right to try to ensure that 
service in the end... I ivas information potentially putting 
getting more and more individuals at risk is acted upon. 
concerned about it. 
Do I tell the ivhole truth ... or (Summary of the problem: it's do I blame the manager right to tell the truth but in 
doing so, it's wrong that 
someone should suffer as a 
result when another individual 
was responsible as well. ) 
[felt she ivas ivrong in )vhat Wrong to withhold 
she'd done information which potentially 
puts the public at risk 
Ifelt he ivas ivrong because he Wrong to withhold 
didn't do anything to sort the information which potentially 
ýrobleni out puts the public at risk 
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Appendix F 
Kohlberg's Stages of Moral Development 
Level A: Stage 1: The Stage of Right is literal obedience to rules and 
Preconventional Punishment and authority, avoiding punishment, and not 
Level Obedience doing physical harm. 
Stage 2: The Stage of Right is serving one's own or other's needs 
Individual and making fair deals in terms of concrete 
Instrumental Purpose exchange. 
and Exchange 
Level B: Stage 3: The Stage of The right is playing a good (nice) role, 
Conventional Level Mutual Interpersonal being concerned about the other people 
Expectations, and their feelings, keeping loyalty and 
Relationships, and trust with partners, and being motivated to 
Conformity follow rules and expectations 
Stage 4: The Stage of The right is doing one's duty in society, 
Social System and upholding the social order, and 
Conscience maintaining the welfare of society or the 
Maintenance group. 
Level C: Stage 5: The Stage of The right is upholding the basic rights, 
Postconventional and Prior Rights and values and legal contracts of a society, 
Principled Level Social Contract or even when they conflict with the concrete 
Utility rules and laws of the group. 
Stage 6: The Stage of This stage assumes guidance by universal 
Universal Ethical ethical principles that all humanity should 
Principles follow. 




ABDOLMOHAMMADI, J M, GABHART, DRL, and REEVES, MF 
(1997) Ethical Cognition of Business Students Individually and in Groups 
Journal of Business Ethics, 16, pp 1717-1725 
ADLER, JE (1987) Moral Development and the Personal Point of View in 
KITTAY, EF and MEYERS, DT (eds) (1987) Women andMoral Theory. 
Rowman and Littlefield, pp 205-234 
AGARWAL, J and MALLOY, DC (1999) Ethical Work Climate 
Dimensions in a Not-For-Profit Organization: An Empirical Study. Journal 
of Business Ethics, 20, pp 1-14 
AKAAH, IP (1996) The Influence of Organizational Rank and Role on 
Marketing Professionals' Ethical Judgments. Journal of Business Ethics, 15, 
pp 605-613 
ARBIB, A, CONKLIN, EJ and HILL, JC (1987) From Schema Theoty to 
Language New York, Oxford: Oxford University Press 
ARISTOTLE The Nicomachean Ethics (ROSS, D, (1987) Oxford: Oxford 
University Press 
ARONFREED, J (1976) Moral Development from the Standpoint of a 
General Psychological Theory in LICKONA, T (ed. ). (1976) Moral 
development and behaviour: theory, research and social issues. New York; 
London : Holt, Rinehart and Winston, pp 54-69 
ARONFREED, J (1994) The Socialization of Altruistic and Sympathetic 
Behavior: Some Theoretical and Experimental Analyses in PUKA, B (ed) 
(1994b), pp 145-168 
ASCH, SE (1971) Effects of group pressure upon the modification and 
distortion of judgements in HINTON, BL and REITZ, HJ (eds) Groups and 
organization: integrated readings in the analysis of social behaviour. 
Belmont: Wadsworth Publishing Co, pp 215-222 
ATTANUCCI, J (1991) Changing subjects: growing up and growing older. 
Journal ofMoral Education, 20, pp 317- 328 
AXELROD, R (1976) (ed) Structure of Decision: The Cognitive Maps of 
Political Elites. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press 
BARNETT, T& VAICYS, C (2000) The Moderating Effect of Individuals' 
Perceptions of Ethical Work Climate on Ethical Judgments and Behavioral 
Intentions. Journal of Business Ethics, 27 pp 351-362 
BARON, R (1999) The Recognition of the Ethical in the Context of 
I-'rofessional Life, PhD Thesis, University of Wolverhampton 
BARROWCLOUGH, A (2000) A Doctor's Dilemma/Features Interview: 
Stephen Bolsin. The Times, (6 June), pp 2-3, (CD-ROM) 
376 
BARTELS, L K, HARRICK, E, MARTELL, K and STRICKLAND, D 
(1998) The Relationship between Ethical Climate and Ethical Problems 
within Human Resource Management. Journal of Business Ethics, 17, pp 
799-804 
BAUMAN, Z (1993) Postmodern Ethics. Oxford: Blackwell 
BELLAH, RN (ed) (1973) Emile Durkheim on Morality and Society. 
Chicago, London: Chicago University Press 
BERGER, P& LUCKMANN, T (1966) The Social Construction of Reality: 
A Treatise in the Sociology of Knowledge. Harmondsworth: Penguin 
Books 
BILLIG, M (1987) Arguing and Thinking. Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press. 
BILLIG, M, CONDOR, S, EDWARDS, D, GANE, M, MIDDLETON, D& 
RADLEY, A (1988) Ideological Dilemmas: A Social Psychology of 
Everyday Thinking. London: Sage Publications. 
BLASS, T (ed) (2000) Obedience to authority: current perspectives on the 
Milgram Paradigm. Mahwah, New Jersey: Lawrence Erlbaum Associates. 
BODILY, CL (1994) Ageism and the Deployments of "Age": A 
Constructionist View in SARBIN, TR& KITSUSE, JI (eds) Constructing 
the Social. London: Sage Publications, pp 174-194 
(littp: //xvww. tlie-bodv-shop. com/global/-values/iiidex. iL, SR, accessed 9 April 
2002). 
BOOD, RP (1998) Charting Organizational Learning: A Comparison of 
Multiple Mapping Techniques in EDEN, C& SPENDER, J-C (eds) 
Managerial and Organizational Cognition: Theory, Methods and Research. 
London: Sage Publications, pp 210-230 
BREWIS, J (1998) Who do you think you are? Feminism, Work, Ethics and 
Foucault in PARKER, M (ed) Ethics and Organizations. London: Sage, ps 
53-75 
BRIEN, A (1997) Regulating Virtue: Formulating, Engendering and 
Enforcing Corporate Ethical Codes. Business and Professional Ethics 
Journal, 15(l), pp 21-52 
BROWN, R. (1988) Group Processes: dynamics within and between groups. 
Oxford: Basil Blackwell 
BROWN, S (1992) Cognitive mapping and repertory grids for qualitative 
survey research: some comparative observations. Journal of Management 
Studies, 29(3), pp 287-298 
BULMER, M (ed) (1984) Sociological Research Methods: an Introduction. 
London: Macmillan 
BUSH, V, HARRIS, S& BUSH, A (1997) Establishing ethical boundaries 
for service providers: a narrative approach. Journal of Services Marketing, 
11(4), pp 265-277 
377 
CARPENDALE, J AND KREBS, DL (1995) Variations in Level of Moral 
Judgment as a Function of Type of Dilemma and Moral Choice. Journal of 
Personalhy, Vol 63, No 2,289-313 
CARR, AZ (1993) Is Business Bluffing Ethical? In CHRYSSIDES, GD 
AND KALER, J H. An Introduction to Business Ethics. London: Chapman 
and Hall, pp 108-118 
CARTWRIGHT, D (1968) The Nature of Group Cohesiveness in 
CARTWRIGHT, D and ZANDER, A (eds) Group Dynamics: Research and 
Theory. 3rd ed., London: Tavistock Publications, pp 91-109 
CARTWRIGHT, D and ZANDER, A (eds) (1968) Group Dynamics: 
Research and Theoty. 3rd ed., London: Tavistock Publications 
CHANG, MK (1998) Predicting Unethical Behavior: A Comparison of the 
Theory of Reasoned Action and the Theory of Planned Behavior. Journal of 
Business Ethics, 17, pp 1825-1834 
CHEN, AYS, SAWYERS, RB and WILLIAMS, PF (1997) Reinforcing 
Ethical Decision Making Through Corporate Culture. Journal of Business 
Ethics, 16, pp 855-865. 
CHIA, R (1994) The Concept of Decision: A Deconstructive Analysis. 
Journal ofManagement Studies, 31(6), pp 781-806 
CHRYSSIDES, GD AND KALER, J H. (1993) An Introduction to Business 
Ethics. London: Chapman and Hall 
CLARKE, I& MACKANESS, W (2001) Management 'Intuition': An 
interpretative account of structure and content of decision schemas using 
cognitive maps. Journal of Management Studies, 38(2), pp 147-172 
COLE, D, SIRGY, M J, & BIRD, MM (2000) How Do Managers Make 
Teleological Evaluations in Ethical Dilemmas? Testing Part of and 
Extending the Hunt-Vitell Model. Journal ofBusiness Ethics, 26, pp 259- 
269 
CRANE, A (1999) Are you Ethical? Please Tick Yes or No: On researching 
Ethics in Business Organisations. Journal of Business Ethics, 20, pp 237-248 
CZARNIAWSKA, B (1998) A Narrative Approach to Organization Studies. 
Thousand Oaks: Sage Publications 
DAMON, W and COLBY, A (1987) Social Influence and Moral Change in 
KURTINES, WM and GEWIRTZ, JL (eds) (1987) Moral development 
through social interaction. New York, Chichester, Brisbane, Toronto, 
Singapore: John Wiley & Sons, pp 3-19 
DAWSON, LM (1997). Ethical Differences Between Men and Women in 
the Sales Profession. Journal of Business Ethics, 16, pp 1143-1152 
DEAL, Tand KENNEDY, A (1981) Corporate Cultures: The rites and 
rituals of corporate life. Harmondsworth: Penguin Books 
DE GEORGE, RT (1990) Using the Techniques of Ethical Analysis in 
Corporate Practice in ENDERLE, G, ALMOND, B AND ARGANDONA, A 
(eds) People in Corporations: Ethical Responsibilities and Corporate 
378 
Effectiveness. Dordrecht, London: Kluwer Academic in cooperation with the 
European Business Ethics Network, pp 25-33 
DEKKER, W (1990) The Responsible Corporation and the Subversive Side 
of Ethics in ENDERLE, G, ALMOND, B AND ARGANDONA, A (eds) 
People in Corporations: Ethical Responsibilities and Corporate 
Effectiveness. Dordrecht, London: Kluwer Academic in cooperation with the 
European Business Ethics Network, pp 11-18 
DENISON, DR (1996) What is the Difference between Organizational 
Culture and Organizational Climate? A Native's Point of View on a Decade 
of Paradigm Wars. Academy ofManagement Review 21(3), pp 619-654 
DENZIN, NK (1979) The logic of naturalistic inquiry in BYNNER, J AND 
STRIBLEY, KM (ed. ) (1979). Social research: principles andprocedures. 
Harlow Essex: Longman, pp 37-43 
DENZIN, NK and LINCOLN, YS (eds) (1994) Handbook of Qualitative 
Research. Thousand Oaks: Sage Publications 
DERRY, R (1987) Moral Reasoning in Work-related conflicts in 
FREDERICK, W (ed) Research in Corporate Social Performance and Policy 
Greenwich, CT: JAI Press, pp 25-49 
DESHPANDE, SP (1997) Managers'Perception of Proper Ethical Conduct: 
The Effect of Sex, Age and Level of Education. Journal of Business Ethics, 
16, pp 79-85 
DESJARDINS, JR (1993) Virtues and business ethics in CHRYSSIDES, G 
D AND KALER, J H. An Introduction toBusiness Ethics. London: 
Chapman and Hall, pp 136-142 
DOUGLAS, P C, DAVIDSON, RA& SCHWARTZ, BN (2001) The effect 
of organizational culture and ethical orientation on accountants' ethical 
judgements. Journal ofBusiness Ethics, 34, pp 101-121 
DOWNIE, RS (1970) Roles and Values: An Introduction to Social Ethics. 
London: Methuen& Co Ltd 
DURKHEIM, E (1957) Professional Ethics and Civic Morals. London: 
Routledge. 
DURKHEIM, E (1961) Moral Education. New York: Free Press 
EASTERBY-SMITH, M (1980) How to use Repertoyy Grids in HRD 
Bradford: MCB Publications Ltd 
EDEN, C (1988) Cognitive Mapping. European Journal of Operational 
Research, 36, pp 1-13 
EDEN, C (1994) Cognitive mapping and problem structuring for system 
dynamics model building. System Dynamics Review 10(2-3) pp 257-276. 
EDEN, C, ACKERMAN, F and CROPPER, S (1992) The Analysis of Cause 
Maps. Journal of Management Studies, 29, pp 310-324 
EDEN, C& ACKERMANN, F (1998) Analysing and Comparing Idiographic 
Causal Maps in EDEN, C& SPENDER, J-C (eds) Managerial and 
379 
Organizational Cognition: Theory, Methods and Research. London: Sage 
Publications, pp 192-209 
EDEN, C& SPENDER, J-C (eds) (1998)Managerial and Organizational 
Cognition: Theoryl, Methods and Research. London: Sage Publications 
ETZIONI, A (1993) Normative-affective choices. Human Relations, 46(9), 
pp 1053-1070 
EXWORTHY, M& HALFORD, S (eds) (1999) Professionals and the new 
Managerialisin in the Public Sector. Buckingham: Open University Press. 
FAUCONNIER, G (1997) Mappings in Thought and Language. Cambridge, 
New York, Melbourne: Cambridge University Press 
FERRELL, 0C AND GRESHAM, L (1985) A contingency Framework for 
Understanding Ethical Decision Making in Marketing. Journal of Marketing 
(Summer 1985), pp 87-96 
FESTINGER, L and ARONSON, E (1968) Arousal and Reduction of 
Dissonance in Social Contexts in CARTWRIGHT, D and ZANDER, A (eds) 
Group Dynamics: Research and Theory. London: Tavistock Publications, pp 
125-136 
FINEMAN, S (ed)(1993) Emotion in Organizations. London: Sage 
Publications 
FISHER, DG and SWEENEY, JT (1998) The Relationship between 
Political Attitudes and Moral Judgement: Examining the Validity of the 
Defining Issues Test. Journal of Business Ethics, 17, pp 905-916 
FISHER, WR (1984) Narration as a Human Communication Paradigm: The 
Case of Public Moral Argument. Communication Monographs, 51 (March), 
pp 1-22 
FLAM, H (1993) Fear, loyalty and greedy organizations in FINEMAN, S 
(ed) Emotion in Organizations. London: Sage Publications, pp 58-75 
FLYNN, R (1999) Managerialism, professionalism and quasi-markets in 
EXWORTHY, M& HALFORD, S (eds) Professionals and the new 
Managerialism in the Public Sector. Buckingham: Open University Press, 
pp 18-36 
FRAEDRICH, J, THORNE, DM and FERRELL, 0C (1994) Assessing the 
Application of Cognitive Moral Development Theory to Business Ethics. 
Journal of Business Ethics, 13, pp 829-838 
FRANSELLA, F and BANNISTER, D (1977) A Manualfor Repertory Grid 
Technique. New York: Academic Press 
FREIDSON, E (1994) Professionalism Reborn. Cambridge: Polity Press. 
FRIEDMAN, M (1993) The Social responsibility of Business is to increase 
its profits in CHRYSSIDES, GD AND KALER, J H. (1993) An 
Introduction to Business Ethics. London: Chapman and Hall, pp 249-254 
FRITZSCHE, DJ (2000) Ethical Climates and the Ethical Dimension of 
Decision Making. Journal of Business Ethics, 24, pp 125-140 
380 
FROMM, E. (1971) Man for Himself: An Enquiry into the Psychology of 
Ethics. London: Routledge & Kegan Paul 
GAUDINE, A& THORNE, L (2001) Emotion and Ethical Decision-Making 
in Organizations. Journal ofBusiness Ethics, 31, pp 175-187 
GARBARINO, J and BRONFENBRENNER, U (1976) The Socialization of 
Moral Judgment and Behavior in Cross-Cultural Perspective in LICKONA, T 1ý (ed. ). (1976) Moral development and behaviour: theoty, research and social 
issues. New York; London: Holt, Rinehart and Winston, pp 70-83 
GELLERMAN, SW (1986). 1, Vhy Good Managers make Bad Ethical 
Choices. Harvard Business Review July-August 1986, pp 85-90 
GERGEN, KJ& GERGEN, MM (1988) Narrative and the Self as 
Relationship. Advances in Experimental Social Psychology. 21, pp 17-56 
GIBBS, J C., BASINGER, KS and FULLER, D (1992) Moral maturity: 
measuring the development of sociomoral reflection. Hillsdale, NJ; Hove: 
Erlbaurn Associates 
GILLIGAN, C (1982,1993) In a Different Voice: Psychological Theory and 
Women's Development. Cambridge, Mass; London: Harvard University 
Press 
GILLIGAN, C (1987) Moral Orientation and Moral Development in 
KITTAY, EF and MEYERS, DT (eds) (1987) lVomen and Moral Theory. 
Rowman and Littlefield, pp 19-33 
GILLIGAN, C& ATTANUCCI, J (1988) Two Moral Orientations in 
GILLIGAN, C, WARD, JV& TAYLOR, JM (eds) Mapping The Moral 
Domain. Cambridge, Mass: Harvard University Press, pp 73-86 
GILLIGAN, J (1976) Beyond Morality: Psychoanalytic reflections on 
shame, guilt and love in LICKONA, T (ed. ). (1976) Moral development and 
behaviour: theoty, research and social issues. New York; London : Holt, 
Rinehart and Winston, pp 144-158 
GLASER, B (1992) Basics of Grounded Theory Analysis. Mill Valley, CA: 
Sociology Press 
GLASER, BG and STRAUSS, A1 (1967): The Discovery of Grounded 
Theory: strategies for qualitative research . Chicago, Aldine Publishing Co 
GLOVER S A, BUMPUS, M A, LOGAN, JE and CIESLA, JR (1997). Re- 
examining the Influence of Individual Values on Ethical Decision Making. 
Journal of Business Ethics, 16, pp 1319-1329. 
GOLDSTEIN, WM& HOGARTH, RM (1997) Research on judgment and 
decision making: Currents, connections and controversies. Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press 
GOLDSTEIN, WM& WEBER, EU (1997) Content and discontent: 
Indications and implications of domain specificity in preferential decision 
making in GOLDSTEIN, WM& HOGARTH, RM Research on judgment 
and decision making: Currents, connections and controversies. Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, pp 566-617 
381 
GOOLSBY JR& HUNT, SD (1992) Cognitive Moral Development and 
Marketing. Journal of Marketing 75 Vol 56 No 1 January 1992,55-68 
GRANITZ, NA& WARD, JC (2001) Actual and Perceived Sharing of 
Ethical Reasoning and Moral Intent Among In-Group and Out-Group 
Members. Journal of Business Ethics, 33, pp 299-322 
GRAYSON, K (1997) Narrative Theory and Consumer Research: 
Theoretical and Methodological Perspectives. Advances in Consumer 
Research, 24, pp 67-71 
GRIFFIN, E (1994) A First look at Communication Theory. New York: 
McGraw-Hill Inc 
HALFORD, S& LEONARD, P (1999) New identities? Professionalism, 
managerialism and the construction of self in EXWORTHY, M& 
HALFORD, S (eds) Professionals and the new Managerialism in the Public 
Sector. Buckingham: Open University Press, pp 102-120 
HALLAM, RS (1994) Some Constructionist Observations on "Anxiety" and 
its History in SARBIN, TR& KITSUSE, JI (eds) Constructing the Social. 
London: Sage Publications, pp 139-156 
HARE, RM (1981) Moral Thinking: Its Levels, Method and Point Oxford: 
Clarendon Press 
HARMAN, G& JARVIS THOMSON, J (1996) Moral Relativism and Moral 
Objectivity. Oxford: Blackwell Publishers 
HARRIS, SG (1994) Organizational Culture and Individual Sensemaking: A 
Schema-based Perspective. Organization Science, 5: 3, pp 309-321 
HASSARD, J AND PARKER, M (eds) (1993) Postmodernism and 
Organizations. London: Sage Publications 
HEARN, J (1993) Emotive Subjects: Organizational Men, Organizational 
Masculinities and the (De)construction of 'Emotions' in FINEMAN, S (ed) 
Emotion in Organizations. London: Sage Publications, pp 142-166 
HENWOOD, K and PIDGEON, N (1993) Qualitative Research and 
Psychological Theorizing in HAMMERSLEY, M (ed) (1993) Social 
Research: Philosophy, Politics and Practice. London: Sage Publications, 
pp 14-32 
HERNDON, NC (Jr) (1996) A New Context for Ethics Education Objectives 
in a College of Business: Ethical Decision-Making Models. Journal of 
Business Ethics, 15, pp 501-510. 
HESLIN, R& PATTERSON, ML (1982) Nonverbal Behavior and Social 
Psychology. New York, London: Plenum Press 
HEYES, KW (1996) The Impact of Professionalism on the Decisionmaking 
Process: A Case Stud in Librarianship: MBA Thesis (unpublished), y 
University of Wolverhampton: accessed 24 March 2001 
HININGS, C R, THIBAULT, L, SLACK, T and KIKULIS, LM (1996) 
Values and Organizational Structure. Human Relations, 49, pp 885-916 
382 
HINTON, B L. and REITZ, HJ (eds) (1971) Groups and organization: 
integrated readings in the analysis of social behaviour. Belmont: Wadsworth 
Publishing Co 
HOCHSCHILD, AR (1983) The Managed Heart. Berkeley: University of 
California Press. 
HOFFMAN, L (1992) A Reflexive Stance for Family Therapy in 
McNAMEE, S& GERGEN, KJ (eds) Therapy as Social Construction. 
London: Sage Publications, pp 7-24 
HOFSTEDE, G (1991) Cultures and Organizations: Software of the Mind. 
London: Harper Collins 
HOFSTEDE, G (1997) Motivation, Leadership and Organization: Do 
American Theories Apply Abroad? In PUGH, DS (ed). Organization 
Theory: Selected Readings. Harmondsworth: Penguin Books, pp 223-249 
HOGARTH, RM (1987) Judgment and Choice. Chichester, England: John 
Wiley & Sons 
HOLLANDER, EP and WILLIS, RH (1971) Some current issues in the 
psychology of conformity and nonconformity in HINTON, BL and REITZ, 
HJ (eds) Groups and organization: integrated readings in the analysis of 
social behaviour. Belmont: Wadsworth Publishing Co, pp 232-248 
HORNING, DNM (1970) Blue collar theft: conceptions of property, 
attitudes toward pilfering and work group norms in a modern industrial plant 
in SMIGEL, E0 and ROSS, HL (eds) (1970) Crimes against bureaucracy. 
New York: Van Nostrand and Reinhold, pp 46-64 
HOWELL, S (ed) (1997) The Ethnography of Moralities. London: 
Routledge 
HSE STRESS HOME PAGE (2004) http: //xvww. hse. gov. uk/stres. -, ýýý/ýiiidex. litm 
accessed 15 February 2004. 
HUFF, AS (1990) (ed) Mapping Strategic Thought. Chichester: John Wiley 
and Sons. 
HUNT, SD AND VITELL S (1986) A General Theory of Marketing Ethics. 
Journal ofMacrontarketing (Spring 1986), pp 5-16 
HURSTHOUSE, R (1999) On Virtue Ethics. Oxford: Oxford University 
Press 
383 
ISEN, AM (1997) Positive Affect and decision making in GOLDSTEIN, W 
M& HOGARTH, R M) Research on judgment and decision making: 
Current, Connections and controversies. Cambridge: Cambridge University 
Press, pp 509-534. 
JENKINS, M (1998) The Theory and Practice of Comparing Causal Maps in 
EDEN, C& SPENDER, J-C (eds) Managerial and Organizational 
Cognition: Theo? y, Methods and Research. London: Sage Publications, pp 
231-249 
JOHNSON, DW (1970) The social psychology of education New York: 
Holt, Rinehart and Winston 
JOHNSON, D W. and JOHNSON, FP (1997)Joining Together. - group 
theory and group skills. 6TH ed, Boston, London: Allyn and Bacon 
JONES, GE and KAVANAGH, MJ (1996) An experimental Examination of 
the Effects of Individual and Situational Factors on Unethical Behavioral 
Intentions in the Workplace. Journal of Business Ethics, 15, pp 511-523 
JONES, TM (1991) Ethical Decision Making by Individuals in 
Organizations: An Issue-Contingent Model. Academy of Management 
Review, 16(2), pp 366-395 
JONES, TM (1995) Instrumental Stakeholder Theory: A Synthesis of Ethics 
and Economic. Academy of Management Review 20, pp 404-437 
JUBB, PB (1999) Whistleblowing: A Restrictive Definition and 
Interpretation. Journal of Business Ethics, 21, pp 77-94 
KANT, 1 (1959) Foundations of the Metaphysics of Morals (translated by L 
W Beck) Indianopolis: Bobbs-Merrill Co, Inc 
KAPI-AN, A (1964). The Conduct of Inquiry. Aylesbury: Intertext books 
KELLY, GA (1955) The Psychology of Personal Constructs: A Theory of 
Personality. London; New York: Routledge 
KELMAN, HC and HAMILTON, VL (1989) Crimes of obedience. New 
Haven, CT: Yale University Press 
KEY, MR (ed) (1980) The Relationship of Verbal and Nonverbal 
Communication. The Hague: Mouton Publishers 
KLEIN, J. (1956) The Study of Groups. London: Routledge, Kegan and Paul 
KNAPP, ML (1978) Nonverbal Communication in Human Interaction. New 
York: Holt, Rinehart and Winston 
KOHLBERG, L (1976) Moral Stages and Moralization: The Cognitive- 
Developmental Approach in LICKONA, T (ed. ). (1976) Moral development 
and behaviour: themy, research and social issues. New York; London 
Holt, Rinehart and Winston, pp 31-53 
KOHLBERG, L. (1981) The Philosophy of Moral Development: moral 
stages and the idea of justice. San Francisco; London: Harper and Row . 
KOHLBERG, L. (1984) The psychology of moral development: the nature 
and validity of moral stages. San Francisco; London: Harper and Row 
384 
KOHLBERG, L and HIGGINS, A (1987) School Democracy and Social 
Interaction in KURTINES, WM and GEWIRTZ, JL (eds) (1987) Moral 
development through social interaction. New York, Chichester, Brisbane, 
Toronto, Singapore: John Wiley & Sons, pp 102-128 
KOHLBERG, L (1994) The Claim to Moral Adequacy of a Highest Stage of 
Moral Judgement in PUKA, B (ed) (1994a) The Great Justice Debate. New 
York, London: Garland Publishing, pp, 2-18 
KOHUT, GF and CORRIHER, SE (1994) The relationship of age, gender, 
experience and awareness of written ethics policies to business decision 
making SAM Advanced Management Journal 59(l), pp 32-40 
KREBS, D L, DENTON, K AND WARK, G (1997) The Forms and 
Functions of Real-Life Moral Decision-Making. Journal of Moral 
Education, Vol 26, No 2,131-145 
KUJALA, J (2001) A multidimensional approach to Finnish Managers' 
Moral Decision-Making. Journal of Business Ethics, 34, pp 231-254 
KUHN, TS (1970) The Structure of Scientific Revolutions, 2d edition. 
Chicago: University of Chicago Press 
KUZEL, AJ (1992) Sampling in qualitative inquiry. In B. F. CRABTREE & 
W. L. MILLER (eds. ) Doing qualitative research. Newbury Park, CA: Sage, 
pp. 31-44 
LABOV, W (1972) Language in the Inner City: Studies in the Black English 
Vernacular. Oxford: Basil Blackwell 
LANGFORD, PE (1995)Approaches to the development of moral reasoning. 
Hove, Hillsdale: Lawrence Erlbaum Associates 
LANGFIELD-SMITH, K and WIRTH, A (1992) Measuring Differences 
between Cognitive Maps. Journal of the Operation Research Society 43(12), 
pp 1135-1150 
LAUKKANNEN, M (1998) Conducting Causal Mapping Research: 
Opportunities and Challenges in EDEN, C& SPENDER, J-C (eds) 
Managerial and Organizational Cognition: Theory, Methods and Research. 
London: Sage Publications, pp 168-189 
LEGGE, K (1998) Is HRM Ethical? Can HRM Be Ethical? In PARKER, M 
(ed) Ethics and Organizations. London: Sage, pp 150-172 
LEWIN, K (1947) Frontiers i#group dynamics. Human Relations, 1, pp 5- 
41. 
LEWIN, K (1951) Field theory in social science. NewYork: Harper 
LICKONA T (1976) Critical Issues in the Study of Moral Development and 
Behavior in LICKONA, T (ed. ). (1976) Moral development and behaviour: 
theory, research and social issues. New York; London : Holt, Rinehart and 
Winston, pp 3-28 
LIEBRUCKS, A (2001) The Concept of Social Construction. Theory & 
Psychology, 11(3), pp 363-391 
385 
LINCOLN, D J, MM PRESSLEY and T LITTLE: (1982). Ethical Beliefs 
and Personal Values of Top Level Executives. Journal of Business Research 
10, pp 475-487. 
LINDLOF, TR (1995) Qualitative Communication Research Methods. 
Thousand Oaks, London, New Delhi: Sage Publications 
LOCKE, D (1994a) Cognitive Stages or Developmental Phases? A Critique 
of Kohlberg's Stage-Structural Theory of Moral Reasoning in PUKA, B (ed) 
(1994a) The Great Justice Debate. New York, London: Garland Publishing, 
pp 104-117 
LOCKE, D (1994b) The Illusion of Stage Six in PUKA, B (ed) (1994a) The 
Great Justice Debate. New York, London: Garland Publishing, pp 161-168 
LOGSDON J M, THOMPSON, JK and REID, RA (1994) Software Piracy: 
Is It Related to Level of Moral Judgment?. Journal of Business Ethics, 13, pp 
849-857 
LOGSDON, JM AND YUTHAS, K (1997). Corporate Social Performance, 
Stakeholder Orientation, and Organizational Moral Development. Journal of 
Business Ethics, 16, pp 1213-1226. 
LOVELL, A (2002) Ethics as a Dependent Variable in Individual and 
Organisational Decision Making. Journal of Business Ethics, 37, pp 145-163 
LYONS, NP (1988) Two Perspectives: On Self, Relationships, and Morality 
in GILLIGAN, C, WARD, JV& TAYLOR, JM (eds) Mapping The Moral 
Domain. Cambridge, Mass: Harvard University Press, pp 21-48 
MACDONALD, KM (1995) The Sociology of the Professions. London: 
Saae Publications C 
MACINTYRE, A (1985) After Virtue: a study in moral theory. London: 
Duck-worth 
MACKIE, JL (1994) The Argument from 'Queerness' in SINGER, P (ed. ) 
Ethics. Oxford; New York: Oxford University Press, pp 159-164 
MACLAGAN, P (1996) The Organizational Context for Moral Development: 
Questions of Power and Access. Journal of Business Ethics, 15, pp 645-654. 
MAGILL, K (1997) Freedom and Experience: Self-Determination without 
Illusions. Basingstoke: Macmillan. 
MALHOTRA, NK and MILLER, GL (1998) An Integrated Model for 
Ethical Decisions in Marketing Research. Journal of Business Ethics 17, pp 
263-280 
MARKHAM, KM and MINTZES, JJ (1994) The Concept Map as a 
Research and Evaluation Tools Further Evidence of Validity. Journal of 
Research in Science Teaching, 31: 1, pp 91-101 
MARSHALL, SP (1995) Schemas in Problem Solving. Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press 
MASON, ES AND MUDRACK, PE (1997) Do Complex Moral Reasoners 
Experience Greater Ethical Work Conflict? Journal of Business Ethics, 16, 
pp 1311-1318. 
386 
McNAMEE, S& GERGEN, KJ (eds)(1992) Therapy as Social 
Construction. London: Sage Publications 
MENGUC, B (1998) Organisational Consequences, marketing ethics and 
salesforce supervision: further empirical evidence. Journal ofBusiness 
Ethics, 17, pp 333-352 
MICELI, MP AND NEAR, JP (1994) Relationships among value 
congruence, perceived victimization and retaliation against whistle-blowers. 
Journal o Management. 20(4) pp 773-395 f 
MILES, MB& HUBERMAN, AM (1994) Qualitative Data Analysis: An 
Expanded Sourcebook (2 d ed). Thousand Oaks: Sage Publications 
MILGRAM, S (1965) Some conditions of obedience and disobedience to 
authority. Human Relations, 18, pp 57-76 
MILGRAM, S (1974) Obedience toAuthority. Tavistock, London 
MINTZBERG, H& WATERS, J (1990) Studying Deciding: An Exchange 
of Views between Mintzberg and Waters, Pettigrew, and Butler. 
Organization Studies, 11(l), pp 1-16 
MISCHEL, W and MISCHEL, HN (1976) A Cognitive Social-Learning 
Approach to Morality and Self-Regulation in LICKONA, T (ed. ). (1976) 
Moral development and behavioun theory, research and social issues. New 
York; London: Holt, Rinehart and Winston, pp 84-107 
MOSCOVICI, S (1976) Social influence and social change. London: 
Academic Press 
MUDRACK, PE and MASON, ES (1996) Individual Ethical Beliefs and 
Perceived Organisational Interests. Journal of Business Ethics, 15, pp 85 1- 
861 
MURPHY, J AND GILLIGAN, C (1994) Moral Development in Late 
Adolescence and Adulthood: A Critique and Reconstruction of Kohlberg's 
Theory in PUKA, B (ed) (1994a) The Great Justice Debate. New York, 
London: Garland Publishing, pp 75-103 
NEAR, JP and MICELI, MP (1995) Effective Whistle-bl owing. Academy 
of Management Review. 20(3), pp 679-709 
NEAR, JT and MICELI, MP (1996) Whistle-blowing: myth and reality. 
Journal of Management. 22(3) pp 507-527. 
NORMAN, R (1983) The Moral Philosophers. Oxford: Oxford University 
Press 
NWACHUKWU, LS and VITELL, SJ (1997) The Influence of Corporate 
Culture on Managerial Ethicaljudgments. Journal of Business Ethics, 16, pp 
757-776. 
PAOLILLO, JGP& VITELL, SJ (2002) An empirical investigation of the 
influence of selected personal, organizational and moral intensity factors on 
ethical decision making. Journal ofBusiness Ethics, 35, pp 65-74. 
PARKER, M (ed) (1998a) Ethics and Organizations. London: Sage 
387 
PARKER, M (1998b) Business Ethics and Social Theory: Postmodernizing 
the Ethical. British Journal ofManagement, 9, pp S27- S36 
PARKER, M (2000) Organizational Culture and Identity: Unity and Division 
at Work. London: Sage Publications 
PARROTT, WG (1992) Moral philosophy and social science: a critique of 
constructionist reason in ROBINSON, D (ed) Social Discourse and Moral 
Judgment. San Diego: Academic Press, pp 207-219 
PATTON, MQ (1990) Qualitative evaluation and research methods (2 d 
edition), Newbury Park, CA: Sage Publications 
PATTON, MQ (2000a) Sample size. Archived at: 
littp: /Ilistsei-v. u! z, i. edu/arciiives/qualrs-I. litniI (E-mail to discussion list dated 6 
August 2000) 
PATTON, MQ (2000b) Sample size # 2. Archived at: 
littp: Hlistserv. uýza. edu/, irchivesýquairs-I. htmI (E-mail to discussion list dated 6 
August 2000) 
PEARSON, G& PARKER, M (2001) The Relevance of Ancient Greeks to 
Modern Business? A Dialogue on Business and Ethics. Journal of Business 
Ethics, 31, pp 341-353 
PERRY, N (1998) Indecent Exposure: theorising whistleblowing. 
Organization Studies 19(2), pp 235-258 
PIAGET, J (1932) The MoralJudgement of the Child. London: Routledge & 
Kegan Paul 
PIERCE, MA and HENRY, JW (1996) Computer Ethics: The Role of 
Personal, Informal and Formal Codes. Journal ofBusiness Ethics, 15, pp 
425-437. 
POOLE, R (1991) Morality andModernity. London: Routledge 
POSTER, M (1994) The Mode of Information and Postmodernity in 
CROWLEY, D& MITCHELL, D (eds) Communication Theory Today. 
Cambridge: Polity Press, pp 173-192 
PUKA, B (1994a) The Majesty and Mystery of Kohlberg's Stage 6 in PUKA, 
B (ed) (1994a) The GreatJustice Debate. New York, London: Garland 
Publishing, pp 118-160 
PUTNAM, LL & MUMBY, DK (1993) Organizations, Emotion and the 
Myth of Rationality in FINEMAN, S (ed) Emotion in Organizations. 
London: Sage Publications, pp 36-57 
WALLINGTON, J (2000) Ethical reflection: A role for ethics in nursing 
practice in GHAYE, T, GILLESPIE, D, & LILLYMAN, S (eds) (2000) 
Empowerment Through Reflection: The narratives of healthcare 
professionals. Dinton: Mark Allen Publishing, pp 3-18 
RADLOFF, R (1968) Opinion Evaluation and Affiliation in CARTWRIGHT, 
D and ZANDER, A (eds) (1968) Group Dynamics: Research and Theory. 3rd 
ed., London: Tavistock Publications 
388 
RAWLS, John (1972) A Theory ofJustice. London: Oxford University 
Press 
REIDENBACH, RE and ROBIN, D P. (1991), A Conceptual Model of 
Corporate Moral Development. Journal of Business Ethics, 10,274 
RENNIE, D L, (1998) Grounded Theory Methodology: The pressing need for 
a coherent logic of justification. Theory andPsychology 8(l), pp 101-119 
REST, J (1976) New Approaches in the Assessment of Moral Judgment in 
LICKONA, T (ed. ). (1976) Moral development and behaviour: theory, 
research and social issues. New York; London : Holt, Rinehart and 
Winston, pp 198-218 
RICKMAN, HP (ed. ) (1976) Dilthey: Selected IVritings. Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press 
RIESSMAN, CK (1993) Narrative Analysis. Newbury Park: Sage 
Publications 
ROOZEN, 1, PELSMACKER, PD& BOSTYN, F (2001) The Ethical 
Dimensions of Decision Processes of Employees. Journal of Business Ethics. 
33, pp 87-99 
RYCHLAK, JF (1992) Morality in a mediating mechanism? A logical 
learning theorist looks at social constructionism in ROBINSON, D (ed) 
Social Discourse and Moral Judgment. SanDiego: Academic Press, pp 43- 
60 
SABINI, J& SILVER, M (1998) Emotion, Character, and Responsibility. 
Oxford: Oxford University Press 
SARBIN, TR& KITSUSE, JI (eds) (1994) Constructing the Social. 
London: Sage Publications 
SCHATZMAN, L& STRAUSS, AL (1973) Field Research: Strategiesfor 
a Natural Sociology. Englewood Cliffs, N J: Prentice-Hall Inc 
SCHEIN, EH (1971) The Problem of Moral Education for the Business 
Manager in HINTON, B L. and REITZ, HJ Groups and organization: 
integrated readings in the analysis of social behaviour. Belmont: 
Wadsworth Publishing Co, pp 542-552. 
SCHEIN, E H. (1988): Organizational Psychology. 3rd Ed. Englewood 
Cliffs, NJ: Prentice-Hall, Inc., 
SCHICK, F (1997) Making Choices: A recasting of Decision Theory. 
Cambridge: Cambridge University Press 
SCHMINKE, M and WELLS, D (1999) Group Processes and Performance 
and their effects on individuals' ethical frameworks. Journal of Business 
Ethics, 18, pp367-381 
SCHMINKE, M (2001) Considering the Business in Business Ethics: An 
Exploratory Study of the influence of Organizational Size and Structure on 
Individual Ethical Predispositions. Journal of Business Ethics 30, pp 375- 
390 
389 
SCHEURICH, JJ (1997) Research Method in the Postmodern. London: 
Falmer Press 
SCHNVANDT, TA (1994) Constructivist, Interpretivist Approaches to 
Human Inquiry in DENZIN, NK and LINCOLN, YS (ed) Handbook of 
Qualitative Research. Thousand Oaks, California: Sage Publications, pp, 
118-137 
SCHWARTZ, M (2000) Why Ethical Codes Constitute an Unconscionable 
Regression. Journal of Business Ethics, 23, pp 173-184 
SCHWARTZ, M (2001) The Nature of the Relationship between Corporate 
Codes of Ethics and Behaviour. Journal of Business Ethics 32, pp 247-262 
SCHWEDER, R and MUCH, N (1987) Determinations of Meaning: 
Discourse and Moral Socialization in KURTINES, WM and GEWIRTZ, JL 
(eds) (1987) Moral development through social interaction. New York, 
Chichester, Brisbane, Toronto, Singapore: John Wiley & Sons, pp 197-244 
SCOTT, WA (1965) Values and organisations. Chicago: Rand McNally 
SHAFIR, E, SIMONSON, H& TVERSKY, A (1997) Reason-based Choice 
in GOLDSTEIN, WM& HOGARTH, RM Research on judgment and 
decision making: Current, Connections and controversies. Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, pp 69-94 
SHANKAR, A& GOULDING, C (2000) Interpretive Consumer Research: 
Two 'new' additions to the canon of interpretive enquiry in Academy of 
Marketing 2000, University of Derby, 5-7 July 2000 
SHERIF, M (1936) The Psychology of SocialNorms. New York: Harper 
SHOTTER, J (1992) Social constructionism: relativism, moral sources, and 
judgements of adequacy in ROBINSON, D (ed) Social Discourse and Moral 
Judgment. San Diego: Academic Press, pp 181-205 
SILVESTER, J, ANDERSON, NR& PATTERSON, F (1999) 
Organizational culture change: an inter-group attributional analysis. Journal 
of Occupational and Organizational Psychology, 72(l), pp 1 on 
SIMON, HA (1976) Administrative Behavior. New York, London: 
Macmillan Publishing 
SIMPSON, E (1994) Moral Development Research: a Case Study of 
Scientific Cultural Bias in PUKA, B (ed) (1994a) The Great Justice Debate. 
New York, London: Garland Publishing, pp 19-45 
SIMS, RL (2000) The relationship between employee attitudes and 
conflicting expectations for lying behavior. The Journal of Psychology. 
134(6), pp 619-633 
SIMS, RL AND KEON, TL (1997) Ethical Work Climate as a Factor in the 
Development of Person-Organization Fit. Journal ofBusiness Ethics, 16, pp 
1095-1105. 
SIMS, RL& KEON, TL (2000) The Influence of Organizational 
Expectations on Ethical Decision Making Conflict. Journal of Business 
Ethics, 23, pp 219-228 
390 
SIMS, RR (1991) The Institutionalisation of Organisational Ethics Journal 
of Business Ethics. 10, pp 493-507 
SIMS, RR (1992) The Challenge of Ethical Behaviour in Organisations. 
Journal of Business Ethics 11, pp 505-513. 
SINCLAIR, A (1993) Approaches to Organisational Culture and Ethics. 
Journal of Business Ethics 12, pp 63-73 
SINGER, MS (2000) Ethical and Fair Work Behaviour: A Normative- 
Empirical Dialogue Concerning Ethics and Justice. Journal of Business 
Ethics. 28, pp 187-209 
SINGER, P (ed. ) (1994) Ethics. Oxford; New York: Oxford University 
Press 
SLIGO, F and STIRTON, N (1998) Does Hindsight Bias Change Perceptions 
of Business Ethics. Journal ofBusiness Ethics, 17,111-124 
SMIGEL, E0 (1970) Public attitudes towards stealing as related to the size 
of the victim organisation in SMIGEL, E0 and ROSS, HL (eds) Crimes 
against bureaucracy New York: Van Nostrand and Reinhold 
SMITH, PB (1973). Groups within Organizations: Applications of Social 
Psychology to Organizational Behaviour. London, New York, Evanston, San 
Francisco: Harper & Row 
SMITH, PL and OAKLEY III, E IT (1997) Gender-Related Differences in 
Ethical and Social Values of Business Students: Implications for 
Management. Journal of Business Ethics, 16, pp 37-45 
SNELL, RS (1996) Complementing Kohlberg: Mapping the Ethical 
Reasoning Used by Managers for Their Own Dilemma Cases. Human 
Relations, 49, pp23-49 
SOLOMON, RC (1993) Corporate Roles, Personal Virtues: An Aristotelian 
Approach to Business Ethics in WINKLER, ER and COOMBS, JR (eds) 
(1993) Applied Ethics: A Reader Oxford: Basil Blackwell Ltd, pp 201-221 
SOMERS, MJ (2001) Ethical Codes of Conduct and Organizational Context: 
A Study of the Relationship between codes of conduct, employee behavior 
and organizational values. Journal of Business Ethics, 30, pp 185-195 
SORELL, T (1998) Beyond the Fringe? The Strange State of Business Ethics 
in PARKER, M (ed) Ethics and Organizations. London: Sage, ps 15-29 
STEVENSON, CL (1963) Facts and Values: Studies in Ethical Analysis. 
New Haven and London: Yale University Press 
STILLINGS, N A, FEINSTEIN, M H, GARFIELD, J L, RISSLAND, E L, 
ROSENBAUM, D A, WEISLER, S E, BAKER-WARD, L (1987) Cognitive 
Science: An Introduction. Cambridge, Mass: MIT Press 
STRAUGHAN, R (1983) From Moral Judgment to Moral Action in 
WEINREICH-HASTE, H AND LOCKE, D (eds) (1983) Morality in the 
Making: Thought, Action and the Social Context. Chichester, New York, 
Brisbane, Toronto, Singapore: John Wiley and Sons, pp 125-140 
391 
STRAUSS, A and CORBIN, J (1994) Grounded Theory Methodology: An 
Overview in DENZIN, NK and LINCOLN, YS (eds) (1994) Handbook of 
Qualitative Research. Thousand Oaks: Sage Publications, pp 273-285 
STREET, M D, ROBERTSON, C AND SCOTT, WG (1997). Ethical 
Decision Making: The Effects of Escalating Commitment. Journal of 
Business Ethics, 16, pp 1153-1161. 
STUBBART, CI and RAMAPRASAD, A (1990) Comments on the 
Empirical Articles and recommendations for future research in HUFF, AS 
(ed) Mapping Strategic Thought. Chichester: John Wiley and Sons, pp 252- 
288 
SWAN, J& NEWELL, S (1998) Making Sense of Technological Innovation: 
The Political and Social Dynamics of Cognition in EDEN, C& SPENDER, 
J-C (eds) Alanagerial and Organizational Cognition: Themy, Alethods and 
Research. London: Sage Publications, pp 108-129. 
TAKALA, T and URPILAINEN, J (1999) Managerial Work ad Lying: A 
Conceptual Framework and an Explorative Case Study. Journal of Business 
Ethics, 20, pp 181-195 
TAPPAN, MB (1999) Authoring a Moral Self: A Dialogical Perspective. 
Journal of Constructivist Psychology, 12, pp, 117-131 
Ten BOS, R (1997) Business Ethics and Bauman Ethics. Organization 
Studies. 18(6), pp 997-1014 
Ten BOS, R and WILLMOTT, H (2001) Towards a Post-Dualistic Business 
Ethics: Interweaving Reason and Emotion in Working Life. Journal of 
Management Studies, 38 (6), pp 769-793 
TREVINO, LK (1986) Ethical Decision Making in Organisations: A 
Person-Situation Interactionist Model. Academy of Management Review. 11, 
pp 601-617 
TREVINO, LK (1992) Moral Reasoning and Business Ethics: Implications 
for Research, Education, and Management. Journal of Business Ethics, 11, 
pp 445-459 
TREVINO, LK and YOUNGBLOOD, SA (1990) Bad Apples in Bad 
Barrels: A Causal Analysis of Ethical Decision-Making Behavior. Journal 
ofApplied Psychology 75, No. 4, pp 378-385 
TUCKMAN, BW (1971) Developmental sequence in small groups in 
HINTON, BL and REITZ, HJ (eds) Groups and organization: integrated 
readings in the analysis of social behaviour. Belmont: Wadsworth 
Publishing Co, pp 74-79 
VICTOR, B and CULLEN, J (1988) The Organisational Bases of Ethical 
Work Climates. Administrative Science Quarterly 33, pp 101-125 
VITELL, SJ and HO, Foo Nin (1997) Ethical Decision Making in 
Marketing: A Synthesis and Evaluation of Scales Measuring the Various 
Components of Decision Making in Ethical Situations. Journal of Business 
Ethics, 16, pp 699- 717 
392 
VYAKARNAM, S, BAILEY, A, MYERS, A and BURNETT, D (1997) 
Towards an Understanding of Ethical Behaviour in Small Firms. Journal of 
Business Ethics, 16, pp 1625-1636 
WAGNER, HR (ed) (1970). Alfi-ed Schutz on Phenomenology and Social 
Relations. Chicago, London: University of Chicago Press 
WANG, S (1996) A Dynamic Perspective of Differences Between Cognitive 
Maps Journal of the Operational Research Society 47, pp 538-549 
WEAVER. GR& AGLE, BR (2002) Religiosity and Ethical Behavior in 
Organizations: A Symbolic Interactionist Perspective. Academy of 
Management Review, 27 (1), pp 77-97 
WEBER J (1991) Applying Kohlberg to Enhance the Assessment of 
Managers Moral Reasoning. Business Ethics Quarterly 1(3) 293-31 
WEBER, J (1993) Institutionalising Ethics into Business Organisations: A 
Model and Research Agenda. Business Ethics Quarterly 3, pp 419-436 
WEEKS, W A, MOORE, C W, McKINNEY, JA& LONGENECKER, JG 
(1999) The Effects of Gender and Career Stage on Ethical Development. 
Journal of Business Ethics, 20, pp 301-313 
WEITZ, S (ed) (1974) Nonverbal communication: Readings with 
Commentaty. New York: Oxford University Press 
WHETSTONE, JT (2001) How Virtue Fits within Business Ethics. Journal 
of Business Ethics, 33, pp101-114 
WHITE, LP& LAM, LW (2000) A Proposed Infrastructural Model for the 
Establishment of Organisational Ethical Systems. Journal of Business Ethics, 
28, pp, 35-42 
WHITE, SK (1991) Political Theory and Postmodernism. Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press 
WILLIAMS, B (1993) Ethics and the Limits of Philosophy. London: 
Fontana Press 
WILMOTT, H (1998) Towards a New Ethics? The Contributions of 
Poststructuralism and Posthumanism in PARKER, M (ed) Ethics and 
Organizations. London: Sage, ps 76-121 
WILSON, FL (1995) The effects of Age, Gender and Ethnic Cultural 
Background on Moral Reasoning. Journal of Social Behavior and 
Personality, Vol 10, No 1,67-78 - 
WIMALASIRI, J S, PAVRI, F and JALIL, AAK (1996) An Empirical 
Study of Moral Reasoning Among Managers in Singapore. Journal of 
Business Ethics, 15, pp 1331-1341 
WIMBUSH, J C, SHEPARD, J M, and MARKHAM, SE (1997) An 
empirical examination of the relationship between ethical climate and ethical 
behaviour from multiple levels of analysis Journal of Business Ethics 16, pp 
1705-1716 
WINDSOR, JC& CAPPEL, JJ (1999) A Comparative Study of Moral 
Reasoning. College Student Journal, 33(2), pp, 281-287 
393 
WOOD, LA (1986) Loneliness in HARRE, R (ed) The Social Construction 
of Emotions. Oxford: Blackwell, pp 184-208 
WOTRUBA, T R, CHONKO, LB& LOE, TW (2001) The Impact of Ethics 
Code Familiarity on Manager Behavior. Journal of Business Ethics 33, pp 
59-69 
WRAY-BLISS, E& PARKER M (1998) Marxism, Capitalism and Ethics in 
PARKER, M (ed) Ethics and Organizations. London: Sage, ps 30-52 
ZEY-FERRELL, M and FERRELL, 0C (1982) Role-Set Configuration and 
Opportunity as Predictors of Unethical Behaviour in Organisations Human 




All the following have helped me along the journey of this project with 
patience, inspiration, support and time and space, each in a different way. It 
seems fairest to list them alphabetically. 
All 16 informants without whom this work would not have been possible 
Dr George Chryssides 
Dr Gron Davies 
Dr Christina Goulding 
Peter Knight 
Dr Kevin Magill 
Dr Moira Owens 
William Scarff 
Staff of University of Wolverhampton Telford Learning Centre. 
395 
